Part 9 (2/2)

Before leaving this portion of the subject, I must mention that other proposals affecting the form of Government of the Provinces have been discussed in Parliament and are likely to attract serious attention.

Theoretically, indeed, it has been a.s.serted, apart from the question of the power of the Upper Houses, and the point is of interest as showing the ideas germinating in the minds of Australasian politicians, that five changes are required in order that the Parliamentary machinery may be brought into proper relations with the people: the election of Ministers by the a.s.sembly; continuity of representation in the a.s.sembly, to be secured by the division of the country into const.i.tuencies returning two representatives who retire alternately at fixed periods; the Swiss form of Initiative and Referendum; and the right of a certain proportion of the members to convoke a special session of Parliament, and of an absolute majority of the electors in a const.i.tuency to require the resignation of their member. The first and second of these reforms, as I have shown, are included in the programme of the Ministry of South Australia, which, however, in spite of its success at the polls, has not pressed them forward {277} during the first session of the New Parliament. Continuity of representation could easily be arranged, as all the const.i.tuencies return two members.

An Elective Executive Bill has been introduced in the House of Representatives in New Zealand and received a large measure of support, though it was opposed by the Premier and the leader of the Opposition.

The idea has taken a strong hold upon the imagination of the Labour Members in all the Provinces.

It may be thought that I have laid stress upon a variety of fantastic theories, but the objection takes insufficient account of the facility with which changes can be effected in the absence of a strong force of traditional conservatism. I must admit, as a failing of Australasian politicians, that they are inclined to welcome innovations which are superficially attractive, without due consideration of the ulterior consequences. To quote an extreme case, the Government of New Zealand proposed, in a Single Bill, not only to abolish the life tenure of Members of the Legislative Council, but to provide machinery for the settlement of disputes between the two Houses and to establish a modified form of the Swiss Referendum. But I am confident that several of the proposals to which I have referred, notably that for an Elective Executive, meet with a large measure of support in the const.i.tuencies.

This movement has gathered strength from the disinclination of Ministries to resign except upon a {278} direct vote of want of confidence. Some of them look with equanimity upon the defeat of cardinal principles of important Bills, whether it be due to the strength of the Opposition or the defection of their own followers, and do not hesitate, if sufficient pressure be exercised, to withdraw them altogether. As the Ministry tends, therefore, to become a body which carries out the wishes of the whole House, and ceases to lead its own Party, the position would be simplified if the whole House elected the Executive for a fixed period. Another argument is found in the increasing desire of the a.s.sembly to s.h.i.+ft its legislative duties to the shoulders of the Executive. Parliament decides the broad principles of measures and leaves the details to be filled in by Regulations made by the Department concerned under the supervision of the Minister and with the approval of the Executive Council.

(2) Graduated death duties are imposed in all the seven Provinces, though in Tasmania the tax levied on the largest properties does not exceed 3 per cent. Western Australia came into line with the other Provinces in 1895, when a Bill imposing graduation up to 10 per cent.

was pa.s.sed, almost without discussion, through both Houses of Parliament. The Premier admitted that it had not been rendered necessary by the condition of the finances, but contended that it should be placed upon the Statute Book while there were few rich men in the community who would resent it.

{279}

Other forms of direct taxation are as follows: New Zealand, South Australia, and New South Wales have taxation on incomes and land values, the two former with, the latter without, graduation; Victoria has a graduated income tax and an ungraduated land tax on estates above a certain value; Tasmania, an ungraduated tax on incomes and the capital value of land; Queensland, an ungraduated income tax, which is only collected on dividends paid by public companies. The taxation in New South Wales, Victoria, New Zealand, and South Australia has been promoted, if not inspired, by the Labour Movement in Parliament, and const.i.tutes its greatest triumph. In Victoria the taxation of land values was rejected by the Legislative Council.

A point of interest is the distinction made by Victoria, Tasmania, and South Australia between incomes derived from property and those which are the result of personal exertion. It is thought to be equitable that the former should be taxed at a higher rate, and the principle is similar to that which dictates the taxation of land upon its unimproved value.

(3) I have referred very briefly in the present chapter to certain forms of industrial legislation; speaking generally, they are based upon English examples and do not call for any particular comment. The Labour Parties are keenly interested in these matters because it is simpler, apart from greater efficacy, that inspectors should protect their {280} interest under Acts of Parliament than that they should be compelled constantly to engage in negotiations with individual employers.

(4) As I have already pointed out, the consideration of Australasian problems must be accompanied by a recollection of the difference of conditions from those existing in Great Britain. Even in the latter country it is obvious that the intimate relations between employers and employed are being replaced, especially in the manufacturing centres, by a purely monetary bond; but they can never, except in individual cases, have had any existence in Australasia, where capitalists and workmen have approached each other and entered into agreements as strangers. Consequently the workmen, attached neither to people nor places, have been prepared to move as their varying interests have suggested and have formed few lasting ties with their employers. Many of the industries, indeed, have tended to accentuate this absence of cordial relations: in pastoralism, for instance, the small permanent staff is supplemented for a few weeks in the year by a large number of shearers and others, who sign a definite agreement with their employers, and, provided that the conditions are carried out, can have no interest either in them or in their properties. Incidentally, an a.s.sociation recently formed at Sydney which engages shearers and provides them with consecutive employment at different sheds, should not only be a financial success, but allay the {281} natural dissatisfaction of a body of men who, though they earn high wages, can depend upon neither regularity nor permanency in their work. I could show that similar conditions prevail in the sugar industry and, to some extent, in agriculture; but enough has been said to prove that the working cla.s.ses are differently situated from those in older countries and partially to explain their willingness to form themselves into Trades Unions and the combativeness of these organisations.

The great maritime strike, though it has been followed by the Broken Hill strikes of 1891 and 1892, the shearers' strikes of 1891 and 1894, and periodical hostilities at Newcastle, has modified largely the att.i.tude of the working cla.s.ses in regard to the efficacy of industrial warfare. The later struggles have princ.i.p.ally affected Queensland and New South Wales, which was the first of the Provinces to attempt to deal with the matter by Act of Parliament. A Board of Conciliation was established upon the recommendation of a Royal Commission, but is admitted to have been a failure in the absence of any compulsory reference of disputes. On the occasion of the most recent disturbances, at Newcastle in 1896, which originated upon an application of the miners for higher wages, the Premier, following English precedents, intervened, and was enabled to settle the dispute, though not until the strike had lasted for three months and had caused much of the foreign trade to be diverted to foreign ports. Actual {282} and prospective losses caused the owners, though they made a small concession at the request of the Premier, to refuse to reinstate the miners except at a slightly lower rate of wages than that against which they had struck. The offer, as modified by the Premier, was accepted by the miners, who had thus, at the cost of much misery, brought about a reduction in their wages. The disturbances of 1894 in Queensland, which reached an acute stage, were met by the Government by resolute administration under special powers obtained by Act of Parliament, but no attempt was made to intervene between the disputants or to make use of the Conciliation Act of 1892, which, as far as I know, has remained a dead letter. It is useless, therefore, to discuss the Act further than to say that its machinery can only be set in motion by a Local Authority, but it may not be unfair to attribute the unsympathetic att.i.tude of the Government to the bitterness engendered by the extravagances of the Labour Party.

In most of the Provinces neither the employers nor the workmen are prepared, as yet, to bind themselves to refer their disputes to an impartial tribunal and to abide by its decision. Though the tendency in that direction is on the increase, it has been suggested that, in the meanwhile, Boards should be const.i.tuted which would be empowered to consider disputes, and, after the examination of books and witnesses, to issue a public report. The judgment would not be enforceable, but might be expected, in {283} the majority of cases, to lead to a settlement of the difficulty; at any rate, it would influence public opinion, which is a large factor in all industrial struggles. But South Australia and New Zealand have pa.s.sed this stage, and have placed drastic measures on their Statute Book which provide, in certain cases, for compulsory awards. The compulsory provisions of the South Australian Act apply only to employers and workmen who are organised and have voluntarily accepted them by the process of registration.

Should they become involved in an industrial dispute, the Governor may, upon the recommendation of the President of the State Board of Conciliation, cause the matter to be referred to it, and the Board may make an award which will be binding upon the parties concerned. In New Zealand, on the other hand, while the proceedings must be initiated by employers or workmen who are registered, the other party, though unregistered, may be called upon, should the Board of Conciliation fail to effect a settlement, to attend before the Court of Arbitration and to obey its award, subject to the general proviso that an employer may suspend or discontinue any industry and an employe cease from working therein. In neither Province is a strike or lock-out permitted during the deliberations of the tribunal.

The Acts do not apply to unorganised workers, except indirectly, partly because they have not been the cause of the great industrial struggles of the past, {284} partly because it would be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce awards against them. It may also have been thought that they would be encouraged thereby to form themselves into Unions, and that the best chance of industrial peace lies in negotiations between responsible bodies of workers and employers who will have too much at stake to be willing to proceed thoughtlessly to extremities. As regards registration, it has been found that the workers of South Australia, though their leaders had supported the compulsory provisions, have been backward in this direction; but that, in New Zealand, no such hesitation has been displayed. The workers in that country do not appear to share the disinclination to agree to the intervention of an arbitrator which is stated to be increasing in Great Britain.

In South Australia, to give a brief account of the new tribunals, Boards of Conciliation may be either Private Boards, const.i.tuted under industrial agreements and endowed with such jurisdiction as may be confided to them in the agreements; or Public Boards, which include Local Boards const.i.tuted for particular localities and particular industries, and the State Board of Conciliation. In New Zealand, the first reference is to an elective Board of Conciliation const.i.tuted for the district in which the dispute has occurred. Should it fail to effect a settlement, the matter may be referred to the Court of Arbitration, which, similarly with the State Board {285} of Conciliation in South Australia, consists of an equal number of representatives of employers and employed and a chairman nominated by the Government, who must, in the former country, be a judge of the Supreme Court. These tribunals are invested with full powers to require the attendance and examination of witnesses, and may either make an award which shall take effect for a period not exceeding two years, and may be enforced by legal process against a.s.sociations and individuals, or they may confine themselves, at their discretion, to a recommendation which will be merely a direction to the parties concerned.

In South Australia the State Board has also the power to inquire into, and report upon, industrial disputes, though the parties be not registered. This portion of the Act has alone been brought into operation, and that unsuccessfully, as, though the representatives of employers and employed on the Board arrived at a unanimous decision upon a dispute affecting the rate of wages, the employer in question refused to be guided by its judgment. The general failure of the Act, though the affirmation of the principle of Conciliation has been valuable, has been due partly to the absence of serious disputes in South Australia, but princ.i.p.ally to the unwillingness both of employers and employed to place themselves in a position in which they will lose control over the terms of employment.

The Act pa.s.sed by the Government of New {286} Zealand, on the contrary, has. .h.i.therto been entirely efficacious, and has prevented the interruption of harmonious relations between employers and employed.

It was first tested upon a dispute which arose over the action of the Consolidated Goldfields Company in reducing wages in the mines from 10s. to 8s. 4d. per day. The men, who were not members of a union, went out on strike, and were then offered wages at the rate of 9s.

Upon the advice of their leaders, the men accepted the offer provisionally; and, having formed themselves into a union which they promptly caused to be registered, referred the matter to the Board of Conciliation. The decision of the Board, which it is unnecessary to specify, was refused by the men, who appealed to the Court of Arbitration. The award of the latter body, which fixed the wages of miners at 9s. 6d. per day, a rate smaller than that which had been received by the men, but larger than that against which they had protested, has been observed loyally by the Company and its employes.

The next dispute arose at Christchurch upon the expiration of the agreement which had been in operation between the boot manufacturers and their workmen for several years, and upon the desire of the former to subst.i.tute new terms which were regarded as distasteful. It was concerned with several matters of detail, but hinged princ.i.p.ally upon the question whether non-unionists should be allowed to work with unionists. As in the {287} former case, an appeal was made from the Board of Conciliation's award to the Court of Arbitration, whose decision, it is noteworthy, both sides had signified their willingness to accept. The award applied to all the bootmakers in the Province with the exception of three or four who were not identified with the boot manufacturers' a.s.sociation, and was accompanied by remarks p.r.o.nounced, it must be remembered, by a judge of the Supreme Court, which cannot fail to be of interest to the Trades Unionists in all parts of the world. I do not, therefore, apologise for quoting them at length:--

”The Arbitration Court has not hitherto been in the habit of giving reasons for its decision. It appears to the Court that, sitting as arbitrators, it should as a general rule follow the ordinary practice of arbitrators and simply give its decision without reasons. In the present case, however, so far as I myself am concerned, I think it is desirable that I should, with respect to part of the award, give some indications of the reasons which have induced the Court to arrive at its conclusion. The part of the award to which I refer is that which relates to clauses 1 and 2 of the general rules which the Manufacturers' a.s.sociation has submitted to the Court: '1. (_a_) It is the individual right of the employer to decide whom he shall employ or dismiss. (_b_) It is the individual right of the workman to accept or refuse work from any employer. {288} 2. Employers or employes, either individually or through any organisation, shall not discriminate for or against any person because he is or is not a member of any organisation, neither shall there be any distinction between organised or non-organised labour; both shall work under the same conditions and receive equal pay for equal work.' The Bootmakers' Union, in opposition to the rules so suggested, put forward the contention that employment should be limited to members of the Bootmakers' Union. The Court, however, is not able to accept the extreme view which has been put forward by the Bootmakers' Union. If it were accepted it might follow that an employer, who had work to do and who could not get Union men to do it, might have to bring his operations to a standstill. The effect of it also would be that non-Union men would be absolutely prevented from earning their living in the workshops of the members of the Manufacturers' a.s.sociation. That, so far as I am concerned, seems to be going beyond what the Court ought to decree. On the other hand, however, I am not prepared to accept absolutely clauses 1 and 2 in the form in which the Manufacturers' a.s.sociation has put them forward. The Court ought, I think, to comply with the intention of the Legislature as evidenced in the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, and ought not to do anything which is calculated to destroy or weaken any industrial organisation. The {289} intention of the Act is indicated in its t.i.tle--the Act is an Act to encourage the formation of Industrial Unions and a.s.sociations. The Court, therefore, ought not to do anything which will tend to destroy or weaken an industrial a.s.sociation, or interfere with the manifest intention of the Legislature as disclosed by the Act. We have this also, that for the last three years the shops of the Manufacturers' a.s.sociation have been practically working as Union shops. It is true that manufacturers say--probably with truth--that they were so worked because they could not help it, but the fact remains that they have been working in that way, and the proposed new rules, as put forward by the manufacturers, expressly reverse the previous mode of working. We have this also, that the previous statement was a statement agreed to between the Manufacturers' a.s.sociation and the Bootmakers' Union, the conference which followed the statement was between the a.s.sociation and the Union, and the dispute now before the Court is between the a.s.sociation and the Union. It is only by means of Unions that labour can take advantage of the Act. Under these circ.u.mstances, it seems to me not unreasonable that the Union should stipulate for special privileges to its members.

The Union are fighting the battle, and it is fair that they should say that the results of the victory, so far as it is a victory, and has any beneficial results, should accrue to them, at any rate in the first instance. They fight {290} the battle for their members, and not for the sake of outside labour. Under these circ.u.mstances it appears to me that it is quite reasonable that the members of the Union should have preference in employment; that members of the Union who are competent should not have to wait about while non-members of the Union are employed in the shops of the Boot Manufacturers' a.s.sociation. The Court, therefore, has modified Rules 1 and 2 in this direction. I need hardly say that each case to be decided under this Act must depend on the particular circ.u.mstances attaching to it; that no one case can be treated as a precedent to any future case, and that because under the particular circ.u.mstances of a particular case, this Court has decided as it has decided, that is no reason why, under different or varying circ.u.mstances, a similar decision ought to be come to. The Court in coming to its decision, takes into consideration not general principles so much as the special circ.u.mstances of each particular case.”

The award, which modified the regulations on the lines laid down by the Court, is regarded as a great triumph by Trade Unionists, who are, not unnaturally, inclined to apply it as a precedent to all organised trades.

A possible exemplification of the efficacy of the Act occurred at the end of 1896, when the engineers employed in the Australian trade of the Union Steams.h.i.+p Company of New Zealand asked that {291} their wages might be raised to the rate which had prevailed before the financial troubles. They took advantage of the increased traffic caused by the holidays in order to emphasise their demands. The engineers of the s.h.i.+ps plying in New Zealand waters made a similar request, which was at once acceded to by the Company, but did not attempt to exert undue pressure. I am not prepared to state that the difference in att.i.tude was due to the Conciliation and Arbitration Act of the latter country, but the coincidence is calculated to encourage that belief. The Managing Director of the Company (Mr. James Mills) told me that he was a hearty supporter of compulsion, not so much because he believed in arbitration, as because a strike or lock-out was obviated, and the parties to a dispute, often trivial at the outset, were brought together before they had been embittered by mutual recriminations. Mr.

Kingston, the Premier of South Australia, and the princ.i.p.al promoter of the South Australian Act, has written in a similar strain:--

”Conciliation Boards should be established in antic.i.p.ation of the differences they are designed to prevent. On the occasion of a great strike, the public cries out for conciliation. Suggestions are received from all quarters recommending Conferences and Arbitration; but when war has been declared, and the disputants, as it were, are at each other's throats, each hopeful of ultimate success, they are seldom in the mood to listen to peacemakers. If either party fears the result of the {292} contest, it may favour pacific counsels. There is, however, a vehement probability that the stronger party will reject all overtures and insist on an unconditional surrender and all the advantages which victory can command. The dispute is then determined, not on its merits, but by sheer strength. The vanquished, smarting under a sense of defeat and injustice, capitulate only with the view to the early renewal of the struggle under more favourable circ.u.mstances.”[11]

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