Part 1 (1/2)

Ontology or the Theory of Being.

by Peter Coffey.

PREFACE.

It is hoped that the present volume will supply a want that is really felt by students of philosophy in our universities-the want of an English text-book on General Metaphysics from the Scholastic standpoint. It is the author's intention to supplement his _Science of Logic_(1) and the present treatise on Ontology, by a volume on the Theory of Knowledge. Hence no disquisitions on the latter subject will be found in these pages: the Moderate Realism of Aristotle and the Schoolmen is a.s.sumed throughout.

In the domain of Ontology there are many scholastic theories and discussions which are commonly regarded by non-scholastic writers as possessing nowadays for the student of philosophy an interest that is merely historical. This mistaken notion is probably due to the fact that few if any serious attempts have yet been made to transpose these questions from their medieval setting into the language and context of contemporary philosophy. Perhaps not a single one of these problems is really and in substance alien to present-day speculations. The author has endeavoured, by his treatment of such characteristically ”medieval”

discussions as those on _Potentia_ and _Actus_, Essence and Existence, Individuation, the Theory of Distinctions, Substance and Accident, Nature and Person, Logical and Real Relations, Efficient and Final Causes, to show that the issues involved are in every instance as fully and keenly debated-in an altered setting and a new terminology-by recent and living philosophers of every school of thought as they were by St. Thomas and his contemporaries in the golden age of medieval scholasticism. And, as the purposes of a text-book demanded, attention has been devoted to stating the problems clearly, to showing the significance and bearings of discussions and solutions, rather than to detailed a.n.a.lyses of arguments.

At the same time it is hoped that the treatment is sufficiently full to be helpful even to advanced students and to all who are interested in the ”Metaphysics of the Schools”. For the convenience of the reader the more advanced portions are printed in smaller type.

The teaching of St. Thomas and the other great Schoolmen of the Middle Ages forms the groundwork of the book. This _corpus_ of doctrine is scarcely yet accessible outside its Latin sources. As typical of the fuller scholastic text-books the excellent treatise of the Spanish author, Urraburu,(2) has been most frequently consulted. Much a.s.sistance has also been derived from Kleutgen's _Philosophie der Vorzeit_,(3) a monumental work which ought to have been long since translated into English. And finally, the excellent treatise in the Louvain _Cours de Philosophie_, by the present Cardinal Archbishop of Mechlin,(4) has been consulted with profit and largely followed in many places. The writer freely and gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to these and other authors quoted and referred to in the course of the present volume.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

I. REASON OF INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.-It is desirable that at some stage in the course of his investigations the student of philosophy should be invited to take a brief general survey of the work in which he is engaged.

This purpose will be served by a chapter on _the general aim and scope of philosophy_, its distinctive characteristics as compared with other lines of human thought, and its relations to these latter. Such considerations will at the same time help to define _Ontology_, thus introducing the reader to the subject-matter of the present volume.

II. PHILOSOPHY: THE NAME AND THE THING.-In the fifth book of Cicero's _Tusculan Disputations_ we read that the terms _philosophus_ and _philosophia_ were first employed by Pythagoras who flourished in the sixth century before Christ, that this ancient sage was modest enough to call himself not a ”wise man” but a ”lover of wisdom” (f????, s?f?a), and his calling not a profession of wisdom but a search for wisdom. However, despite the disclaimer, the term _philosophy_ soon came to signify _wisdom_ simply, meaning by this the highest and most precious kind of knowledge.

Now human knowledge has for its object everything that falls in any way within human experience. It has _extensively_ a great variety in its subject-matter, and _intensively_ a great variety in its degrees of depth and clearness and perfection. _Individual facts_ of the past, communicated by human testimony, form the raw materials of _historical_ knowledge. Then there are all the individual things and events that fall within one's own personal experience. Moreover, by the study of human language (or languages), of works of the human mind and products of human genius and skill, we gain a knowledge of _literature_, and of the _arts_-the fine arts and the mechanical arts. But not merely do we use our senses and memory thus to acc.u.mulate an una.s.sorted stock of informations about isolated facts: a miscellaneous ma.s.s of mental furniture which const.i.tutes the bulk of human knowledge in its _least developed_ form-_cognitio ____vulgaris,___ the knowledge of the comparatively uneducated and unreflecting cla.s.ses of mankind. We also use our reasoning faculty to reflect, compare, cla.s.sify these informations, to interpret them, to reason about them, to infer from them _general truths_ that embrace individual things and events _beyond our personal experience_; we try to explain them by seeking out their _reasons_ and _causes_. This mental activity gradually converts our knowledge into _scientific_ knowledge, and thus gives rise to those great groups of systematized truths called the _sciences_: as, for example, the physical and mathematical sciences, the elements of which usually form part of our early education. These sciences teach us a great deal about ourselves and the universe in which we live.

There is no need to dwell on the precious services conferred upon mankind by discoveries due to the progress of the various _special_ sciences: mathematics as applied to engineering of all sorts; astronomy; the physical sciences of light, heat, sound, electricity, magnetism, etc.; chemistry in all its branches; physiology and anatomy as applied in medicine and surgery. All these undoubtedly contribute much to man's _bodily_ well-being. But man has a _mind_ as well as a body, and he is moreover a _social_ being: there are, therefore, other special sciences-”human” as distinct from ”physical” sciences-in which man himself is studied in his mental activities and social relations with his fellow-men: the sciences of social and political economy, const.i.tutional and civil law, government, statesmans.h.i.+p, etc. Furthermore, man is a _moral_ being, recognizing distinctions of good and bad, right and wrong, pleasure and happiness, duty and responsibility, in his own conduct; and finally he is a _religious_ being, face to face with the fact that men universally entertain views, beliefs, convictions of some sort or other, regarding man's subjection to, and dependence on, some higher power or powers dwelling somehow or somewhere within or above the whole universe of his direct and immediate experience: there are therefore also sciences which deal with these domains, morality and religion. Here, however, the domains are so extensive, and the problems raised by their phenomena are of such far-reaching importance, that the sciences which deal with them can hardly be called special sciences, but rather const.i.tuent portions of the one wider and deeper _general_ science which is what men commonly understand nowadays by philosophy.

The distinction between the special sciences on the one hand and philosophy, the general science, on the other, will help us to realize more clearly the nature and scope of the latter. The special sciences are concerned with discovering the _proximate_ reasons and causes of this, that, and the other definite department in the whole universe of our experience. The subject-matter of some of them is totally different from that of others: physiology studies the functions of living organisms; geology studies the formation of the earth's crust. Or if two or more of them investigate the same subject-matter they do so from different standpoints, as when the zoologist and the physiologist study the same type or specimen in the animal kingdom. But the common feature of all is this, that each seeks only the reasons, causes, and laws which give a _proximate_ and _partial_ explanation of the facts which it investigates, leaving untouched and unsolved a number of deeper and wider questions which may be raised about the _whence_ and _whither_ and _why_, not only of the facts themselves, but of the reasons, causes and laws a.s.signed by the particular science in explanation of these facts.

Now it is those deeper and wider questions, which can be answered only by the discovery of the _more remote_ and _ultimate_ reasons and causes of things, that philosophy undertakes to investigate, and-as far as lies within man's power-to answer. No one has ever disputed the supreme importance of such inquiries into the ultimate reasons and causes of things-into such questions as these, for instance: What is the nature of man himself? Has he in him a principle of life which is spiritual and immortal? What was his first origin on the earth? Whence did he come? Has his existence any purpose, and if so, what? Whither does he tend? What is his destiny? Why does he distinguish between a right and a wrong in human conduct? What is the ultimate reason or ground of this distinction? Why have men generally some form or other of religion? Why do men generally believe in G.o.d? Is there really a G.o.d? What is the origin of the whole universe of man's experience? Of life in all its manifestations? Has the universe any intelligible or intelligent purpose, and if so, what? Can the human mind give a certain answer to any of these or similar questions?

What about the nature and value of human _knowledge_ itself? What is its scope and what are its limitations? And since vast mult.i.tudes of men _believe_ that the human race has been specially enlightened by G.o.d Himself, by Divine Revelation, to know for certain what man's destiny is, and is specially aided by G.o.d Himself, by Divine Grace, to work out this destiny-the question immediately arises: What are the real relations between reason alone on the one hand and reason enlightened by such Revelation on the other, in other words between natural knowledge and supernatural faith?

Now it will be admitted that the special sciences take us some distance along the road towards an answer to such questions, inasmuch as the truths established by these sciences, and even the wider hypotheses conceived though not strictly verified in them, furnish us with most valuable data in our investigation of those questions. Similarly the alleged fact of a Divine Revelation cannot be ignored by any man desirous of using all the data available as helps towards their solution. The Revelation embodied in Christianity claims not merely to enlighten us in regard to many ultimate questions which mankind would be able to answer without its a.s.sistance, but also to tell us about our destiny some truths of supreme import, which of ourselves we should never have been able to discover. It is obvious, then, that whether a man has been brought up from his infancy to believe in the Christian Revelation or not, his whole outlook on life will be determined very largely by his belief or disbelief in its authenticity and its contents. Similarly, if he be a Confucian, or a Buddhist, or a Mohammedan, his outlook will be in part determined by what he believes of their teachings. Man's conduct in life has undoubtedly many determining influences, but it will hardly be denied that among them the predominant influence is exerted by the views that he holds, the things he believes to be true, concerning his own origin, nature and destiny, as well as the origin, nature and destiny of the universe in which he finds himself. The Germans have an expressive term for that which, in the absence of a more appropriate term, we may translate as a man's _world-outlook_; they call it his _Weltanschauung_. Now this world-outlook is formed by each individual for himself from his interpretation of _his experience as a whole_. It is not unusual to call this world-outlook a man's _philosophy of life_. If we use the term _philosophy_ in this wide sense it obviously includes whatever light a man may gather from the _special sciences_, and whatever light he may gather from a divinely revealed _religion_ if he believes in such, as well as the light his own reason may shed upon a special and direct study of those ultimate questions themselves, to which we have just referred. But we mention this wide sense of the term _philosophy_ merely to put it aside; and to state that we use the term in the sense more commonly accepted nowadays, the sense in which it is understood to be distinct from the _special sciences_ on the one side and from _supernatural theology_ or the systematic study of divinely revealed religion on the other. Philosophy is distinct from the special sciences because while the latter seek the proximate, the former seeks the ultimate grounds, reasons and causes of all the facts of human experience.

Philosophy is distinct from supernatural theology because while the former uses _the unaided power of human reason_ to study the ultimate questions raised by human experience, the latter uses _reason enlightened by Divine Revelation_ to study the contents of this Revelation in all their bearings on man's life and destiny.

Hence we arrive at this simple and widely accepted definition of philosophy: _the science of all things through their ultimate reasons and causes as discovered by the unaided light of human reason_.(5) The first part of this definition marks off philosophy from the special sciences, the second part marks it off from supernatural theology.

We must remember, however, that these three departments of knowledge-scientific, philosophical, and revealed-are not isolated from one another in any man's mind; they overlap in their subject-matter, and though differing in their respective standpoints they permeate one another through and through. The separation of the special sciences from philosophy, though adumbrated in the speculations of ancient times and made more definite in the middle ages, was completed only in modern times through the growth and progress of the special sciences themselves. The line of demarcation between philosophy and supernatural theology must be determined by the proper relations between Reason and Faith: and naturally these relations are a subject of debate between philosophers who believe in the existence of an authentic Divine Revelation and philosophers who do not. It is the duty of the philosopher as such to determine by the light of reason whether a Supreme Being exists and whether a Divine Revelation to man is possible. If he convinces himself of the existence of G.o.d he will have little difficulty in inferring the _possibility_ of a Divine Revelation. The _fact_ of a Divine Revelation is a matter not for philosophical but for historical research. Now when a man has convinced himself of the existence of G.o.d and the fact of a Divine Revelation-the _preambula fidei_ or prerequisite conditions of Faith, as they are called-he must see that it is eminently reasonable for him to believe in the contents of such Divine Revelation; he must see that the truths revealed by G.o.d cannot possibly trammel the freedom of his own reason in its philosophical inquiries into ultimate problems concerning man and the universe; he must see that these truths may possibly act as beacons which will keep him from going astray in his own investigations: knowing that truth cannot contradict truth he knows that if he reaches a conclusion really incompatible with any certainly revealed truth, such conclusion must be erroneous; and so he is obliged to reconsider the reasoning processes that led him to such a conclusion.(6) Thus, the position of the Christian philosopher, aided in this negative way by the truths of an authentic Divine Revelation, has a distinct advantage over that of the philosopher who does not believe in such revelation and who tries to solve all ultimate questions independently of any light such revelation may shed upon them. Yet the latter philosopher as a rule not only regards the ”independent” position, which he himself takes up in the name of ”freedom of thought” and ”freedom of research,” as the superior position, but as the only one consistent with the dignity of human reason; and he commonly accuses the Christian philosopher of allowing reason to be ”enslaved” in ”the shackles of dogma”. We can see at once the unfairness of such a charge when we remember that the Christian philosopher has convinced himself _on grounds of reason alone_ that G.o.d exists and has made a revelation to man. His belief in a Divine Revelation is a _reasoned_ belief, a _rationabile obsequium_ (Rom. XII. 1); and only if it were a blind belief, unjustifiable on grounds of reason, would the accusation referred to be a fair one. The Christian philosopher might retort that it is the unbelieving philosopher himself who really destroys ”freedom of thought and research,” by claiming for the latter what is really an abuse of freedom, namely _license_ to believe what reason shows to be erroneous. But this counter-charge would be equally unfair, for the unbelieving philosopher does not claim any such undue license to believe what he knows to be false or to disbelieve what he knows to be true. If he denies the fact or the possibility of a Divine Revelation, and therefore pursues his philosophical investigations without any regard to the contents of such revelation, it is because he has convinced himself on grounds of reason that such revelation is neither a fact nor a possibility. He and the Christian philosopher cannot both be right; one of them must be wrong; but as reasonable men they should agree to differ rather than hurl unjustifiable charges and counter-charges at each other.

All philosophers who believe in the Christian Revelation and allow its authentic teachings to guide and supplement their own rational investigation into ultimate questions, are keenly conscious of the consequent superior depth and fulness and cert.i.tude of Christian philosophy as compared with all the other conflicting and fragmentary philosophies that mark the progress of human speculation on the ultimate problems of man and the universe down through the centuries. They feel secure in the possession of a _philosophia __ perennis_,(7) and none more secure than those of them who complete and confirm that philosophy by the only full and authentic deposit of Divinely Revealed Truth, which is to be found in the teaching of the Catholic Church.

The history of philosophical investigation yields no one universally received conception of what philosophy is, nor would the definition given above be unreservedly accepted. Windelband, in his _History of Philosophy_(8) instances the following predominant conceptions of philosophy according to the chronological order in which they prevailed: (_a_) the systematic investigation of the problems raised by man and the universe (early Grecian philosophy: absence of differentiation of philosophy from the special sciences); (_b_) the practical art of human conduct, based on rational speculation (later Grecian philosophy: distrust in the value of knowledge, and emphasis on practical guidance of conduct); (_c_) the helper and handmaid of the Science of Revealed Truth, _i.e._ supernatural theology, in the solution of ultimate problems (the Christian philosophy of the Fathers of the Church and of the Medieval Schools down to the sixteenth century: universal recognition of the value of the Christian Revelation as an aid to rational investigation); (_d_) a purely rational investigation of those problems, going beyond the investigations of the special sciences, and either abstracting from, or denying the value of, any light or aid from Revelation (differentiation of the domains of science, philosophy and theology; modern philosophies from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century; excessive individualism and rationalism of these as unnaturally divorced from recognition of, and belief in, Divine Revelation, and unduly isolated from the progressing positive sciences); (_e_) a critical a.n.a.lysis of the significance and scope and limitations of human knowledge itself (recent philosophies, mainly concerned with theories of knowledge and speculations on the nature of the cognitive process and the reliability of its products).

These various conceptions are interesting and suggestive; much might be said about them, but not to any useful purpose in a brief introductory chapter. Let us rather, adopting the definition already set forth, try next to map out into its leading departments the whole philosophical domain.

III. DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY: SPECULATIVE AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.-The general problem of cla.s.sifying all the sciences built up by human thought is a logical problem of no little complexity when one tries to work it out in detail. We refer to this general problem only to mention a widely accepted principle on which it is usually approached, and because the division of philosophy itself is a section of the general problem. The principle in question is that sciences may be distinguished indeed by partial or total _diversity of subject-matter_, but that such diversity is not essential, that _diversity of standpoint_ is necessary and sufficient to const.i.tute distinct sciences even when these deal with one and the same subject-matter. Now applying this principle to philosophy we see firstly that it has the same subject-matter as all the special sciences taken collectively, but that it is distinct from all of them inasmuch as it studies their data not from the standpoint of the proximate causes, but from the higher standpoint of the ultimate causes of these data. And we see secondly that philosophy, having this one higher standpoint throughout all its departments, is _one_ science; that its divisions are only material divisions; that there is not a plurality of philosophies as there is a plurality of sciences, though there is a plurality of departments in philosophy.(9) Let us now see what these departments are.

If we ask why people seek knowledge at all, in any department, we shall detect two main impelling motives. The first of these is simply the desire to know: _trahimur omnes cupiditate sciendi_. The natural feeling of wonder, astonishment, ”_admiratio_,” which accompanies our perception of things and events, prompts us to seek their causes, to discover the reasons which will make them _intelligible_ to us and enable us to _understand_ them. But while the possession of knowledge for its own sake is thus a motive of research it is not the only motive. We seek knowledge _in order to use it_ for the guidance of our conduct in life, for the orientation of our activities, for the improvement of our condition; knowing that knowledge is power, we seek it in order to make it minister to our needs. Now in the degree in which it fulfils such ulterior purposes, or is sought for these purposes, knowledge may be described as _practical_; in the degree in which it serves no ulterior end, or is sought for no ulterior end, other than that of perfecting our minds, it may be described as _speculative_. Of course this latter purpose is in itself a highly practical purpose; nor indeed is there any knowledge, however speculative, but has, or at least is capable of having, some influence or bearing on the actual tenor and conduct of our lives; and in this sense all knowledge is practical. Still we can distinguish broadly between knowledge which has no direct, immediate bearing on our acts, and knowledge that has.(10) Hence the possibility of distinguis.h.i.+ng between two great domains of philosophical knowledge-_Theoretical_ or _Speculative Philosophy_, and _Practical Philosophy_. There are, in fact, two great domains into which the data of all human experience may be divided; and for each distinct domain submitted to philosophical investigation there will be a distinct department of philosophy. A first domain is the order _realized_ in the universe independently of man; a second is the order which man himself _realizes_: _things_, therefore, and _acts_. The order of the external universe, the order of nature as it is called, exists independently of us: we merely study it (_speculari_, ?e????), we do not create it. The other or _practical_ order is established by our acts of _intelligence_ and _will_, and by our _bodily action_ on external things under the direction of those faculties in the arts. Hence we have a _speculative_ or _theoretical_ philosophy and a _practical_ philosophy.(11)