Part 30 (1/2)

_August 2nd._--There have been a few days' interval since I wrote, and I now date from Pey-tang, and from the General's s.h.i.+p the 'Granada,' a Peninsular and Oriental steamer; for I owe it to him that I am here. I need hardly tell you the events that have occurred--public events I mean--since the 28th, as they will all be recorded by 'Our Own.' We moved on the 29th to a different anchorage, some five miles nearer Pey-tang. ... All the evidence was to the effect that the Pey-tang Forts were undefended, at least that there were no barricades in the river, and therefore that the best way of taking them would be to pa.s.s them in the gunboats as we did the Peiho Forts in 1858, and as we also pa.s.sed Nankin that year ... but it was resolved that we should land a quant.i.ty of men in the mud about a mile and a half below them. This was to have taken place on the 30th, and those of my gentlemen who intended to leave me, as better fun was to be found elsewhere, kept up a tremendous bustle and noise from about 4 A.M. However, at about 6, they were informed that the orders for landing were countermanded, on the plea that there was too much sea to admit of the horses being transferred from the vessels to the gunboats. Next day, the 31st, it was raining, and the sea seemed rougher in the morning. However, at about 9, the gunboats began to move. The General had agreed that I should have his s.h.i.+p, and that I should move either over the bar or as near to it as I could manage. ... I anch.o.r.ed the 'Granada' outside the bar, and as I did not choose to lose the sight of the landing, I got into my row-boat ... going at last on board the 'Coromandel,' the Admiral's s.h.i.+p. The landing went on merrily enough. It was a lovely, rather calm evening. We were within a long-range shot of the Forts; and if shot or sh.e.l.l had dropped among the boats and men who were huddled up on the edge of the mud-bank, it would have been inconvenient. Our enemy, however, had no notion of doing anything so ungenerous; so the landing went on uninterruptedly, the French carrying almost all they wanted on their backs, our men employing coolies, &c., for that purpose. We saw nothing of the enemy except the movements of a few Tartar hors.e.m.e.n out of and into the town, galloping along the narrow causeway on which our troops were to march. At midnight eight gunboats--six English and two French--steamed past the Forts. It was a moment of some excitement, because we did not know whether or not they would be fired at. However, nothing of the kind took place; and, about an hour after they had started, three rockets that soared and burst over the village intimated that they had reached the place appointed to them. Having witnessed this part of the proceedings I lay down on the deck with my great-coat over me; but not for long, for at half-past two, Captain Dew (my old friend)[1] arrived with the announcement that, having been on an errand to the lines of the troops, he had met a party of French soldiers who were obliging some Chinese to carry a wooden gun which they had captured in the fort, declaring that they had entered it, found it deserted, and possessed of no defences but two wooden guns. It turned out that they had not entered first, but that an English party, headed by Mr.

Parkes, had preceded them. This rather promised to diminish the interest of the attack on the forts which had been fixed for half-past four in the morning. But there was another fort on the opposite side of the river, perhaps there might be some resistance there. Alas! vain hope. Three shots were fired at it from the gunboats which had pa.s.sed through during the night, and some twenty labourers walked out of it to seek a more secure field for their industry in some neighbouring village. Afterwards our troops went in and found it empty as the other; so ended the capture of Pey-tang.

We came over the bar in the evening, and I went to see Hope Grant at the captured fort, where he has fixed his abode. While there we discovered a strongish body of Tartar cavalry, at a distance of about four miles along the causeway which leads from this to Tientsin and Taku. I urged the General to send out a party to see what these gentry were doing, lest they should be breaking up the causeway, or doing any other mischief; and I heard from him this morning that he had arranged with General Montauban to do so, and that a party of 2,000 men started on that errand early. The Tartars seem to be in greater force than was supposed. The officer in command (rightly or wrongly, I know not which) resolved to consider the expedition merely a reconnaissance, and to retire after staying on the ground a short time. Of course the Tartars will consider this a victory, and will he elated by it; but perhaps this is a good thing, as it may induce them to face us on the open. The ground on which they were found is firm and fit for cavalry, and is about four miles from the Peiho Forts. This is a very nasty place. The country around is all under water, and it is impossible to get through it except by moving along the one or two causeways that intersect it. The military are, therefore, glad to find sound footing at no great distance.

[Sidenote: Chinese overtures.]

Up to this time no communication of any kind had pa.s.sed between the Special Amba.s.sadors and any Chinese officials. An _ultimatum_ had been presented by Mr. Bruce in March, demanding an apology for the attack on our s.h.i.+ps of war, the immediate ratification of the Treaty, and prompt payment of the indemnity of 4,000,000 taels, as therein stipulated. As these demands had been formally refused by the Chinese Government, there was no room for diplomacy. Even the bare announcement of his arrival Lord Elgin feared they might interpret as an invitation to treat, and use as an excuse for dilatory and evasive negotiations. The justice of this view was proved by what took place on the 5th of August. Having occasion to station one of his s.h.i.+ps near the sh.o.r.e for the purpose of getting water, the Admiral sent a flag of truce to warn some Tartar troops posted near the spot, that 'his s.h.i.+p had not gone there with the view of making an attack, but that it would fire on the Tartars if they approached too near it.' The Governor- General at once took advantage of the opening this gave him. Affecting to believe that the flag of truce came from Lord Elgin, he addressed to him a despatch full of professions of amity, and saying that he 'had received instructions to discuss and dispose of all questions with the British Minister,' but containing no mention of the _ultimatum_. To this and numerous similar missives, which came for a time in rapid succession, Lord Elgin had but one reply--that he could discuss nothing until the demands already made had been satisfied.

_August 9th._--My diplomacy began yesterday, for I received in the morning a communication from the Governor-General of the province, not frankly conceding our demands, but making tolerably plausible proposals for the sake of occasioning delay. I have refused to stay the march of the military on such overtures; but the great slowness of our operations is likely to lead me into diplomatic difficulties. The Chinese authorities, if they become frightened, are clever enough to advance propositions which it may be impossible to accede to without compromising the main objects of this costly expedition, and by refusing which I shall, nevertheless, expose myself to great animadversion. There was a reconnaissance again this morning, and I hope from the report of Crealock (who accompanied it, and who is doing very well) that the enemy will prove quite as little formidable as I have always expected. The serious advance was positively to have taken place to-morrow, but I almost fear there will be another delay. I am anxious to conclude peace as soon as possible after the capture of the Peiho Forts, because, from what I have seen of the conduct of the French here, I am sure that they will commit all manner of atrocities, and make foreigners detested in every town and village they enter. Of course their presence makes it very difficult to maintain discipline among our own people.

[Sidenote: Taking of the forts.]

The 'serious advance' took place on the 12th, and was completely successful. On that day the Allies took possession of the little town of Sinho: two days later they occupied Tangkow. The forts, however, which guarded the entrance of the Peiho--the Taku Forts, from which the British forces had been so disastrously repulsed the year before--remained untaken.

Opinions were divided as to the plan of operations. The French were for attacking first the great fortifications on the right or southern bank of the river; but Sir Robert Napier urged that the real key to the enemy's position was the most northerly of the forts, on the left or northern bank.

Happily his counsels prevailed. On the 21st this fort was taken by a.s.sault, with but little loss of life; and the soundness of the judgment which selected the point of attack was proved by the immediate surrender of all the remaining defensible positions on both sides of the river.

During the greater part of this time Lord Elgin was on board the 'Granada,'

moored off Pey-tang, suffering all the anxieties of an active spirit condemned to inactivity in the midst of action: responsible generally for the fate of the expedition, yet without power to control any detail of its operations; fretting especially at the delays which are, perhaps, necessarily incident to a divided and subdivided command. Writing after the surrender of the Taku Forts he said:--

I have torn up the earlier part of this letter, because it is needless to place on record the anxieties I felt at that time. To revert to the portion of my history which was included in the part of my letter that I have destroyed, I must tell you that it was on the 12th that the troops first moved out of Pey-tang. I saw them defile past, and in the afternoon rode out to the camp, but was turned back by a large body of Tartar cavalry, who menaced my flank, and as some of my people had just discovered, in the apartment of the Tartar General at Sinho, a letter stating that they were determined to capture the 'big barbarian himself' this time, I thought it better to retrace my steps. The second action took place on the 14th, and on the 15th I rode out to see the General, and had a conference with him. On the 17th I went to the gulf to see Gros. I have had dozens of letters from the Chinese authorities, and I have answered some of them, not in a way to give them much pleasure. All these details were given at full length in my annihilated letter, but already they seem out of date.

_Tangkow.--August 23rd._--Grant has been marvellously favoured by the weather, for the rain, which arrests all movements here, stopped the day before he moved out of Pey-tang, and began again about an hour after he had taken the Taku Fort, which led to the surrender of the whole. I must also say that the result entirely justified the selection which he made of his point of attack, and, as this was against the written opinion of the French General, it is a feather in Grant's cap. The Chinese are just the same as they were when I knew them formerly. They fired the cannons with quite as little accuracy, but there was one point of difference in their proceedings. On previous occasions we have always found their forts open on one side; so that, when they were turned, the troops left them and escaped. In this instance they were enclosed with ditches, palisades, stakes, &c., so that the poor fellows had nothing for it but to remain in them till they were pushed out by bayonets. Almost all our casualties occurred during the escalade. I went through the hospitals yesterday, and found very few who had been struck by round shot. A very small portion of the force was engaged, so that my opinion of its unnecessary magnitude is not shaken. I need not describe the action for you, as you will no doubt see elsewhere a detailed account of it. My own personal history will not be indifferent to you. I left the 'Granada' at about 5.30 P.M. on the 20th (Monday). Found some dinner and a tent at the camp at Sinho. Started next morning at about 5.30 A.M.; rode into Tangkow, where I now am, and mounted to the top of the Head-quarters' House, whence I had a very good view of the operations. I was dislodged after a while, because a battery opened fire at about fifteen hundred yards from us, and some of the b.a.l.l.s fell so near, that we began to think they were perhaps firing at me. On being dislodged from my Belvidere, I took some breakfast to console myself; and soon after, seeing the British flag on the fort which we had been attacking, I rode over to it. We met a good many of our own wounded, and all round the fort were numbers of the poor Chinamen, staked and ma.s.sacred in all sorts of ways. I found the two Generals there, and soon after the Admiral came up from his s.h.i.+p under a flag of truce. Two letters came to me from the Chinese; but, true to my policy of letting the fighting men have all the prestige of taking the Forts, I would not have anything to say to them. The messengers were told that they must give up the forts to the Commanders-in-Chief before I would listen to them; and that, in the meantime, the army would proceed with its operations. They moved on accordingly, and I returned to my post of observation at Tangkow. I had hardly reached it when the rain began, and in about an hour the roads had become absolutely impa.s.sable for artillery, and nearly so for everything else. The troops met with no resistance at the second fort, and the indefatigable Parkes having gone over to the unfortunate Governor-General, extorted from him a surrender of the whole, which he brought to the Commanders-in-Chief on the morning of the 22nd, having, I believe, dictated its terms. Of course, Grant's triumph is complete, and deservedly so. ... The system of our army involves such an enormous transportation of provisions, &c., that we make, however, but slow progress. I have, therefore, urged the Admiral, who has got through the barriers at the mouth of the Peiho (and who is not unwilling to go ahead), to proceed up the river with his gunboats: if he meets with any obstructions which are serious, he can stop his progress, and await the arrival of troops. If he meets none, he will soon reach Tientsin.

_August 24th._--This morning, at about four, Grant awoke me with a letter from the Admiral, saying that he had experienced in going up the river exactly what we did in 1858--the poor people coming down in crowds to offer submission and provisions, and no opposition of any kind. He wrote from ten miles below Tientsin, which place he was going to occupy with his small gunboat force. The General has agreed to despatch a body of infantry in gunboats, and to make his cavalry march by land; and I am only awaiting the return of the Admiral to move on.

So all is going on well. Grant has also agreed to send a regiment to Shanghae in case there should be trouble there. ... It really looks now as if my absence would not be protracted much beyond the time we used to speak of before I started. ... At the same time, I do not like to be too confident.

[Sidenote: The Peiho.]

_August 25th.--Noon._--High and dry at about fifteen miles below Tientsin. This must remind you of some of my letters from the Yangtze, two years ago. We started this morning at 6.30 in the 'Granada:' the General and I, with both our staffs. We had gone on famously to this point, sc.r.a.ping through the mud occasionally with success. In rounding a corner, however, at which a French gunboat had already stuck before us, we have run upon a bank. It is very strange to me to be going up the Peiho river again. The fertility of the plain through which it runs strikes me more than it did formerly. The harvest is at hand, and the crops clothe it luxuriantly. The poor people in the villages do not appear to fear us much. We treated them well before, and they expect similar treatment again. The Admiral did his work of occupying Tientsin well.... He has great qualities.

[Sidenote: Tientsin.]

_Tientsin.--Sunday, August 26th._--We reached this place about midnight. It was about the most nervous operation at which I ever a.s.sisted, going round the sharp turns with this long s.h.i.+p by moonlight. I had a moment of painful _saisiss.e.m.e.nt_ when I felt almost certain that we should run into my dear colleague Gros, who had grounded in a little gunboat at one of the worst bends of the river.

We only saved him by dropping an anchor from the stern, and going backwards full speed. The Yangtze was bad enough, but we never used to go on at night, and there was no danger of collisions. This s.h.i.+p looks also as if she would go head over heels much more easily than the 'Furious.' I am waiting for Parkes and the General before I decide as to landing, &c. Is it not strange to be here? Immediately ahead of us is the yamun where Gros and I spent the eventful weeks in 1858, which preceded the signature of the treaties of Tientsin! _Two P.M._--We are to have the yamun in which Reed and Putiatine were lodged in 1858; a much better quarter than our old one; and the General, Gros, and I are all to lodge in it together.

[Sidenote: Chinese yamun.]

_Tientsin.--August 27th._--I had a very bad headache after I had sent off the mail yesterday. ... Our s.h.i.+p had, moreover, got aground, and was lying over so much on one side that it seemed possible that she might topple over altogether. Under these circ.u.mstances, and having the prospect of a very noisy night on board, I determined to land and sleep in my yamun. The portion of it dedicated to me consists of a regular Chinese garden, with rockwork and bridges, and ponds full of lotus leaves, and flowerpots of all dimensions with shrubs and flowers in them, surrounded on two sides by wooden buildings, containing rooms with carved woodwork and other Chinese neatnesses. It is the only house of a Chinese gentleman I have ever inhabited, for when I was here before I dwelt in a temple. The mosquitoes were a little troublesome at first, but I got my net up, and slept tolerably, better than I should have done here; for the iron s.h.i.+ps get so heated by the sun during the day that they are never cool, however fresh the night air may be.

[Sidenote: Negotiations.]

_August 29th._--I intended to have told you that I was sending a stiff letter to my old friend Kweiliang; but, in fact, it has taken some time and consultation with Gros to settle its terms, and it is only now being translated. Yesterday afternoon the long-expected mail arrived. ... Shall I really eat my Christmas dinner with you? Really many things are more improbable than that. I hoped at one time that this letter might be despatched from Pekin; but as we have to meet Commissioners here, and to make a kind of supplementary treaty before proceeding thither, it is doubtful whether we shall accomplish this. I am not sure that I like my present domicile as well as I did my domicile here in 1858, because, although it is a great deal more _orne_, it is proportionably hotter, being surrounded by walls which we cannot see over. It is a great place, with an infinite number of courts and rooms of all sizes. I should think several families must live in it, unless the establishment of a Chinese gentleman is very large indeed. If Kweiliang and Co. come into our terms, my present intention is to send at once to Frederick officially, and request him to come on to Pekin. ... He has been having some very troublesome work at Shanghae with the Rebels; indeed, there is at present work enough for both of us in China.

_September 1st._--Kweiliang arrived last night, and sent me a hint that he intended to call on me to-day. I sent one in return, to say that I would not see him until he had answered my letter. I fear a little more bullying will be necessary before we bring this stupid Government up to the mark. Both yesterday and to-day I took a ride in the morning with Grant. I rode a horse of his, a very nice one. The sun becomes powerful very early, but it is a charming climate now. The abundance of all things wonderful: beef and mutton at about threepence a pound; peaches, grapes, and all sorts of vegetables in plenty; ice in profusion. I daresay, however, that in six weeks' time it may be very cold.

At one moment, on the 2nd of September, it really seemed as if the object of the mission was achieved; for the Imperial Commissioners--one of whom was the same Kweiliang who had conducted the negotiations in 1858--in a formal despatch gave a positive a.s.surance that the Treaty of Tientsin should be faithfully observed, and that all the demands. .h.i.therto made should be conceded in full. A draft of convention was accordingly prepared on this basis; but, when it came to the point, Kweiliang and his colleagues declared that they had no authority to sign it without referring to Pekin; and it became obvious that he either did not possess, or did not at that moment wish it to be supposed that he possessed, powers equal to those which he held in 1858, although his previous language had been calculated to convey the opposite impression.

[Sidenote: Broken off.]

Here was clearly a deliberate design to create delay, with the view of dragging on negotiations into the winter. It was indispensable, Lord Elgin thought, to check this policy by an act of vigour; and accordingly, with the concurrence of Baron Gros, he intimated to the Imperial Commissioners that, in consequence of the want of good faith exhibited by them in a.s.suming the t.i.tle of Plenipotentiaries when they could not exercise the authority which it implied, and of the delays which the alleged necessity of constant reference to Pekin would occasion, he had determined to proceed at once to Tung-chow, in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital, and to enter into no further negotiations with them until he should have reached that place.

_September 8th._--I am at war again! My idiotical Chinamen have taken to playing tricks, which give me an excellent excuse for carrying the army on to Pekin. It would be a long affair to tell you all the ins and outs, but I am sure from what has come to pa.s.s during the last few days, that we must get nearer Pekin before the Government there comes to its senses. The blockheads have gone on negotiating with me just long enough to enable Grant to bring all his army up to this point.