Part 16 (2/2)

Again, a few years later, Meadows wrote: ”The greatest, though not nearest, danger of a weak China lies precisely in those territorial aggressions of Russia which she began two centuries ago, and which, if allowed to go on, will speedily give her a large and populous territory, faced with Sveaborgs and Sebastopols on the seaboard of Eastern Asia. Let England, America and France beware how they create a sick giant in the Far East. China is a world-necessity.” Foreshadowing the gradual extension of Russia into China, and the time when the former country would become dominant at Pekin, and when, with all Manchuria organized behind her, she would occupy the whole of the Yellow River basin, Meadows expressed the belief that, should that occasion occur, no combination of powers would then be able to thwart Russia's purpose. ”With 120,000,000 Chinese to work or fight for her, nothing would stand between Russia and the conquest of the rest of the Celestial Empire; not China alone, but Europe itself would then be dominated, and it would cost the Russian Emperor of China but little trouble to overwhelm the Pacific States of the New World.” Such was the forecast of a writer whose name is to-day forgotten.

What are the advantages which Russia possesses over England in dealing with China? There is, in the first place, the advantage of proximity. The Chinese people in the northern provinces, and especially at the capital, which is not far from the Great Wall, undoubtedly discriminate between Russians and other foreigners. Like other Orientals, they only believe what they see; and Russia is seen and realized on the northern frontier.

Besides the effect of contact, the Russians possess a gift in dealing with the Chinese. The affinities and a.n.a.logies which the Russians and Chinese exhibit have been depicted by Michie in his book on the ”Siberian Overland Route.” ”a.n.a.logies in the manners, customs and modes of thought of the two races are constantly turning up, and their resemblance to the Chinese has become a proverb among the Russians themselves. The Russians and the Chinese are peculiarly suited to each other in the commercial as well as in the diplomatic departments. They have an equal disregard for truth, for the Russian, in spite of his fair complexion, is, at the bottom, more than half Asiatic. There is nothing original about this observation, but it serves to explain how it is that the Russians have won their way into China by quiet and peaceable means, while we have always been running our heads against a stone wall, and never could get over it without breaking it down. The Russians meet the Chinese as Greek meets Greek; craft is encountered with craft, politeness with politeness, and patience with patience. They understand each other's character thoroughly, because they are so closely alike.” Michie went on to say that ”when either a Russian or a Chinese meets a European, say an Englishman, he instinctively recoils from the blunt, straightforward, up-and-down manner of coming to business at once, and the Asiatic either declines a contest which he cannot fight with his own weapons, or, seizing the weak point of his antagonist, he angles for him until he wearies him into acquiescence. As a rule, the Asiatic has the advantage. His patient equanimity and heedlessness of the waste of time are too much for the impetuous haste of the European. This characteristic of the Russian trading cla.s.ses has enabled them to insinuate them selves into the confidence of the Chinese; to fraternize and identify themselves with them, and, as it were, to make common cause with them in their daily life; while the Western European holds himself aloof, and only comes in contact with the Chinese when business requires it; for, in all the rest, a great gulf separates them in thoughts, ideas and the aims of life.”

Of interest, also, as showing how history repeats itself, are the observations made nearly forty years ago by Lockhart, a missionary, after a long residence in China. Lockhart wrote: ”The Russian government antic.i.p.ated us, not in the knowledge of the advantages of close commercial and political relations with an empire so enormous in its resources, but in the employment of those arguments that alone could render a vain and effeminate State sensible of their value.... The map of all the Russias, published at St. Petersburg, now includes that vast portion of Central Asia heretofore const.i.tuting the outlying provinces of the Chinese empire beyond the Great Wall. Having placed a mission in the Chinese capital and organized an overwhelming army in Chinese Tartary, with magazines of warlike resources, Russia easily secured a permanent footing in region after region, till she had dominated over, and then obtained the cession of, all the intervening s.p.a.ce, leaving the conquest of the entire Chinese empire to the time when it should please the reigning Czar to order his Cossacks to take possession. It is impossible to state with any precision the amount of moral or material support which the Chinese emperor received from his imperial brother and formidable neighbor, and which encouraged him to the obstinate resistance that he offered to the demands of England and France [in 1860]; but a slight acquaintance with Russian policy must satisfy any one that, having established itself as a favored nation, Russia could not regard with complacency any attempt made by another nation to share such advantages.” Comprehending, therefore, the Chinese character, perceiving clearly that the present Manchu dynasty is unable to perform the elementary functions of an organized society, that Pekin is another Teheran or Constantinople, that, while the people are sound, the courts and the officials are corrupt, Russia has studied and gained over certain influential persons and applied skillfully the maxim, _divide et impera_. What China is taught night and day is that Russia is a land power, and, therefore, alone can protect China; that she keeps her promises and threats; that, with England, on the other hand, it is always a case of _vox et praeterea nihil_. In short, Russia protects China in a peculiar sense, that is to say, for a price, to be paid to Russia or even to her friends. The dominating idea instilled into the Chinese court and bureaucracy, which, in the absence of a strong policy on England's part, are in a hypnotized condition, is to be saved from j.a.pan. The great object of Russian policy is to utilize China for territorial and political expansion.

What would China be worth to Russia? This question is answered by Mr.

Colquhoun at considerable length. What the utilization of China would mean can be realized, he says, only by a full appreciation of the extraordinary resources of that country, judged from various points of view. The Celestial Empire has the men with which to create armies and navies; the materials, especially iron and coal, requisite for the purposes of railway and steam navigation; all the elements, in fact, out of which to evolve a great living force. One thing alone is wanting, namely, the will, the directing power, which, absent from within, is now being applied from without. That supplied, there are to be found in abundance within China itself the capacity to carry out, the brains to plan, the hands to work.

When, moreover, it is understood that not merely is the soil fertile, but that the mineral resources, the greatest, perhaps, in the whole world, are, as yet, practically untouched, the merest surface being scratched; when we further consider the volume of China's population, the ability and enterprise, and, above all, the intense vitality of the people, as strong as ever after four millenniums; when we reflect on the general characteristics of the race; it seems indisputable that the Chinese, under wise direction, are destined to dominate the whole of Eastern Asia, and, may be, to play a leading part in the affairs of the world. Even although the Celestial Empire appears to be now breaking up, it is capable, under tutelage, of becoming reconsolidated. Often before now, when conquered, has China either thrown off the yoke or absorbed its conquerors. But never before has the conqueror come, as does the czar to-day, in the guise of a great organizing force. To much the same effect wrote Michie, whose opinion is of weight, and from whom we have already quoted: ”The theory that China's decadence is due to the fact that she has long since reached maturity and has outlived the natural term of a nation's existence does not hold good. The ma.s.s of the people have not degenerated; they are as fresh and vigorous as ever they were; it is the government only that has become old and feeble; a change of dynasty may yet restore to China the l.u.s.ter which belongs legitimately to so great a nation. The indestructible vitality of Chinese inst.i.tutions has preserved the country unchanged throughout many revolutions. The high civilization of the people and their earnestness in the pursuit of peaceful industry have enabled them to preserve their national existence through more dynastic changes than perhaps any other country or nation has experienced.” Mr. Colquhoun, for his own part, testifies that, in peaceful pursuits, in agriculture, in the arts and manufactures, no limit can be placed to the capabilities of China. Even in the paths of war, he deems it difficult to foretell what, under skillfull direction, may not be accomplished. It is true that, touching this point, there is a wide difference of opinion. Prjevalski said, apropos of the Tonquin campaign: ”She [China] lacks the proper material; she lacks the life-giving spirit. Let Europeans supply the Chinese with any number of arms that they please: let them exert themselves ever so energetically to train Chinese soldiers: let them even supply leaders: the Chinese Army will, nevertheless, even under the most favorable conditions, never be more than an artificially created, mechanically united, unstable organism. Subject it but once to the serious test of war, speedy dissolution will overtake such an army, which could never hope for victory over a foe animated with any real spirit.” On the other hand, high testimony has been borne by other travelers and military critics to the excellent quality of China's raw material for military purposes. Wingrove Cooke, the ”Times” correspondent with the allied forces in 1857-58, who is generally accounted one of the best critics of Chinese men and affairs; Count d'Escayrac de Lauture, one of the Pekin prisoners in 1859-60; Chinese Gordon and Lord Wolseley, have all spoken highly of the courage and endurance of the Chinese soldier. The following summary of his capabilities was given by one who had had experience with Gordon's ”Ever-Victorious Army”: ”The old notion is pretty well got rid of that they are at all a cowardly people, when properly paid and efficiently led; while the regularity and order of their habits, which dispose them to peace in ordinary times, give place to a daring bordering on recklessness in times of war. Their intelligence and capacity for remembering facts render them well fitted for use in modern warfare, as do also the coolness and the calmness of their disposition. Physically, they are, on the average, not so strong as Europeans, but considerably more so than most of the other races of the East; and, on a cheap diet of rice, vegetables, salt fish and pork, they can go through a vast amount of fatigue whether in a temperate climate or a tropical one, where Europeans are ill fitted for exertion. Their wants are few; they have no caste prejudices and hardly any appet.i.te for intoxicating liquors.” It is Mr. Colquhoun's opinion, based upon prolonged observation, that, if China were conquered by Russia, organized, disciplined and led by Russian officers and Russian administrators, an industrial and military organization would be developed which India could not face, and which would shake to its foundations the entire fabric of the British Empire. If, he says, the Chinese failed to profit by their numerical superiority and their power of movement in Tonquin, it must be remembered that they were as ill-equipped and supplied and nearly as unorganized and unofficered as they were in the Chino- j.a.panese war. Transport, commissariat, tents, medical service, all the paraphernalia employed in organized army work, were then, as in the late campaign, absolutely unknown. Notwithstanding the unfavorable judgment of Prjevalski that the Chinese are animated by neither military nor patriotic spirit, the conviction of many observers is that, however undisciplined they proved themselves in the Chino-j.a.panese war; however badly the undrilled, unfed, unled Chinamen in uniform compared with the highly organized troops of j.a.pan, their capabilities, as the components of a fighting machine, should be rated exceedingly high. The apparent inconsistencies of the Chinese can, in all likelihood, be reconciled. That they offer excellent military material when shaped and guided by foreigners may be p.r.o.nounced certain. If they come from the Manchurian provinces or from Shantung, they are found to be steady, willing to be taught and amenable to discipline, of splendid physique and able to bear hards.h.i.+ps and cold without a murmur. If from Honan, they exhibit many of the best characteristics of highland races--courage and loyalty to their own leader, but they are more difficult to manage, and they are not steady in any sense of the word. The southern Chinese seem to be held generally in low esteem, but one should not forget that the best fighters of the Taeping army were the men from the Canton province, and that, as seamen, the coast populations of Southern China are unequaled. The western highlanders, whether Mohammedans or not, are men of good physique, and would make good fighting material. The Mongolians are hors.e.m.e.n from their early years, and are suitable for light cavalry of the Cossack type.

Like the Central Asian peoples, the Chinese possess in a high degree the virtue of pa.s.sive bravery. At first the Russians, in their contests in Central Asia, expended much time and wasted many lives in besieging towns.

They acted with caution, throwing up approaches and opening trenches. This method, however, was presently abandoned for that of open escalade, as, for instance, at Tashkend, Khojand and Uratapa. Finally, the plan was adopted of storming breaches, to permit of which breaching batteries would be thrown up at very close quarters, after which, a favorable time being chosen, the place would be carried by storm. From every point of view, this proved to be the most effective method. The Chinamen, as has been proved repeatedly, is like other Central Asiatics in this respect, that, under cover, he sustains the heaviest fire with indifference; he never surrenders except under bold a.s.saults, which he cannot withstand.

What is the conclusion to which the observations of all first-hand students of China have conducted them? Their conclusion is that it is a question of vital importance, a matter of commercial life and death, for England to maintain and consolidate herself in the Yangtse basin, which cannot possibly be done except by an effective occupation of the upper Yangtse, and by developing in every possible way her communications along that watercourse, and by the West River from Hongkong, also by railway connection with Upper Burmah and through that province with India. Mr.

Colquhoun, for his part, also believes it to be high time that countries like the United States, Australasia and Germany should set themselves to watch with attention, not to say anxiety, the situation in the Far East.

He advises them to reflect upon the history of the ancient empire formed by Genghis Khan and his successors, for that history is repeating itself to-day. Russia is conquering by modern methods the kingdoms of Genghis and Kublai Khan, and the Russian Czar, once emperor of China, will take the place of the Tartar conquerors who carried fire and sword beyond the Carpathians and the Vistula and throughout eastern, western and southern Asia.

THE END

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