Part 40 (1/2)

[Sidenote: The march of the 14th and 66th batteries and six Naval 12-pounders.]

[Sidenote: and 6th brigade.]

[Sidenote: Dundonald and 7th battery.]

[Sidenote: 2nd and 4th brigades.]

Meanwhile the larger units had begun to carry out their orders. The 14th and 66th Field batteries of No. 1 brigade division, under command of Lieut.-Colonel Hunt, and six Naval 12-pounders, under the command of Lieutenant F. C. A. Ogilvy, R.N., moved across the railway line at 3.30 a.m., accompanied by the officer commanding the whole of the Royal Artillery then in Natal, Colonel C. J. Long, who had been directed by General Buller personally to supervise the movements of these batteries. East of the railway these guns joined the 6th brigade and advanced at 4 a.m. with that unit, northward. Lord Dundonald's brigade moved also at 4 a.m., accompanied by the 7th Field battery.

The 2nd brigade, at the same hour, left camp and marched towards Colenso, followed at 4.30 a.m. by the 4th brigade.

[Sidenote: 5th brigade. 2nd brigade division.]

The 5th brigade moved off at the same time. Lieut.-Colonel Parsons, commanding No. 2 brigade division, although directed by the written operation orders to follow the 4th brigade (Lyttelton) in order to enfilade the kopjes north of the iron bridge, had received verbal instructions from Sir R. Buller through Colonel Long that at least one of his batteries was to cross the river with Hart's brigade. He accordingly marched with his guns on the right rear of the 5th brigade.

[Sidenote: Hart's instructions, guide, and map.]

Major-General Hart had been provided with a tracing of a map, a Kaffir guide, and a colonist as interpreter to a.s.sist him in finding ”the Bridle Drift immediately west of the junction of the Doornkop Spruit and the Tugela,” by which he was to cross the river. This map was a plane-table sketch, prepared by an engineer officer shortly before the action. It was an attempt to fill into a farm survey, made for land registration, as many of the topographical features as could be seen from a distance. Unfortunately it had not been verified by any close reconnaissance of the river, and thus both the sketch and the orders were misleading. A Bridle Drift, used by natives in the dry season of the winter but uncertain in the summer, did indeed exist, although on that particular day it was unfordable. But the sketch, on which the order relied, showed the Doornkop Spruit as running into the Tugela at the western bend of the remarkable loop which that river makes to the north-west, about one mile east of E. Robinson's farm; it showed, moreover, the Bridle Drift close to the junction of the spruit, and placed, also immediately to the west of the Drift, another loop of the river. On all three of these points the sketch was defective. Only a short but deep donga enters the river at this western end of the loop, near 2 on map No. 15. The Doornkop Spruit joins the river at the eastern, not the western bend of the loop. The Bridle Drift lies, not near to the western bend of the loop, but a mile to the westward.

Finally, the Tugela makes no second loop for several miles to the westward. The effect of these topographical errors in the map, and in the written orders was further enhanced by another serious misapprehension. Major-General Hart had been informed on the previous evening that the Kaffir guide lived close to the drift where he was to cross, and could be relied on not to make any mistake about it.

Unfortunately the native misunderstood his instructions, or had been given wrong instructions, for he conceived that he was intended to lead the column, not to the Bridle Drift, but to a point (marked 4 on map No. 15) close to his own kraal, at the head of and inside the loop, where, owing to the existence of rapids, the river was fordable, breast-high, by men on foot. The practicability of this drift had been personally verified by the native on the two previous nights, but no staff officer had accompanied him. Another similar foot-ford might have been found at point 6 immediately below the junction of the Doornkop Spruit with the Tugela, but the existence of neither of these fords was known to Major-General Hart or to the Headquarter staff.[228]

[Footnote 228: General Buller's telegram to the War Office, dated 15th December, 1899, states: ”There are two fordable places in the Tugela ... they are about two miles apart ...

General Hart was to attack the left drift, General Hildyard the right.”]

[Sidenote: The march of Hart's (5th) brigade.]

The 5th brigade marched from its parade ground in ma.s.s of quarter-columns, the battalions being arranged in the following order:--

2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, commanded by Col. C. D. Cooper.

1st Connaught Rangers, commanded by Col. L. G. Brooke.

1st Border regiment, commanded by Col. J. H. E. Hinde.

1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, commanded by Lt.-Col. T. M. G.

Thackeray.

Half of the 17th Company, R.E., under the command of Major H. H.

Ma.s.sy, followed in rear. A squadron of the Royal Dragoons acted as advance guard as far as Doornkop Spruit, where the cavalry moved off to the left.

[Sidenote: Hart's intention.]

The Brigadier had informed the commanding officers on the previous evening that he intended the leading battalion to line the right bank of the Tugela, while the remainder crossed. After pa.s.sing, the brigade was to move eastward, and attempt to close the enemy into the Colenso loop of the river.

[Sidenote: Hart plunges into the loop.]

[Sidenote: The Boer artillery opens fire, shortly after 6 a.m.]

[Sidenote: Unseen riflemen enfilade the attack.]

Hart, following the directions of the Kaffir guide, led his brigade in a north-westerly direction to the first drift over the Doornkop Spruit,[229] and thence northward, the formation of the leading battalion being now changed to an advance in fours from the right of companies at deploying interval, the three rear battalions continuing in ma.s.s of quarter-columns. A few cavalry scouts preceded the brigade: the main body of the Royal Dragoons, under Lieut.-Colonel J. F.

Burn-Murdoch, watched the left flank, his officers' patrols moving down to the river's bank, without provoking any fire. Colonel Burn-Murdoch despatched three successive gallopers to inform General Hart that these patrols reported the enemy in force on his front and left. General Hart replied that he intended to cross by the drift in front of him, and would ignore the enemy on his left, unless they attacked in strength. The column, therefore, continued to move steadily on the point, near to the western bend of the loop, where the sketch had placed the Bridle Drift. But, as the brigade was crossing a newly-ploughed mealie-field, within 300 yards of the entrance of the loop, the Brigadier riding at its head perceived that the map was misleading, and on enquiry, the Kaffir guide pointed up the loop, and stated, through the interpreter, that it was in that direction that the ford lay. Almost simultaneously a Boer gun opened on the column from the underfeature below Grobelaar Mountain, and its sh.e.l.l, pa.s.sing over the whole depth of the brigade, burst behind the rear battalion.