Part 1 (2/2)
In Italy, too, the condition is serious, for she produces far less than she needs, despite every effort of her Government to stimulate production.
[Ill.u.s.tration: WHEAT FIELDS OF THE WORLD]
Germany and Austria-Hungary have not escaped universal suffering from lack of wheat. Germany before the war was a wheat-importing country, and Austria-Hungary was able to supply herself with wheat, but had none to export. Their war crops have been below normal, and even the wheat taken from conquered territory has not been sufficient to prevent severe shortage, resulting in bread riots in industrial centres.
The imports of wheat into both the Allied and enemy European countries to supplement the wheat of their own raising came in peace-times from seven countries--Russia, Roumania, Australia, the United States, Canada, Argentina, and India. Most of these have now failed as a source of supply.
Russia and Roumania were the great wheat-bins of Europe. They produced as much wheat as the United States, and sometimes more, and they were always able to make up or nearly make up the deficiencies of western Europe. Russia and Roumania are now themselves on the verge of famine.
Even before their own situation became so desperate, they could get little wheat to the western Allies, because the enemy territory and the battle-lines made a great wall of separation.
Australia and India both continue to grow large crops of wheat, and have a surplus in storage, but it cannot be sent to Europe because of lack of s.h.i.+ps. Australia has wheat stored from her last three crops.
The Argentine had very poor crops in 1916 and 1917, and although the 1918 crop is good, it is scarcely more available to Europe than Australia's wheat.
SO THE WHEAT SCARCITY IS NOT A QUESTION ONLY OF THE AMOUNT OF WHEAT IN THE WORLD. IT IS A PROBLEM OF GETTING IT WHERE IT IS NEEDED--WHEAT PLUS s.h.i.+PS. Not a single s.h.i.+p must go farther than is absolutely necessary. A glance at the map shows why wheat for Europe should come from North America rather than from Australia or India, or even the Argentine. The trip from Australia is three times as long as from North America, so it takes only one-third as many s.h.i.+ps to carry food to Europe from the United States as from Australia. The Argentine is twice as far from Europe as the United States, and therefore twice as many s.h.i.+ps are needed to carry an equal amount of Argentine food to Europe. If this continent could produce and save enough next year to provide the whole of the Allied food necessities, we could save 1,500,000 tons of world s.h.i.+pping to be used for other purposes. EVERY s.h.i.+P SAVED IS A s.h.i.+P BUILT TO CARRY MORE MEN AND MORE AMMUNITION TO FRANCE.
WHEAT IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States has never had a large wheat surplus to export, and the last few years it has had an unusually low supply to meet the extraordinary demand. The 1916 crop was small. The 1917 crop was only four-fifths of normal, little more than we ordinarily consume ourselves. We entered the last harvest with our stocks of wheat and other cereals practically exhausted. Hence to feed the Allies until the 1918 harvest, we had to send wheat which we should ordinarily have eaten. All that we could send under normal conditions from July, 1917, to July, 1918, has usually been estimated at about 20,000,000 bushels, but in the first eleven months of this time we actually did send 120,000,000 bushels, six times as much as we could have s.h.i.+pped without conservation. One-half of the total output of our flour-mills in the month of May, 1918, went abroad.
This achievement in feeding the Allies has been made possible and will continue to be possible, through the measures of economy and subst.i.tution established by the Food Administration, and the constant and continued personal sacrifice of each one of us.
Even the 1918 wheat crop, successful as it promises to be, will not mean freedom from saving. Throughout the war there can be no relaxation. We must build up a great national reserve in years of good harvest for the greater and greater demands of Europe. NEVER AGAIN MUST WE LET OURSELVES AND THE WORLD FACE THE DANGER THAT WAS BEFORE US IN THE SPRING OF 1918.
MEETING THE WHEAT SHORTAGE
To keep wheat constantly going over to our Allies and sufficient stores in the United States at the same time, is one of the big problems of the Food Administration. Production has had to be increased and consumption decreased. The price has had to be kept down, for in a time of shortage prices always tend to go up. It is true that high prices furnish one method of decreasing the consumption of food, but it is a method that means enforced conservation by the poor and no conservation by the rich. The burden thus falls on those least able to bear it.
To meet this situation the Food Administration has gone into the wheat business itself. PRACTICALLY ENTIRE CONTROL OF THE BUYING AND SELLING OF WHEAT IS IN THE HANDS OF THE GREAT UNITED STATES FOOD ADMINISTRATION GRAIN CORPORATION. Through this organization all wheat sales are made to the Army and Navy, to our allies, and to the neutrals. The price which it pays for these huge quant.i.ties sets the price for the entire country. The Food Administration also makes the movement of wheat from the farmer to the miller and to the wholesaler as simple and direct as possible. It prevents h.o.a.rding and speculation. ”I am convinced,” said Mr. Hoover, in April, 1918, ”that at no time in the last three years has there been as little speculation in the nation's food as there is to-day.”
[Ill.u.s.tration: COST OF A POUND LOAF OF BREAD]
As a result of this business management of wheat, the consumer pays less for flour, although the farmer gets more for his wheat. In May, 1917, the difference between the price of the farmer's wheat and of the flour made from it was $5.86 per barrel of 196 pounds. Fifteen months later the difference was 64 cents. In February, 1917, before the United States went into the war, flour sold at wholesale for $8.75 a barrel. In May, 1917, the war, with no food control, had driven the price up to $17. But in February, 1918, after six months of the Food Administration, it had gone down to $10.50 wholesale, and this in spite of unprecedented demand for our very short supply. Without control, flour would undoubtedly be selling for $50 a barrel. During the Civil War, with no world wheat shortage, but without food control, the price of wheat increased 130 per cent over the price in 1861.
The milling and sale of flour, the baking of bread, and the purchases of the individual are all regulated to a greater extent than would have scarcely been thought possible before the war.
Every effort has been made to produce a great 1918 wheat-crop.
Congress, at the time the Food Control Bill was pa.s.sed, fixed the price of the 1918 wheat at a minimum of $2 per bushel, and the President later fixed the price at $2.20. This has been high enough to encourage the farmer to increase his crop and not too high to be fair to the consumer. The Department of Agriculture, during the winter of 1917-18, had for its slogan, ”a billion-bushel crop for 1918.” It has worked intensively to help the farmer in selecting and testing seed and in fighting destructive insects and plant-diseases, and in every way to help him grow more wheat.
Constant reliance has been placed on the individual's intelligence and patriotism in wheat-saving. One of the unusual aspects of the Food Administration is its confidence in the co-operation of the country and the response which this confidence has met. Wheatless meals are now a commonplace occurrence. Wheatless days are being observed in many hotels and homes. People all over the country have pledged themselves to do entirely without wheat until the 1918 harvest is available. About 100,000 barrels of flour were returned by individuals and companies during the spring of 1918, to be s.h.i.+pped to the Allies and the Army and Navy. The individual all over the country, consumer, dealer, miller, or farmer, has risen to the occasion to do his share toward the fulfilment of the Government's promise to Europe.
CHAPTER II
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