Volume III Part 23 (2/2)
[Footnote 1258: ”During the vote the delegates commenced a system of cheering, first for Conkling, then for Fenton. Senator Conkling was very conspicuous throughout the balloting. His friends gathered around him, while the other side surrounded Fenton, and whenever either moved their friends cheered.... Had there been a secret ballot Fenton would have won in spite of the threats and bribes.”--New York _World_, September 8, 1870.]
Thus far Conkling's success had been as unexpected as it was dazzling.
Heretofore he had been in office but not in power. Now for the first time he had a strong majority behind him. He could do as he liked. He possessed the confidence of the President, the devotion of his followers, and the admiration of his opponents, who watched his tactics in the selection of a candidate for governor with deepest interest. It was a harrowing situation. For several weeks Horace Greeley had been the princ.i.p.al candidate talked of, and although the editor himself did not ”counsel or advise” his nomination, he admitted that ”he would feel gratified if the convention should deliberately adjudge him the strongest candidate.”[1259] Several circ.u.mstances added to his strength. Conkling had encouraged his candidacy to checkmate Fenton's support of Marshall O. Roberts. For this reason the President also favoured him. Besides, Stewart L. Woodford, who really expected little, offered to withdraw if Greeley desired it,[1260] while DeWitt C. Littlejohn, always a t.i.tan in the political arena, likewise side-stepped. These influences, as Conkling intended, silenced Fenton and suppressed Roberts.
[Footnote 1259: New York _Tribune_, August 27, 1870.]
[Footnote 1260: _Ibid._, September 8.]
On the other hand, Greeley's old-time enemies had not disappeared. No one really liked him,[1261] while party managers, the shadow of whose ill-will never ceased to obscure his chances, shook their heads.
Reasons given in 1868 were repeated with greater emphasis, and to prevent his nomination which now seemed imminent, influences that had suddenly made him strong were as quickly withdrawn. It was intimated that the President preferred Woodford, and to defeat Fenton's possible rally to Roberts use was again made of Curtis. The latter did not ask such preferment, but Conkling, who had made him chairman, promised him the governors.h.i.+p and Curtis being human acquiesced. In the fierce encounter, however, this strategy, as questionable as it was sudden, destroyed Greeley, humiliated Curtis, and nominated Woodford.[1262]
Conkling's tactics neither commended his judgment nor flattered his leaders.h.i.+p. But Conkling did not then possess the nerve openly to make war upon Greeley. On the contrary, after secretly informing his lieutenants of his preference for Curtis, he dodged the vote on the first ballot and supported Greeley on the second, thus throwing his friends into confusion. To extricate them from disorder he sought an adjournment, while Fenton, very adroitly preventing such an excursion to the repair-shop, forced the convention to support Woodford or accept Greeley. The feeling obtained that Conkling had lost the prestige of his early victory, but in securing control of the State Committee he began the dictators.h.i.+p that was destined to continue for eleven years.
[Footnote 1261: Edward Cary, _Life of George William Curtis_, p. 230.]
[Footnote 1262: Three ballots were cast as follows:
Woodford 153 170-1/2 258 Greeley 143 139 105-1/2 Curtis 104-1/2 87-1/2 20 ------- ------- ------- Total 390-1/2 397 383-1/2
The following ticket was nominated: Governor, Stewart L. Woodford, Kings; Lieutenant-Governor, Sigmund Kaufman, Kings; Comptroller, Abiah W. Palmer, Dutchess; Ca.n.a.l Commissioners, Absalom Nelson, Erie; Alexander Barkley, Was.h.i.+ngton; Prison Inspector, John Parkhurst, Clinton.]
The New York _Times_ charged Greeley's defeat upon Fenton, insisting that ”the fault is not to be laid at the door of Senator Conkling.”[1263] Conkling also explained that ”Greeley was pertinaciously supported by all those connected with the custom-house.
He failed from a want of confidence in him, so general among the delegates that electioneering and persuasion could not prevail against it, and even those who voted for him declared, in many instances, that they did so as a harmless compliment, knowing that he could not be nominated.”[1264] Greeley himself avoided the controversy, but his acknowledgment of Fenton's loyal support and his sharp censure of Curtis indicated full knowledge of Conkling's strategy, to whom, however, he imputed no ”bad faith,” since ”his aid had not been solicited and none promised.”[1265] Nevertheless, the great editor did not forget!
[Footnote 1263: September 10 and 14, 1870.]
[Footnote 1264: From speech of July 23, 1872, New York _Times_, July 24, 1872.]
[Footnote 1265: New York _Tribune_, September 13, 1870.]
CHAPTER XIX
TWEED WINS AND FALLS
1870
The campaign that followed the control of Tweed and Conkling combined the spectacular and the dramatic. The platform of each party was catchy. Both congratulated Germany for its victories and France for its republic. Cuba also was remembered. But here the likeness ceased.
Democrats praised Hoffman, arraigned Grant, sympathised with Ireland, demanded the release of Fenian raiders and the abolition of vexatious taxes, declared the system of protection a robbery, and resolved that a license law was more favourable to temperance than prohibition. On the other hand, Republicans praised the President, arraigned the Governor, applauded payments on the national debt and the reduction of taxation, denounced election frauds and subventions to sectarian schools, and resolved that so long as towns and cities have the right to license the sale of liquor, they should also have the right to prohibit its sale. The live issue, however, was Tammany and the Tweed frauds. Congress had authorised Circuit Courts of the United States to appoint in every election district one person from each party to watch the registration and the casting and the count of votes. It had also empowered United States marshals to appoint deputies to keep order at the polls and to arrest for offences committed in their presence.
Against these acts the Democrats vigorously protested, declaring them unconst.i.tutional, revolutionary, and another step toward centralisation, while Republicans pointed out their necessity in the interest of a fair vote and an honest count.
To Conkling the result of the campaign was of the utmost importance.
He had suddenly come into power, and success would materially aid him in carrying out his policy of reorganising the party in the metropolis. For many years, under an arrangement with Tammany, Republicans had held important munic.i.p.al positions. This custom had grown out of the appointment of mixed commissions, created by Republican legislatures, which divided the patronage between the two parties. But since 1865, under Fenton's skilful manipulation, these Tammany-Republicans, as they were called, had become the ardent promoters of the Fenton machine, holding places on the general and district committees, carrying primaries with the aid of Democratic votes, and resorting to methods which fair-minded men did not approve.
Among other things it was charged that Fenton himself had a secret understanding with Democratic leaders.[1266] These rumours had aroused the suspicions of many Republicans, who thought it time to dissolve the Tammany partners.h.i.+p, and having obtained control of the State Committee in the late convention, Conkling proposed to reorganise the New York general committee. Fenton was not unmindful of Conkling's purpose. It had been disclosed in the convention, and to defeat it the Chautauquan was indifferent to ways and means. During much of the campaign he absented himself from the State, while threats of avenging the appointment of Murphy and the removal of Grinnell created the apprehension that his faction would secretly oppose the ticket.[1267]
[Footnote 1266: A.R. Conkling, _Life of Roscoe Conkling_, p. 329.]
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