Part 10 (1/2)
”If, however, you have meant nothing more by all this than to point out the use you shall make of the miracles, &c. (which have been granted for the sake of the argument) when those miracles, &c. shall have been either proven, or else acknowledged true, in relation to the main question, then I have no fault to find; but otherwise, your argument in this place seems to be a little premature.
”You say, 'the known facts, such as the miracles, &c. I used as proof of the divine mission of the servants of G.o.d. This divine mission being proved gives the ground on which I contend for the merit of their testimony, concerning a future state.'
”Here you will perceive, sir, that, according to your own statement, to prove this divine mission, you must first prove the certainty of those miracles, &c. on which the truth of the divine mission is predicated. And these are things about the truth of which, as I indicated all along, there may be serious doubts.
”I am at a loss also to understand, what you mean by a 'divine mission.' You inform me that I misapprehended you 'in supposing that'
you 'mean to contend, that what the apostles have said respecting a future state, was spoken by way of _conclusions_ from certain known facts.' Here, I must confess, I am really at a loss to understand you: how that either Jesus, or his apostles, could understand a divine mission, even if they had received one, unless it were by _conclusions_ from _certain known facts_, that is, facts well known to them, I cannot conceive; and therefore must have some further explanation on this subject before I can fully answer you. For I must be better informed than I am at present, what you mean by a _divine mission_, before I can see the necessity of 'denying the reality of those miracles--or of granting the authority of their (Christ and his apostles) testimony;' that is, in regard to a future state. But even if I should be made to see this, it would be of no use for the present; because as it respects the final issue of the argument, I have not, neither do I now admit the reality of those miracles: as you must have seen by my seventh number.
”The next particular which demands notice is the quoted pa.s.sage which I p.r.o.nounced _Most excellent_!
”Here a serious query suggests itself to my mind. I ask myself: am I, or am I not, as capable of writing my sentiments, so as to be understood by a rational man, as those plain illiterate men who wrote the gospels? And yet if my words are so wrested by logical _twisticisms_ (if I may be allowed to use that expression) so as to mean what never entered my heart, and all this with apparent serious candor too, what may have been the fate of the writings of the evangelists? Now this is something in which I cannot be deceived, i.
e. as it respects myself; for any man of common sense does know his own meaning, whether his words fully express his meaning or not, or whether they may be made to mean something else or not.
”Permit me therefore once more to explain. The expression, _Most excellent_! was not so much intended to have been applied to the sentence preceding it, as to the author of that sentence, whose goodness, in stating so explicitly what he understands by the christian faith, I commended. And you must excuse me for not being able to see any inconsistency, absurdity, or contradiction in my words which follow that expression. Suppose a case. You have a good and faithful servant, who feels happy in your service, and is perfectly contented with his fare. You promise him with some favours which you had never before made known to him. He is elated with the idea of your goodness, which he has never doubted, but did not know till now that it was to be manifested in this particular way. You tell him that a knowledge of this, with his former knowledge, 'is as much as his present welfare requires.' He very readily a.s.sents to the truth of the proposition; and further adds, it is even 'more than is necessary for his present welfare,' for he was contented and happy before. Would any rational man say that your servant talked unreasonably? Would he say that such reasoning was absurd? I think not. Your servant does not despise either your goodness or your bounty; he considers that his master knows best, what is best for his servant; and he receives with grat.i.tude whatever is bestowed. Your argument would have appeared to me more just, if, after fully understanding me, which I perceive, by the use you have made of the quotation from my sixth number, you now do, you had proved from well known facts, or from conclusive argument, the absolute necessity of the hope of a christian in order for the 'present welfare' of mankind. In doing this you would have ingenuously refuted the proposition which I say would have been _exactly right_.
”You do not seem, sir, yet to have fully understood me as to my object in searching for truth. You ask, saying, 'Do you not appear to be solicitous to have your doubts removed, without expecting the least advantage by it?' You must know, sir, that this is only on supposition, that my doubts are founded in error; in which case I should reap the advantage, as my object is truth. You will recollect that my first object was to search for _moral truth_; without being at all solicitous where, or on what ground it shall be found. Truth _only_ is my object. In this _only_ I feel at all interested in this argument. Hence I shall be just as much obliged to you to _confirm_ me in my doubts, admitting they are founded in truth, as I shall to _remove_ them, admitting they are founded in error.
”I once thought just as you, viz. that the idea and contemplation of enjoying future life was absolutely necessary to present enjoyment; but I am now fully convinced, yea, more, it is absolutely known to be a fact, that the idea is altogether visionary and illusive. I admit that a knowledge of the truth, so far as the truth may be known, is perfectly _congenial_ with the present happiness of mankind: though it is often the case that a partial knowledge of the truth, in relation to any particular subject, produces distress and misery rather than enjoyment. I now am very happy in knowing some things, which, once, only the idea of their being true would have given me pain. I am inclined to think that the idea of _now_ enjoying the pleasures, or _now_ enduring the pains of a future life is altogether chimerical. I can enjoy the life or lives of others in a future tense just as well as I can _now_ enjoy my own future life. I have as much reason to believe that rational intelligence always did exist, as I have to believe it always will; yea, one idea is just as certain to me as the other, and no more so. And as I cannot reflect on the idea of eternity past, only with a kind of reverential _awe_ mingled with sublime pleasure; so the idea of eternity to come produces in me the same sensation; yea, feeling myself equally ignorant of both, (which must be the case on the supposition that revelation is not true.) I can perceive no difference. I feel anxious to know, however, every thing which can be known on this subject; and yet, at the same time, I am inclined to think I should _doubt_ of every revelation of which I can have any conception, unless it should be so made that I could see its truth, (or at least the evidences of its truth) over and over again, and that they should still remain by me at all times, so that I could examine them, and re-examine them, the same as I now look at the stars in the firmament.
”Thus I have opened my mind to you, more fully than I have ever done before, on this subject; and notwithstanding your writings may be very beneficial to others (as well as mine, for some may stand in need of one, and some of the other) yet, here comes up my doubts again, if I am benefited by them, I expect it will be in a different way than that of being any more persuaded of the truth of divine revelation.
Nevertheless, I am no less anxious to continue the correspondence on this account.
”Your address to TRUTH, which you are pleased to put into the mouth of my argument, is closed with an idea which does not grow out of my hypothesis. 'The joyous expectation of soon losing sight of thee (i.
e. truth) forever in the ellysium of non existence!' _Non-existence_, sir, does not _exist_! Neither does the term convey an idea to my understanding of any thing. I know of no existence, neither can I conceive of any, except that which I believe to be eternal in its nature. And the idea of _something_ being formed or made out of _nothing_, or of something's returning to nothing again, I have long since exploded. Every thing, however, excepting first principles, is liable to _change_. Hence arises the various modes, states, circ.u.mstances, conditions and situations in beings and things: also their different properties, relations and dependences.
”I know not whether consciousness is a being, or whether it be only a mode of being. If it be the former, it always did, and always will exist, in some state or other; if the latter, the state of the being may be so changed that although ident.i.ty exists, yet consciousness is not there. And there is no more absurdity in this idea than there is in supposing that the same matter which forms a _cube_, may become a _globe_. I can as well conceive of a conscious being to day, becoming unconscious to-morrow, as I can conceive of a person in a sound sleep.
But _non-existence_ (strictly speaking) sounds to my understanding something like the _falsity of truth_!
”I now come to your reply to my sixth number; and in my remarks, which will be but few, I shall follow the arrangement which you have made.
”1st. The candid concessions which you have made, and the charity which you have extended towards doubting Christians, or candid unbelievers (for such I conceive there may be) is honourable both to yourself and to the cause which you have espoused, and your writing, of course gains a much more favourable reception than the writings of those who appear to be filled with a spirit of acrimony, and are ready at once to deal out anathemas against every thing of which they cannot approve. But, sir, you will permit me to say, we ought to be cautious, lest our personal attachment to an author, and his charitable feelings towards us be such, as imperceptibly to blind us to correct reason, and cause us to imbibe his errors, merely because they are his, and mistake them for truth.
”I am well aware that I should find it difficult to prove that I now believe what I do without a miracle, as you have suggested; for if miracles have existed they may have, indirectly, more influence in my mind than I am at present sensible of; and therefore I will not undertake to say that I am not princ.i.p.ally indebted to them for my present views of the character of the supreme Being. I am disposed to acknowledge in humble grat.i.tude all the blessings which I have received, and am made sensible of, let them come to me by what means, or through what channel soever. But I do not see how you had a right to expect that I should either _refute_, or else _acquiesce_ in your opinion on this subject.--What! must I either prove that there have been no such things as miracles, or else admit their truth! Must I either refute your notion that they have had great influence on my faith and practice, or else '_express my acquiescence_' that such is the fact! Hard lines! I choose to take the easier course, and confess that I am too ignorant to do either. I am willing, however, still to be instructed.
”2d. I have nothing at present to say on the subject of prophecy; i.e.
to reconcile the pretensions to it with the honesty of the prophets, without admitting divine inspiration, better than what I have written in my seventh number. When I have received your answer to that I may have something more to write. I would suggest, however, here, that as you frequently make use of the expression 'divine inspiration,' I want the expression more fully defined and explained. I have no distinct idea, that I know of, of _divine inspiration_. I suppose you mean the same by it which you did by the 'divine mission,' given to the apostles, or at least something similar; but still I am ignorant of the subject. You have sometimes spoken of divine revelation, as though it was something distinct from this divine mission, and which was a proof of it; but, you must excuse me, I am still all in the dark about it. Do be so good as to inform me how you suppose the prophets, or apostles, or even Jesus, could know for a certainty that they were divinely inspired?
”3. When I acknowledged that there are evidences in favour of divine revelation, I did not suppose it necessary to state what those evidences are; because some of them, to say the least, are very apparent. The bare report of any thing, I conceive to be evidence of the report's being true; and would be sufficient to acquire belief should nothing arise in the mind to counterbalance it: and as I had repeatedly promised to give you the reasons for my doubts I expected to have been indulged a little longer before I should have been again faulted on this subject. But as it respects this matter I am all patience and submission, if it may be so that truth shall finally come to light.
”Under this article you have gone into a very lengthy discussion to shew that the evidence by which the apostles believed in the resurretion could not be counterbalanced, &c. And if I understand what you have written it amounts in my mind to about the following, viz.
the apostles could not have been convinced of the fact of the resurrection by any evidence short of the fact itself. 2dly. If the fact did exist there is no evidence which can conterbalance it.
_Ergo_. As the apostles were convinced of the truth, the fact did exist. This is pretty much like saying, if the fact were _true_, it could not have been _false_! But I spoke of the evidence in relation to _ourselves_ rather than the _apostles_: we believe or disbelieve for ourselves, and by such evidence as _we_ have. You think if twelve men should testify in favour of a resurrection, and the body could not be found, 'various opinions would result from such evidence.' If so, some might believe the account true; and they might persuade others to believe it; and only let it be reported and believed that some one had died for the truth of it, and it would make no difference after this, as it respects the influence of faith, whether the account was true or false.
”You will excuse me for making no further remarks on what you have written under this article till you have answered my seventh number, and also given me a more clear definition of _divine inspiration_.
”4. What you have written under the fourth article, generally speaking, is satisfactory, till I come to the last sentence; and even with that I have not much fault to charge you with. It is true we may be mistaken as to our ideas of the eternity or immutability of any thing; but then, as it respects argument, it is just as well as though we were correct, as no one can prove us otherwise; no, nor even raise a reasonable doubt on the subject. But even if it could be demonstrated that there is not a rational being now in the universe who existed two centuries ago, or one who will exist two centuries hence, I conceive, as the fact could not, so the knowledge of the fact ought not to make any difference in the relation, dependence and moral obligation between man and man. Man learns by his own experience, as well as from the experience of others; and _vice versa_; hence we profit by the experience of those who have gone before us.