Part 4 (2/2)

The att.i.tude of Cicero and his contemporaries towards popular belief was still the general att.i.tude in the first days of the Empire. It was of no avail that Augustus re-established the decayed State cult in all its splendour and variety, or that the poets during his reign, when they wished to express themselves in harmony with the spirit of the new regime, directly or indirectly extolled the revived orthodoxy. Wherever we find personal religious feeling expressed by men of that time, in the Epistles of Horace, in Virgil's posthumous minor poems or in such pa.s.sages in his greater works where he expresses his own ideals, it is philosophy that is predominant and the official religion ignored. Virgil was an Epicurean; Horace an Eclectic, now an Epicurean, then a Stoic; Augustus had a domestic philosopher. Ovid employed his genius in writing travesties of the old mythology while at the same time he composed a poem, serious for him, on the Roman cult; and when disaster befell him and he was cast out from the society of the capital, which was the breath of life to him, he was abandoned not only by men, but also by the G.o.ds-he had not even a philosophy with which to console himself. It is only in inferior writers such as Valerius Maximus, who wrote a work on great deeds-good and evil-under Tiberius, that we find a different spirit.

Direct utterances about men's relations.h.i.+p to the G.o.ds, from which conclusions can be drawn, are seldom met with during this period. The whole question was so remote from the thoughts of these people that they never mentioned it except when they a.s.sumed an orthodox air for political or aesthetic reasons. Still, here and there we come across something. One of the most significant p.r.o.nouncements is that of Pliny the Elder, from whom we quoted the pa.s.sage about the wors.h.i.+p of Fortune. Pliny opens his scientific encyclopedia by explaining the structure of the universe in its broad features; this he does on the lines of the physics of the Stoics, hence he designates the universe as G.o.d. Next comes a survey of special theology. It is introduced as follows: ”I therefore deem it a sign of human weakness to ask about the shape and form of G.o.d. Whoever G.o.d is, if any other G.o.d (than the universe) exists at all, and in whatever part of the world he is, he is all perception, all sight, all hearing, all soul, all reason, all self.” The popular notions of the G.o.ds are then reviewed, in the most supercilious tone, and their absurdities pointed out. A polite bow is made to the wors.h.i.+p of the Emperors and its motives, the rest is little but persiflage. Not even Providence, which was recognised by the Stoics, is acknowledged by Pliny. The conclusion is like the beginning: ”To imperfect human nature it is a special consolation that G.o.d also is not omnipotent (he can neither put himself to death, even if he would, though he has given man that power and it is his choicest gift in this punishment which is life; nor can he give immortality to mortals or call the dead to life; nor can he bring it to pa.s.s that those who have lived have not lived, or that he who has held honourable offices did not hold them); and that he has no other power over the past than that of oblivion; and that (in order that we may also give a jesting proof of our partners.h.i.+p with G.o.d) he cannot bring it about that twice ten is not twenty, and more of the same sort-by all which the power of Nature is clearly revealed, and that it is this we call G.o.d.”

An opinion like that expressed here must without doubt be designated as atheism, even though it is nothing but the Stoic pantheism logically carried out. As we have said before, we rarely meet it so directly expressed, but there can hardly be any doubt that even in the time of Pliny it was quite common in Rome. At this point, then, had the educated cla.s.ses of the ancient world arrived under the influence of h.e.l.lenistic philosophy.

CHAPTER VII

Though the foundation of the Empire in many ways inaugurated a new era for the antique world, it is, of course, impossible, in an inquiry which is not confined to political history in the narrowest sense of the word, to operate with anything but the loosest chronological divisions. Accordingly in the last chapter we had to include phenomena from the early days of the Empire in order not to separate things which naturally belonged together.

From the point of view of religious history the dividing line cannot possibly be drawn at the Emperor Augustus, in spite of his restoration of wors.h.i.+p and the orthodox reaction in the official Augustan poetry, but rather at about the beginning of the second century. The enthusiasm of the Augustan Age for the good old times was never much more than affectation.

It quickly evaporated when the promised millennium was not forthcoming, and was replaced by a reserve which developed into cynicism-but, be it understood, in the upper circles of the capital only. In the empire at large the development took its natural tranquil course, unaffected by the manner in which the old Roman n.o.bility was effacing itself; and this development did not tend towards atheism.

The reaction towards positive religious feeling, which becomes clearly manifest in the second century after Christ, though the preparation for it is undoubtedly of earlier date, is perhaps the most remarkable phenomenon in the religious history of antiquity. This is not the place to inquire into its causes, which still remain largely unexplained; there is even no reason to enter more closely into its outer manifestations, as the thing itself is doubted by n.o.body. It is sufficient to mention as instances authors like Suetonius, with his nave belief in miracles, and the rhetorician Aristides, with his Asclepius-cult and general sanctimoniousness; or a minor figure such as Aelian, who wrote whole books of a p.r.o.nounced, nay even fanatical, devotionalism; or within the sphere of philosophy movements like Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism, both of which are as much in the nature of mystic theology as attempts at a scientific explanation of the universe. It is characteristic, too, that an essentially anti-religious school like that of the Epicureans actually dies out at this time. Under these conditions our task in this chapter must be to bring out the comparatively few and weak traces of other currents which still made themselves felt.

Of the earlier philosophical schools Stoicism flowered afresh in the second century; the Emperor Marcus Aurelius himself was a prominent adherent of the creed. This later Stoicism differs, however, somewhat from the earlier. It limits the scientific apparatus which the early Stoics had operated with to a minimum, and is almost exclusively concerned with practical ethics on a religious basis. Its religion is that of ordinary Stoicism: Pantheism and belief in Providence. But, on the whole, it takes up a more sympathetic att.i.tude towards popular religion than early Stoicism had done. Of the bitter criticism of the absurdities of the wors.h.i.+p of the G.o.ds and of mythology which is still to be met with as late as Seneca, nothing remains. On the contrary, partic.i.p.ation in public wors.h.i.+p is still enjoined as being a duty; nay, more: attacks on belief in the G.o.ds-in the plain popular sense of the word-are denounced as pernicious and reprehensible. Perhaps no clearer proof could be adduced of the revolution which had taken place in the att.i.tude of the educated cla.s.ses towards popular religion than this change of front on the part of Stoicism.

Contrary to this was the att.i.tude of another school which was in vogue at the same time as the Stoic, namely, the Cynic. Between Cynicism and popular belief strained relations had existed since early times. It is true, the Cynics did not altogether deny the existence of the G.o.ds; but they rejected wors.h.i.+p on the ground that the G.o.ds were not in need of anything, and they denied categorically the majority of the popular ideas about the G.o.ds. For the latter were, in fact, popular and traditional, and the whole aim of the Cynics was to antagonise the current estimate of values. A characteristic instance of their manner is provided by this very period in the fragments of the work of Oenomaus. The work was ent.i.tled _The Swindlers Unmasked_, and it contained a violent attack on oracles.

Its tone is exceedingly pungent. In the extant fragments Oenomaus addresses the G.o.d in Delphi and overwhelms him with insults. But we are expressly told-and one utterance of Oenomaus himself verifies it-that the attack was not really directed against the G.o.d, but against the men who gave oracles in his name. In his opinion the whole thing was a priestly fraud-a view which otherwise was rather unfamiliar to the ancients, but played an important part later. Incidentally there is a violent attack on idolatry. The work is not without acuteness of thought and a certain coa.r.s.e wit of the true Cynical kind; but it is entirely uncritical (oracles are used which are evidently inventions of later times) and of no great significance. It is even difficult to avoid the impression that the author's aim is in some degree to create a sensation. Cynics of that day were not strangers to that kind of thing. But it is at any rate a proof of the fact that there were at the time tendencies opposed to the religious reaction.

A more significant phenomenon of the same kind is to be found in the writings of Lucian. Lucian was by education a rhetorician, by profession an itinerant lecturer and essayist. At a certain stage of his life he became acquainted with the Cynic philosophy and for some time felt much attracted to it. From that he evidently acquired a sincere contempt of the vulgar superst.i.tion which flourished in his time, even in circles of which one might have expected something better. In writings which for the greater part belong to his later period, he pilloried individuals who traded (or seemed to trade) in the religious ferment of the time, as well as satirised superst.i.tion as such. In this way he made an important contribution to the spiritual history of the age. But simultaneously he produced, for the entertainment of his public, a series of writings the aim of which is to make fun of the Olympian G.o.ds. In this work also he leant on the literature of the Cynics, but subst.i.tuted for their grave and biting satire light causeries or slight dramatic sketches, in which his wit-for Lucian was really witty-had full scope. As an instance of his manner I shall quote a short pa.s.sage from the dialogue _Timon_. It is Zeus who speaks; he has given Hermes orders to send the G.o.d of wealth to Timon, who has wasted his fortune by his liberality and is now abandoned by his false friends. Then he goes on: ”As to the flatterers you speak of and their ingrat.i.tude, I shall deal with them another time, and they will meet with their due punishment as soon as I have had my thunderbolt repaired.

The two largest darts of it were broken and blunted the other day when I got in a rage and flung it at the sophist Anaxagoras, who was trying to make his disciples believe that we G.o.ds do not exist at all. However, I missed him, for Pericles held his hand over him, but the bolt struck the temple of the Dioscuri and set fire to it, and the bolt itself was nearly destroyed when it struck the rock.” This sort of thing abounds in Lucian, even if it is not always equally amusing and to the point. Now there is nothing strange in the fact that a witty man for once should feel inclined to make game of the old mythology; this might have happened almost at any time, once the critical spirit had been awakened. But that a man, and moreover an essayist, who had to live by the approval of his public, should make it his trade, as it were, and that at a time of vigorous religious reaction, seems more difficult to account for. Lucian's controversial pamphlets against superst.i.tion cannot be cla.s.sed off-hand with his _Dialogues of the G.o.ds_; the latter are of a quite different and far more harmless character. The fact is rather that mythology at this time was fair game. It was cut off from its connexion with religion-a connexion which in historical times was never very intimate and was now entirely severed. This had been brought about in part by centuries of criticism of the most varied kind, in part precisely as a result of the religious reaction which had now set in. If people turned during this time to the old G.o.ds-who, however, had been considerably contaminated with new elements-it was because they had nothing else to turn to; but what they now looked for was something quite different from the old religion. The powerful tradition which had bound members of each small community-we should say, of each towns.h.i.+p-to its familiar G.o.ds, with all that belonged to them, was now in process of dissolution; in the larger cities of the world-empire with their mixed populations it had entirely disappeared.

Religion was no longer primarily a concern of society; it was a personal matter. In the face of the enormous selection of G.o.ds which ancient paganism came gradually to proffer, the individual was free to choose, as individual or as a member of a communion based upon religious, not political, sympathy. Under these circ.u.mstances the existence of the G.o.ds and their power and will to help their wors.h.i.+ppers was the only thing of interest; all the old tales about them were more than ever myths of no religious value. On closer inspection Lucian indeed proves to have exercised a certain selection in his satire. G.o.ds like Asclepius and Serapis, who were popular in his day, he prefers to say nothing about; and even with a phenomenon like Christianity he deals cautiously; he sticks to the old Olympian G.o.ds. Thus his derision of these const.i.tutes an indirect proof that they had gone out of vogue, and his forbearance on other points is a proof of the power of the current religion over contemporary minds.

As to ascribing any deeper religious conviction to Lucian-were it even of a purely negative kind-that is, in view of the whole character of his work, out of the question. To be sure, his polemical pamphlets against superst.i.tion show clearly, like those of Oenomaus, that the religious reaction did not run its course without criticism from certain sides; but even here it is significant that the criticism comes from a professional jester and not from a serious religious thinker.

A few words remain to be said about the two monotheistic religions which in the days of the Roman Empire came to play a great, one of them indeed a decisive, part. I have already referred to pagan society's att.i.tude towards Judaism and Christianity, and pointed out that the adherents of both were designated and treated as atheists-the Jews only occasionally and with certain reservations, the Christians nearly always and unconditionally. The question here is, how far this designation was justified according to the definition of atheism which is the basis of our inquiry.

In the preceding pages we have several times referred to the fact that the real enemy of Polytheism is not the philosophical theology, which generally tends more or less towards Pantheism, but Monotheism. It is in keeping with this that the Jews and the Christians in practice are downright deniers of the pagan G.o.ds: they would not wors.h.i.+p them; whereas the Greek philosophers as a rule respected wors.h.i.+p, however far they went in their criticism of men's ideas of the G.o.ds. We shall not dwell here on this aspect of the matter; we are concerned with the theory only. Detailed expositions of it occur in numerous writings, from the pa.s.sages in the Old Testament where heathenism is attacked, to the defences of Christianity by the latest Fathers of the Church.

The original Jewish view, according to which the heathen G.o.ds are real beings just as much as the G.o.d of the Jews themselves-only Jews must not wors.h.i.+p them-is in the later portions of the Old Testament superseded by the view that the G.o.ds are only images made of wood, stone or metal, and incapable of doing either good or evil. This point of view is taken over by later Jewish authors and completely dominates them. In those acquainted with Greek thought it is combined with Euhemeristic ideas: the images represent dead men. The theory that the G.o.ds are really natural objects-elements or heavenly bodies-is occasionally taken into account too. Alongside of these opinions there appears also the view that the pagan G.o.ds are evil spirits (demons). It is already found in a few places in the Old Testament, and after that sporadically and quite incidentally in later Jewish writings; in one place it is combined with the Old Testament's account of the fallen angels. The demon-theory is not an instrument of Jewish apologetics proper, not even of Philo, though he has a complete demonology and can hardly have been ignorant of the Platonic-Stoic doctrine of demons.

Apart from the few and, as it were, incidental utterances concerning demons, the Jewish view of the pagan G.o.ds impresses one as decidedly atheistic. The G.o.d is identical with the idol, and the idol is a dead object, the work of men's hands, or the G.o.d is identical with a natural object, made by G.o.d to be sure, but without soul or, at any rate, without divinity. It is remarkable that no Jewish controversialist seriously envisaged the problem of the real view of the G.o.ds embodied in the popular belief of the ancients, namely, that they are personal beings of a higher order than man. It is inconceivable that men like Philo, Josephus and the author of the Wisdom of Solomon should have been ignorant of it. I know nothing to account for this curious phenomenon; and till some light has been thrown upon the matter, I should hesitate to a.s.sert that the Jewish conception of Polytheism was purely atheistic, however much appearance it may have of being so.

It was otherwise with Christian polemical writing. As early as St. Paul the demon-theory appears distinctly, though side by side with utterances of seemingly atheistic character. Other New Testament authors, too, designate the G.o.ds as demons. The subsequent apologists, excepting the earliest, Aristides, lay the main stress on demonology, but include for the sake of completeness idolatry and the like, sometimes without caring about or trying to conciliate the contradictions. In the long run demonology is victorious; in St. Augustine, the foremost among Christian apologists, there is hardly any other point of view that counts.

To trace the Christian demonology in detail and give an account of its various aspects is outside the scope of this essay. Its origin is a twofold one, partly the Jewish demonology, which just at the commencement of our era had received a great impetus, partly the theory of the Greek philosophers, which we have characterised above when speaking of Xenocrates. The Christian doctrine regarding demons differs from the latter, especially by the fact that it does not acknowledge good demons; they were all evil. This was the indispensable basis for the interdict against the wors.h.i.+p of demons; in its further development the Christians, following Jewish tradition, pointed to an origin in the fallen angels, and thus effected a connexion with the Old Testament. While they at the same time retained its angelology they had to distinguish good and evil beings intermediate between G.o.d and man; but they carefully avoided designating the angels as demons, and kept them distinct from the pagan G.o.ds, who were all demons and evil.

The application of demonology to the pagan wors.h.i.+p caused certain difficulties in detail. To be sure, it was possible to identify a given pagan G.o.d with a certain demon, and this was often done; but it was impossible to identify the Pagans' conceptions of their G.o.ds with the Christians' conceptions of demons. The Pagans, in fact, ascribed to their G.o.ds not only demoniac (diabolical) but also divine qualities, which the Christians absolutely denied them. Consequently they had to recognise that pagan wors.h.i.+p to a great extent rested on a delusion, on a misconception of the essential character of the G.o.ds which were wors.h.i.+pped. This view was corroborated by the dogma of the fallen angels, which was altogether alien to paganism. By identifying them with the evil spirits of the Bible, demon-names were even obtained which differed from those of the pagan G.o.ds and, of course, were the correct ones; were they not given in Holy Writ?

In general, the Christians, who possessed an authentic revelation of the matter, were of course much better informed about the nature of the pagan G.o.ds than the Pagans themselves, who were groping in the dark. Euhemerism, which plays a great part in the apologists, helped in the same direction: the supposition that the idols were originally men existed among the Pagans themselves, and it was too much in harmony with the tendency of the apologists to be left unemployed. It was reconciled with demonology by the supposition that the demons had a.s.sumed the masks of dead heroes; they had beguiled mankind to wors.h.i.+p them in order to possess themselves of the sacrifices, which they always coveted, and by this deception to be able to rule and corrupt men. The Christians also could not avoid recognising that part of the pagan wors.h.i.+p was wors.h.i.+p of natural objects, in particular of the heavenly bodies; and this error of wors.h.i.+pping the ”creation instead of the creator” was so obvious that the Christians were not inclined to resort to demonology for an explanation of this phenomenon, the less so as they could not identify the sun or the moon with a demon. The conflict of these different points of view accounts for the peculiar vacillation in the Christian conception of paganism. On one hand, we meet with crude conceptions, according to which the pagan G.o.ds are just like so many demons; they are specially prominent when pagan miracles and prophecies are to be explained. On the other hand, there is a train of thought which carried to its logical conclusion would lead to conceiving paganism as a whole as a huge delusion of humanity, but a delusion caused indeed by supernatural agencies. This conclusion hardly presented itself to the early Church; later, however, it was drawn and caused a not inconsiderable s.h.i.+fting in men's views and explanations of paganism.

Demonology is to such a degree the ruling point of view in Christian apologetics that it would be absurd to make a collection from these writings of utterances with an atheistic ring. Such utterances are to be found in most of them; they appear spontaneously, for instance, wherever idolatry is attacked. But one cannot attach any importance to them when they appear in this connexion, not even in apologists in whose works the demon theory is lacking. No Christian theologian in antiquity advanced, much less sustained, the view that the pagan G.o.ds were mere phantoms of human imagination without any corresponding reality.

Remarkable as this state of things may appear to us moderns, it is really quite simple, nay even a matter of course, when regarded historically.

Christianity had from its very beginning a decidedly dualistic character.

The contrast between this world and the world to come was identical with the contrast between the kingdom of the Devil and the kingdom of G.o.d. As soon as the new religion came into contact with paganism, the latter was necessarily regarded as belonging to the kingdom of the Devil; thus the conception of the G.o.ds as demons was a foregone conclusion. In the minds of the later apologists, who became acquainted with Greek philosophy, this conception received additional confirmation; did it not indeed agree in the main with Platonic and Stoic theory? Details were added: the Christians could not deny the pagan miracles without throwing a doubt on their own, for miracles cannot be done away with at all except by a denial on principle; neither could they explain paganism-that gigantic, millennial aberration of humanity-by merely human causes, much less lay the blame on G.o.d alone. But ultimately all this rests on one and the same thing-the supernatural and dualistic hypothesis. Consequently demonology is the kernel of the Christian conception of paganism: it is not merely a natural result of the hypotheses, it is the one and only correct expression of the way in which the new religion understood the old.

<script>