Part 19 (1/2)

1.Quoted in Lewis, Islam from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople Islam from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople, pp. 9798. The Muqadimmah Muqadimmah is technically only the prolegomenon to a larger work that today is much less read. is technically only the prolegomenon to a larger work that today is much less read.

2.Ayalon, Outsiders in the Lands of Islam Outsiders in the Lands of Islam, p. 328.

3.Reuven Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War: 12601281 Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War: 12601281 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 21516. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 21516.

4.Ibid., p. 228.

5.See Linda S. Northrup, ”The Bahri Mamluk Sultanate, 12501390,” in Carl F. Petry, ed., The Cambridge History of Egypt The Cambridge History of Egypt, Vol. 1: Islamic Egypt, 6401517 Islamic Egypt, 6401517 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

6.R. Stephen Humphreys, ”The Emergence of the Mamluk Army,” Studia Islamica Studia Islamica 45 (1977): 6799. 45 (1977): 6799.

7.Peter M. Holt, ”The Position and Power of the Mamluk Sultan,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 38, no. 2 (1975): 23749; Northrup, ”Bahri Mamluk Sultanate,” p. 263. 38, no. 2 (1975): 23749; Northrup, ”Bahri Mamluk Sultanate,” p. 263.

8.Ayalon, Outsiders in the Land of Islam Outsiders in the Land of Islam, p. 328.

9.Ibid., p. 69.

10.Ibid., p. 72.

11.Ibid., p. 328; Northrup, ”Bahri Mamluk Sultanate,” pp. 25657, says that the one-generation principle was never explicitly stated anywhere.

12.Amalia Levanoni, ”The Mamluk Conception of the Sultanate,” International Journal of Middle East Studies International Journal of Middle East Studies 26, no. 3 (1994): 37392. 26, no. 3 (1994): 37392.

13.See f.u.kuyama, State-Building State-Building, chap. 2.

14.Jean-Claude Garcin, ”The Regime of the Circa.s.sian Mamluks,” in Petry, Cambridge History of Egypt Cambridge History of Egypt, p. 292.

15.In a contemporary version of this problem, the World Bank advises developing countries to separate the policy maker from the service provider. The latter becomes a pure agent and can be disciplined by the former for nonperformance. See World Bank, World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People (Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.: World Bank, 2004), pp. 4661. (Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.: World Bank, 2004), pp. 4661.

16.Northrup, ”Bahri Mamluk Sultanate,” p. 257.

17.Ibid., pp. 25859.

18.Ibid., pp. 26162.

19.Garcin, ”The Regime of the Circa.s.sian Mamluks,” p. 290.

20.Carl F. Petry, ”The Military Inst.i.tution and Innovation in the Late Mamluk Period,” in Petry, Cambridge History of Egypt Cambridge History of Egypt, p. 468.

21.Ibid., pp. 47073.

22.Tilly, ”War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Evans et al., eds.

23.Peter B. Evans, ”Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative a.n.a.lysis of the Third World State,” Sociological Forum Sociological Forum 4, no. 4 (1989): 56182. 4, no. 4 (1989): 56182.

24.See Petry, ”The Military Inst.i.tution and Innovation,” p. 478.

25.David Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom: A Challenge to a Mediaeval Society Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom: A Challenge to a Mediaeval Society (London: Vallentine Mitch.e.l.l, 1956), p. 98. (London: Vallentine Mitch.e.l.l, 1956), p. 98.

26.Petry, ”The Military Inst.i.tution and Innovation,” pp. 47980; Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms Gunpowder and Firearms, pp. 101105.

15: THE FUNCTIONING AND DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN STATE.

1.Niccol Machiavelli, The Prince The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 1718.

2.On early Ottoman history, see Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire The Ottoman Empire, pp. 58.

3.Ibid., p. 107; I. Metin Kunt, The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 15501650 The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 15501650 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 913. A parallel inst.i.tution was the Russian (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 913. A parallel inst.i.tution was the Russian kormlenie kormlenie, or feeding.

4.Kunt, Sultan's Servants Sultan's Servants, pp. 1415.

5.Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 36. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 36.

6.Kunt, Sultan's Servants Sultan's Servants, p. 24.

7.Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats Bandits and Bureaucrats, p. 36.

8.Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire The Ottoman Empire, p. 109.

9.Ibid., pp. 11415.

10.McNeill, Europe's Steppe Frontier Europe's Steppe Frontier, pp. 3840.

11.Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire The Government of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 6670.

12.Kunt, Sultan's Servants Sultan's Servants, pp. 3132.

13.Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition, pp. 5859.

14.Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire The Ottoman Empire, p. 65.

15.Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats Bandits and Bureaucrats, p. 28.

16.For example, the Kutadgu Bilig, written for the Turkish ruler of the Karakhanids in 1069, which said, ”To control the state requires a large army. To support the troops requires great wealth. To obtain this wealth the people must be prosperous. For the people to be prosperous the laws must be just. If any one of these is neglected the state will collapse.” Quoted in Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire The Ottoman Empire, p. 66.

17.Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire Ottoman Empire, p. 88.

18.The historian William McNeill suggests another reason why Ottoman peasants were relatively lightly taxed in the empire's early days. The ruling elite were themselves recruited, through the devs.h.i.+rme system, from impoverished rural communities in the Balkans and elsewhere; the soldier-administrators understood the rigors of peasant life and had sympathy for the reaya. He points out, however, that the relatively light burden on the peasantry in the core areas of the empire could be sustained only through continuing predation on the empire's frontiers. The sipahi cavalrymen who const.i.tuted the bulk of the army were self-sustaining through their timars; there was a very limited tax base to support any expansion of the army, so larger forces required the conquest of new territories to create new timars. As we will see, the system began to break down when the empire reached the limits of its foreign expansion and was forced to increase tax rates in its core territories. See McNeill, Europe's Steppe Frontier Europe's Steppe Frontier, p. 32.

19.Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire The Ottoman Empire, p. 59.

20.Ibid., p. 60.

21.Max Weber characterized the Ottoman system as patrimonial; indeed, contemporary political scientists use Weber's term ”sultanism” to describe a poorly inst.i.tutionalized system. The reason for this was that the Ottoman system at the highest levels was indeed only weakly rule bound and therefore still patrimonial. The succession system, which invited a free-for-all among the system's partic.i.p.ants, was only one example. As in Persia, Rome, China, and other empires, members of the ruler's family and courtiers in the palace were often far more vulnerable to arbitrary rule, since they were potential partic.i.p.ants in a zero-sum struggle for power. Sultans could and did appoint their sons and other kin to high posts as governors or military commanders. The rise of particular individuals to position of vizier or grand vizier was a matter of patronage networks and personal influence. Political power and private fortunes were dependent on one's personal ties to the court and to the sultan. See Weber, Economy and Society Economy and Society, Vol. 2, pp. 102526; also Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats Bandits and Bureaucrats, pp. 3032.

22.Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire Ottoman Empire, p. 59.

23.McNeill, Europe's Steppe Frontier Europe's Steppe Frontier, p. 42.

24.Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 35562; Barkey, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 35562; Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats Bandits and Bureaucrats, pp. 5152. See also Omer Lutfi Barkan and Justin McCarthy, ”The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Middle East,” International Journal of Middle East Studies International Journal of Middle East Studies 6, no. 1 (1975): 328. 6, no. 1 (1975): 328.