Part 90 (1/2)

Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by 9 o'clock A.M., I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall act accordingly.

Should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified from firing upon your men.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, _Major-General_.

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_General Pemberton to General Grant._

To Headquarter, Vicksburg, MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, July 4, 1863.

Commanding United States Forces before Vicksburg.

General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this day, and in reply to say that the terms proposed by you are accepted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. C. PEMBERTON, _Lieutenant-General_.

_____

_General Grant to the a.s.sistant Adjutant-General._

Headquarters, Military Division of the Mississippi, To In the Field, Chattanooga, Tennessee, COLONEL J. C. KELTON, December 23d, 1863.

a.s.sistant Adjutant-General, Was.h.i.+ngton, D. C.

Colonel: In pursuance of General Orders, No. 337, War Department, of date Was.h.i.+ngton, October 16th, 1863, delivered to me by the Secretary of War, at Louisville, Kentucky, on the 18th of the same month, I a.s.sumed command of the ”Military Division of the Mississippi,” comprising the Departments of the Ohio, the c.u.mberland, and the Tennessee, and telegraphed the order (p. 395) a.s.suming command, together with the order of the War Department, referred to, to Major-General A. E. Burnside, at Knoxville, and to Major-General W. S. Rosecrans, at Chattanooga.

My action in telegraphing these orders to Chattanooga in advance of my arrival there, was induced by information furnished me by the Secretary of War, of the difficulties with which the Army of the c.u.mberland had to contend in supplying itself over a long, mountainous, and almost impa.s.sable road from Stevenson, Alabama, to Chattanooga, Tennessee, and his fears that General Rosecrans would fall back to the north side of the Tennessee river. To guard further against the possibility of the Secretary's fears, I also telegraphed to Major-General Thomas on the 19th of October, from Louisville, to hold Chattanooga at all hazards; that I would be there as soon as possible. To which he replied, on same date, ”I will hold the town till we starve.”

Proceeding directly to Chattanooga, I arrived there on the 23d of October, and found that General Thomas had immediately, on being placed in command of the Department of the c.u.mberland, ordered the concentration of Major-General Hooker's command at Bridgeport preparatory to securing the river and main wagon road between that place and Brown's Ferry, immediately below Lookout Mountain.

The next morning after my arrival at Chattanooga, in company with Thomas and Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, Chief Engineer, I made a reconnoissance of Brown's Ferry and the hills on the south side of the river, and at the mouth of Lookout Valley. After the reconnoissance, the plan agreed upon was for Hooker to cross at Bridgeport to the south side of the river with all the force that could be spared from the railroad, and move on the main wagon road by way of Whitesides to Wauhatchie, in Lookout Valley.

Major-General J. M. Palmer was to proceed by the only practicable route north of the river from his position opposite Chattanooga, to a point on the north bank of the Tennessee river, and opposite Whitesides, there to cross to the south side to hold the road pa.s.sed over by Hooker. In the meantime and before the enemy could be apprised of our intentions, a force under the direction of Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, Chief Engineer, was to be thrown across the river at or near Brown's Ferry to seize the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley, covering the Brown's Ferry road, and orders were given accordingly.

It was known that the enemy held the north end of Lookout Valley with a brigade of troops, and the road leading around the foot of the mountain from their main camps in Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Valley. Holding these advantages, he would have had little difficulty in concentrating a sufficient force to have defeated or driven Hooker back. To remedy this the seizure of the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley and covering the Brown's Ferry road was deemed of the highest importance. This, by the use of pontoon bridges at Chattanooga and Brown's Ferry, would secure to us by the north bank of the river, across Moccasin Point, a shorter line by which to re-enforce our troops in Lookout Valley, than the narrow and tortuous road around the foot of Lookout Mountain afforded the enemy for re-enforcing his.

The force detailed for this expedition consisted of four thousand men, under command of General Smith, Chief Engineer, eighteen hundred of which under Brigadier-General W. B. Hagen, in sixty pontoon boats, containing thirty armed men each, floated (p. 396) quietly from Chattanooga past the enemy's pickets to the foot of Lookout Mountain on the night of the 27th of October, landed on the south side of the river at Brown's Ferry, surprised the enemy's pickets stationed there, and seized the hills covering the ferry, without the loss of a man killed and but four or five wounded. The remainder of the force, together with the material for a bridge, was moved by the north bank of the river across Moccasin Point to Brown's Ferry, without attracting the attention of the enemy, and before day dawned the whole force was ferried to the south bank of the river; 2nd the almost inaccessible heights rising from Lookout Valley, at its outlet to the river and below the mouth of Lookout creek were secured. By ten o'clock A.M. an excellent pontoon bridge was laid across the river at Brown's Ferry, thus securing to us the end of the desired road nearer the enemy's forces, and the shorter line over which to pa.s.s troops if a battle became inevitable. Positions were taken up by our troops from which they could not have been driven except by vastly superior forces, and then only with great loss of the enemy. Our artillery was placed in such position as to completely command the roads leading from the enemy's main camps in Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Valley.

On the 28th Hooker emerged into Lookout Valley at Wauhatchie by the direct road from Bridgeport by way of Whitesides to Chattanooga, with the 11th Army Corps, under Major-General Howard, and Geary's Division of the 12th Army Corps, and proceeded to take up positions for the defence of the road from Whitesides, over which he had marched, and also the road leading from Brown's Ferry to Kelly's Ferry, throwing the left of Howard's Corps forward to Brown's Ferry. The Division that started under command of Palmer for Whitesides, reached its destination, and took up the position intended in the original plan of this movement. Three movements so successfully executed, secured to us two comparatively good lines by which to obtain supplies from the terminus of the railroad at Bridgeport, namely, the main wagon road by way of Whitesides, Wauhatchie, and Brown's Ferry, distant but twenty-eight miles, and the Kelly's Ferry and Brown's Ferry road, which, by the use of the river from Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry, reduced the distance for wagoning to but eight miles.

Up to this period our forces at Chattanooga were practically invested, the enemy's lines extending from the Tennessee river above Chattanooga to the river at and below the point of Lookout Mountain below Chattanooga, with the south bank of the river picketed to near Bridgeport, his main force being fortified in Chattanooga Valley, at the foot of and on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and a brigade in Lookout Valley. True, we held possession of the country north of the river, but it was from sixty to seventy miles over the most impracticable of roads to any supplies. The artillery horses and mules had become so reduced by starvation that they could not have been relied on for moving anything. An attempt at retreat must have been with men alone, and with only such supplies as they could carry. A retreat would have been almost certain annihilation, for the enemy, occupying positions within gunshot of, and overlooking our very fortifications, would unquestionably have pursued our retreating forces. Already more than ten thousand animals had perished in supplying half rations to the troops by the long and tedious route from Stevenson and Bridgeport to Chattanooga, over (p. 397) Waldron's Ridge. They could not have been supplied another week.

The enemy was evidently fully apprised of our condition in Chattanooga, and of the necessity of our establis.h.i.+ng a new and shorter line by which to obtain supplies, if we would maintain our position, and so fully was he impressed of the importance of keeping from us these lines, lost to him by surprise, and in a manner he little dreamed of, that in order to regain possession of them, a night attack was made by a portion of Longstreet's forces on a portion of Hooker's troops (Geary's Division of the 12th Corps) the first night after Hooker's arrival in the valley.

This attack failed, however, and Howard's Corps, which was moving to the a.s.sistance of Geary, finding that it was not required by him, carried the remaining heights held by the enemy west of Lookout Creek. This gave us quiet possession of the line of communication heretofore described south of the Tennessee river.

Of these operations I cannot speak more particularly, the sub-reports having been sent to Was.h.i.+ngton without pa.s.sing through my hands.

By the use of two steamboats, one of which had been left at Chattanooga by the enemy and fell into our hands, and one that had been built by us at Bridgeport, plying between Bridgeport and Kelly's Ferry, we were enabled to obtain supplies with but eight miles of wagoning. The capacity of the railroad and steamboats was not sufficient, however, to supply all the wants of the army, but actual suffering was prevented.

Ascertaining from scouts and deserters that Bragg was detaching Longstreet from the front and moving him in the direction of Knoxville, Tennessee, evidently to attack Burnside, and feeling strongly the necessity of some move that would compel him to retain all his forces and recall those he had detached, directions were given for a movement against Missionary Ridge with a view of carrying it, and threatening the enemy's communication with Longstreet, of which I informed Burnside by telegraph on the 7th of November. After a thorough reconnoissance of the ground, however, it was deemed utterly impracticable to make the move until Sherman could get up, because of the inadequacy of our force and the condition of the animals then at Chattanooga, and I was forced to leave Burnside, for the present, to contend against superior forces of the enemy until the arrival of Sherman with his men and means of transportation. In the meantime reconnoissances were made and plans matured for operations. Despatches were sent to Sherman, informing him of the movement of Longstreet and the necessity of his immediate presence at Chattanooga. On the 14th of November, I telegraphed to Burnside as follows:

”To ”MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.

”Your despatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can tell better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct.