Part 87 (2/2)

All this may have been providential in driving us ultimately to a line of operations which has proven eminently successful.

For further particulars of Steele's Bayou expedition see report of Major-General W. T. Sherman, forwarded on the 12th of April.

As soon as I decided to open water communication from a point on the Mississippi near Milliken's Bend to New Carthage I determined to occupy the latter place, it being the first point below Vicksburg that could be reached by land at the stage of water then existing, and the occupancy of which, while it secured to us a point on the Mississippi river, would also protect the main line of communication by water. Accordingly the thirteenth army corps, Major-General J. A. McClernand commanding, was directed to take up its line of march on the 29th day of March for New Carthage, the fifteenth and seventeenth corps to follow, moving no faster than supplies and ammunition could be transported to them.

The roads though level were intolerably bad, and the movement was therefore necessarily slow. Arriving at Smith's Plantation, two miles from New Carthage, it was found that the levee of Bayou Vidal was broken in several places, thus leaving New Carthage an island.

All the boats that could be were collected from the different bayous in the vicinity, and others were built, but the transportation of an army in this way was found exceedingly tedious. Another route had to be found. This was done by making a further march around Vidal to Perkins' Plantation, a distance of twelve miles more, making the whole distance to be marched from Milliken's Bend to reach water communication on the opposite side of the point thirty-five miles. Over this distance, with bad roads to contend against, supplies of ordnance stores and provisions had to be hauled by wagons with which to commence the campaign on the opposite side of the river.

At the same time that I ordered the occupation of New Carthage, preparations were made for running transports by the Vicksburg batteries with Admiral Porter's gunboat fleet.

On the night of the 16th of April Admiral Porter's fleet and the transports Silver Wave, Forest Queen, and Henry Clay ran the Vicksburg batteries. The boilers of the transports were protected as well as possible with hay and cotton. More or less commissary stores were put on each. All three of these boats were struck more or less frequently while pa.s.sing the enemy's batteries, and the Henry Clay, by the explosion of a sh.e.l.l or by other means, was set on fire and entirely consumed. The other two boats were somewhat injured, but not seriously disabled. No one on board of either was hurt.

As these boats succeeded in getting by so well, I ordered six more to be prepared in like manner for running the batteries.

These latter, viz.: Tigress, Anglo-Saxon, Cheeseman, Empire City, Horizonia, and Moderator, left Milliken's Bend on the night of the 22d April, and five of them got by, but in a somewhat damaged condition. The Tigress received a shot in her hull below the water line, and sunk on the Louisiana sh.o.r.e soon after pa.s.sing the last of the batteries. The crews of these steamers, with (p. 379) the exception of that of the Forest Queen, Captain D. Conway, and the Silver Wave, Captain McMillan, were composed of volunteers from the army. Upon the call for volunteers for this dangerous enterprise, officers and men presented themselves by hundreds, anxious to undertake the trip. The names of those whose services were accepted will be given in a separate report.

It is a striking feature, so far as my observation goes, of the present volunteer army of the United States, that there is nothing which men are called upon to do, mechanical or professional, that accomplished adepts cannot be found for the duty required in almost every regiment.

The transports injured in running the blockade were repaired by order of Admiral Porter, who was supplied with the material for such repairs as they required, and who was and is ever ready to afford all the a.s.sistance in his power for the furtherance of the success of our arms. In a very short time five of the transports were in running order, and the remainder were in a condition to be used as barges in the moving of troops. Twelve barges loaded with forage and rations were sent in tow of the last six boats that run the blockade; one half of them got through in a condition to be used.

Owing to the limited number of transports below Vicksburg it was found necessary to extend our line of travel to Hard Times, Louisiana, which, by the circuitous route it was necessary to take, increased the distance to about seventy miles from Milliken's Bend, our starting point.

The thirteenth army corps being all through to the Mississippi and the seventeenth army corps well on the way, so much of the thirteenth as could be got on board the transports and barges were put aboard and moved to the front of Grand Gulf on the 29th of April. The plan here was that the navy should silence the guns of the enemy, and the troops land under cover of the gunboats and carry the place by storm.

At 8 o'clock A.M. the navy made the attack, and kept it up for more than five hours in the most gallant manner. From a tug out in the stream I witnessed the whole engagement. Many times it seemed to me the gunboats were within pistol-shot of the enemy's batteries. It soon became evident that the guns of the enemy were too elevated and their fortifications too strong to be taken from the water side. The whole range of hills on that side were known to be lined with rifle-pits, besides the field artillery could be moved to any position where it could be made useful in case of an attempt at landing. This determined me to again run the enemy's batteries, turn his position by affecting a landing at Rodney, or at Bruinsburg, between Grand Gulf and Rodney. Accordingly orders were immediately given for the troops to debark at Hard Times, Louisiana, and march across to the point immediately below Grand Gulf. At dark the gunboats again engaged the batteries, and all the transports run by, receiving but two or three shots in the pa.s.sage, and these without injury. I had some time previously ordered a reconnoissance to a point opposite Bruinsburg, to ascertain if possible from persons in the neighborhood the character of the road leading to the highlands back of Bruinsburg. During the night I learned from a negro man that there was a good road from Bruinsburg to Port Gibson, which determined me to land there.

The work of ferrying the troops to Bruinsburg was commenced (p. 380) at daylight in the morning, the gunboats as well as transports being used for the purpose.

As soon as the thirteenth army corps was landed, and could draw three days' rations to put in haversacks (no wagons were allowed to cross until the troops were all over) they were started on the road to Port Gibson. I deemed it a matter of vast importance that the highlands should be reached without resistance.

The seventeenth corps followed as rapidly as it could be put across the river.

About 2 o'clock on the 1st of May, the advance of the enemy was met eight miles from Bruinsburg, on the road to Port Gibson. He was forced to fall back, but as it was dark, he was not pursued far until daylight. Early on the morning of the 1st I went out, accompanied by members of my staff, and found McClernand with his corps engaging the enemy about four miles from Port Gibson. At this point the roads branched in exactly opposite directions, both, however, leading to Port Gibson. The enemy had taken position on both branches, thus dividing as he fell back the pursuing forces. The nature of the ground in that part of the country is such that a very small force could r.e.t.a.r.d the progress of a much larger one for many hours. The roads usually run on narrow, elevated ridges, with deep and impenetrable ravines on either side. On the right were the divisions of Hovey, Carr, and Smith, and on the left the division of Osterhaus, of McClernand's corps. The three former succeeded in driving the enemy from position to position back toward Port Gibson steadily all day.

Osterhaus did not, however, move the enemy from the position occupied by him on our left until Logan's division of McPherson's corps arrived.

McClernand, who was with the right in person, sent repeated messages to me before the arrival of Logan to send Logan's and Quinby's divisions of McPherson's corps to him.

I had been on that as well as all other parts of the field, and could see how they could be used there to advantage. However, as soon as the advance of McPherson's corps (Logan's division) arrived, I sent one brigade to McClernand on the right, and sent one brigade, Brigadier-General J. E. Smith commanding, to the left to the a.s.sistance of Osterhaus.

By the judicious disposition made of this brigade, under the immediate supervision of McPherson and Logan, a position was soon obtained giving us an advantage which soon drove the enemy from that part of the field, to make no further stand south of Bayou Pierre.

The enemy was here repulsed with a heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The repulse of the enemy on our left took place late in the afternoon. He was pursued toward Port Gibson, but night closing in, and the enemy making the appearance of another stand, the troops slept upon their arms until daylight.

In the morning it was found that the enemy had retreated across Bayou Pierre, on the Grand Gulf road, and a brigade of Logan's division was sent to divert his attention whilst a floating bridge was being built across Bayou Pierre immediately at Port Gibson. This bridge was completed, eight miles marched by McPherson's corps to the north fork of Bayou Pierre, that stream bridged, and the advance of this corps commenced pa.s.sing over it at 5 o'clock the following morning.

On the 3d the enemy was pursued to Hawkinson's Ferry, with (p. 381) slight skirmis.h.i.+ng all day, during which we took quite a number of prisoners, mostly stragglers from the enemy.

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