Part 37 (2/2)

The following table shows the approximate strength of the force:--

Arms. Officers. Other Horses, Guns Ranks. Riding & Naval. Naval Field Machine.

Draught. 47-in. 12-pr. 15-pr.

Staff 34 137 123 -- -- -- -- Naval brigade 31 297 6 2 12 -- -- Mounted Troops 126 2,561 2,700 -- -- -- 2 Royal Artillery 39 1,074 869 -- -- 30 -- Royal Engineers 14 419 255 -- -- -- -- Infantry(4 brigades) 416 13,521 716 -- -- -- 16 A.S. Corps 16 217 550 -- -- -- -- R.A.M. Corps 30 464 336 -- -- -- --

Total 706 18,672 5,555 2 12 30 18

[Sidenote: On line of communication.]

Two battalions of regular infantry (the 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers and the 2nd Somerset Light Infantry), and three Colonial corps (the Natal Royal Rifles, the Durban Light Infantry and the Imperial Light Infantry), with four Naval 12-pounders, manned by detachments from H.M.S. _Philomel_ and _Forte_, and the Natal Field battery, held the line of communication with Durban.

[Sidenote: Method of issuing orders.]

Although Sir Redvers Buller had a.s.sumed personal command, it was arranged that, in the absence of the Headquarter staff, his orders should be issued by the divisional staff of Lieutenant-General Sir C.

F. Clery, who had hitherto been the senior officer south of the Tugela.

[Sidenote: Boers in the Natal region Dec. 6th-Dec. 14th.]

In the chapter dealing with the const.i.tution of the Boer army, it has been pointed out that any statement of the strength of a Boer force at a particular period is quite misleading, if regarded like a formal ”daily state” of a European force in the field. Subject to this reservation, the aggregate strength of the original commandos, which invaded Natal on the outbreak of war, has already been a.s.sessed at 23,500, and it has been stated that Transvaal reinforcements, amounting to some 3,000 men, had subsequently been added; but this increase was reduced by the departure at the end of November of three Free State commandos to oppose Lord Methuen's advance on Kimberley.

The commandos remaining in Natal were, moreover, much weakened by the practice of burghers returning to their farms to visit their families without leave, and, although some Natal Dutchmen had been commandeered to take up arms, the total Boer forces actually serving in Natal at this period did not probably much exceed 20,000 men. A detachment of 800 was at Helpmakaar,[215] watching the Tugela Ferry and the western frontier of Zululand, from which, throughout the middle of the month, the Boer Intelligence department expected an attack. Another detachment of 500 piqueted the river from the Tugela Ferry up to Colenso. To the west four commandos were stationed near Potgieters and Skiet's drifts, and detachments watched the intermediate crossings.

The attacks of the Ladysmith garrison on Gun Hill and Surprise Hill and the destruction of the Waschbank bridge produced a considerable feeling of uneasiness at Boer Headquarters soon after Sir Redvers reached Frere. Their own official records show that there was a reluctance to detach any more burghers than were deemed absolutely necessary to the Tugela. Having regard to these facts, although no exact figures can be given, it is probable that an estimate made on 13th December by General Buller's Intelligence staff, that about 6,000 to 7,000 men had been concentrated under Louis Botha in the neighbourhood of Colenso, was not far from the mark. On the other hand, the Boer official telegrams of that date put the number as low as 5,000.

[Footnote 215: Map No. 3.]

[Sidenote: Close connection between Boer main army in Natal and Botha.]

Botha's detachment and the Boer main army were, however, within an hour's ride of each other, and thus could readily render mutual a.s.sistance, unless an attack from the south should be combined with an exactly-timed sortie by the Ladysmith garrison. Yet the Boers had reason to fear this combination against them. The troops under Sir George White were still mobile, and the enterprises against Gun Hill and Surprise Hill, in the second week of December, had shown that both officers and men were keen to be again let slip at the enemy.[216]

Moreover, the large number of mounted men, who, though shut up in Ladysmith, were in fact astride of the Boers' lines of communication, both with the Transvaal and with the Free State, would be likely to prove a serious danger in the event of Botha's defeat by Sir Redvers.

[Footnote 216: See Volume II.]

[Sidenote: A formidable natural fortress.]

Nevertheless, the task which the British commander-in-chief had decided to undertake was not an easy one. From Potgieters Drift on the west to the junction of the Tugela with Sunday's river, about 30 miles east of Colenso, a ridge of hills, broken only by narrow kloofs and dongas, line like a continuous parapet the northern bank of the former river.

Westward the ridge is connected by the Brakfontein Nek with that spur of the Drakensberg which is ent.i.tled the Tabanyama Range. This was destined, a month later, to bar the advance of the relieving army on that side. The eastern flank was guarded by the lower slopes of the Biggarsberg, which run parallel to Sunday's river and fill the area lying between that stream and the Buffalo. The approaches to the beleaguered town from the south were thus covered by an immense natural redoubt. Opposite to the very centre of the front face of this redoubt lay Colenso. Behind this centre, and at right angles to the parapet, a cl.u.s.ter of hills was flung back to the ridge of Caesar's Camp, immediately to the south of Ladysmith. Through this confused ma.s.s of broken ground, so favourable to the methods of fighting of its defenders, ran the three roads which connect Colenso and Ladysmith. Of these roads the western pa.s.sed over three very strong and presumably entrenched positions. The central had become by disuse impa.s.sable.[217]

Much of the eastern was only fit for ox-wagons. Along the face of this strategic fort ran the Tugela, an admirable moat, as completely commanded by the heights on its left bank as is the ditch of a permanent work by its parapet. West of Colenso this moat was traversable by guns and wagons at only five places, _i.e._, Robinson's, Munger's, Skiet's, Maritz, and Potgieters drifts. Of these the four first named were difficult for loaded wagons. Eastward of Colenso the only practicable drift was that by which the Weenen road crosses the river. Other fords, through which single hors.e.m.e.n or men on foot, breast-high, could wade, existed both to the east and to the west, but with the exception of a bridle drift near Colenso they were not marked on the maps in possession of the troops, and could only be discovered by enquiry and reconnaissance.

[Footnote 217: This central road, or old track, is not shown on maps 3 and 4, but is shown on map 15.]

[Sidenote: Botha depends on mobility for holding his long line of defence.]

The commandos a.s.signed to General Louis Botha for the defence of the line of the Tugela were obviously insufficient to man the whole of this immense position; yet he was able to rely on the mobility of his burghers; and on this, also, that he was so situated that his a.s.sailant would, in order to attack him anywhere, have to traverse distances greater than Botha need cover to reinforce from the centre either flank as soon as threatened. Moreover, not only did the heights he held afford a perfect view for miles over the country to the south, but the Tugela hills are precipitous and rocky as to their southern faces, while the approaches to them from the north present, as a rule, easy slopes and gentle gradients.

[Sidenote: Difficulty of finding out where the Boers were.]

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