Part 1 (1/2)
The Psychology of Beauty
by Ethel D Puffer
PREFACE
THE hu who thrills to the experience of beauty in nature and in art does not forever rest with that experience unquestioned The day comes when he yearns to pierce the secret of his e him--to defend and to justify his transport to himself and to others He seeks a reason for the faith that is in him And so have arisen the speculative theories of the nature of beauty, on the one hand, and the studies of concrete beauty and our feelings about it, on the other
Speculative theory has taken its oay, however, as a part of philosophy, in relating the Beautiful to the other great concepts of the True and the Good; building up an architectonic of abstract ideas, far from the immediate facts and problerown up, on the other hand, in the last years, a great literature of special studies in the facts of aesthetic production and enjoyations into the physiological psychology of aesthetic reactions; studies in the genesis and development of art forroups of facts for psychology; they have not been taken up into a single authoritative principle Psychology cannot do justice to the imperative of beauty, by virtue of which, e say ”this is beautiful,” we have a right to iree with us A synthesis of these tendencies in the study of beauty is needed, in which the results of ible a philosophical theory of beauty The chief purpose of this book is to seek to effect such a union
A way of defining Beauty which grounds it in general principles, while allowing it to reach the concrete case, is set forth in the essay on the Nature of Beauty The following chapters aim to expand, to test, and to confir, partly by the aid of the aforesaid special studies, how it accounts for our pleasure in pictures, music, and literature
The whole field of beauty is thus brought under discussion; and therefore, though it nowhere seeks to be exhaustive in treatment, the book may fairly claim to be a more or less consistent and complete aesthetic theory, and hence to address itself to the student of aesthetics as well as to the general reader The chapter on the Nature of Beauty, indeed, will doubtless be found by the latter somewhat technical, and should be oy The general conclusions of the book are sufficiently stated in the less abstract papers
Of the essays which co volume, the first, third, and last are reprinted, in more or less revised form, from the ”Atlantic Monthly” and the ”International Monthly”
Although written as independent papers, it is thought that they do not unduly repeat each other, but that they serve to verify, in each of the several realms of beauty, the truth of the central theory of the book
The various influences which have served to shape a work of this kind beco; but I cannot refrain from a word of thanks to the teachers whose inspiration and encourageratitude to Professor Mary A Jordan and Professor H Nore, who in literature and in philosophy first set me in the way of aesthetic interest and inquiry, and to Professor Hugo Munsterberg of Harvard University, whose philosophical theories and scientific guidance have largely influenced ht
WELLESLEY COLLEGE, April 24, 1905
I CRITICISM AND AESTHETICS
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BEAUTY
I CRITICISM AND AESTHETICS
IT is not so long ago that the field of literary criticis the only country in the world where criticisedabout the present general interest and understanding of the theoretical questions at issue The combatants were, of course, the impressionistic and scientific schools of criticis were the more or less recent controversies between MM Anatole France and Jules Lemaitre as representatives of the first, and M
Brunetiere as the chief exponent of the second They have planted their standards; and we see that they stand for tendencies in the critical activity of every nation The ideal of the i in some exquisitely happy characterization,-- to create a lyric of criticishold of the scientist, on the other hand, is the doctrine of literary evolution, and his aim is to show the history of literature as the history of a process, and the work of literature as a product; to explain it froeneral laws of literary reat lines of modern criticism; their purposes and ideals stand diametrically opposed Of late, however, there have not been wanting signs of a spirit of reconciliation, and of a tendency to concede the value, each in its own sphere, of different but coain the lion and the la a delightful paper of Mr Lewis E Gates on Impressionism and Appreciation,<1> that the lamb had assimilated the lion For the heir of all literary studies, according to Professor Gates, is the appreciative critic; and he it is who shall fulfill the true function of criticis and its psychological origin, ”as a characteristic moment in the development of human spirit, and as a delicately transparent illustration of aesthetic law” But, ”in regarding the work of art under all these aspects, his aimatize, but to enjoy; to realize the athered unto itself froinatively to the eneration”
<1> Atlantic Monthly, July, 1900
Thus it would seem that if the report of his personal reactions to a work of literary art is the intention of the impressionist, and its explanation that of the scientist, the purpose of the appreciative critic is fairly na reproduction of that work, from material furnished by those other forms of critical activity Must, then, thethe two opposed views, forthwith claim our adherence? To put to use all the devices of science and all the treasures of scholarshi+p for the single end of i with the original melody all the hares have added, is, indeed, a great undertaking But is it as valuable as it is vast? M
Brunetiere has poured out his irony upon the critics who believe that their own reactions upon literature are anything to us in the presence of the works to which they have thrilled May it not also be asked of the interpreter if its function is a necessary one? Do we require so htenive the dull palate its full savor; but what literary epicure, what real boo-lover, will acknowledge his own need of it? If the whole aiement the contents, expressed and iinal and derived, of a piece of literature, the value of the end, at least to the intelligent reader, is out of all proportion to the laboriousness of the 's a joy! Forof this kind is, after all, not a reason to be urged against the method The real weakness of appreciative criticism lies elsewhere It teaches us to enjoy; but are we to enjoy everything? Since its only aim is to reveal the ”intricate implications” of a work of art; since it offers, and professes to offer, no literary judg indeed no explicit standard of literary value,--it must, at least on its own theory, take its objects of appreciation ready-made, so to speak, by popular acclaim It possesses no criterion; it likes whate'er it looks on; and it can never tell us e are not to like That is unsatisfactory; and it is worse,-- it is self-destructive For, not being able to reject, appreciation cannot, in logic, choose the objects of its attention But a method which cannot limit on its own principles the field within which it is to work is conde; it bears a fallacy at its core In order to make criticism theoretically possible at all, the power to choose and reject, and so the pronouncing of judgral part of it
To such a task the critic onis need to know the latent possibilities of emotion for us in a book or a poem; but whether it is excellent or the reverse, whether ”ere right in beingto hear, for we desire to justify the faith that is in us
If, then, the office of the judge be an essential part of the critical function, the appreciative critic, whatever his other merits,--and we shall examine them later,--fails at least of perfection His scheme is not the ideal one; and we may turn back, in our search for it, to a closer view of those which his was to supersede I; it has always vigorously repudiated the notion of the standard, and we know, therefore, that no more than appreciation can it choose its material and stand alone But scientific criticism professes, at least, the true faith M
Brunetiere holds that his own ment can be rendered
The doctrine of the evolution of literary species isit Literary species, M Brunetiere maintains, do exist They develop and are transforous to the evolution of natural types It reiven Although M Brunetiere seems to make classification the disposal of a work in the hierarchy of species, and judgment the disposal of it in relation to others of its own species, he has never sharply distinguished between the his three principles of classification, scientific, moral, and aesthetic, as three principles by which he estimates the excellence of a work His own exaed in being classified The work of art is judged, then, by its relation to the type Is this position tenable?
I hold that, on the contrary, it precludes the possibility of a critical judg is not the less a bad king for being a good father; and if his kingshi+p is his essential function, he ed with reference to that alone Now a piece of literature is, with reference to its end, first of all a work of art It represents life and it enjoins morality, but it is only as a work of art that it attains consideration; that, in the words of M Lemaitre, it ”exists” for us at all Its ai
The type belongs to natural history The one principle at the basis of scientific criticism is, as we have seen, the conception of literary history as a process, and of the work of art as a product The work of art is, then, a e and adaptation like those of natural evolution But how can the conception of values enter here? Excellence can be attributed only to that which attains an ideal end; and a necessary succession has no end in itself The ”type,” in this sense, is perfectly hollow
To say that the modern chrysanthemum is better than that of our forbears because it is more chrysanthemum-like is true only if we make the latter form the arbitrary standard of the chrysanthee is inferior to the horse of to-day, it is because, on M Brunetiere's principle, he is less horse-like But who shall decide which is inal or the latter development? No species which is constituted by its own history can be said to have an end in itself, and can, therefore, have an excellence to which it shall attain In short, good and bad can be applied to thea fictitious superiority to the last terically be preferred to another As for the individual specimens, since the conception of the type does not admit the principle of excellence, confor
The work of art, on the other hand, as a thing of beauty, is an attainment of an ideal, not a product, and, from this point of view, is related not at all to the other terms of a succession, its causes and its effects, but only to the abstract principles of that beauty at which it aih, the whole principle of this contention has been admitted by M Brunetiere in a casual sentence, of which he does not appear to recognize the full significance ”We acknowledge, of course,” he says, ”that there is in criticism a certain difference from natural history, since we cannot eliminate the subjective ele impressions on us makes a part of their definition It is not in order to be eaten that the tree produces its fruit” But this is giving away his whole position! As little as the conformity of the fruit to its species has to do with our pleasure in eating it, just so little has the conforenre to do with the quality by virtue of which it is defined as art