Part 2 (2/2)
(_a_) _Possible or Potential Being and Actual Being._-The first of these distinctions is that between possibility and actuality, between that which can be and that which actually is. For a proper understanding of this distinction, which will be dealt with presently, it is necessary to note here the following divisions of _actual_ being, which will be studied in detail later on.
(_b_) _Infinite Being and Finite Beings._-All people have a sufficiently clear notion of Infinite Being, or Infinitely Perfect Being: though not all philosophers are agreed as to how precisely we get this notion, or whether there actually exists such a being, or whether if such being does exist we can attain to a certain knowledge of such existence. By infinite being we mean a being possessing all conceivable perfections in the most perfect conceivable manner; and by finite beings all such beings as have actually any conceivable limitation to their perfection. About these nominal definitions there is no dispute; and scholasticism identifies their respective objects with _G.o.d_ and _creatures_.
(_c_) _Necessary Being and Contingent Beings._-Necessary being we conceive as that being which exists of necessity: being which if conceived at all cannot be conceived as non-existent: being in the very concept of which is essentially involved the concept of actual existence: so that the attempt to conceive such being as non-existent would be an attempt to conceive what would be self-contradictory. Contingent being, on the other hand, is being which is conceived not to exist of necessity: being which may be conceived as not actually existent: being in the concept of which is not involved the concept of actual existence. The same observations apply to this distinction as to the preceding one. It is obvious that any being which we regard as actual we must regard either as necessary or as contingent; and, secondly, that necessary being must be considered as absolutely independent, as having its actual existence _from itself_, by its own nature; while contingent being must be considered as dependent for its actual existence on some being _other_ than itself. Hence necessary being is termed _Ens a se_, contingent being _Ens ab alio_.
(_d_) _Absolute Being and Relative Beings._-In modern philosophy the terms ”absolute” and ”relative,” as applied to being, correspond roughly with the terms ”G.o.d” and ”creatures” in the usage of theistic philosophers. But the former pair of terms is really of wider application than the latter.
The term _absolute_ means, etymologically, that which is loosed, unfettered, disengaged or free from bonds (_absolutum_, _ab-solvere_, _solvo_ = _se-luo_, from ???): that, therefore, which is not bound up with anything else, which is in some sense self-sufficing, independent; while the _relative_ is that which is in some way bound up with something else, and which is so far not self-sufficing or independent. That, therefore, is _ontologically_ absolute which is in some sense self-sufficing, independent of other things, _in its existence_; while the ontologically relative is that which depends in some real way for its existence on something else. Again, that is _logically_ absolute which _can be conceived and known by us without reference to anything else_; while the logically relative is that which we can conceive and know only through our knowledge of something else. And since we usually name things according to the way in which we conceive them, we regard as absolute any being which is _by itself_ and _of itself_ that which we conceive it to be, or that which its name implies; and as relative any being which is what its name implies only _in virtue of some relation_ to something else.(69) Thus, a man is a _man_ absolutely, while he is a _friend_ only relatively to others.
It is obvious that the primary and general meaning of the terms ”absolute”
and ”relative” can be applied and extended in a variety of ways. For instance, _all_ being may be said to be ”relative” _to the knowing mind_, in the sense that all knowledge involves a transcendental relation of the known object to the knowing subject. In this widest and most improper sense even G.o.d Himself is relative, not however as being, but as known.
Again, when we apply the same attribute to a variety of things we may see that it is found in one of them in the most perfect manner conceivable, or at least in a fuller and higher degree than it is found in the others; and that it is found in these others only with some sort of subordination to, and dependence on, the former: we then say that it belongs to this _primarily_ or _absolutely_, and to the others only _secondarily_ or _relatively_. This is a less improper application of the terms than in the preceding case. What we have especially to remember here is that there are many different kinds of dependence or subordination, all alike giving rise to the same usage.
Hence, applying the terms absolute and relative to the predicate ”being”
or ”real” or ”reality,” it is obvious in the first place that the _potential_ as such can be called ”being,” or ”reality” only in relation to the _actual_. It is the actual that is being _simpliciter_, _par excellence_; the potential is so only in relation to this.(70) Again, _substances_ may be termed beings absolutely, while _accidents_ are beings only relatively, because of their dependence on substances; though this relation is quite different from the relation of potential to actual being. Finally all finite, contingent realities, actual and possible, are what they are only because of their dependence on the Infinite and Necessary Being: and hence the former are relative and the latter absolute; though here again the relation is different from that of accident to substance, or of potential to actual.
Since the order of being includes all orders, and since a being is _absolutely_ such-or-such in any order only when that being realizes in all its fulness and purity such-or-such reality, it follows that the being which realizes in all its fulness the reality of _being_ is the Absolute Being in the highest possible sense of this term. This concept of Absolute Being is the richest and most comprehensive of all possible concepts: it is the very ant.i.thesis of that other concept of ”being in general” which is common to everything and distinguished only from nothingness. It includes in itself all actual and possible modes and grades and perfections of finite things, apart from their limitations, embodying all of them in the one highest and richest concept of that which makes all of them real and actual, _viz._ the concept of Actuality or Actual Reality itself.
Hegel and his followers have involved themselves in a pantheistic philosophy by neglecting to distinguish between those two totally different concepts.(71) A similar error has also resulted from failure to distinguish between the various modes in which being that is relative may be dependent on being that is absolute. G.o.d is the Absolute Being; creatures are relative. So too is substance absolute being, compared with accidents as inhering and existing in substance. But G.o.d is not therefore to be conceived as the one all-pervading substance, of which all finite things, all phenomena, would be only accidental manifestations.
CHAPTER II. BECOMING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS.
6. THE STATIC AND THE CHANGING.-The things we see around us, the things which make up the immediate data of our experience, not only _are_ or _exist_; they also _become_, or _come_ into actual existence; they _change_; they pa.s.s out of actual existence. The abstract notion of being represents its object to the mind in a static, permanent, changeless, self-identical condition; but if this condition were an adequate representation of reality change would be unreal, would be only an illusion. This is what the Eleatic philosophers of ancient Greece believed, distinguis.h.i.+ng merely between being and nothingness. But they were mistaken; for change in things is too obviously real to be eliminated by calling it an illusion: even if it were an illusion, this illusion at least would have to be accounted for. In order, therefore, to understand reality we must employ not merely the notion of being (something _static_), but also the notion of becoming, change, process, appearing and disappearing (something _kinetic_, and something _dynamic_). In doing so, however, we must not fall into the error of the opposite extreme from the Eleatics-by regarding change as the adequate representation of reality.
This is what Herac.l.i.tus and the later Ionians did: holding that nothing _is_, that all _becomes_ (p??ta ???), that change is all reality, that the stable, the permanent, is non-existent, unreal, an illusion. This too is false; for change would be unintelligible without at least an abiding _law_ of change, a permanent _principle_ of some sort; which, in turn, involves the reality of some sort of abiding, stable, permanent being.
We must then-with Aristotle, as against both of those one-sided conceptions-hold to the reality both of being and of becoming; and proceed to see how the stable and the changing can both be real.
To convince ourselves that they are both real, very little reflection is needed. We have actual experience of both those elements of reality in our consciousness and memory of our own selves. Every human individual in the enjoyment of his mental faculties knows himself as an abiding, self-identical being, yet as constantly undergoing real changes; so that throughout his life he is really the same being, though just as certainly he really changes. In external nature, too, we observe on the one hand innumerable processes of growth and decay, of motion and interaction; and on the other hand a similarly all-pervading element of sameness or ident.i.ty amid all this never-ending change.
7. THE POTENTIAL AND THE ACTUAL. (_a_) POSSIBILITY, ABSOLUTE, RELATIVE, AND ADEQUATE.-It is from our experience of actuality and change that we derive not only our notion of temporal duration, but also our notion of _potential being_ or _possibility_, as distinct from that of _actual being_ or _actuality_. It is from our experience of what actually exists that we are able to determine what can, and what cannot exist. We know from experience what gold is, and what a tower is; and that it is intrinsically possible for a golden tower to exist, that such an object of thought involves no contradiction, that therefore its existence is not impossible, even though it may never actually exist as a fact. Similarly, we know from experience what a square is, and what a circle is; and that it is intrinsically impossible for a square circle to exist, that such an object of thought involves a contradiction, that therefore not only is such an object never actually existent in fact, but that it is in no sense real, in no way possible.
Thus, _intrinsic_ (or _objective_, _absolute_, _logical_, _metaphysical_) possibility is the mere non-repugnance of an object of thought to actual existence. Any being or object of thought that is conceivable in this way, that can be conceived as capable of actually existing, is called intrinsically (or objectively, absolutely, logically, metaphysically) possible being. The absence of such intrinsic capability of actual existence gives us the notion of the intrinsically (objectively, absolutely, logically, metaphysically) impossible. We shall return to these notions again. They are necessary here for the understanding of real change in the actual universe.
Fixing our attention now upon the real changes which characterize the data of our experience, let us inquire what conditions are necessary in order that an intrinsically possible object of thought become here and now an actual being. It matters not whether we select an example from the domain of organic nature, of inorganic nature, or of art-whether it be an oak, or an iceberg, or a statue. In order that there be here and now an actual oak-tree, it is necessary not only (1) that such an object be intrinsically possible, but (2) that there have been planted here an actual acorn, _i.e._ an actual being having in it subjectively and really the pa.s.sive potentiality of developing into an actual oak-tree, and (3) that there be in the actual things around the acorn active powers or forces capable of so influencing the latent, pa.s.sive potentiality of the acorn as gradually to evolve the oak-tree therefrom. So, too, for the (1) intrinsically possible iceberg, there are needed (2) water capable of becoming ice, and (3) natural powers or forces capable of forming it into ice and setting this adrift in the ocean. And for the (1) intrinsically possible statue there are needed (2) the block of marble or other material capable of becoming a statue, and (3) the sculptor having the power to mould this material into an actual statue.
In order, therefore, that a thing which is not now actual, but only intrinsically or absolutely possible, become actual, there must actually exist some being or beings endowed with the _active power or potency_ of making this possible thing actual. The latter is then said to be _relatively, extrinsically_ possible-in relation to such being or beings.
And obviously a thing may be possible relatively to the power of one being, and not possible relatively to lesser power of another being: the statue that is intrinsically possible in the block of marble, may be extrinsically possible relatively to the skilled sculptor, but not relatively to the unskilled person who is not a sculptor.
Furthermore, relatively to the same agent or agents, the production of a given effect, the doing of a given thing, is said to be _physically_ possible if it can be brought about by such agents acting according to the ordinary course of nature; if, in other words they have the physical power to do it. Otherwise it is said to be physically impossible, even though metaphysically or intrinsically possible, _e.g._ it is physically impossible for a dead person to come to life again. A thing is said to be _morally_ possible, in reference to free and responsible agents, if they can do it without unreasonable inconvenience; otherwise it is considered as morally impossible, even though it be both physically and metaphysically possible: as often happens in regard to the fulfilment of one's obligations.
That which is _both intrinsically and extrinsically possible_ is said to be _adequately possible_. Whatever is intrinsically possible is also extrinsically possible in relation to G.o.d, who is _Almighty_, _Omnipotent_.
<script>