Part 20 (2/2)
Half an hour later Yakoob Khan, attended by some of his princ.i.p.al n.o.bles, rode into camp. He was received with the honor due to his rank but, personally, General Roberts greeted him with great coldness. The Ameer stated that he came into camp because he could not control the soldiery of Cabul; and that, therefore, he had left the place and come in, to show his friends.h.i.+p for the English.
Whatever may have been the motives for his coming, they were never fully explained. Circ.u.mstances which afterwards occurred strongly confirmed the suspicion that he meditated treachery.
He was treated honorably; but the guard of honor which was a.s.signed to him was, in fact, a guard over him and, from that time, he was virtually a prisoner. General Roberts declined, altogether, to discuss with him the events of the ma.s.sacre of Cabul; saying that this was a matter which could not now be entered into, but would be fully investigated on the arrival at the Afghan capital.
The following day, the brigades of Generals Baker and Macpherson joined the advance at Zerghun-Shah. The amount of transport available was only sufficient for half the baggage of the army; and it was necessary, therefore, to move forward in two divisions--the one advancing a day's march, and then halting; while the animals went back to bring up the baggage of the second division, on the following day.
A proclamation was now issued by the general, and sent forward among the people of the valley; saying that the object of the expedition was only to punish those concerned in the ma.s.sacre at Cabul, and that all loyal subjects of the Ameer would be well treated.
On the 3rd of October Macpherson's brigade, with the cavalry, reached Suffed-Sang. Here they halted, while the baggage animals went back to bring up General Baker's brigade. The att.i.tude of the people of the valley had now become very threatening. Great numbers of hill tribesmen had come down; and on this day an attack was made upon the rear guard, but was beaten off with loss.
That the natives were bitterly hostile was undoubted; but they were, for the most part, waiting to see the result of the approaching fight. The Heratee and Cabul regiments were confident that they would defeat the approaching column. They had a great advantage in numbers, had been drilled in European fas.h.i.+on, were armed with Enfields, and had an enormous park of artillery at their disposal. They were able to choose their own fighting ground, and had selected a spot which gave them an immense advantage. They were, therefore, confident of victory.
Had the British troops been beaten, the inhabitants of the Logan valley were prepared to rise, to a man. The Ghilzais and other hill tribes would have swept down upon the line of retreat; and few, if any, of the British force would have returned to tell the tale.
The next day Baker's division had the post of honor, and made a short march to Chaurasia. Beyond this village, the enemy had taken up their position. Three miles beyond the village the valley ends--a ma.s.s of hills shutting it in, with only a narrow defile leading, through them, to the plain of Cabul beyond. Upon both sides of the defile the enemy had placed guns in position, and lined the whole circle of the hills commanding the approach to it.
Mountaineers from their birth, they believed that--although the British infantry might possess a superiority in the plain--they could be no match for them on the steep hillside; and they no doubt thought that no attempt would be made to storm so strong a position, but that the British column would march straight up the valley into the defile, where they would be helplessly slaughtered by the guns and matchlock men on the heights.
Judging from their own tactics, they had reason for the belief that their position was an impregnable one. In their hill fights the Afghans never come to close quarters. Posted behind rocks and huge boulders, the opposing sides keep up a distant musketry duel--lasting, sometimes, for days--until one side or the other becomes disheartened with its losses, or has exhausted its ammunition. Then it falls back, and the other claims the victory.
The idea that English soldiers would, under a heavy fire from their concealed force, steadily climb up the broken mountainside, and come to close quarters, probably never entered into their calculations.
At daybreak on the 6th, a working party were sent forward to improve the road towards the defile. But they had scarcely started when the cavalry patrol in advance rode in, and announced that the enemy were in great strength on the hills, and had guns in position to command the road.
General Roberts had now a choice of two courses--he could either attack the whole Afghan force, with the one division at hand; or he could wait until joined by Macpherson's brigade, next morning. The feat of carrying such a position in face of an immensely superior force, with only half of his little command, was a very serious one but, upon the other hand, every hour added to the number of hillmen who swarmed upon the flanks of the army, just beyond musket range.
A delay of twenty-four hours would bring the whole fighting force of the tribesmen into the valley and, while attacking the enemy's position in the front, he would be liable to an a.s.sault upon his rear, by them.
Confident in the valor of his soldiers, he chose the first alternative and, at eleven o'clock, his little force marched out from the camp to attack the Afghan army. By this time the enemy's position had been reconnoitered, and it was found to be too strong for a direct attack. It was therefore resolved to ascend the hills on both flanks, and so to drive their defenders back beyond the defile. This, in any case, would have been the best mode of a.s.sault; but against semi-savage enemies, flank attacks are peculiarly effective. Having prepared for an a.s.sault in one direction, they are disconcerted and disheartened by finding themselves attacked in a different manner; and the fear of a flank being turned, and the line of retreat thereby menaced, will generally suffice to cause a rapid retreat.
General Baker, himself, took the command of the left attack. His force consisted of four guns of Number 2 Mountain Battery, two Gatling guns, the 7th company of Sappers and Miners, a wing of the 72nd Highlanders, six companies of the 5th Ghoorkas, 200 men of the 5th Punjaub Infantry, and 450 of the 23rd Pioneers. This was the main column of attack.
The right column--under the command of Major White, of the 72nd Highlanders--consisted of a wing of that regiment, 100 men of the 23rd Pioneers, three guns of the Royal Artillery, and two squadrons of cavalry. This attack was intended only as a feint, and to distract the attention of the Afghans from the main attack. A strong reserve was left in Chaurasia, to guard the baggage and to overawe the tribesmen.
As General Baker's column reached the foot of the hills, the 23rd--who led the advance, thrown out in skirmis.h.i.+ng line--began to climb the ascent. The enemy were armed with Sniders and Enfields, and their fire was rapid and continuous; fortunately it was by no means accurate, and our losses were small. The Afghans, in their hill fighting, are accustomed to fire very slowly and deliberately--taking steady aim, with their guns resting on the rocks--and, so fighting, they are excellent shots. It is probable, however, that the steady advance of our men towards them flurried and disconcerted them; and that they thought more of firing quickly, than of taking a correct aim.
The 72nd, pressing up the hill, were a.s.sisted by the fire of the mountain guns and Gatlings, and by that of the Punjaubees in their rear. Gradually the upper slopes of the hills were gained; and the British troops, pressing forward, drove the Afghans back along the crest. Several times they made obstinate stands, holding their ground until the 72nd were close to them.
These, however, would not be denied. The ma.s.sacre of the mission at Cabul had infuriated the soldiers, and each man was animated with a stern determination to avenge our murdered countrymen. For an hour and a half the fight continued; and then the Afghans abandoned the ridge, and fled in confusion. They rallied upon some low hills, 600 yards from the rear; but the mountain guns and Gatlings opened upon them and, the whole line advancing to the attack, the enemy fell back.
Major White's column had been doing excellent service, on the right. Although the attack had been intended only as a feint, it was pushed forward so vigorously that it met with a success equal to that which had attended the main column, on the left. The enemy were driven off the hills on the right of the defile. Twenty guns were captured, and the direct road cleared of the enemy.
Unfortunately, our cavalry was in the rear. The road through the pa.s.s was difficult and, before they could get through into the plain on the other side, the ma.s.ses of Afghans had fallen back into the strong villages scattered over it; and could not be attacked by cavalry, alone. The enemy had from 9000 to 10,000 men upon the ridge, including thirteen regiments of regular troops. They left 300 dead upon the field and, besides these, carried off large numbers of killed and wounded, during the night. Upon our side only 20 were killed, and 67 wounded.
Had General Roberts had his whole force with him, he could--after capturing the hills--have at once pushed forward, and have attacked the enemy on the plain; and the Afghans, disheartened and panic stricken, would have been completely crushed. With so small a force in hand, and the possibility of a serious attack by the tribes on his rear, General Roberts did not think it prudent to advance farther; and the regiments which had taken the princ.i.p.al part in the ma.s.sacre of Cabul marched away, unmolested.
Enormously superior as they still were in numbers, they had no thought of further resistance. The capture of positions which they deemed impregnable, by a force so inferior in number to their own, had utterly disheartened them; and the Heratee regiments which, but the day before, had been so proudly confident of their ability to exterminate the Kaffirs, were now utterly demoralized and panic stricken. In the night the whole of the Afghan troops scattered, and fled. Our cavalry--under General Ma.s.sy--swept along the plain of Cabul and, skirting the town, kept on as far as the Ameer's great entrenched camp at Sherpur, three miles further along the valley. Here 75 guns were captured.
In the morning, Macpherson arrived. General Roberts now advanced with his whole force of infantry, and found that he had no longer a foe before him. The Afghan army had disappeared.
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