Part 34 (1/2)
”I looked in at the town hall yesterday,” Ned said, ”and such an uproar was going on that no one could be heard to speak. Twenty men were on their feet at once, shouting and haranguing, and paying not the slightest attention to each other; while the rest joined in from time to time with deafening cries and yells. Never did I see such a scene. And it is upon such men as these that it rests to decide upon the measures to be taken for the safety of the city!”
”Ah, if we had but the prince here among us again for a few hours there would be some hope,” Sainte Aldegonde said; ”for he would be able to persuade the people that in times like these there is no safety in many counsellors, but that they must be content for the time to obey one man.”
On the Flemish side of the river the sluices had been opened at Saftingen. The whole country there, with the exception of the ground on which Kalloo and the other villages stood, was under water. Still the Blauwgaren d.y.k.e, and an inner d.y.k.e called the Kowenstyn, barred back the water, which, had it free course, would have turned the country into a sea and given pa.s.sage to the fleets of Zeeland. Now that it was too late, those who had so fiercely opposed the plan at first were eager that these should be cut. But it was now out of their power to do so. The Lord of Kowenstyn, who had a castle on the d.y.k.e which bore his name, had repeatedly urged upon the Antwerp magistracy the extreme importance of cutting through this d.y.k.e, even if they deferred the destruction of the outer one. Enraged at their obstinacy and folly, and having the Spanish armies all round him, he made terms with Parma, and the Spaniards established themselves firmly along the bank, built strong redoubts upon it, and stationed five thousand men there.
As the prince had foreseen, the opening of the Saftingen sluice had a.s.sisted Parma instead of adding to his difficulties; for he was now no longer confined to the ca.n.a.l, but was able to bring a fleet of large vessels, laden with cannon and ammunition, from Ghent down the Scheldt, and in through a breach through the d.y.k.e of Borght to Kalloo. Sainte Aldegonde, in order to bar the Borght pa.s.sage, built a work called Fort Teligny upon the d.y.k.e, opposite that thrown up by the Spaniards, and in the narrow pa.s.sage between them constant fighting went on between the Spaniards and patriots. Still the people of Antwerp felt confident, for the Scheldt was still open, and when food became short the Zeeland fleet could at any time sail up to their a.s.sistance. But before winter closed in Parma commenced the work for which he had made such mighty preparations.
Between Kalloo and Oordam, on the opposite side, a sand bar had been discovered, which somewhat diminished the depth of the stream and rendered pile driving comparatively easy. A strong fort was erected on each bank and the work of driving in the piles began. From each side a framework of heavy timber, supported on these ma.s.sive piles, was carried out so far that the width of open water was reduced from twenty-four to thirteen hundred feet, and strong blockhouses were erected upon each pier to protect them from a.s.sault. Had a concerted attack been made by the Antwerp s.h.i.+ps from above, and the Zeeland fleet from below, the works could at this time have been easily destroyed. But the fleet had been paralyzed by the insubordination of Treslong, and there was no plan or concert; so that although constant skirmis.h.i.+ng went on, no serious attack was made.
The brave Teligny, one night going down in a rowboat to communicate with the Zeelanders and arrange for joint action, was captured by the Spanish boats, and remained for six years in prison. His loss was a very serious blow to Antwerp and to the cause. On the 13th of November Parma sent in a letter to Antwerp, begging the citizens to take compa.s.sion on their wives and children and make terms. Parma had none of the natural bloodthirstiness of Alva, and would have been really glad to have arranged matters without further fighting; especially as he was almost without funds, and the att.i.tude of the King of France was so doubtful that he knew that at any moment his plans might be overthrown.
The States in January attempted to make a diversion in favour of Antwerp by attacking Bois le Duc, a town from which the Spaniards drew a large portion of their supplies. Parma, although feeling the extreme importance of this town, had been able to spare no men for its defence; and although it was strong, and its burghers notably brave and warlike, it seemed that it might be readily captured by surprise. Count Hohenlohe was entrusted with the enterprise, and with 4000 infantry and 200 cavalry advanced towards the place. Fifty men, under an officer who knew the town, hid at night near the gate, and when in the morning the portcullis was lifted, rushed in, overpowered the guard, and threw open the gate, and Hohenlohe, with his 200 troopers and 500 pikemen, entered.
These at once, instead of securing the town, scattered to plunder. It happened that forty Spanish lancers and thirty foot soldiers had come into the town the night before to form an escort for a convoy of provisions. They were about starting when the tumult broke out. As Hohenlohe's troops thought of nothing but pillage, time was given to the burghers to seize their arms; and they, with the little body of troops, fell upon the plunderers, who, at the sight of the Spanish uniforms, were seized with a panic. Hohenlohe galloped to the gate to bring in the rest of the troops; but while he was away one of its guards, although desperately wounded at its capture, crawled to the ropes which held up the portcullis and cut them with his knife. Thus those within were cut off from their friends. Many of them were killed, others threw themselves from the walls into the moat, and very few of those who had entered made their escape.
When Hohenlohe returned with 2000 fresh troops and found the gates shut in his face, he had nothing to do but to ride away, the enterprise having failed entirely through his own folly and recklessness; for it was he himself who had encouraged his followers to plunder. Had he kept them together until the main force entered, no resistance could have been offered to him, or had he when he rode out to fetch reinforcements left a guard at the gate to prevent its being shut, the town could again have been taken. Parma himself wrote to Philip acknowledging that ”Had the rebels succeeded in their enterprise, I should have been compelled to have abandoned the siege of Antwerp.”
But now the winter, upon which the people in Antwerp had chiefly depended for preventing the blocking of the stream, was upon the besiegers. The great river, lashed by storms into fury, and rolling huge ma.s.ses of ice up and down with the tide, beat against the piers, and constantly threatened to carry them away. But the structure was enormously strong. The piles had been driven fifty feet into the river bed, and withstood the force of the stream, and on the 25th of February the Scheldt was closed.
Parma had from the first seen that it was absolutely impossible to drive piles across the deep water between the piers, and had prepared to connect them with a bridge of boats. For this purpose he had constructed thirty-two great barges, each sixty-two feet in length, and twelve in breadth. These were moored in pairs with ma.s.sive chains and anchors, the distance between each pair being twenty-two feet. All were bound together with chains and timbers and a roadway protected by a parapet of ma.s.sive beams was formed across it. Each boat was turned into a fortress by the erection of solid wooden redoubts at each end, mounting heavy guns, and was manned by thirty-two soldiers and four sailors. The forts at the end of the bridge each mounted ten great guns, and twenty armed vessels with heavy pieces of artillery were moored in front of each fort. Thus the structure was defended by 170 great guns.
As an additional protection to the bridge, two heavy rafts, each 1250 feet long, composed of empty barrels, heavy timbers, s.h.i.+ps' masts, and woodwork bound solidly together, were moored at some little distance above and below the bridge of boats. These rafts were protected by projecting beams of wood tipped with iron, to catch any vessels floating down upon them. The erection of this structure was one of the most remarkable military enterprises ever carried out.
Now that it was too late the people of Antwerp bitterly bewailed their past folly, which had permitted an enterprise that could at any moment have been interrupted to be carried to a successful issue.
But if something like despair seized the citizens at the sight of the obstacle that cut them off from all hope of succour, the feelings of the great general whose enterprise and ability had carried out the work were almost as depressed. His troops had dwindled to the mere shadow of an army, the cavalry had nearly disappeared, the garrisons in the various cities were starving, and the burghers had no food either for the soldiers or themselves.
The troops were two years behindhand in their pay. Parma had long exhausted every means of credit, and his appeals to his sovereign for money met with no response. But while in his letters to Philip he showed the feelings of despair which possessed him, he kept a smiling countenance to all else. A spy having been captured, he ordered him to be conducted over every part of the encampment. The forts and bridge were shown to him, and he was requested to count the pieces of artillery, and was then sent back to the town to inform the citizens of what he had seen.
At this moment Brussels, which had long been besieged, was starved into surrender, and Parma was reinforced by the troops who had been engaged in the siege of that city. A misfortune now befell him similar to that which the patriots had suffered at Bois le Duc. He had experienced great inconvenience from not possessing a port on the sea coast of Flanders, and consented to a proposal of La Motte, one of the most experienced of the Walloon generals, to surprise Ostend. On the night of the 29th of March, La Motte, with 2000 foot and 1200 cavalry, surprised and carried the old port of the town. Leaving an officer in charge of the position, he went back to bring up the rest of his force. In his absence the soldiers scattered to plunder. The citizens roused themselves, killed many of them, and put the rest to flight, and by the time La Motte returned with the fresh troops the panic had become so general that the enterprise had to be abandoned.
The people of Antwerp now felt that unless some decisive steps were taken their fate was sealed. A number of armed vessels sailed up from Zeeland, and, a.s.sisted by a detachment from Fort Lillo, suddenly attacked and carried Fort Liefkenshoek, which had been taken from them at the commencement of the siege, and also Fort St. Anthony lower down the river. In advancing towards the latter fort they disobeyed Sainte Aldegonde's express orders, which were that they should, after capturing Liefkenshoek, at once follow the d.y.k.e up the river to the point where it was broken near the fort at the end of the bridge, and should there instantly throw up strong works.
Had they followed out these orders they could from this point have battered the bridge, and destroyed this barrier over the river. But the delay caused by the attack on the Fort St. Anthony was fatal, for at night Parma sent a strong body of soldiers and sappers in boats from Kalloo to the broken end of the d.y.k.e, and these before morning threw up works upon the very spot where Sainte Aldegonde had intended the battery for the destruction of the bridge to be erected. Nevertheless the success was a considerable one. The possession of Lillo and Liefkenshoek restored to the patriots the command of the river to within three miles of the bridge, and enabled the Zeeland fleet to be brought up at that point.
Another blow was now meditated. There was in Antwerp an Italian named Gian.o.belli, a man of great science and inventive power. He had first gone to Spain to offer his inventions to Philip, but had met with such insolent neglect there that he had betaken himself in a rage to Flanders, swearing that the Spaniards should repent their treatment of him. He had laid his plans before the Council of Antwerp, and had asked from them three s.h.i.+ps of a hundred and fifty, three hundred and fifty, and five hundred tons respectively, besides these he wanted sixty flat bottomed scows. Had this request been complied with it is certain that Parma's bridge would have been utterly destroyed; but the leading men were building a great s.h.i.+p or floating castle of their own design, from which they expected such great things that they christened it the End of the War. Gian.o.belli had warned them that this s.h.i.+p would certainly turn out a failure. However, they persisted, and instead of granting him the s.h.i.+ps he wanted, only gave him two small vessels of seventy and eighty tons.
Although disgusted with their parsimony on so momentous an occasion, Gian.o.belli set to work with the aid of two skilful artisans of Antwerp to fit them up.
In the hold of each vessel a solid flooring of brick and mortar a foot thick was first laid down. Upon this was built a chamber of masonry forty feet long, three and a half feet wide, and as many high, and with side walls five feet thick. This chamber was covered with a roof six feet thick of tombstones placed edgeways, and was filled with a powder of Gian.o.belli's own invention. Above was piled a pyramid of millstones, cannonb.a.l.l.s, chain shot, iron hooks, and heavy missiles of all kinds, and again over these were laid heavy marble slabs. The rest of the hold was filled with paving stones.
One s.h.i.+p was christened the Fortune, and on this the mine was to be exploded by a slow match, cut so as to explode at a calculated moment. The mine on board the Hope was to be started by a piece of clockwork, which at the appointed time was to strike fire from a flint. Planks and woodwork were piled on the decks to give to the two vessels the appearance of simple fires.h.i.+ps. Thirty-two small craft, saturated with tar and turpentine and filled with inflammable materials, were to be sent down the river in detachments of eight every half hour, to clear away if possible the raft above the bridge and to occupy the attention of the Spaniards.
The 5th of April, the day after the capture of the Liefkenshoek, was chosen for the attempt. It began badly. Admiral Jacobzoon, who was in command, instead of sending down the fireboats in batches as arranged, sent them all off one after another, and started the two mine s.h.i.+ps immediately afterwards. As soon as their approach was discovered, the Spaniards, who had heard vague rumours that an attack by water was meditated, at once got under arms and mustered upon the bridge and forts. Parma himself, with all his princ.i.p.al officers, superintended the arrangements. As the fleet of small s.h.i.+ps approached they burst into flames. The Spaniards silently watched the approaching danger, but soon began to take heart again. Many of the boats grounded on the banks of the river before reaching their destination, others burned out and sank, while the rest drifted against the raft, but were kept from touching it by the long projecting timbers, and burned out without doing any damage.