Part 50 (2/2)
Cape Town, 5th February, 1900.
The following notes by Field-Marshal Commander-in-Chief are communicated for the guidance of all concerned.
By Order,
KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM, Chief of Staff.
NOTES FOR GUIDANCE IN SOUTH AFRICAN WARFARE.
CAVALRY.
1. On reconnaissances or patrols not likely to be prolonged beyond one day, the cavalry soldier's equipment should be lightened as much as possible, nothing being taken that can possibly be dispensed with.
2. It has been brought to my notice that our cavalry move too slowly when on reconnaissance duty, and that unnecessarily long halts are made, the result being that the enemy, although starting after the cavalry, are able to get ahead of it. I could understand this if the country were close and difficult, but between the Modder and the Orange rivers its general features are such as to admit of small parties of cavalry accompanied by field guns being employed with impunity.
ARTILLERY.
3. If the enemy's guns have, in some instances, the advantage of ours in range, we have the advantage of theirs in mobility, and we should make use of this by not remaining in positions, the precise distance of which from the enemy's batteries has evidently been fixed beforehand. Moreover, it has been proved that the Boers' fire is far less accurate at unknown distances. In taking up positions compact battery formations should be avoided. The guns should be opened out, or it may be desirable to advance by sections or batteries. Similarly, retirements should be carried out at considerably increased intervals, by alternate batteries or sections if necessary, and care should be taken to travel quickly through the danger zone of hostile artillery fire.
The following plan, frequently adopted by the Boers, has succeeded in deceiving our artillery on several occasions:--
Suppose A to be a gun emplacement, the gun firing smokeless powder; simultaneously with the discharge of the gun at A a powder flask of black powder will be exploded at B, a hill in the rear, leading us to direct our projectile on B. Careful calculation with a watch, however, will defeat this plan.
INFANTRY.
4. The present open formation renders it difficult for officers to exercise command over their men, except such as may be in their immediate vicinity. A remedy for this would appear to be a system of whistle calls by which a company lying in extended order could obey orders as readily as if in quarter column. I invite suggestions for such a system of whistle calls as would be useful.
5. It is difficult to recognise officers as equipped at present, and it seems desirable they should wear a distinguis.h.i.+ng mark of some kind, either on the collar at the back of the neck, or on the back of the coat.
6. Soldiers, when under fire, do not take sufficient advantage of the sandy nature of the soil to construct cover for themselves. If such soil is sc.r.a.ped even with a canteen lid, a certain amount of cover from rifle fire can be obtained in a short time.
7. The distribution of ammunition to the firing line is one of the most difficult problems of modern warfare. One solution, which has been suggested to me, is for a portion of the supports gradually to creep forward until a regular chain of men is established from the supports (where the ammunition carts should be) right up to the firing line. The ammunition could then be gradually worked up by hand till it reached the firing line, where it could be pa.s.sed along as required.
This would, no doubt, be a slow method of distributing ammunition, but it appears to be an improvement on the present method, which is almost impossible to carry out under fire.
8. Reports received suggest that the Boers are less likely to hold entrenchments _on the plain_ with the same tenacity and courage as they display when defending kopjes, and it is stated that this applies especially to night time, if they know that British infantry are within easy striking distance from them. How far this is true time only can show.
ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.
END OF VOL. I.
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