Part 67 (1/2)

He paused, and Donal sat silent--so long that his lords.h.i.+p opened the eyes which, the better to enjoy the process of sentence-making, he had kept shut, and half turned his head towards him: he had begun to doubt whether he was really by his bedside, or but one of his many visions undistinguishable by him from realities. Re-a.s.sured by the glance, he resumed.

”I cannot, of course, expect from you such an exhaustive and formed opinion as from an older man who had made metaphysics his business, and acquainted himself with all that had been said upon the subject; at the same time you must have expended a considerable amount of thought on these matters!”

He talked in a quiet, level manner, almost without inflection, and with his eyes again closed--very much as if he were reading a book inside him.

”I have had a good deal,” he went on, ”to shake my belief in the common ideas on such points.--Do you believe there is such a thing as free will?”

He ceased, awaiting the answer which Donal felt far from prepared to give him.

”My lord,” he said at length, ”what I believe, I do not feel capable, at a moment's notice, of setting forth; neither do I think, however unavoidable such discussions may be in the forum of one's own thoughts, that they are profitable between men. I think such questions, if they are to be treated at all between man and man, and not between G.o.d and man only, had better be discussed in print, where what is said is in some measure fixed, and can with a glance be considered afresh. But not so either do I think they can be discussed to any profit.”

”What do you mean? Surely this question is of the first importance to humanity!”

”I grant it, my lord, if by humanity you mean the human individual. But my meaning is, that there are many questions, and this one, that can be tested better than argued.”

”You seem fond of paradox!”

”I will speak as directly as I can: such questions are to be answered only by the moral nature, which first and almost only they concern; and the moral nature operates in action, not discussion.”

”Do I not then,” said his lords.h.i.+p, the faintest shadow of indignation in his tone, ”bring my moral nature to bear on a question which I consider from the ground of duty?”

”No, my lord,” answered Donal, with decision; ”you bring nothing but your intellectual nature to bear on it so; the moral nature, I repeat, operates only in action. To come to the point in hand: the sole way for a man to know he has freedom is to do something he ought to do, which he would rather not do. He may strive to acquaint himself with the facts concerning will, and spend himself imagining its mode of working, yet all the time not know whether he has any will.”

”But how am I to put a force in operation, while I do not know whether I possess it or not?”

”By putting it in operation--that alone; by being alive; by doing the next thing you ought to do, or abstaining from the next thing you are tempted to, knowing you ought not to do it. It sounds childish; and most people set action aside as what will do any time, and try first to settle questions which never can be settled but in just this divinely childish way. For not merely is it the only way in which a man can know whether he has a free will, but the man has in fact no will at all unless it comes into being in such action.”

”Suppose he found he had no will, for he could not do what he wished?”

”What he ought, I said, my lord.”

”Well, what he ought,” yielded the earl almost angrily.

”He could not find it proved that he had no faculty for generating a free will. He might indeed doubt it the more; but the positive only, not the negative, can be proved.”

”Where would be the satisfaction if he could only prove the one thing and not the other.”

”The truth alone can be proved, my lord; how should a lie be proved?

The man that wanted to prove he had no freedom of will, would find no satisfaction from his test--and the less the more honest he was; but the man anxious about the dignity of the nature given him, would find every needful satisfaction in the progress of his obedience.”

”How can there be free will where the first thing demanded for its existence or knowledge of itself is obedience?”

”There is no free will save in resisting what one would like, and doing what the Truth would have him do. It is true the man's liking and the truth may coincide, but therein he will not learn his freedom, though in such coincidence he will always thereafter find it, and in such coincidence alone, for freedom is harmony with the originating law of one's existence.”

”That's dreary doctrine.”

”My lord, I have spent no little time and thought on the subject, and the result is some sort of practical clearness to myself; but, were it possible, I should not care to make it clear to another save by persuading him to arrive at the same conviction by the same path--that, namely, of doing the thing required of him.”

”Required of him by what?”