Part 17 (1/2)

The battle of Arginusae now gave the Athenians the control of the Asiatic seas, and so discouraged were the Lacedaemonians, that they were induced to make proposals of peace. This is doubted, indeed, by Grote, since no positive results accrued to Athens.

(M566) The Chians and other allies of Sparta, in conjunction with Cyrus, now sent envoys to the ephors, to request the restoration of Lysander to the command of the fleet. They acceded to the request substantially, and Lysander reached Ephesus, B.C. 405, to renovate the Lacedaemonian power and turn the fortunes of war.

(M567) The victorious Athenian fleet was now at aegospotami, in the h.e.l.lespont, opposite Lampsacus, having been inactive for nearly a year.

There the fleet was exposed to imminent danger, which was even seen by Alcibiades, in his forts opposite, on the Chersonese. He expostulated with the Athenian admirals, but to no purpose, and urged them to retire to Sestos. As he feared, the Athenian fleet was surprised, at anchor, on this open sh.o.r.e, while the crews were on sh.o.r.e in quest of a meal. One hundred and seventy triremes were thus ingloriously captured, without the loss of a man-the greatest calamity which had happened to Athens since the beginning of the war, and decisive as to its result. The captive generals were slaughtered, together with four thousand Athenian prisoners. Conon, however, made his escape. So disgraceful and unnecessary was this great calamity, that it is supposed the fleet was betrayed by its own commanders; and this supposition is strengthened by its inactivity since the battle of Arginusae. This crowning disaster happened in September, B.C.

405, and caused a dismay at Athens such as had never before been felt-not even when the Persians were marching through Attica. Nothing was now left to the miserable city but to make what preparation it could for the siege, which everybody foresaw would soon take place. The walls were put in the best defense it was possible, and two of the three ports were blocked up.

Not only was Athens deprived of her maritime power, but her very existence was now jeopardized.

(M568) Lysander was in no haste to march upon Athens, since he knew that no corn s.h.i.+ps could reach the city from the Euxine, and that a famine would soon set in. The Athenian empire was annihilated, and nothing remained but Athens herself! The Athenians now saw that nothing but union between the citizens could give them any hope of success, and they made a solemn pledge in the Acropolis to bury their dissensions and cultivate harmonious feelings.

(M569) In November, Lysander, with two hundred triremes, blockaded the Piraeus. The whole force of Sparta, under King Pausanias, went out to meet him, and encamped at the gates of Athens. The citizens bore the calamity with fort.i.tude, and, when they began to die of hunger, sent propositions for capitulation. But no proposition was received which did not include the demolition of the long walls which Pericles had built. As famine pressed, and the condition of the people had become intolerable, Athens was obliged to surrender on the hard conditions that the Piraeus should be destroyed, the long walls demolished, all foreign possessions evacuated, all s.h.i.+ps surrendered, and, most humiliating of all, that Athens should become the ally of Sparta, and follow her lead upon the sea and upon the land.

(M570) Thus fell imperial Athens, after a glorious reign of one hundred years. Lysander entered the city as a conqueror. The s.h.i.+ps were surrendered, all but twelve, which the Athenians were allowed to retain; the unfinished s.h.i.+ps in the dockyards were burned, the fortifications demolished, and the Piraeus dismantled. The const.i.tution of the city was annulled, and a board of thirty was nominated, under the dictation of Lysander, for the government of the city. The conqueror then sailed to Samos, which was easily reduced, and oligarchy was restored on that island, as at Athens.

(M571) The fall of Athens virtually closed the Peloponnesian war, after a bitter struggle between the two leading States of Greece for thirty years.

Lysander became the leading man in Greece, and wielded a power greater than any individual Greek before or after him. Sparta, personified in him, became supreme, and ruled over all the islands, and over the Asiatic and Thracian cities. The tyrants whom he placed over Athens exercised their power with extreme rigor-sending to execution all who were obnoxious, seizing as spoil the property of the citizens, and disarming the remaining hoplites in the city. They even forbade intellectual teaching, and shut the mouth of Socrates. Such was Athens, humbled, deprived of her fleet, and rendered powerless, with a Spartan garrison occupying the Acropolis, and discord reigning even among the Thirty Tyrants themselves.

(M572) In considering the downfall of Athens, we perceive that the unfortunate Sicilian expedition which Alcibiades had stimulated proved the main cause. Her maritime supremacy might have been maintained but for this aggression, which Pericles never would have sanctioned, and which Nicias so earnestly disapproved. After that disaster, the conditions of the State were totally changed, and it was a bitter and desperate struggle to retain the fragments of empire. And the catastrophe proved, ultimately, the political ruin of Greece herself, since there was left no one State sufficiently powerful to resist foreign attacks. The glory of Athens was her navy, and this being destroyed, Greece was open to invasion, and to the corruption brought about by Persian gold. It was Athens which had resisted Persia, and protected the maritime States and islands. When Athens was crippled, the decline of the other States was rapid, for they had all exhausted themselves in the war. And the war itself has few redeeming features. It was a wicked contest carried on by rivalry and jealousy. And it produced, as war generally does, a cla.s.s of unprincipled men who aggrandize themselves at the expense of their country. Nothing but war would have developed such men as Alcibiades and Lysander, and it is difficult to say which of the two brought the greatest dishonor on their respective States. Both were ambitious, and both hoped to gain an ascendency incompatible with free inst.i.tutions. To my mind, Alcibiades is the worst man in Grecian history, and not only personally disgraced by the worst vices, but his influence was disastrous on his country. Athens owed her political degradation more to him than any other man. He was insolent, lawless, extravagant, and unscrupulous, from his first appearance in public life. He incited the Sicilian expedition, and caused it to end disastrously by sending Gylippus to Syracuse. He originated the revolt of Chios and Miletus, the fortification of Decelea, and the conspiracy of the Four Hundred. And though he partially redeemed his treason by his three years' services, after his exile, yet his vanity, and intrigues, and prodigality prevented him from accomplis.h.i.+ng what he promised. It is true he was a man of great resources, and was never defeated either by sea or land; ”and he was the first man in every party he espoused-Athenian, Spartan, or Persian, oligarchial or democratical, but he never inspired confidence with any party, and all parties successively threw him off.”

The end of such a man proclaims the avenging Nemesis in this world. He died by the hands of Persian a.s.sa.s.sins at the instance of both Lysander and Cyrus, who felt that there could be nothing settled so long as this restless schemer lived. And he died, unlamented and unhonored, in spite of his high birth, wealth, talents, and personal accomplishments.

(M573) Lysander was more fortunate; he gained a great ascendency in Sparta, but his ambition proved ruinous to his country, by involving it in those desperate wars which are yet to be presented.

CHAPTER XX.

MARCH OF CYRUS AND RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.

(M574) The Peloponnesian war being closed, a large body of Grecian soldiers were disbanded, but rendered venal and restless by the excitements and changes of the past thirty years, and ready to embark in any warlike enterprise that promised money and spoil. They were unfitted, as is usually the case, for sober and industrial pursuits. They panted for fresh adventures.

(M575) This restless pa.s.sion which war ever kindles, found vent and direction in the enterprise which Cyrus led from Western Asia to dethrone his brother Artaxerxes from the throne of Persia. Some fourteen thousand Greeks from different States joined his standard-not with a view of a march to Babylon and an attack on the great king, but to conquer and root out the Pisidian mountaineers, who did much mischief from their fastnesses in the southeast of Asia Minor. This was the ostensible object of Cyrus, and he found no difficulty in enlisting Grecian mercenaries, under promise of large rewards. All these Greeks were deceived but one man, to whom alone Cyrus revealed his real purpose. This was Clearchus, a Lacedaemonian general of considerable ability and experience, who had been banished for abuse of authority at Byzantium, which he commanded. He repaired to Sardis and offered his services to Cyrus, who had been sent thither by his father Darius to command the Persian forces. Cyrus accepted the overtures of Clearchus, who secured his confidence so completely that he gave him the large sum of ten thousand darics, which he employed in hiring Grecian mercenaries.

(M576) Other Greeks of note also joined the army of Cyrus with a view of being employed against the Pisidians. Among them were Aristippus and Menon, of a distinguished family in Thessaly; Proxenus, a Botian; Agis, an Arcadian; Socrates, an Achaean, who were employed to collect mercenaries, and who received large sums of money. A considerable body of Lacedaemonians were also taken under pay.

The march of these men to Babylon, and their successful retreat, form one of the most interesting episodes in Grecian history, and it is this march and retreat which I purpose briefly to present.

(M577) Cyrus was an extraordinary man. The younger son of the Persian king, he aimed to secure the sovereignty of Persia, which fell to his elder brother, Artaxerxes, on the death of Darius. During his residence at Sardis, as satrap or governor, he perceived and felt the great superiority of the Greeks to his own countrymen, not only intellectually, but as soldiers. He was brave, generous, frank, and ambitious. Had it been his fortune to have achieved the object of his ambition, the whole history of Persia would have been changed, and Alexander would have lived in vain.

Perceiving and appreciating the great qualities of the Greeks, and learning how to influence them, he sought, by their aid, to conquer his way to the throne.

(M578) But he dissembled his designs so that they were not suspected, even in Persia. As has been remarked, he communicated them only to the Spartan general, Clearchus. Neither Greek nor Persian divined his object as he collected a great army at Sardis. At first he employed his forces in the siege of Miletus and other enterprises, which provoked no suspicion of his real designs.

(M579) When all was ready, he commenced his march from Sardis, in March, B.C. 401, with about eight thousand Grecian hoplites and one hundred thousand native troops, while a joint Lacedaemonian and Persian fleet coasted around the south of Asia Minor to co-operate with the land forces.

(M580) These Greeks who thus joined his standard under promise of large pay, and were unwittingly about to plunge into unknown perils, were not outcasts and paupers, but were men of position, reputation, and, in some cases, of wealth. About half of them were Arcadians. Young men of good family, ennuied of home, restless and adventurous, formed the greater part, although many of mature age had been induced by liberal offers to leave their wives and children. They simply calculated on a year's campaign in Pisidia, from which they would return to their homes enriched.

So they were a.s.sured by the Greek commanders at Sardis, and so these commanders believed, for Cyrus stood high in popular estimation for liberality and good faith.