Part 13 (1/2)

(M417) The Persian fleet, fearing a similar disaster as happened near Mount Athos, struck directly across the aegean, from Samos to Euba, attacking on the way the intermediate islands. Naxos thus was invaded and easily subdued. From Naxos, Datis sent his fleet round the other Cyclades Islands, demanding reinforcements and hostages from all he visited, and reached the southern extremity of Euba in safety. Etruria was first subdued, unable to resist. After halting a few days at this city, he crossed to Attica, and landed in the bay of Marathon, on the eastern coast. The despot Hippias, son of Pisistratus, twenty years after his expulsion from Athens, pointed out the way.

(M418) But a great change had taken place at Athens since his expulsion.

The city was now under democratic rule, in its best estate. The ten tribes had become identified with the government and inst.i.tutions of the city.

The senate of the areopagus, renovated by the annual archons, was in sympathy with the people. Great men had arisen under the amazing stimulus of liberty, among whom Miltiades, Themistocles, and Aristides were the most distinguished. Miltiades, after an absence of six years in the Chersonesus of Thrace, returned to the city full of patriotic ardor. He was brought to trial before the popular a.s.sembly on the charge of having misgoverned the Chersonese; but he was honorably acquitted, and was chosen one of the ten generals of the republic annually elected. He was not, however, a politician of the democratic stamp, like Themistocles and Aristides, being a descendant of an ill.u.s.trious race, which traced their lineage to the G.o.ds; but he was patriotic, brave, and decided. His advice to burn the bridge over the Danube ill.u.s.trates his character-bold and far-seeing. Moreover, he was peculiarly hostile to Darius, whom he had so grievously offended.

(M419) Themistocles was a man of great native genius and sagacity. He comprehended all the embarra.s.sments and dangers of the political crisis in which his city was placed, and saw at a glance the true course to be pursued. He was also bold and daring. He was not favored by the accidents of birth, and owed very little to education. He had an unbounded pa.s.sion for glory and for display. He had great tact in the management of party, and was intent on the aggrandizement of his country. His morality was reckless, but his intelligence was great-a sort of Mirabeau: with his pa.s.sion, his eloquence, and his talents. His unfortunate end-a traitor and an exile-shows how little intellectual pre-eminence will avail, in the long run, without virtue, although such talents as he exhibited will be found useful in a crisis.

(M420) Aristides was inferior to both Alcibiades and Themistocles in genius, in resource, in boldness, and in energy; but superior in virtue, in public fidelity, and moral elevation. He pursued a consistent course, was no demagogue, unflinching in the discharge of trusts, just, upright, unspotted. Such a man, of course, in a corrupt society, would be exposed to many enmities and jealousies. But he was, on the whole, appreciated, and died, in a period of war and revolution, a poor man, with unbounded means of becoming rich-one of the few examples which our world affords of a man who believed in virtue, in G.o.d, and a judgment to come, and who preferred the future and spiritual to the present and material-a fool in the eyes of the sordid and bad-a wise man according to the eternal standards.

(M421) Aristides, Miltiades, and perhaps Themistocles, were elected among the ten generals, by the ten tribes, in the year that Datis led his expedition to Marathon. Each of the ten generals had the supreme command of the army for a day. Great alarm was felt at Athens as tidings reached the city of the advancing and conquering Persians. Couriers were sent in hot haste to the other cities, especially Sparta, and one was found to make the journey to Sparta on foot-one hundred and fifty miles-in forty-eight hours. The Spartans agreed to march, without delay, after the last quarter of the moon, which custom and superst.i.tion dictated. This delay was fraught with danger, but was insisted upon by the Spartans.

(M422) Meanwhile the dangers multiplied and thickened, that not a moment should be lost in bringing the Persians into action. Five of the generals counseled delay. The polemarch, Calimachus, who then had the casting vote, decided for immediate action. Themistocles and Aristides had seconded the advice of Miltiades, to whom the other generals surrendered their days of command-a rare example of patriotic disinterestedness. The Athenians marched at once to Marathon to meet their foes, and were joined by the Plataeans, one thousand warriors, from a little city-the whole armed population, which had a great moral effect.

(M423) The Athenians had only ten thousand hoplites, including the one thousand from Plataea. The Persian army is variously estimated at from one hundred and ten thousand to six hundred thousand. The Greeks were encamped upon the higher ground overlooking the plain which their enemies occupied.

The fleet was ranged along the beach. The Greeks advanced to the combat in rapid movement, urged on by the war-cry, which ever animated their charges. The wings of the Persian army were put to flight by the audacity of the charge, but the centre, where the best troops were posted, resisted the attack until Miltiades returned from the pursuit of the retreating soldiers on the wings. The defeat of the Persians was the result. They fled to their s.h.i.+ps, and became involved in the marshes. Six thousand four hundred men fell on the Persian side, and only one hundred and ninety-two on the Athenian. The Persians, though defeated, still retained their s.h.i.+ps, and sailed toward Cape Sunium, with a view of another descent upon Attica. Miltiades, the victor in the most glorious battle ever till then fought in Greece, penetrated the designs of the Persians, and rapidly retreated to Athens on the very day of battle. Datis arrived at the port of Phalerum to discover that his plans were baffled, and that the Athenians were still ready to oppose him. The energy and promptness of Miltiades had saved the city. Datis, discouraged, set sail, without landing, to the Cyclades.

(M424) The battle of Marathon, B.C. 490, must be regarded as one of the great decisive battles of the world, and the first which raised the political importance of the Greeks in the eyes of foreign powers. It was fought by Athens twenty years after the expulsion of the tyrants, and as a democratic State. On the Athenians rest the glory forever. It was not important for the number of men who fell on either side, but for giving the first great check to the Persian domination, and preventing their conquest of Europe. And its moral effect was greater than its political.

It freed the Greeks from that fear of the Persians which was so fatal and universal, for the tide of Persian conquest had been hitherto uninterrupted. It animated the Greeks with fresh courage, for the bravery of the Athenians had been unexampled, as had been the generals.h.i.+p of Miltiades. Athens was delivered by the almost supernatural bravery of its warriors, and was then prepared to make those sacrifices which were necessary in the more desperate struggles which were to come. And it inspired the people with patriotic ardor, and upheld the new civil const.i.tution. It gave force and dignity to the democracy, and prepared it for future and exalted triumphs. It also gave force to the religious sentiments of the people, for such a victory was regarded as owing to the special favor of the G.o.ds.

The Spartans did not arrive until after the battle had been fought, and Datis had returned with his Etrurian prisoners to Asia.

(M425) The victory of Marathon raised the military fame of Miltiades to the most exalted height, and there were no bounds to the enthusiasm of the Athenians. But the victory turned his head, and he lost both prudence and patriotism. He persuaded his countrymen, in the full tide of his popularity, to intrust him with seventy s.h.i.+ps, with an adequate force, with powers to direct an expedition according to his pleasure. The armament was cheerfully granted. But he disgracefully failed in an attack on the island of Paros, to gratify a private vindictive animosity. He lost all his _eclat_ and was impeached. He appealed, wounded and disabled from a fall he had received, to his previous services. He was found guilty, but escaped the penalty of death, but not of a fine of fifty talents. He did not live to pay it, or redeem his fame, but died of the injury he had received. Thus this great man fell from a pinnacle of glory to the deepest disgrace and ruin-a fate deserved, for he was not true to himself or country. The Athenians were not to blame, but judged him rightly. It was not fickleness, but a change in their opinions, founded on sufficient grounds, from the deep disappointment in finding that their hero was unworthy of their regards. No man who had rendered a favor has a claim to pursue a course of selfishness and unlawful ambition. No services can offset crimes. The Athenians, in their unbounded admiration, had given unbounded trust, and that trust was abused. And as the greatest despots who had mounted to power had earned their success by early services, so had they abused their power by imposing fetters, and the Athenians, just escaped from the tyranny of these despots, felt a natural jealousy and a deep repugnance, in spite of their previous admiration. The Athenians, in their treatment of Miltiades, were neither ungrateful nor fickle, but acted from a high sense of public morality, and in a stern regard to justice, without which the new const.i.tution would soon have been subverted. On the death of Miltiades Themistocles and Aristides became the two leading men of Athens, and their rivalries composed the domestic history of the city, until the renewed and vast preparations of the Persians caused all dissensions to be suspended for the public good.

(M426) But the jealousies and rivalries of these great men were not altogether personal. They were both patriotic, but each had different views respecting the course which Athens should adopt in the greatness of the dangers which impended. The policy of Aristides was to strengthen the army-that of Themistocles, the navy. Both foresaw the national dangers, but Themistocles felt that the hopes of Greece rested on s.h.i.+ps rather than armies to resist the Persians. And his policy was adopted. As the world can not have two suns, so Athens could not be prospered by the presence of two such great men, each advocating different views. One or the other must succ.u.mb to the general good, and Aristides was banished by the power of ostracism.

(M427) The wrath of Darius-a man of great force of character, but haughty and self-sufficient, was tremendous when he learned the defeat of Datis, and his retreat into Asia. He resolved to bring the whole force of the Persian empire together to subdue the Athenians, from whom he had suffered so great a disgrace. Three years were spent in active preparations for a new expedition which should be overwhelming. All the allies of Persia were called upon for men and supplies. Nor was he deterred by a revolt of Egypt, which broke out about this time, and he was on the point of carrying two gigantic enterprises-one for the reconquest of Egypt, and the other for the conquest of Greece-when he died, after a reign of thirty-six years, B.C. 485.

(M428) He was succeeded by his son Xerxes, who was animated by the animosities, but not the genius of his father. Though beautiful and tall, he was faint-hearted, vain, blinded by a sense of power, and enslaved by women. Yet he continued the preparations which Darius projected. Egypt was first subdued by his generals, and he then turned his undivided attention to Greece. He convoked the dignitaries of his empire-the princes and governors of provinces, and announced his resolution to bridge over the h.e.l.lespont and march to the conquest of Europe. Artaba.n.u.s, his uncle, dissuaded him from the enterprise, setting forth especially the probability that the Greeks, if victorious at sea, would destroy the bridge, and thus prevent his safe return. Mardonius advised differently, urging ambition and revenge, motives not lost on the Persian monarch. For four years the preparations went forward from all parts of the empire, including even the islands in the aegean. In the autumn of 481 B.C., the largest army this world has ever seen a.s.sembled at Sardis. Besides this, a powerful fleet of one thousand two hundred and seven s.h.i.+ps of war, besides transports, was collected at the h.e.l.lespont. Large magazines of provisions were formed along the coast of Asia Minor. A double bridge of boats, extending from Abydos to Sestos-a mile in length across the h.e.l.lespont, was constructed by Phnicians and Egyptians; but this was destroyed by a storm. Xerxes, in a transport of fury, caused the heads of the engineers to be cut off, and the sea itself scourged with three hundred lashes. This insane wrath being expended, the monarch caused the work to be at once reconstructed, this time by the aid of Greek engineers. Two bridges were built side by side upon more than six hundred large s.h.i.+ps, moored with strong anchors, with their heads toward the aegean. Over each bridge were sketched six vast cables, which held the s.h.i.+ps together, and over these were laid planks of wood, upon which a causeway was formed of wood and earth, with a high palisade on each side. To facilitate his march, Xerxes also constructed a ca.n.a.l across the isthmus which connects Mount Athos with the main land, on which were employed Phnician engineers. The men employed in digging the ca.n.a.l worked under the whip. Bridges were also thrown across the river Strymon.

(M429) These works were completed while Xerxes wintered at Sardis. From that city he dispatched heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Sparta and Athens, to demand the usual tokens of submission-earth and water. He also sent orders to the maritime cities of Thrace and Macedonia to prepare dinner for himself and hosts, as they pa.s.sed through. Greece was struck with consternation as the news reached the various cities of the vast forces which were on the march to subdue them. The army proceeded from Sardis, in the spring, in two grand columns, between which was the king and guards and select troops-all native Persians, ten thousand foot and ten thousand horse. From Sardis the hosts of Xerxes proceeded to Abydos, through Ilium, where his two bridges across the h.e.l.lespont awaited him.

From a marble throne the proud and vainglorious monarch saw his vast army defile over the bridges, perfumed with frankincense and strewed with myrtle boughs. One bridge was devoted to the troops, the other to the beasts and baggage. The first to cross were the ten thousand household troops, called Immortals, wearing garlands on their heads; then followed Xerxes himself in his gilded chariot, and then the rest of the army. It occupied seven days for the vast hosts to cross the bridge. Xerxes then directed his march to Doriscus, in Thrace, near the mouth of the Hebrus, where he joined his fleet. There he took a general review, and never, probably, was so great an army marshaled before or since, and composed of so many various nations. There were a.s.sembled nations from the Indus, from the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Levant, the aegean and the Euxine-Egyptian, Ethiopian, and Lybian. Forty-six nations were represented-all that were tributary to Persia. From the estimates made by Herodotus, there were one million seven hundred thousand foot, eighty thousand horse, besides a large number of chariots. With the men who manned the fleet and those he pressed into his service on the march, the aggregate of his forces was two million six hundred and forty thousand.

Scarcely an inferior number attended the soldiers as slaves, sutlers, and other persons, swelling the amount of the males to five million two hundred and eighty-three thousand two hundred and twenty-the whole available force of the Eastern world-Asia against Europe: as in mediaeval times it was Europe against Asia. It is, however, impossible for us to believe in so large a force, since it could not have been supplied with provisions. But with every deduction, it was still the largest army the world ever saw.

(M430) After the grand enumeration of forces, Xerxes pa.s.sed in his chariot to survey separately each body of contingents, to which he put questions.

He then embarked in a gilded galley, and sailed past the prows of the twelve hundred s.h.i.+ps moored four hundred feet from the sh.o.r.e. That such a vast force could be resisted was not even supposed to be conceivable by the blinded monarch. But Demaratus, the exiled king of Sparta, told him he would be resisted unto death, a statement which was received with derision.

(M431) After the review, the grand army pursued its course westward in three divisions and roads along Thrace, levying enormous contributions on all the Grecian towns, which submitted as the Persian monarch marched along, for how could they resist? The mere provisioning this great host for a single day impoverished the country. But there was no help, for to mortal eyes the success of Xerxes was certain. At Acanthus, Xerxes separated from his fleet, which was directed to sail round Mount Athos, while he pursued his march through Paeonia and Crestonia, and rejoin him at Therma, on the Thermaic Gulf, in Macedonia, within sight of Mount Olympus.

(M432) Meanwhile, the Athenians, fully alive to their danger, strained every nerve to make preparations to resist the enemy; fortunately, there was in the treasury a large sum derived from the Lamian mines, and this they applied, on the urgent representations of Themistocles, to building s.h.i.+ps and refitting their navy. A Panh.e.l.lenic congress, under the presidency of Athens and Sparta, a.s.sembled at the Isthmus of Corinth.-the first great league since the Trojan war. The representatives of the various States buried their dissensions, the most prominent of which were between Athens and aegina. In reconciling these feuds, Themistocles took a pre-eminent part. Indeed, there was need, for the political existence of h.e.l.las was threatened, and despair was seen in most every city. Even the Delphic oracle gave out replies discouraging and terrible; intimating, however, that the safety of Athens lay in the wooden wall, which, with extraordinary tact, was interpreted by Themistocles to mean that the true defense lay in the navy. Salamis was the place designated by the oracle for the retreat, which was now imperative, and thither the Athenians fled, with their wives and children, guarded by their fleet. It was decided by the congress that Sparta should command the land forces, and Athens the united navy of the Greeks; but many States, in deadly fear of the Persians, persisted in neutrality, among which were Argos, Cretes, Corcyra. The chief glory of the defense lay with Sparta and Athens. The united army was sent into Thessaly to defend the defile of Tempe, but discovering that they were unable to do this, since another pa.s.s over Mount Olympus was open in the summer, they retreated to the isthmus of Corinth, and left all Greece north of Mount Citheron and the Megarid territory without defense. Had the Greeks been able to maintain the pa.s.ses of Olympus and Ossa, all the northern States would probably have joined in the confederation against Persia; but, as they were left defenseless, we can not wonder that they submitted, including even the Achaeans, Borotians, and Dorians.

(M433) The Pa.s.s of Thermopylae was now fixed upon as the most convenient place of resistance, next to the vale of Tempe. Here the main land was separated from the island of Euba by a narrow strait two miles wide. On the northern part of the island, near the town of Histiaea, the coast was called Artemisium, and here the fleet was mustered, to co-operate with the land forces, and oppose, in a narrow strait, the progress of the Persian fleet. The defile of Thermopylae itself, at the south of Thessaly, was between Mount ta and an impa.s.sable mora.s.s on the Maliac Gulf. Nature had thus provided a double position of defense-a narrow defile on the land, and a narrow strait on the water, through which the army and the fleet must need pa.s.s if they would co-operate.

(M434) While the congress resolved to avail themselves of the double position, by sea and land, the Olympic games, and the great Dorian, of the Carneia, were at hand. These could not be dispensed with, even in the most extraordinary crisis to which the nation could be exposed. While, therefore, the Greeks a.s.sembled to keep the national festivals, probably from religious and superst.i.tious motives, auguring no good if they were disregarded, Leonidas, king of Sparta, with three hundred Spartans, two thousand one hundred and twenty Arcadians, four hundred Corinthians, two hundred men from Philius, and eighty from Mycenae-in all three thousand one hundred hoplites, besides Helots and light troops, was sent to defend the pa.s.s against the Persian hosts. On the march through Botia one thousand men from Thebes and Thespiae joined them, though on the point of submission to Xerxes. The Athenians sent their whole force on board their s.h.i.+ps, joined by the Plataeans.

(M435) It was in the summer of 480 B.C. when Xerxes reached Therma, about which time the Greeks arrived at their allotted posts. Leonidas took his position in the middle of the Pa.s.s-a mile in length, with two narrow openings. He then repaired the old wall built across the Pa.s.s by the Phocians, and awaited the coming of the enemy, for it was supposed his force was sufficient to hold it till the games were over. It was also thought that this narrow pa.s.s was the only means of access possible to the invading army; but it was soon discovered that there was also a narrow mountain path from the Phocian territory to Thermopylae. The Phocians agreed to guard this path, and leave the defense of the main pa.s.s to the Peloponnesian troops. But Leonidas painfully felt that his men were insufficient in number, and found it necessary to send envoys to the different States for immediate re-enforcements.

(M436) The Greek fleet, a.s.sembled at Artemisium, was composed of two hundred and seventy-one triremes and nine penteconters, commanded by Themistocles, but furnished by the different States. A disaster happened to the Greeks very early; three triremes were captured by the Persians, which caused great discouragement, and in a panic the Greeks abandoned their strong naval position, and sailed up the Euban Strait to Chalcis.

This was a great misfortune, since the rear of the army of Leonidas was no longer protected by the fleet. But a destructive storm dispersed the fleet of the Persians at this imminent crisis, so that it was impossible to lend aid to their army now arrived at Thermopylae. Four hundred s.h.i.+ps of war, together with a vast number of transports, were thus destroyed. The storm lasted three days. After this disaster to the Persians, the Greek fleet returned to Artemisium. Xerxes encamped within sight of Thermopylae four days, without making an attack, on account of the dangers to which his fleet were exposed. On the fifth day he became wroth at the impudence and boldness of the petty force which quietly remained to dispute his pa.s.sage, for the Spartans amused themselves with athletic sports and combing their hair. Nor was it altogether presumption on the part of the Greeks, for there were four or five thousand heavily-armed men, the bravest in the land, to defend a pa.s.sage scarcely wider than a carriage-road-with a wall and other defenses in front.