Part 11 (2/2)
62. ”Does it not, then, appertain to that which is formed by composition, and is naturally compounded, to be thus affected, to be dissolved in the same manner as that in which it was compounded; and if there is any thing not compounded, does it not appertain to this alone, if to any thing, not to be thus affected?”
”It appears to me to be so,” said Cebes.
”Is it not most probable, then, that things which are always the same, and in the same state, are uncompounded, but that things which are constantly changing, and are never in the same state, are compounded?”
”To me it appears so.”
”Let us return, then,” he said, ”to the subjects on which we before discoursed. Whether is essence itself, of which we gave this account that it exists, both in our questions and answers, always the same, or does it sometimes change? Does equality itself, the beautiful itself, and each several thing which is, ever undergo any change, however small?
Or does each of them which exists, being an unmixed essence by itself, continue always the same, and in the same state, and never undergo any variation at all under any circ.u.mstances?”
”They must of necessity continue the same and in the same state, Socrates,” said Cebes.
63. ”But what shall we say of the many beautiful things, such as men, horses, garments, or other things of the kind, whether equal or beautiful, or of all things synonymous with them? Do they continue the same, or, quite contrary to the former, are they never at any time, so to say, the same, either with respect to themselves or one another?”
”These, on the other hand,” replied Cebes, ”never continue the same.”
”These, then, you can touch, or see, or perceive by the other senses; but those that continue the same, you can not apprehend in any other way than by the exercise of thought; for such things are invisible, and are not seen?”
”You say what is strictly true,” replied Cebes.
64. ”We may a.s.sume, then, if you please,” he continued, ”that there are two species of things; the one visible, the other invisible?”
”We may,” he said.
”And the invisible always continuing the same, but the visible never the same?”
”This, too,” he said, ”we may a.s.sume.”
”Come, then,” he asked, ”is there anything else belonging to us than, on the one hand, body, and, on the other, soul?”
”Nothing else,” he replied.
”To which species, then, shall we say the body is more like, and more nearly allied?”
”It is clear to everyone,” he said, ”that it is to the visible.”
”But what of the soul? Is it visible or invisible?”
”It is not visible to men, Socrates,” he replied.
”But we speak of things which are visible, or not so, to the nature of men; or to some other nature, think you?”
”To that of men.”
”What, then, shall we say of the soul--that it is visible, or not visible?”
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