Part 15 (1/2)

ROLL CALL

International Security a.s.sistance Force (ISAF) May 2007July 2008

At Forward Operating Base Fenty, Jalalabad Airfield, Nangarhar Province: Colonel Chip Preysler, Commander, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (”173rd Airborne”), 10th Mountain Division At Forward Operating Base Naray, Kunar Province: Lieutenant Colonel Chris Kolenda, Squadron Commander, 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment (”1-91 Cav”), 173rd Airborne, 10th Mountain Division Captain Nathan Springer, 1-91 Cav Headquarters Troop Commander Captain Joey Hutto, 1-91 Cav a.s.sistant Operations Officer At Combat Outpost Keating and Observation Post Warheit, Nuristan Province: Bulldog Troop, 1-91 Cav, 173rd Airborne, 10th Mountain Division Captain Tom Bostick, Commander Captain Joey Hutto, Commander Second Lieutenant Ken Johnson, Fire Support Officer 1st Platoon First Lieutenant Dave Roller, Leader First Lieutenant Hank Hughes, Leader 2nd Platoon First Lieutenant John Meyer, Leader First Lieutenant Kyle Marc.u.m, Leader Staff Sergeant Ryan Fritsche Sergeant John Wilson Private First Cla.s.s Alberto Barba 3rd Platoon First Lieutenant Alex Newsom, Leader Sergeant First Cla.s.s Rodney O'Dell Staff Sergeant John Faulkenberry Private First Cla.s.s Chris Pfeifer Private First Cla.s.s Michael Del Sarto Private First Cla.s.s Jonathan Sultan On the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kala Gush, Nuristan Province: Navy Commander Sam Paparo, team head Trainer of the Afghan National Army (ANA) Troops at Combat Outpost Keating, Nuristan Province: Marine Master Sergeant Scott Ingbretsen On the Home Front: Sarah Faulkenberry, wife of Staff Sergeant John Faulkenberry Karen Pfeifer, wife of Private Chris Pfeifer June 2008June 2009 At Jalalabad Airfield, Nangarhar Province: Colonel John Spiszer, Commander, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division At Forward Operating Base Naray, Kunar Province: Lieutenant Colonel James Markert, Squadron Commander, 6th Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment (”6-4 Cav”) of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division At Combat Outpost Keating and Observation Post Fritsche: Blackfoot Troop, 6th Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment (”6-4 Cav”) of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division Captain Robert Yllescas, Troop Commander First Lieutenant Joseph Mazzocchi, Executive Officer Specialist Rick Victorino, Intelligence Officer First Lieutenant Kyle Tucker, Fire Support Officer First Lieutenant Kaine Meshkin, Red Platoon Leader First Lieutenant Chris Safulko, Blue Platoon Leader Trainer of the ANA Troops at Combat Outpost Keating: Marine Lieutenant Chris Briley On the Home Front Dena Yllescas, wife of Captain Rob Yllescas

CHAPTER 16

”There's Not Going to Be Any Ice Cream”

First Lieutenant Dave Roller couldn't believe his eyes, couldn't help but grin.

Two dozen naked young women?

Are you kidding kidding me? me?

Roller and his platoon were on a ridgeline overlooking the hamlet of Saret Koleh, east of Combat Outpost Keating. They had camped there to watch over the area, to try to discern whether the Nuristanis had any idea that the next day, July 27, 2007, Captain Tom Bostick, the leader of Bulldog Troop, would be coming to the village for a shura. The nearby road was a popular site for insurgent attacks, so there had been occasional sweeps of the hamlet, but until now, no U.S. troops had ever made an official visit. For more than a day, Roller and 1st Platoon had been reporting atmospherics back to Bostick, their commander, at the base: ”Trucks are rolling through here,” they would say, or, ”The weather looks good for tomorrow.” Now, through the magnifying scope on his rifle, Roller was finally seeing something really noteworthy.

”Bulldog-Six, this is Red-One,” he had murmured over his radio to Bostick a few minutes before, using both of their call signs. ”Looks like some women are leaving the village right now.”

He'd watched as more than twenty women made their way from Saret Koleh to a stream that fed into the Landay-Sin River. Then kept watching as they started to disrobe.

”Looks like they're about to jump in the creek,” Roller whispered.

They ranged in age from about sixteen to thirty. The sun was pounding the mountains on this hot July day, and after jumping into the stream, they splashed one another playfully as they bathed in the cool water.

It was, to say the least, jarring: Roller had seen only about five local women in total during his first two months in Afghanistan, and all of them had been covered from head to toe in burqas. It looks like a G.o.dd.a.m.n sorority pool party, he thought. He was two thousand feet above the Nuristani women, looking at them from eight hundred yards away, so couldn't see any real details, just general shapes and colors. Still, there was intelligence to be had here: their romping made him fairly certain that no one in the hamlet of Saret Koleh had any idea that 1st Platoon was watching from just up the hill.

”Red-One, this is Bulldog-Six,” Bostick said. ”What's going on?”

”Sir, you're not going to believe this,” Roller replied. ”I got about twenty to twenty-five women here, naked, taking a bath.”

It was a comic overture, but a fleeting one, to a day that would end up being the worst of their lives.

First Lieutenant Alex Newsom and his 3rd Platoon were with Bostick at Combat Outpost Kamu that momentous July day, ready to serve as a quick reaction force. Both Roller and Newsom hailed from soft, privileged worlds that they had essentially rejected for lives of blood and muck. Roller had grown up in Coral Gables, Florida, and Newsom in Beverly Hills. Both were handsome: Roller had a tousle-haired all-American look to him, while Newsom was swarthy, with a devilish charm. They were the sort of guys the Army used to great success in recruiting videos, the Army Of One soldiers who were Being All They Can Be.

The two had briefly been cla.s.smates at U.S. Army Ranger School, the intense two-month combat leaders.h.i.+p course in Fort Benning, Georgia, but they hadn't connected in any meaningful way until they were each a.s.signed a platoon in Bulldog Troop, 1-91 Cavalry Squadron, part of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, in Schweinfurt, Germany. After four weeks in Germany, Roller and Newsom had flown back to Fort Benning for a reconnaissance-and-surveillance course focused on conducting operations in small teams and on foot. They'd bonded then, coming to see foot patrols and Vietnam-era tactics as the way to go in Afghanistan. Their commanders in Germany seemed to want to drive everywhere, while Roller and Newsom pictured themselves as bada.s.ses humping through the wooded hills.

It hadn't taken them much time at all to become best friends. They were confident, even c.o.c.ky, and as mere lieutenants, perhaps a bit too comfortable in their dealings with superior officers. On their way back to Germany after the recon course, having been upgraded to First Cla.s.s, the two of them drank all the Woodford Reserve bourbon on the plane.

Then Captain Tom Bostick, Jr., came into their lives to kick that silliness out of them.

Bostick, as the cliche went, had been bred to serve. His paternal grandfather, Bill, was an Army sergeant at Pearl Harbor when the j.a.panese bombs. .h.i.t. One of Bill's brothers survived the Bataan Death March. The family could trace its military service all the way back to James Bostick of North Carolina, who'd fought the Redcoats during the American Revolution; through him, Captain Bostick was related to the Texas Revolutionary War hero Sion Bostick, who as a seventeen-year-old Texas Army scout had been one of three soldiers responsible for capturing Mexican President Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna. Bostick's father, Tom senior, did an eighteen-month tour in Vietnam with the Marines, after which he came back, married Brenda Keeler in 1968, and got on with his life. A year later, at the naval base in San Diego, Brenda gave birth to Tommy junior.

Tommy Bostick, Jr., had joined the Army Reserves while still in high school in Llano, Texas. He went to Panama as a Ranger with Operation Just Cause, the mission against Manuel Noriega; served as an instructor at Fort Benning; and worked in Kuwait at Special Operations Command during Operation Desert Thunder, the international military buildup that responded to Saddam Hussein's threat to violate the international no-fly zone over Iraq. Bostick fell in love with a fellow soldier named Jennifer Dudley, who was in Military Intelligence and had a baby daughter named Jessica from a previous marriage. In September 1991, he got a four-day pa.s.s, flew to Fort Meade in Maryland, and married Jennifer. Their daughter Ashlie was born a year later. In 1998, after ten years as an enlisted man, Tom Bostick applied to Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning and got in on his second try. He became an officer and did a tour in Iraq, then another in Afghanistan.

Bostick was one of the company commanders in Vicenza, Italy, with the 173rd Airborne when, in 2006, he first caught the eye of General Frank Helmick, commander of the Southern European Task Force (Airborne). Helmick needed an aide de camp, and Bostick was the obvious choice. It would have been a comfortable job, but Bostick turned it down: he wanted to command troops in the field, even though he had already done that in Iraq and Afghanistan. Helmick admired him for making that decision, and he set it up so that soon Bostick and his girls had moved to Germany, where he was a.s.signed to 1-91 Cav. The squadron had only a handful of experienced Infantry leaders, including Operations Sergeant Major Michael ”Ted” Kennedy and Captain Joey Hutto, the squadron's plans officer. Bostick would join that coterie.

The first time the troops of 1-91 Cav met Bostick, they were standing in formation at the motor pool for the change-of-command ceremony. Bostick explained that they were all a family now. He spoke with compa.s.sion and empathy, but what impressed the rank and file most was the knowledge that he had started out as one of them and worked his way up, from enlisted man to officer. He hadn't just joined ROTC in college and then gone right into the military as a lieutenant, without ever putting in any time as a lowly grunt.

It meant a lot to Private First Cla.s.s Jonathan Sultan of 3rd Platoon that the new commander understood what it was to be a joe. The nineteen-year-old Sultan had enlisted in the Army the year before. He hated his platoon leader, Newsom, who he thought had the energy of a hummingbird-”hated” him, that was, in the way any private would hate a tough lieutenant who rode his men hard and held them to impossible standards. Newsom was constantly pus.h.i.+ng the members of his platoon to run and do sit-ups, pushups, and pull-ups, but the drill they dreaded most was when he'd force them to exercise wearing full body armor and gas masks-the goal being to increase their lung capacity and get them comfortable with the oxygen deprivation they would experience in the mountains of Afghanistan. The more his troops b.i.t.c.hed, the harder Newsom pushed-but there was nothing he made them do that he wasn't also doing himself.

As far as Newsom was concerned, Captain Bostick was the harda.s.s: he'd let you fall on your face and learn whatever the lesson was for yourself, and if you still didn't learn it, he'd make d.a.m.n sure you knew you were failing. Bostick emphasized communications above all. He wanted everyone talking, everyone sharing, not just the radio guy. And he didn't care one bit about rank when cracking down. In the middle of one exercise, he approached Newsom and yanked him out of his truck: ”You'd better have the f.u.c.king hand mike glued to your f.u.c.king helmet, or I'll do it myself,” the captain said. Embarra.s.sing though it'd been, Newsom for sure wouldn't make that mistake again: he now knew that the most powerful weapon he had was his radio.

The 173rd Airborne had originally been destined for Iraq, but in February 2007, the Pentagon opted to send the brigade to Afghanistan instead. This change of plans was no small matter, since at the time, the troopers were already training in Germany for urban, not mountain, combat. The brigade quickly revised its mission rehearsal exercises, and the senior officers canceled all Iraq-oriented language and cultural preparation, including advanced courses for Arabic-speaking intelligence officers. Amazingly, six years after 9/11, there were no Pashto speakers on hand to take their place. The timeline for the brigade's departure was also moved up by six weeks.

Lieutenant Dave Roller, for one, was happy about the change. He had trouble justifying the war in Iraq to himself both morally and legally and had been worried about how he would explain the Why? Why? to his men. He called his father with the news: he was going to fight the ”good” war. Moreover, since there were only two brigades in Afghanistan-compared to what would be almost ten times that many in Iraq during the 2007 surge of troops-Roller was able to suggest to his soldiers that they were headed somewhere ”unique” and ”special.” Bostick had been there before, so that added to his confidence. to his men. He called his father with the news: he was going to fight the ”good” war. Moreover, since there were only two brigades in Afghanistan-compared to what would be almost ten times that many in Iraq during the 2007 surge of troops-Roller was able to suggest to his soldiers that they were headed somewhere ”unique” and ”special.” Bostick had been there before, so that added to his confidence.

The troopers of 1-91 Cav flew from Germany to Kyrgyzstan to Bagram to Jalalabad to Naray, and then Bulldog Troop broke off and moved to Camp Keating. At each stop along the way, conditions became more austere. When they sat down for a meal at Bagram Air Base, Tom Bostick turned to his fire-support officer, Second Lieutenant Kenny Johnson.

”You gonna eat that ice cream?” Bostick asked him.

”No,” replied Johnson.

”You should,” Bostick said. ”Because at Keating there's not going to be any f.u.c.king ice cream.”

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Howard had handed over command of the area to Lieutenant Colonel Chris Kolenda on May 31, 2007. Kolenda lost his first man two days later.

Kolenda was an unconventional officer with a good heart, a deep belief in the potential of the Afghan people, and often the highest IQ in the room. He was in Jalalabad for a brigade-level meeting, sitting in a commanders' conference, when he was handed a note informing him that there had been a firefight in his area of operations. He excused himself and went to the operations center, where he called back to Forward Operating Base Naray and was told that one of his men was KIA. Kolenda had been in the Army for almost twenty years, and this was the first time-ever-that a soldier under his command had been killed. Private First Cla.s.s Jacob Lowell, twenty-two, was a big teddy bear of a guy, a football enthusiast who'd been something of a problem child before finding his direction in the Army. That day, a patrol to Gawardesh was ambushed from the high ground; Lowell, the gunner on a Humvee, was shot in the leg. He managed to get back in the turret and kept firing his .50-caliber, but a second bullet-this one to the chest-ended his life.

Although Kolenda hadn't known Lowell personally,-a feeling of intense anger, combined with a deep sense of loss, came over him. He told himself he needed to remain calm. He needed to get more troops, more resources, into the fight. He needed to focus on the living, on winning the next battle and then setting conditions that would make it easier to capitalize on future successes. It was not easy. Later, Kolenda and Captain John Page, the 1-503 Infantry Legion Company34 commander who had led the patrol, a.n.a.lyzed what had happened. This ambush was different from the enemy attacks that 3-71 Cav had experienced during its time in Nuristan. Until the previous month, when all of those ANA troops were slaughtered, nearly every firefight had occurred across a considerable distance, and the insurgents had appeared poorly trained. But in this latest incident, the enemy fighters had been willing to come close to their targets-to venture a ”near” ambush, as such an action was known. They hid on the high ground just above the road, behind features of the terrain that kept them well concealed. And as had been the case with the ambush of the ANA and Pearsall's platoon, this was a well-planned attack conducted by trained and disciplined fighters. commander who had led the patrol, a.n.a.lyzed what had happened. This ambush was different from the enemy attacks that 3-71 Cav had experienced during its time in Nuristan. Until the previous month, when all of those ANA troops were slaughtered, nearly every firefight had occurred across a considerable distance, and the insurgents had appeared poorly trained. But in this latest incident, the enemy fighters had been willing to come close to their targets-to venture a ”near” ambush, as such an action was known. They hid on the high ground just above the road, behind features of the terrain that kept them well concealed. And as had been the case with the ambush of the ANA and Pearsall's platoon, this was a well-planned attack conducted by trained and disciplined fighters.

The Americans seemed to be facing a different enemy in 2007 than they had faced in 2006.

Officers from 3-71 Cav had every good intention when they planned the grand opening of the Naray water-pipe project: they timed it to occur after their own departure, so that their replacements-and most specifically, Captain Nathan Springer of 1-91 Cav's Headquarters Troop-would get a quick success under their belt and earn some goodwill among the locals. Like many of the best-laid plans in Afghanistan, this one made perfect sense on paper.

The project itself wasn't the problem. The contractor had tapped into a spring above and to the east of Naray, which sent clean, potable water flowing down the mountain, through a pipe, to several spots in Naray Village. The problem was this: about halfway down the mountain, between the spring and Naray, sat the hamlet of Shali Kot, which was completely bypa.s.sed by the pipe. It was an honest mistake on the part of the United States, if most likely not so on the part of the Naray elders, with whom the contractor had worked in designing the project.

Springer didn't know about any of this before he went to the opening ceremony. There, while inspecting the pipe, he was approached by a Shali Kot elder named Mohammed Ayoub, who made it clear that he thought the omission of his village from the water project was insulting and unfair. He and the other Shali Kot elders claimed that the project not only threatened their own water supply but also violated a previous agreement between them and the elders of Naray regarding water rights. Ayoub let Springer have it-Springer's interpreter could barely keep up with his tirade-and concluded the conversation by calling the American an infidel, an intense pejorative in this part of the world. Hearing this, the head of Naray District, Shamsur Rahman-a six-foot-three behemoth of a man-stepped in and slapped Ayoub several times with the back of his hand for the disrespect he had shown Springer. That ended the ceremony.

There was a lot that the Americans still had to learn about Afghanistan. Maybe they would never learn what they needed to in order to win this war. But Springer knew that to insult (however unintentionally) a village elder who then called you an infidel was not good-not good at all.

Springer told the story to Kolenda, who agreed to budget additional funds to include Shali Kot in the pipe scheme. More important, however, was the larger lesson to be drawn from the episode: money and development projects were a double-edged sword. Zar, zan, zamin, Zar, zan, zamin, Kolenda thought. It was an Afghan saying, the Dari words for ”gold, women, land”-the driving forces of conflict in the area, and here Kolenda thought. It was an Afghan saying, the Dari words for ”gold, women, land”-the driving forces of conflict in the area, and here land land also meant ”water,” and also meant ”water,” and water water also meant ”gold.” These were ancient reasons for strife that hadn't gone out of style in Naray and Shali Kot. If the Americans weren't careful, their generosity could create more problems for them than solutions. also meant ”gold.” These were ancient reasons for strife that hadn't gone out of style in Naray and Shali Kot. If the Americans weren't careful, their generosity could create more problems for them than solutions.35 Nothing about this country was simple. The population of Kolenda's total area of operations in northern Kunar and eastern Nuristan included at least four of Afghanistan's many ethnic groups, including Pashtuns and Nuristanis. And then there were the political divisions. The villages of Barikot and Naray had ties to the National Islamic Front, a mujahideen party that had been active during the Soviet war, while the Kamdesh elders had long-established links to the rival HIG. The local leader of the National Islamic Front loathed HIG's founder, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the feeling was mutual. Thus, even more than a decade after the Soviets' withdrawal, the Kom Nuristanis living in Naray and the Kom Nuristanis in Kamdesh District were stuck in the clutch of a blood feud. Of course, the religious differences were complicated as well-the several strains of Sunni Islam in the region, for instance, disagreed about the relative importance of certain texts and the role to be played by the mullahs. At the far end of the spectrum was the fanatical Islam being pushed by the Taliban and some of the more extreme seminaries, or madra.s.sas.

Kolenda considered it his duty to understand all of this. He studied the distinctions and the similarities among the various groups and sects, keeping in his head a sort of Venn diagram that looked like a spilled case of Slinkys-which he knew could ultimately make the difference between life and death for his men.

The 3-71 Cav staff officers, immediately impressed with Kolenda during their overlap in May, had referred to him as ”The Big Brain.” They found his calm demeanor and inquisitive nature a refres.h.i.+ng change from the personal qualities of the man he was replacing, their own squadron leader, whom they called, behind his back, Howard the Tyrant. Kolenda, a Nebraska native, hadn't been satisfied with just an undergraduate degree from the United States Military Academy, so he'd gone on to earn master of arts degrees in modern European history, from the University of Wisconsin, and in national security and strategic studies, from the U.S. Naval War College.

In 2001, the Army War College Foundation Press had published a book he'd edited, Leaders.h.i.+p: The Warrior's Art, Leaders.h.i.+p: The Warrior's Art, which contained essays by military thinkers, including Kolenda himself, on lessons of leaders.h.i.+p gleaned throughout the ages. ”The most effective leaders are able to motivate people... not by appealing to fear and interest alone (the 'transactional' approach), but by appealing to ideas more lasting, more meaningful, and ultimately more human,” he wrote. In another essay, he examined ideas articulated on the topic by Aristotle, Cicero, Plato, and Xenophon, arguing that the best leaders were those who valued independent thought and individual initiative. In a third piece, he took a critical look at Alexander the Great. which contained essays by military thinkers, including Kolenda himself, on lessons of leaders.h.i.+p gleaned throughout the ages. ”The most effective leaders are able to motivate people... not by appealing to fear and interest alone (the 'transactional' approach), but by appealing to ideas more lasting, more meaningful, and ultimately more human,” he wrote. In another essay, he examined ideas articulated on the topic by Aristotle, Cicero, Plato, and Xenophon, arguing that the best leaders were those who valued independent thought and individual initiative. In a third piece, he took a critical look at Alexander the Great.

And now here Kolenda was, literally following in Alexander's footsteps, though this was his first time ever commanding on the field of battle. It was a h.e.l.l of a place for him to make the transition from the world of theory to brutal reality.