Part 9 (2/2)

Thompson then laid out his arguments in favor of the meeting: The very prospect of such a summit would prompt the Soviets to take a amore reasonable approacha to issues such as Laos, nuclear testing, and disarmament.

A face-to-face meeting would be the best place for Kennedy to influence crucial decisions of the October Party Congress that could set the stage for the superpower relations.h.i.+p for years to come.

Because Mao Tse-tung opposed such U.S.a”Soviet consultations, Thompson suggested the amere fact of meeting will exacerbate Sovieta”Chinese relations.a Finally, showing the world a willingness to talk directly to Khrushchev would influence public opinion in a way that would make it easier for Kennedy to maintain a strong U.S. position in favor of defending West Berlinas freedoms.

Despite the negative turn in relations with Moscow, Thompson also argued that Khrushchev had not fundamentally altered his desire to do business with the West, nor had he abandoned his foreign policy doctrine of peaceful coexistence. Thompson often worried about being labeled by his Was.h.i.+ngton critics as a Khrushchev apologist, but he nevertheless argued that the Soviet leader had not initiated confrontation with the West in the Third World but had merely taken advantage of U.S. setbacks in Cuba, Laos, Iraq, and the Congo.

However, too much was at stake for Kennedy to agree to such a summit without preconditions that would more thoroughly test Soviet intentionsa”and avoid further foreign policy mistakes. Through diplomatic probes, Kennedy wanted to determine whether Khrushchev genuinely wished to improve relations.

After a day of reflection, Kennedy responded cautiously to Thompson through Rusk. Rusk wanted the amba.s.sador to tell Khrushchev that the president aremains desirousa to meet the Soviet leader and hoped they could still do so by early June in Viennaa”the Sovietsa preferred location. Kennedy regretted, however, that he couldnat yet make a firm decision but would do so before Khrushchev returned to Moscow on May 20.

What followed were the conditions.

Most important, Rusk cabled that Thompson should relay to Khrushchev that the chances for such a summit werenat good if the Soviets didnat change their approach to the ongoing conflict in Laos. The Geneva talks were beginning the following week, and Kennedy wanted to end the war and achieve a neutral Laos. But the Soviets had been stalling in Geneva while fighting escalated.

Special envoy Averell Harriman, who was leading the U.S. delegation in Geneva, had reported to Kennedy that he doubted Khrushchev was ready to accept a neutral Laos because the acommies in Geneva are full of confidence and appear utterly relaxed about achieving their goals in Laos.a The Soviets, Harriman said, were maneuvering to put the U.S. in the unacceptable position of having to attend the conference before they had an effective ceasefire, hardly the actions of a country that would engage usefully in a summit meeting.

Beyond that, Rusk told Thompson that afor domestic political reasons,a the president wanted Khrushchev to provide some prospect that he would work toward Kennedyas goal of achieving a nuclear test ban agreement during their Vienna talks. Furthermore, the president wanted a.s.surance that any public statement in Vienna would exclude reference to Berlin, a matter he was unprepared to negotiate.

Three days later, President Kennedy was test-driving the same message via his brother as RFK sat in his unders.h.i.+rt with Bolshakov at the Justice Department.

It suited Bolshakov fine that Bobby had picked May 9a”a national holiday in Moscowa”for their first, furtive meeting. Though it was just another workday in Was.h.i.+ngton, the Soviet emba.s.syas staff had the day off to celebrate the sixteenth anniversary of the n.a.z.i defeat. That served Bolshakovas purpose of concealing even from his closest comrades the ultrasecret conduit to President Kennedy that he had established.

In going forward with the contact, Bolshakov had disregarded the opposition of his nearest superior, the station chief, or rezident, at the emba.s.sy for Soviet military intelligence, the GRU. For Bolshakovas boss, it was unthinkable that a mid-level Soviet agent would establish the most important U.S.a”Soviet intelligence back channel imaginable. In meeting with Robert Kennedy, Bolshakov was connecting with a man who was at the same time the presidentas brother, his closest confidant, and his attorney general, thus overseeing all the counterintelligence activities of the FBI.

What gave Bolshakov the confidence to nevertheless pursue such a high-level mission was the sanction of the Soviet leader himself through Khrushchevas son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubei, editor of the newspaper Izvestia and Bolshakovas friend. Adzhubei had recommended Bolshakov to Khrushchev as someone who could help counsel him when he was planning his first trip to the U.S. in 1959. (Until shortly before then, Bolshakov had loyally served Marshal Georgy Zhukov, the decorated war hero and defense minister whom Khrushchev had purged.) What followed was Bolshakovas new posting to the U.S. under the cover of emba.s.sy information officer and editor of the English-language Soviet propaganda magazine USSR. It would be Bolshakovas second tour in Was.h.i.+ngton, the first having come under cover as correspondent for the news agency Ta.s.s from 1951 to 1955.

For a cloak-and-dagger operative, Bolshakov had an unusually high profile as Was.h.i.+ngton societyas favorite Soviet. He was a gregarious, hard-drinking bon vivant with wisps of black hair, piercing blue eyes, and a central-casting Russian accent. His friends and acquaintances included a number of Kennedy circle insiders: Was.h.i.+ngton Post editor Ben Bradlee; reporter Charles Bartlett, who had introduced the president to his wife, Jacqueline; the presidentas chief of staff, Kenny OaDonnell; his special counsel, Ted Sorensen; and his press secretary, Pierre Salinger.

However, Bolshakovas most important link to Kennedy had been Frank Holeman, a Was.h.i.+ngton journalist who had been close to Nixon and was now trying to ingratiate himself with the Kennedy administration. With his six-foot-eight frame, Southern accent and manners, deep voice, and ever-present bow tie and cigar, he was known by colleagues as athe Colonel.a Though only forty years old, Holeman was a Was.h.i.+ngton fixture, having covered presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and now Kennedy. He knew Was.h.i.+ngton was all about contacts, and he had them everywhere.

Bolshakov had worked Holeman as an unpaid informant from the time they had met at a 1951 Soviet emba.s.sy lunch in the American correspondentas honor. Holeman had endeared himself to the Kremlin by blocking a National Press Club effort to ban Soviet journalists from members.h.i.+p in response to the Czech governmentas jailing of the entire a.s.sociated Press bureau in Prague. Explaining why he had done so, Holeman joked that the club should be a place where all parties could aswap lies.a He then went even further on behalf of the Soviets, landing club members.h.i.+p for a new Soviet press officer, an individual likely to be a spy.

When Bolshakov returned to Moscow in 1955, he handed off the Holeman contact to his GRU successor, Yuri Gvozdev, whose cover was as a cultural attach. Gvozdev had pa.s.sed through Holeman, who described himself as the Sovietsa acarrier pigeon,a a crucial message that the Eisenhower administration should not overreact to Khrushchevas November 1958 Berlin ultimatum because Khrushchev would never go to war over Berlin. Working through Holeman, Gvozdev also helped lay the groundwork for Nixonas visit to the Soviet Union thereafter, handling negotiations over the conditions.

When Bolshakov replaced Gvozdev in 1959, he reacquainted himself with Holeman and the two struck up such a close friends.h.i.+p that their families often got together socially. As fortune would have it, Holeman had been close for some years to the new attorney generalas press secretary, Ed Guthman, to whom he had been pa.s.sing on the most interesting aspects of his conversations with Bolshakov. Guthman in turn had reported the gist of those talks to Robert Kennedy. With Guthmanas blessing, Holeman on April 29 first floated the possibility of a meeting when he asked Bolshakov, aDonat you think it would be better to meet directly with Robert Kennedy so that he receives your information at first hand?a Ten days and countless conversations later, Bolshakov sensed something important was up when Holeman asked if he would join him for a alate luncha at about four p.m.

aWhy so late?a Bolshakov asked.

Holeman explained he had tried to reach Bolshakov several times over the course of the day but that the holiday duty officer had told him Bolshakov was at the printing office, finis.h.i.+ng the new edition of his magazine.

A short time later, after they had settled into the chairs in the corner of a cozy, inconspicuous Georgetown restaurant, Holeman looked at his watch. When Bolshakov asked whether it was time for him to go home, Holeman said, aNo, itas our time to go. You have an appointment with Robert Kennedy at six.a ad.a.m.n it,a said Bolshakov, looking at his old suit and frayed s.h.i.+rt cuffs. aWhy didnat you tell me before?a aAre you afraid?a asked Holeman.

aNot afraid, but Iam not ready for such a meeting.a aYou are always ready.a Holeman smiled.

At the Justice Department, Bobby told the Soviet his brother worried that tension between the two countries was caused in large degree by misunderstanding and misinterpretation of each otheras intentions and actions. Through the Bay of Pigs experience, Bobby said, his brother had learned about the dangers of taking action based on bad information. He told Bolshakov that his brother had made a mistake after the Bay of Pigs in failing to immediately fire the senior officials responsible for the operation.

aThe American government and the President,a said Bobby, aare concerned that the Soviet leaders.h.i.+p underestimates the capabilities of the U.S. government and those of the President himself.a The message he wanted Bolshakov to relay to the Kremlin could not have been clearer: If Khrushchev tried to test his brotheras resolve, the president would have no choice but to atake corrective actiona and introduce a tougher approach toward Moscow.

He told Bolshakov, aAt present, our princ.i.p.al concern is the situation in Berlin. The importance of this issue may not be evident to everybody. The President thinks that further misunderstanding of our opinions on Berlin could lead to a war.a Yet, he added, it was precisely because of the complications of the Berlin situation that the president didnat want the Vienna meeting to focus on a matter where it would be so difficult to achieve progress.

What the president wanted, Bobby told Bolshakov, was for Khrushchev and his brother to use the meeting as a chance to better understand each other, to create personal ties, and to outline a course to further develop their relations.h.i.+p. He wanted real agreements on matters like the nuclear test ban. On Berlin, however, he believed in delaying significant diplomatic steps until both sides had had more time to thoroughly study the matter.

For an individual who had only been called to join the meeting a couple of hours earlier, the Soviet seemed well prepared to respond. If the top U.S. and Soviet leaders met, Bolshakov said, Khrushchev would then consider asubstantiala concessions on nuclear testing, and would also offer progress on Laos. Bolshakov did not comment on RFKas insistence that Berlin remain off-limits in any summit decisions, which Bobby may have misinterpreted as agreement.

Encouraged by Bolshakovas response, Bobby sketched out a potential nuclear test ban deal. The two countries had been negotiating at lower levels since 1958, but their sticking point was verification. The U.S. had sought without success the right to inspect sites in the Soviet Union. Bobby proposed a unilateral concession under which the U.S. would cut in half, from twenty to ten, the number of inspections it was demanding each year on each otheras territory to investigate seismic events. The condition for this agreement, he said, would be that neither side would veto the creation of an international commission that could monitor complaints.

Behind Bobbyas proposal lay a growing U.S. fear that the Soviets were digging holes so deep and large that they could conceal a weapons test. The most annual inspections Moscow had been willing to accept previously were three. And Moscow wanted any verification to be performed by a atroikaaa”three officials representing the Soviet bloc, the capitalist West, and the Third World. U.S. officials had opposed that approach as it would have granted a Soviet representative a de facto veto. Said Bobby, aThe President does not want to repeat the sad experience of Khrushchevas meeting with Eisenhower at Camp David and hopes that this forthcoming meeting will produce concrete agreements.a Playing the role of suitor, Bolshakov said nothing that would make Bobby believe the presidentas preconditions for a summit were unacceptable to Khrushchev. There was only one problem: Bolshakov was a mere message carrier who could not know Khrushchevas mind as well as Bobby knew that of his brother.

The perils to the U.S. of the Bolshakova”Bobby Kennedy contact were deep and multiple. Bolshakov could deceive on Moscowas behalf without knowing he was doing so, while Bobby was far less likely to engage in disinformation and, even if he had tried, would have been less skilled in doing so. Beyond that, Bolshakov almost undoubtedly was tailed by FBI agents. Reports back from field agents on their meetings could have increased FBI boss J. Edgar Hooveras suspicions of the Kennedys.

Finally, Bolshakov lacked Bobbyas license to horse-trade. And because JFK would keep the contacts secret even from his own top Cabinet members until after the Vienna Summit, he had no independent means to verify Bolshakovas reliability. Moscow not only controlled what Bolshakov could discuss, it also determined the precise manner in which he would raise issues. If Robert Kennedy raised a matter for which Bolshakov was unprepared, the Soviet spy would respond that he would consider the issue and get back to the attorney general later.

The most important messages Bolshakov brought back from his first meeting with Bobby relayed the presidentas readiness for a summit, his fear that the Soviet leader perceived him as weak, his aversion to negotiating Berlinas status, and his desire above all else to achieve a nuclear test ban deal. Bobby came away from the initial contact unable to provide his brother any greater insight into Khrushchev. He was at the same time gaining the false impression that Khrushchev was ready to accept his brotheras conditions.

After five hours of conversation, Bobby gave Bolshakov a ride home. Kept awake by adrenaline, the Soviet operative stayed up all night before cabling a full report to Moscow early the next morning. Through Bolshakov, Khrushchev knew far better what Kennedy hoped to achieve through a summit and what he feared about it. At the same time, he had effectively misled the president about what the Soviet side was willing to accept.

MOSCOW.

FRIDAY, MAY 12, 1961.

Eager to close agreement for a Vienna Summit, Khrushchev rapidly satisfied Kennedyas desire for confidence-building gestures.

In Geneva, Soviet officials negotiating Laos reached agreement with British representatives on a formula to defuse an impending crisis. The result would be a fourteen-nation conference on Laos in Geneva, with the goal of an end to hostilities and a neutral Laos.

On the same day, Khrushchev delivered a speech in Tbilisi, in the Soviet republic of Georgia, that senior State Department officials considered the most moderate Soviet statement on U.S.a”Soviet relations since the U-2 incident the previous May. Repeating language he had used in his acceptance of Kennedyas summit invitation, Khrushchev said, aAlthough President Kennedy and I are men of different poles, we live on the same Earth. We have to find a common language on certain questions.a On that day, too, Khrushchev sent a letter to Kennedy accepting his invitation of nearly two months earlier to a summit meeting. The letter made no mention of a nuclear test ban, though it touched upon areas where they might make progress, such as Laos. However, Khrushchev was not willing to lay Berlin to the side. He said he did not seek unilateral advantage in the divided city, but wanted through their meeting to remove a adangerous source of tension in Europe.a Now it was Kennedyas move.

WAs.h.i.+NGTON, D.C.

SUNDAY, MAY 14, 1961.

Not wanting to appear rushed, Kennedy took forty-eight hours to reply. He was unhappy about Khrushchevas failure to embrace the test ban issue and his insistence on discussing Berlin. The Soviet leaderas letter had walked away from Kennedyas preconditions as relayed by Bobby to Bolshakov. Yet for all the perils, Kennedy saw no option but to agree to the meeting.

Khrushchevas Tbilisi speech and his gestures on Laos were encouraging. However, the awkward truth was that what could be one of the most decisive meetings since World War II was less than one month off and there would be little time for the two sides to reach agreement on what diplomats referred to as the summitas adeliverables.a To veteran diplomats, the presidentas haste looked restless and naive.

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