Part 14 (1/2)
BUSH CALLED NICK Calio, the White House chief of congressional liaison, to the Oval Office.
”Nicky,” Bush said, ”you take this, you get this up to them now. We're not...”
Calio had a perplexed look on his face.
”Do you know about this?” Bush asked. He was furious about leaks to the news media.
”Can I see it?” Calio asked, as Bush handed him a single sheet of paper. Calio read quickly. It was a memo to Powell, O'Neill, Rumsfeld, Ashcroft, Tenet and FBI Director Mueller. Subject: ”Disclosures to Congress.” The order, signed by Bush, said that only the so-called Big Eight - the Republican and Democratic leaders of both Senate and House, and the chairmen and ranking members of the two intelligence committees - could receive cla.s.sified information or sensitive law enforcement information.
”No,” Calio said, saying that he had not seen it.
”Well, they were supposed to tell you,” the president said, referring to Andy Card or the White House counsel.
(That morning The Was.h.i.+ngton Post had run a front page story headlined ”FBI, CIA Warn Congress of More Attacks” that I had coauth.o.r.ed with Susan Schmidt. The story focused on a cla.s.sified briefing that CIA and FBI officials had given on the Hill earlier in the week. We reported the high probability of another terrorist attack, and said one intelligence official had told Congress there was a ”100 percent” chance of an attack if the United States retaliated with military force in Afghanistan.) Calio tried to explain to the president that such a restriction would be a disaster. It would be like cutting off oxygen to 527 of the 535 members of Congress.
”I don't care. Get it up there. This is what's going to happen,” Bush ordered.
”Okay,” said Calio, ”but I just want to tell you that you can expect - ”
”I'm not defending it,” Bush said. ”Do you get the picture here?”
Calio nodded.
”Get it up there to them, okay?”
”Fine,” Calio said.
”It's tough s.h.i.+t,” the president said.
Bush later talked with Senator Bob Graham, the Florida Democrat who chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee. It was the longest conversation Graham had ever had with Bush, and he heard a real stream of Texas profanity.
Calio then undertook what was basically an intense Middle East-style shuttle diplomacy between Bush and the Congress trying to bring both toward the middle. Finally Bush agreed to lift the order. He had sent the message that he could cut them off if he wanted.
SECRETARY RUMSFELD APPEARED at a press conference in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on Friday with President Karimov. Karimov said that Uzbekistan would grant the U.S. use of its airs.p.a.ce and one of its airfields for humanitarian and search and rescue operations, and was ready to step up cooperation for the exchange of intelligence.
A reporter asked what the United States had offered in exchange. ”There have been no specific quid pro quos if that is what you are looking for,” Rumsfeld replied.
Karimov quickly added, ”I would like to emphasize that there has been no talk of quid pro quos so far.”
Rumsfeld, his eye down the road, said what Karimov wanted 10 hear. ”The interest of the United States is of a long-standing relations.h.i.+p with this country,” he a.s.sured all, ”and not something that 15 focused on the immediate problem alone.”
AT THE NSC meeting that morning, General Franks joined in on the secure video from CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa.
”Tommy, are we ready to go?” Bush asked.
”Yes, sir, we're ready to go.”
”We need a summary of the targets,” the president said.
The first day's strike was going to be somewhat small - only about 31 targets overall. They were going to use about 50 cruise missiles, 15 land-based bombers and about 25 strike aircraft from aircraft carriers. They would attack bin Laden training camps, the Taliban air defense system and any concentrations of al Qaeda if there were any that could be located.
Defense was also rescrubbing the so-called no strike list, targets that were not supposed to be hit - power plants, schools, hospitals and especially mosques - to show it was not an attack against the Afghan population. The list was to be updated each day.
”We need to discuss rules of engagement,” Myers said, proposing that they do it the next day by secure video.
The president said he had told Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert and Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott of the coming strikes. He said he would inform House Democratic Leader Richard Gephardt.
When they turned to freezing terrorist a.s.sets, one of Bush's favorite instruments, Powell said, ”Hezbollah and Hamas will go on the list of organizations subject to the financial war on terror.”
The president bristled. ”We have a long-term campaign against terrorism,” he said, ”but first things first. We'll get to the others in due course.” The wait and delay was getting to him. Al Qaeda and Afghanistan had to receive all the energy now. After he got his latest feeling of frustration off his chest he reminded them, yes, he was not backing off. ”I'm committed to an overall effort in the war on terror.” *
Powell said that some of the international relief organizations were worried about dropping food to the Taliban and were trying to identify which villages were not controlled by them.
Wolfowitz said there was good flow into Uzbekistan. Already nine of the necessary 67 planeloads had arrived and they would now be ready by October 7 when they hoped bombing would begin. He said, ”We have 33,000 people in the theater. We had 21,000 in the theater September 10.” So 12,000 had been recently deployed, though no U.S. military were yet inside Afghanistan.
AT CIA HEADQUARTERS, Hank had hung a sign outside his office door taken from a recruiting poster used by British explorer Ernest Shackleton for his 1914 Antarctica expedition.
It read, ”Officers wanted for hazardous journey. Small Wages. Bitter cold. Long months of complete darkness. Constant danger. Safe return doubtful. Honour and recognition in case of success.”
Inside, Hank was about to dispatch the most important message of his career to the field. Approved by Tenet and Cofer Black, it was addressed to about a dozen stations and bases in Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan which were running secret a.s.sets and sources inside Afghanistan. This included the tribal allies and the Northern Alliance. The message also went to Gary's Jawbreaker team on the ground and to several other CIA paramilitary teams that were preparing to go in-country.
The three-page message, headed ”Military Strategy,” listed these points: 1. Instruct all tribal allies to ground and identify all their aircraft immediately.
2. Instruct the tribals to cease all significant military movement - basically to stand down and hold in place.
3. The future plan was to have the opposition forces drive to isolate enemy forces, but to wait before moving.
4. Instruct all a.s.sets throughout Afghanistan to begin sabotage operations immediately everywhere. This would include tossing hand grenades through Taliban offices, disrupting Taliban convoys, pinning down those moving Taliban supplies and ammunition, and generally making pests of themselves. (This would be the first employment of concerted lethal force in Bush's war on terrorism.) 5. Informing all of them that paramilitary insertions would go forward in the south and be combined with more specific air strikes.
6. All would have to define no strike zones - hospitals, schools.
7. All tribal factions and leaders should identify and locate primary targets.
8. a.s.sets should try to identify possible escape routes out of Afghanistan for bin Laden and his al Qaeda leaders.h.i.+p - and then try to set up reconnaissance of the routes for interdiction.
9. Be prepared to interrogate and exploit prisoners.
10. a.s.sess humanitarian needs.
They were instructed to share the full text with General Franks to make sure of complete transparency with the military commander.
Hank closed the message, ”We are fighting for the CT [counterterrorist] objectives in the Afghan theater and although this sets high goals in very uncertain, s.h.i.+fting terrain, we are also fighting for the future of CIA/DOD integrated counterterrorism warfare around the globe. While we will make mistakes as we chart new territory and new methodology, our objectives are clear, and our concept of partners.h.i.+p is sound.”
Leaflets to be dropped into Afghanistan were prepared with a crude drawing of a military tank wedged between two small Afghan-style buildings.
In Pashto, Dari and English, the leaflet read, ”The Taliban are using civilian areas to hide their equipment, endangering everyone in the area. Flee any area where military equipment or personnel are located.”
ON SAt.u.r.dAY MORNING, October 6, at 8:30 A.M., the president was at Camp David for the secure video NSC meeting. Tensions over the disputed province of Kashmir were flaring.
”We're watching India,” Powell said. ”We're waiting for a readout of Blair conversations.”