Part 13 (1/2)

And the report is, that this new argument, notwithstanding its every-day theme, is one that admits of being sung also; and that the Virgil who is able to compose 'these Georgies of the Mind,' may promise himself fame, though his end is one that will enable him to forego it. Let us see if we can find any further track of him and his great argument, whether in prose or verse;--this poet who cares not whether he has his 'singing robes' about him or not, so he can express and put upon record his new 'observations of this husbandry.'

THE EXEMPLAR OF GOOD.--'And surely,' he continues, 'if the purpose be in good earnest, _not to write at leisure that which men may read at leisure_'--note it--that which men may read at leisure--'but really to _instruct_ and _suborn action and active life_, these GEORGICS of the MIND, concerning the husbandry and tillage thereof, are no less worthy than _the heroical descriptions of virtue, duty_, and _felicity_; therefore the _main and primitive division_ of MORAL KNOWLEDGE, seemeth to be into the EXEMPLAR or PLATFORM of GOOD, and THE REGIMEN or CULTURE OF THE MIND, the one describing the NATURE of GOOD, the other prescribing RULES _how_ to SUBDUE, APPLY, and ACCOMMODATE THE WILL OF MAN THEREUNTO.'

As to '_the nature of good_, positive or simple,' the writers on this subject have, he says, 'set it down excellently, in describing the forms of virtue and duty, with their situations, and postures, in distributing them into their kinds, parts, provinces, actions, and administrations, and the like: nay, farther, they have commended them to man's nature and spirit, with great quickness of argument, and beauty of persuasions; yea, and fortified and entrenched them, _as much as discourse can do_, against corrupt and popular opinions. And for the degrees and comparative nature of good, they have excellently handled it also.'--That part deserveth to be reported for 'excellently laboured.'

What is it that is wanting then? What radical, fatal defect is it that he finds even in the doctrine of the NATURE OF GOOD? What is the difficulty with this platform and exemplar of good as he finds it, notwithstanding the praise he has bestowed on it? The difficulty is, that it is not scientific. It is not broad enough. It is _special_, it is limited to the species, but it is not properly, it is not effectively, specific, because it is not connected with the doctrine of nature in general. It does not strike to those universal original principles, those simple powers which determine the actual historic laws and make the nature of things itself. This is the criticism, therefore, with which this critic of the learning of the world as he finds it, is constrained to qualify that commendation.

_Notwithstanding_, if before they had come to _the popular and received notions of 'vice'_ and _'virtue,' 'pleasure'_ and _'pain,'_ and the rest, they had stayed a little longer upon the inquiry concerning THE ROOTS of GOOD and EVIL, and the strings to those roots, they had given, in my opinion, _a great light to that which followed_, and especially _if they had consulted with nature_, they had made their doctrines less prolix and more profound, which being by them in part omitted, and in part handled with much confusion, we will endeavour to resume and open in a more clear manner. Here then, is the preparation of the Platform or Exemplar of Good, the scientific platform of virtue and felicity; going behind the popular notion of vice and virtue, pain and pleasure, and the like, he strikes at once to the nature of good, as it is 'formed in everything,' for the foundation of this specific science. He lays the beams of it, in the axioms and definitions of his '_prima philosophia_' 'which do not fall within the compa.s.s of the special parts of science, but are more common and of a higher stage, for the distributions and part.i.tions of knowledge are _not_ like several lines that meet in one angle, and so touch but in a point, but are like _branches of a tree that meet in a stem_ which hath a dimension and quant.i.ty of entireness and continuance before it comes to discontinue and break itself into arms and boughs,' and it is not the narrow and specific observation on which the popular notions are framed, but the scientific, which is needed for the New Ethics,--the new knowledge, which here too, is POWER. He must detect and recognise here also, he must track even into the nature of man, those universal 'footsteps' which are but 'the same footsteps of nature treading or printing in different substances.'

'There is formed in _everything_ a double nature of good, the one as everything is a total or substantive in itself, and the other, as it is a part or member of a greater body whereof the latter is in _degree_ the greater and the worthier, because it tendeth to the conservation of a more general form.... This double nature of good, and the comparison thereof, is much more engraven upon MAN, _if he degenerate not_, unto whom the conservation of duty to the public ought _to be much more precious_ than the conservation of _life and being_;' and, by way of ill.u.s.tration, he mentions first the case of Pompey the Great, 'who being in commission of purveyance for a famine at Rome, and being dissuaded with great vehemency by his friends, that he should not hazard himself to sea in an extremity of weather, he said only to them, ”_Necesse est ut eam, non ut vivam_.”' But, he adds, 'it may be _truly_ affirmed, that there was never any philosophy, religion, or other discipline, which did so plainly and highly _exalt_ the good which is _communicative_, and _depress_ the good which is private and particular, as the _holy faith_, well declaring that it was the _same G.o.d_ that gave the _Christian law to men_, who gave those laws of nature to inanimate creatures that we spake of before; for we read that the elected saints of G.o.d have wished themselves anathematised, and razed out of the book of life, in an ecstasy of charity, and infinite feeling of communion.'

And having first made good his a.s.sertion, that this being set down, and _strongly planted_, determines most of the _controversies_ wherein moral philosophy is conversant, he proceeds to develop still further these scientific notions of good and evil, which he has gone below the popular notions and into the nature of things to find, these scientific notions, which, because they are scientific, he has still to go out of the specific nature to define; and when he comes to nail down his scientific platform of the _human_ good with them, when he comes to strike their clear and simple lines, deep as the universal const.i.tution of things, through the popular terms, and clear up the old confused theories with them, we find that what he said of them beforehand was true; they do indeed throw great light upon that which follows.

To that exclusive, incommunicative good which inheres in the private and particular nature,--and he does not call it any hard names at all from his scientific platform; indeed in the vocabulary of the Naturalist we are told, that these names are omitted, 'for we call a nettle but a nettle, and the faults of fools their folly,'--that exclusive good he finds both pa.s.sive and active, and this also is one of those primary distinctions which 'is formed in all things,' and so too is the _subdivision_ of pa.s.sive good which follows. 'For there is impressed upon _all things_ a triple desire, or appet.i.te, proceeding from _love to themselves_; one, of preserving and continuing their form; another, of _advancing_ and perfecting their form; and a third, of multiplying and extending their form upon other things; whereof the multiplying or signature of it upon other things, is that which we handled by the name of active good.' But pa.s.sive good includes both conservation and perfection, or _advancement_, which latter is the highest degree of pa.s.sive good. For to preserve in state is the less; to preserve with advancement is the greater. As to _man_, his approach or a.s.sumption to DIVINE or ANGELICAL NATURE is the perfection of _his_ form, the error or false imitation of which good is that which is the tempest of human life. So we have heard before; but in the doctrine which we had before, it was the dogma,--the dogma whose inspiration and divinity each soul recognized; to whose utterance each soul responded, as deep calleth unto deep,--it was the Law, the Divine Law, and not the _science of it_, that was given.

And having deduced 'that good of man which is private and particular, as far as seemeth fit,' he returns 'to that good of man which respects and beholds society,' which he terms DUTY, because the term of duty is more proper to a mind well framed and disposed towards others, as the term of VIRTUE is applied to a mind well formed and composed in itself; though neither can a man understand _virtue, without some relation to society_, nor _duty, without an inward disposition_.

But he wishes us to understand and remember, now that he comes out of the particular nature, and begins to look towards society with this term of Duty, that he is still dealing with 'the will of particular persons,' that it is still the science of _morals_, and not _politics_, that he is meddling with. 'This part may seem at first,'

he says, 'to pertain to science civil and politic, but not if it be well observed; for it concerneth the regiment and _government of every man over himself_, and not over others.' And this is the plan which he has marked out in his doctrine of government as the most hopeful point in which to _commence_ political reformations; and one cannot but observe, that if this art and science should be successfully cultivated, the one which he dismisses so briefly would be cleared at once of some of those difficulties, which rendered any more direct treatment of it at that time unadvisable. This part of learning concerneth then 'the regiment and government of every man over himself, and not over others.' '_As_ in architecture _the direction_ of _the framing_ the _posts, beams_, and _other parts_ of _building_, is not the same with the manner of joining them and erecting the building; and in mechanicals, the direction _how_ to _frame_ AN INSTRUMENT OR ENGINE is not the same with the manner of _setting it on work_, and employing it; _and yet, nevertheless_, in expressing of the one, you _incidentally_ express the _aptness_ towards the other [hear]

_so_ the doctrine of the conjugation of men in society differeth from _that_ of _their conformity thereunto_.' The received doctrine of that conjugation certainly appeared to; and the more this scientific doctrine of the parts, and the conformity thereunto, is incidentally expressed,--the more the scientific direction _how to frame_ the instrument or engine, is opened, the more this difference becomes apparent.

But even in limiting himself to the individual human nature as it is developed in particular persons, regarding society only as it is incidental to that, even in putting down his new scientific platform of the good that the appet.i.te and will of man naturally seeks, and in marking out scientifically its _degrees_ and _kinds_, he gives us an opportunity to perceive in pa.s.sing, that he is not altogether without occasion for the use of that particular art, with its peculiar 'organs' and 'methods' and 'ill.u.s.tration,' which he recommends under so many heads in his treatise on that subject, for the delivery or tradition of knowledges, which tend to _innovation_ and _advancement_--knowledge which is 'progressive' and 'foreign from opinions received.'

This doctrine of _duty_ is sub-divided into two parts; the _common_ duty of every man as a MAN, or A MEMBER of A STATE, which is that part of the platform and exemplar of good, he has before reported as 'extant, and well laboured.' The other is the _respective_ or _special_ duty of every man in his PROFESSION, VOCATION and PLACE; and it is under this head of the _special_ and _respective_ duties of places, vocations and professions, where the subject begins to grow narrow and pointed, where it a.s.sumes immediately, the most critical aspects,--it is here that his new arts of delivery and tradition come in to such good purpose, and stand him instead of other weapons. For this is one of those cases precisely, which the philosopher on the Mountain alluded to, where an argument is set on foot at the table of a man of prodigious fortune, when the man himself is present. Nowhere, perhaps,--in his freest forms of writing, does he give a better reason, for that so deliberate and settled determination, which he so openly declares, and everywhere so stedfastly manifests, not to put himself in an antagonistic att.i.tude towards opinions, and vocations, and professions, as they stood authorized in his time. Nowhere does he venture on a more striking comparison or simile, for the purpose of setting forth that point vividly, and impressing it on the imagination of the reader.

'The first of these [sub-divisions of duty] is extant, and well laboured, as hath been said. The second, likewise, I may report rather dispersed than deficient; which _manner of dispersed argument I acknowledge to be best_; [it is one he is much given to;] for who can take upon him to write of the proper duty, virtue, _challenge_ and _right_ of EVERY several vocation, profession and place? [--truly?--]

For although sometimes a looker on, may see more than a gamester, and there be a proverb more arrogant than sound, 'that the _vale_ best discovereth _the hill_,' yet there is small doubt, that men can write best, and most really and materially of their own professions,' and it is to be wished, he says, 'as that which would make learning, indeed, solid and fruitful, that active men would, or could, become writers.'

And he proceeds to mention opportunely in that connection, a case very much in point, as far as he is concerned, but not on the face of it, so immediately to the purpose, as that which follows. It will, however, perhaps, repay that very careful reading of it, which will be necessary, in order to bring out its pertinence in this connection.

And we shall, perhaps, not lose time ourselves, by taking, as we pa.s.s, the glimpse which this author sees fit to give us, of the facilities and encouragements which existed then, for the scientific treatment of this so important question of the duties and vices of vocations and professions.

'In which I _cannot but_ mention, _honoris causa, your majesty's_ excellent book, touching the _duty_ of A KING' [and he goes on to give a description which applies, without much 'forcing,' to the work of another king, which he takes occasion to introduce, with a direct commendation, a few pages further on]--'a work richly compounded of divinity, morality, and policy, with great _aspersion_ of all other arts; and being, in mine opinion, one of the most sound and healthful writings that I have read. Not sick of business, as those are who lose themselves in their order, nor of convulsions, as those which cramp in matters impertinent; not savoring of perfumes and paintings as those do, who seek to please the reader more than nature beareth, and chiefly _well disposed_ in the _spirits_ thereof, being _agreeable to truth_, and _apt for action_;'--[this pa.s.sage contains some hints as to this author's notion of what a book should be, in form, as well as substance, and, therefore, it would not be strange, if it should apply to some other books, as well]--'and far removed from _that natural infirmity_, whereunto _I noted those that write in their own professions_, to be _subject_, which is that they _exalt it above measure_; for your majesty hath truly described, _not_ a king of a.s.syria or Persia, in their _external_ glory, [and not that kind of king, or kingly author is he talking of] but a _Moses_, or a _David, pastors of their people_.

'Neither can I _ever lose out of my remembrance_, what I heard your majesty, in the same sacred spirit of government, deliver in a great cause of judicature, which was, that kings ruled by _their laws_, as G.o.d did by the laws of nature, and ought rarely to put in use their supreme prerogative, as G.o.d doth his power of working miracles. _And yet, notwithstanding_, in your book of _a free monarchy_, you do well give men to understand, that you know the plenitude of the _power_ and _right_ of a king, as well as _the circle of his office and duty. Thus have I presumed to _allege_ this excellent writing of your majesty, _as a prime_ or _eminent example_ of Tractates, concerning _special_ and _respective_ duties.' [It is, indeed, an _exemplar_ that he talks of here.] 'Wherein _I should have said as much, if it had been written a thousand years since_: neither am I moved with certain courtly decencies, which I esteem it flattery to praise in presence; no, it is flattery to _praise in absence: that is_, when _either_ the virtue is absent, _or--the occasion_ is absent, and so the praise is _not natural_, but _forced_, either in truth, _or--in time_. But let Cicero be read in his oration _pro Marcello_, which is nothing but an excellent TABLE of _Caesar's_ VIRTUE, and _made to his face_; besides the _example_ of many other excellent persons, _wiser a great deal than such observers_, and we will never doubt upon a _full occasion_, to give _just_ praises to _present_ or _absent_.'

The reader who does not think that is, on the whole, a successful paragraph, considering the general slipperiness of the subject, and the state of the ice in those parts of it, in particular where the movements appear to be the most free and graceful; such a one has, probably, failed in applying to it, that key of 'times,' which a _full occasion_ is expected to produce for this kind of delivery. But if any doubt exists in any mind, in regard to this author's opinion of the rights of his own profession and vocation, and _the circle_ of _its_ office and duties,--if any one really doubts what only allegiance this author professionally acknowledges, and what kings.h.i.+p it is to which this great argument is internally dedicated, it may be well to recall the statement on that subject, which he has taken occasion to insert in another part of the work, so that that point, at least, may be satisfactorily determined.

He is speaking of 'certain base conditions and courses,' in his criticism on the manners of learned men, which he says 'he has no purpose to give allowance to, wherein divers professors of learning have wronged themselves and gone too far,'--glancing in particular at the trencher philosophers of the later age of the Roman state, 'who were little better than parasites in the houses of the great. But above all the rest,' he continues, 'the _gross_ and _palpable flattery_, whereunto, many, not unlearned, have abased and abused their wits and pens, turning, as Du Bartas saith, Hecuba into Helena, and Faustina into Lucretia, hath most diminished the price and estimation of learning. Neither is the _modern dedication_, of books and writings _as to patrons_, to be commended: for that books--such as are _worthy the name of books_, ought to have _no patrons, but_--(hear) but--Truth and Reason. And the ancient custom was to dedicate them only to _private and equal friends_, or to _ent.i.tle_ the books with their names, or if to _kings_ and _great persons_, it was _some such_ as the argument of the book was fit and proper for: but these and the like courses may deserve rather _reprehension_ than defence.

'Not that I can tax,' he continues, however, 'or condemn the application of learned men to men in fortune.' And he proceeds to quote here, approvingly, a series of speeches on this very point, which appear to be full of pertinence; the first of the philosopher who, when he was asked in mockery, 'How it came to pa.s.s that philosophers were followers of rich men, and not rich men of philosophers,' answered soberly, and yet sharply, 'Because the one sort knew what they had need of, and the other did not'. And then the speech of Aristippus, who, when some one, tender on behalf of philosophy, reproved him that he would offer the profession of philosophy such an indignity, as for a private suit to fall at a tyrant's feet, replied, 'It was not his fault, but it was the fault of Dionysius, that he had his ears in his feet'; and, lastly, the reply of another, who, yielding his point in disputing with Caesar, claimed, 'That it was reason to yield to him who commanded thirty legions,' and 'these,' he says, 'these, and _the like_ applications, and stooping to points of necessity and convenience, cannot be disallowed; for, though they may have _some outward baseness_, yet, in a _judgment truly made_, they are to be accounted submissions _to the occasion_, and _not to the person_.'

And that is just _Volumnia's_ view of the subject, as will be seen in another place.

Now, this no more dishonors you at all, Than to take in a town with gentle words, Which else would put you to your fortune, and The hazard of much blood.-- And you will rather show our general louts How you can frown, than spend a _fawn_ upon them, For the inheritance of their loves, and _safeguard_ Of _what that want might ruin_.

But then, in the dramatic exhibition, the other side comes in too:--

I will not do't; Lest I surcease to honor mine own truth, And by my body's action, teach my mind _A most inherent baseness._

It is the same poet who says in another place:--