Volume II Part 17 (2/2)
The failure of the fusionists greatly pleased the Democrats, who, in spite of the bitter contest for seats in the New York City delegation, exhibited confidence and some enthusiasm at their state convention on September 15. The Softs, led by Daniel E. Sickles, represented Tammany; the Hards, marshalled by Fernando Wood, were known as the custom-house delegation. In 1857, the city delegates had been evenly divided between the two factions; but this year the Softs, confident of their strength, insisted upon having their entire delegation seated, and, on a motion to make Horatio Seymour temporary chairman, they proved their control by a vote of 54 to 35. The admission of Tammany drew a violent protest from Fernando Wood and his delegates, who then left the convention in a body amidst a storm of hisses and cheers.
A strong disposition existed to nominate Seymour for governor. Having been thrice a candidate and once elected, however, he peremptorily declined to stand. This left the way open to Amasa J. Parker, an exceptionally strong candidate, but one who had led the ticket to defeat in 1856. John J. Taylor of Oswego, whose congressional career had been limited to a single term because of his vote for the Kansas-Nebraska bill in 1854, became the nominee for lieutenant-governor by acclamation. In its platform, the convention very cunningly resolved that it was ”content” to have the American people judge President Buchanan's administration by its acts, and that it ”hailed with satisfaction” the fact that the people of Kansas had settled the Lecompton question by practically making the territory a free State.
Thus Parker stood for Buchanan and popular sovereignty, while the Republicans denounced the Lecompton trick as a wicked scheme to subvert popular sovereignty. It was a sharp issue. The whole power of the Administration had been invoked to carry out the Lecompton plan, and New York congressmen were compelled to support it or be cast aside. But in their speeches, Parker and his supporters sought to minimise the President's part and to magnify the Douglas doctrine. It was an easy and plausible way of settling the slavery question, and one which commended itself to those who wished it settled by the Democratic party. John Van Buren's use of it recalled something of the influence and power that attended his speeches in the Free-soil campaign of 1848. Since that day he had been on too many sides, perhaps, to command the hearty respect of any, but he loved fair play, which the Lecompton scheme had outraged, and the application of the doctrine that seemed to have brought peace and a free State to the people appealed to him as a correct principle of government that must make for good. He presented it in the clear, impa.s.sioned style for which he was so justly noted. His speeches contained much that did not belong in the remarks of a statesman; but, upon the question of popular sovereignty, as ill.u.s.trated in Kansas, John Van Buren prepared the way in New York for the candidacy and coming of Douglas in 1860.
Roscoe Conkling, now for the first time a candidate for Congress, exhibited something of the dexterity and ability that characterised his subsequent career. The public, friends and foes, did not yet judge him by a few striking and picturesque qualities, for his vanity, imperiousness, and power to hate had not yet matured, but already he was a close student of political history, and of great capacity as an orator. The intense earnestness of purpose, the marvellous power of rapidly absorbing knowledge, the quickness of wit, and the firmness which Cato never surpa.s.sed, marked him then, as afterward upon the floor of Congress, a mighty power amidst great antagonists. Perhaps his anger was not so quickly excited, nor the shafts of his sarcasm so barbed and cruel, but his speeches--dramatic, rhetorical, with the ever-present, withering sneer--were rapidly advancing him to leaders.h.i.+p in central New York. A quick glance at his tall, graceful form, capacious chest, and ma.s.sive head, removed him from the cla.s.s of ordinary persons. Towering above his fellows, he looked the patrician.
It was known, too, that he had muscle as well as brains. Indeed, his nomination to Congress had been influenced somewhat by the recent a.s.sault on Charles Sumner. ”Preston Brooks won't hurt him,” said the leader of the Fifth Ward, in Utica.[496]
[Footnote 496: Alfred R. Conkling, _Life and Letters of Roscoe Conkling_, p. 77.]
The keynote of the campaign, however, was not spoken until Seward made his historic speech at Rochester on October 25. The October success in Pennsylvania had thrilled the Republicans; and the New York election promised a victory like that of 1856. Whatever advantage could be gained by past events and future expectations was now Seward's.
Lincoln's famous declaration, ”I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free,” had been uttered in June, and his joint debate with Douglas, concluded on October 15, had cleared the political atmosphere, making it plain that popular sovereignty was not the pathway for Republicans to follow. Seward's utterance, therefore, was to be the last word in the campaign.
It was not entirely clear just what this utterance would be. Seward had shown much independence of late. In the preceding February his course on the army bill caused severe comment. Because of difficulties with the Mormons in Utah it was proposed to increase the army; but Republicans objected, believing the additional force would be improperly used in Kansas. Seward, however, spoke and voted for the bill. ”He is perfectly bedevilled,” wrote Senator Fessenden; ”he thinks himself wiser than all of us.”[497] Later, in March, he caught something of the popular-sovereignty idea--enough, at least, to draw a mild protest from Salmon P. Chase. ”I regretted,” he wrote, ”the apparent countenance you gave to the idea that the Douglas doctrine of popular sovereignty will do for us to stand upon for the present.”[498] Seward did not go so far as Greeley and Raymond, but his expressions indicated that States were to be admitted with or without slavery as the people themselves decided. Before, he had insisted that Congress had the right to make conditions; now, his willingness cheerfully to co-operate with Douglas and other ”new defenders of the sacred cause in Kansas” seemed to favour a new combination, if not a new party. In other words, Seward had been feeling his way until it aroused a faint suspicion that he was tr.i.m.m.i.n.g to catch the moderate element of his party. If he had had any thought of harmony of feeling between Douglas and the Republicans, however, the Lincoln debate compelled him to abandon it, and in his speech of October 25 he confined himself to the discussion of the two radically different political systems that divided the North and the South.
[Footnote 497: James S. Pike, _First Blows of the Civil War_, p. 379.]
[Footnote 498: Warden, _Life of Chase_, p. 343.]
The increase in population and in better facilities for internal communication, he declared, had rapidly brought these two systems into close contact, and collision was the result. ”Shall I tell you what this collision means? They who think it is accidental, unnecessary, the work of interested or fanatical agitators, and therefore ephemeral, mistake the case altogether. It is an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces, and it means that the United States must and will, sooner or later, become either entirely a slave-holding nation, or entirely a free labour nation. Either the cotton and rice fields of South Carolina and the sugar plantations of Louisiana will ultimately be tilled by free labour, and Charleston and New Orleans become marts for legitimate merchandise alone, or else the rye fields and wheat fields of Ma.s.sachusetts and New York must again be surrendered by their farmers to slave culture and to the production of slaves, and Boston and New York become once more markets for trade in the bodies and souls of men.”[499]
[Footnote 499: F.W. Seward, _Life of W.H. Seward_, Vol. 2, p. 351.]
It was one of the most impressive and commanding speeches that had ever come from his eloquent lips, but there was nothing new in it. As early as 1848 he had made the antagonism between freedom and slavery the leading feature of a speech that attracted much attention at the time, and in 1856 he spoke of ”an ancient and eternal conflict between two entirely antagonistic systems of human labour.” Indeed, for ten years, in company with other distinguished speakers, he had been ringing the changes on this same idea. Only four months before, Lincoln had proclaimed that ”A house divided against itself cannot stand.”[500] Yet no one had given special attention to it. But now the two words, ”irrepressible conflict,” seemed to sum up the antipathy between the two systems, and to alarm men into a realisation of the real and perhaps the immediate danger that confronted them.
”Hitherto,” says Frederick W. Seward in the biography of his father, ”while it was accepted and believed by those who followed his political teachings, among his opponents it had fallen upon unheeding ears and incredulous minds. But now, at last, the country was beginning to wake up to the gravity of the crisis, and when he pointed to the 'irrepressible conflict' he was formulating, in clear words, a vague and unwilling belief that was creeping over every intelligent Northern man.”[501]
[Footnote 500: _Lincoln-Douglas Debates_, p. 48.]
[Footnote 501: F.W. Seward, _Life of W.H. Seward_, Vol. 2, p. 352.]
The effect was instantaneous. Democratic press and orators became hysterical, denouncing him as ”vile,” ”wicked,” ”malicious,” and ”vicious.” The _Herald_ called him an ”arch-agitator,” more dangerous than Beecher, Garrison, or Theodore Parker. It was denied that any conflict existed except such as he was trying to foment. Even the New York _Times_, his own organ, thought the idea of abolis.h.i.+ng slavery in the slave States rather fanciful, while the Springfield _Republican_ p.r.o.nounced his declaration impolitic and likely to do him and his party harm. On the other hand, the radical anti-slavery papers thought it bold and commendable. ”With the instinct of a statesman,” the _Tribune_ said, ”Seward discards all minor, temporary, and delusive issues, and treats only of what is final and essential. Clear, calm, sagacious, profound, and impregnable, showing a masterly comprehension of the present aspect and future prospects of the great question which now engrosses our politics, this speech will be pondered by every thoughtful man in the land and confirm the eminence so long maintained by its author.”[502] James Watson Webb, in the _Courier and Enquirer_, declared that it made Seward and Republicanism one and inseparable, and settled the question in New York as to who should be the standard-bearer in 1860.
[Footnote 502: New York _Daily Tribune_, October 27, 1858.
”Few speeches from the stump have attracted so great attention or exerted so great an influence. The eminence of the man combined with the startling character of the doctrine to make it engross the public mind. Republicans looked upon the doctrine announced as the well-weighed conclusion of a profound thinker and of a man of wide experience, who united the political philosopher with the practical politician. It is not probable that Lincoln's 'house divided against itself' speech had any influence in bringing Seward to this position.
He would at this time have scorned the notion of borrowing ideas from Lincoln; and had he studied the progress of the Illinois canva.s.s, he must have seen that the declaration did not meet with general favour.
In February of this year there had been bodied forth in Seward the politician. Now, a far-seeing statesman spoke. One was compared to Webster's 7th-of-March speech,--the other was commended by the Abolitionists.”--James F. Rhodes, _History of the United States_, Vol.
2, pp. 344-5.]
The result of the election was favourable to the Republicans, Morgan's majority over Parker being 17,440.[503] Ninety-nine members of the Legislature and twenty-nine congressmen were either Republicans or anti-Lecompton men. But, compared with the victory of 1856, it was a disappointment. John A. King had received a majority of 65,000 over Parker. The _Tribune_ was quick to charge some of this loss to Seward.
”The clamour against Sewardism lost us many votes,” it declared the morning after the election. Two or three days later, as the reduced majority became more apparent, it explained that ”A knavish clamour was raised on the eve of election by a Swiss press against Governor Seward's late speech at Rochester as revolutionary and disunionist.
Our loss from this source is considerable.” The returns, however, showed plainly that one-half of the Americans, following the precedent set in 1857, had voted for Parker, while the other half, irritated by the failure of the union movement at Syracuse, had supported Burrows.
Had the coalition succeeded, Morgan's majority must have been larger than King's. But, small as it was, there was abundant cause for Republican rejoicing, since it kept the Empire State in line with the Republican States of New England, Ohio, Michigan, Iowa, and Wisconsin, which were now joined for the first time by Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Minnesota. Indeed, of the free States, only California and Oregon had indorsed Buchanan's administration.
[Footnote 503: Edwin D. Morgan, 247,953; Amasa J. Parker, 230,513; Lorenzo Burrows, 60,880; Gerrit Smith, 5470.--_Civil List, State of New York_ (1887), p. 166.]
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