Part 5 (1/2)
With respect to the faults which I may have committed in this translation (for I am not vain enough to suppose it is without fault), I might plead as an excuse, that the whole of it has been executed amidst severe endurance from bodily infirmity and indigent circ.u.mstances; and that a very considerable part of it was accomplished amidst other ills of no common magnitude, and other labors inimical to such an undertaking. But whatever may be my errors, I will not fly to calamity for an apology. Let it be my excuse that the mistakes I may have committed in lesser particulars, have arisen from my eagerness to seize and promulgate those great truths in the philosophy and theology of Plato, which though they have been concealed for ages in oblivion, have a subsistence coeval with the universe, and will again be restored, and flourish for very extended periods, through all the infinite revolutions of time.
In the next place, it is necessary to speak concerning the qualifications requisite in a legitimate student of the philosophy of Plato, previous to which I shall just notice the absurdity of supposing that a mere knowledge of the Greek tongue, however great that knowledge may be, is alone sufficient to the understanding the sublime doctrines of Plato; for a man might as well think that he can understand Archimedes without a knowledge of the elements of geometry, merely because he can read him in the original. Those who entertain such an idle opinion, would do well to meditate on the profound observation of Herac.l.i.tus, ”that polymathy does not teach intellect,” ([Greek: Polymathic noon ou didaskei]).
By a legitimate student, then, of the Platonic philosophy, I mean one who, both from nature and education, is properly qualified for such an arduous undertaking; that is one who possesses a naturally good disposition; is sagacious and acute, and is inflamed with an ardent desire for the acquisition of wisdom and truth; who from his childhood has been well instructed in the mathematical disciplines; who, besides this, has spent whole days, and frequently the greater part of the night, in profound meditation; and, like one triumphantly sailing over a raging sea, or skillfully piercing through an army of foes, has successfully encountered an hostile mult.i.tude of doubts;--in short, who has never considered wisdom as a thing of trifling estimation and easy access, but as that which cannot be obtained without the most generous and severe endurance, and the intrinsic worth of which surpa.s.ses all corporeal good, far more than the ocean the fleeting bubble which floats on its surface.
To such as are dest.i.tute of these requisites, who make the study of words their sole employment, and the pursuit of wisdom but at best a secondary thing, who expect to be wise by desultory application for an hour or two in a day, after the fatigues of business, after mixing with the base mult.i.tude of mankind, laughing with the gay affecting airs of gravity with the serious, tacitly a.s.senting to every man's opinion, however absurd, and winking at folly however shameful and base--to such as these--and, alas! the world is full of such--the sublimest truths must appear to be nothing more than jargon and reverie, the dreams of a distempered imagination, or the ebullitions of fanatical faith.
But all this is by no means wonderful, if we consider that two-fold ignorance is the disease of the many. For they are not only ignorant with respect to the sublimest knowledge, but they are even ignorant of their ignorance. Hence they never suspect their want of understanding, but immediately reject a doctrine which appears at first sight absurd, because it is too splendid for their bat-like eyes to behold. Or if they even yield their a.s.sent to its truth, their very a.s.sent is the result of the same most dreadful disease of the soul. For they will fancy, says Plato, that they understand the highest truths, when the very contrary is really the case. I earnestly therefore entreat men of this description, not to meddle with any of the profound speculations of the Platonic philosophy, for it is more dangerous to urge them to such an employment, than to advise them to follow their sordid avocations with unwearied a.s.siduity, and toil for wealth with increasing alacrity and vigor; as they will by this means give free scope to the base habits of their soul, and sooner suffer that punishment which in such as these must always precede mental illumination, and be the inevitable consequence of guilt.
It is well said indeed by Lysis, the Pythagorean, that to inculcate liberal speculations and discourses to those whose morals are turbid and confused, is just as absurd as to pour pure and transparent water into a deep well full of mire and clay; for he who does this will only disturb the mud, and cause the pure water to become defiled. The woods of such, as the same author beautifully observes, (that is the irrational or corporeal life), in which these dire pa.s.sions are nourished, must first be purified with fire and sword, and every kind of instrument (that is, through preparatory disciplines, and the political virtues), and reason must be freed from its slavery to the affections, before any thing useful can be planted in these savage haunts.
Let not such then presume to explore the regions of Platonic philosophy.
The land is too pure to admit the sordid and the base. The road which conducts to it is too intricate to be discovered by the unskillful and stupid, and the journey is too long and laborious to be accomplished by the effeminate and the timid, by the slave of pa.s.sion and the dupe of opinion, by the lover of sense and the despiser of truth. The dangers and difficulties in the undertaking are such as can be sustained by none but the most hardy and accomplished adventurers; and he who begins the journey without the strength of Hercules, or the wisdom and patience of Ulysses, must be destroyed by the wild beasts of the forest, or perish in the storms of the ocean; must suffer trans.m.u.tation into a beast through the magic power of Circe, or be exiled for life by the detaining charm of Calypso; and in short must descend into Hades, and wander in its darkness, without emerging from thence to the bright regions of the morning, or be ruined by the deadly melody of the Syren's song. To the most skillful traveler, who pursues the right road with an ardor which no toils can abate, with a vigilance which no weariness can surprise into negligence, and with virtue which no temptations can seduce, it exhibits for many years the appearance of the Ithaca of Ulysses, or the flying Italy of AEneas; for we no sooner gain a glimpse of the pleasing land which is to be the end of our journey, than it is suddenly ravished from our view, and we still find ourselves at a distance from the beloved coast, exposed to the fury of a stormy sea of doubts.
Abandon then, ye groveling souls, the fruitless design! Pursue with avidity the beaten road which leads to popular honors and sordid gain, but relinquish all thoughts of a voyage for which you are totally unprepared. Do you not perceive what a length of sea separates you from the royal coast? A sea,
Huge, horrid, vast, where scarce in safety sails The best built s.h.i.+p, though Jove inspire the gales.
And may we not very justly ask you, similar to the interrogation of Calypso,
What s.h.i.+ps have you, what sailors to convey, What oars to cut the long laborious way?
I shall only observe further, that the life of Plato, by Olympiodorus, was prefixed to this translation, in preference to that by Diogenes Laertius, because the former is the production of a most eminent Platonist, and the latter of a mere historian, who indiscriminately gave to the public whatever anecdotes he found in other authors. If the reader combines this short sketch of the life of Plato with what that philosopher says of himself in his 7th Epistle, he will be in possession of the most important particulars about him that can be obtained at present.
EXPLANATIONS OF CERTAIN PLATONIC TERMS
As some apology may be thought necessary for having introduced certain unusual words of Greek origin, I shall only observe, that, as all arts and sciences have certain appropriate terms peculiar to themselves, philosophy, which is the art of arts, and science of sciences, as being the mistress of both, has certainly a prior and a far superior claim to this privilege. I have not, however, introduced, I believe, any of these terms without at the same time sufficiently explaining them; but, lest the contrary should have taken place, the following explanation of all such terms as I have been able to recollect, and also of common words used by Platonists in a peculiar sense, is subjoined for the information of the reader.
Anagogic, [Greek: anagogikos]. Leading on high.
Demiurgus, [Greek: demiourgos]. Jupiter, the artificer of the universe.
Dianoetia. This word is derived from [Greek: dianoia], or that power of the soul which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect. Plato is so uncommonly accurate in his diction, that this word is very seldom used by him in any other than its primary sense.
The Divine, [Greek: to Theion], is being subsisting in conjunction with the one. For all things, except the one, viz. essence, life, and intellect, are considered by Plato as suspended from and secondary to the G.o.ds. For the G.o.ds do not subsist in, but prior to, these, which they also produce and connect, but are not characterized by these. In many places, however, Plato calls the partic.i.p.ants of the G.o.ds by the names of the G.o.ds. For not only the Athenian Guest in the Laws, but also Socrates in the Phaedrus, calls a divine soul a G.o.d. ”For,” says he, ”all the horses and charioteers of the G.o.ds are good,” &c. And afterwards, still more clearly, he adds, ”And this is the life of the G.o.ds.” And not only this, but he also denominates those nature G.o.ds that are always united to the G.o.ds, and which, in conjunction with them, give completion to one series. He also frequently calls daemons G.o.ds, though, according to essence, they are secondary to and subsist about the G.o.ds. For in the Phaedrus, Timaeus, and other dialogues, he extends the appellation of G.o.ds as far as the daemons. And what is still more paradoxical than all this, he does not refuse to call some men G.o.ds; as, for instance, the Elean Guest in the Sophista. From all this, therefore, we must infer that with respect to the word G.o.d, one thing which is thus denominated is simply deity; another is so according to union; a third, according to partic.i.p.ation; a fourth, according to contact; and a fifth, according to similitude. Thus every superessential nature is primarily a G.o.d; but every intellectual nature is so according to union. And again, every divine soul is a G.o.d according to partic.i.p.ation; but divine daemons are G.o.ds according to contact with the G.o.ds; and the souls of men obtain this appellation through similitude. Each of these, however, except the first, is as we have said, rather divine than a G.o.d; for the Athenian Guest in the Laws, calls intellect itself divine. But that which is divine is secondary to the first deity, in the same manner as the united is to the one; that which is intellectual to intellect; and that which is animated to soul. Indeed, things more uniform and simple always precede, and the series of beings ends in the one itself.
Doxastic. This word is derived from doxa, opinion, and signifies that which is apprehended by opinion, or that power which is the extremity of the rational soul. This power knows the universal in particulars, as that every man is a rational animal; but it knows not the dioti, or why a thing is, but only the oti, or that it is.
The Eternal, [Greek: To aionion], that which has a never-ending subsistence, without any connection with time; or, as Plotinus profoundly defines it, infinite life at once total and full.
That which is generated, [Greek: to geneton]. That which has not the whole of its essence or energy subsisting at once without temporal dispersion.
Generation, [Greek: genesis]. An essence composite and multiform, and conjoined with time. This is the proper signification of the word; but it is used symbolically by Plato, and also by theologists more ancient than Plato, for the sake of indication. For as Proclus beautifully observes (in MS. Comment in Parmenidem), ”Fables call the ineffable unfolding into light through causes, generation.” ”Hence,” he adds in the Orphic writings, the first cause is denominated time; for where there is generation, according to its proper signification, there also there is time.”
A Guest, [Greek: Xenos]. This word, in its more ample signification in the Greek, denotes a stranger, but properly implies one who receives another, or is himself received at an entertainment. In the following dialogues, therefore, wherever one of the speakers is introduced as a Xenos, I have translated this word guest, as being more conformable to the genius of Plato's dialogues, which may be justly called rich mental banquets, and consequently the speakers in them may be considered as so many guests. Hence in the Timaeus, the persons of that dialogue are expressly spoken of as guests.
Hyparxis, [Greek: uparxis]. The first principle or foundation, as it were, of the essence of a thing. Hence also, it is the summit of essence.