Part 18 (1/2)
Party A 6,000 votes ” B 4,800 ”
” C 1,900 ”
------ Total 12,700
Arrange these numbers in a line, and divide successively by 1, 2, 3, and so on, thus:--
Party A. Party B. Party C.
6,000 4,800 1,900 3,000 2,400 960 2,000 1,600 1,500 1,200 1,200 960 1,000
The eleventh highest number, which const.i.tutes the measuring rod, will be found to be 1000; the largest party obtains six seats, the second party obtains four seats, with a remainder of 800 votes, and the third only one seat, with a remainder of 900 votes. The two smaller parties taken together poll 6700 votes but only obtain five seats, as compared with the six seats obtained by the larger party with 6000 votes; the two remainders of 800 and 900 votes, which together const.i.tute more than a quota, having no influence on the result of the election. Even if, in the allotment of seats, the largest party has a remainder of votes not utilized, yet this remainder necessarily bears a smaller proportion to the total of the votes polled than is the case with a smaller party.
Thus the system works steadily in favour of the larger party.
The question of remainders, or votes not utilized in the distribution of seats, is of minor importance when the const.i.tuencies return a large number of members. When, for example, as in the city of Brussels, there are twenty-one members to be elected, the votes not utilized bear a small proportion to those that have been taken into account in the allotment of seats. In Belgium, however, there are several const.i.tuencies returning as few as three members, and there is naturally a demand that these const.i.tuencies should be united so that the method of distribution should yield more accurate results.
If the d'Hondt rule, like every other method of distribution, is open to criticism from the point of view of theoretical perfection, it must be admitted that in practice it yields excellent results. The election at Ghent resulted in the return of six Catholics, three Liberals and two Socialists; it would have been impossible to have allotted the seats more fairly. Under the old non-proportional method the Catholics would have obtained eleven representatives and the Liberals and Socialists none. The immeasurable improvement effected by every true proportional method is apt to be overlooked in the critical examination of the working of these methods in those extreme cases which rarely occur in practice.
_The formation of ”cartels.”_
The steady working of the d'Hondt rule in favour of the larger parties has, however, not escaped the attention of advocates of proportional representation. The late Professor Hagenbach-Bischoff has formulated the proposal that parties should be allowed to put forward combined lists, and that in the first allotment of seats the totals of the combined lists should be taken as the basis of distribution. The need of some such provision may be shown by an example used in ill.u.s.tration of the d'Hondt system, at a meeting held under the auspices of the French Proportional Representation League.[8] A const.i.tuency with eleven members was taken; four lists, A, B, C, and D, received 6498, 2502, 1499, and 501 votes respectively; the d'Hondt rule made 834 the measuring rod, and gave A seven members, B three, C one, and D none. The question was asked why provision was not made for the transfer of the votes from list D to list C, so that if, for example, these lists were put forward by Radical-Socialists and by Socialists respectively, the parties might obtain the additional seat to which their combined totals ent.i.tled them. It will be seen that lists C and D, with a total of 2000 votes (more than twice 834), obtained but one representative, while list A, with 6498 votes, obtained seven representatives.[9]
Professor Hagenbach-Bischoffs proposal, which would meet this difficulty, has not been embodied in the Belgian law, but ”cartels”
(arrangements for the presentation of a common list) are formed between the Liberals and Socialists so as to lessen their loss of representation due to the working of the d'Hondt rule. The ”cartels,” however, do not give satisfaction, as experience shows that many Liberals who would vote for a Liberal list decline to vote for a ”cartel” of Liberals and Socialists; whilst, on the other hand, extreme Socialists decline to support a Liberal-Socialist coalition. In the Finnish system, however, provision is made for the combination of lists in accordance with Professor Hagenbach-Bischoff's suggestion. Indeed, as the Finnish law forbids any list to contain more than three names, some such provision was necessary in order to allow each separate party to nominate a full list of candidates.
The experience of the Belgian ”cartels” would seem to show that, even where party organization and discipline are highly developed, many electors resent the disposal of their votes by a bargain between the organizations concerned. The single transferable vote, by allowing each elector to indicate his second choice in the way in which he himself prefers, would enable smaller parties to obtain their share of representation without involving a preliminary compact between party organizations. A list system seems to establish a rigid division between parties, whilst there is no such corresponding rigid division in the minds of many electors. The model elections conducted by the Proportional Representation Society cannot perhaps be accepted as a conclusive guide to the action of voters at a real election, yet the number of Liberals who, in the last of these elections, gave an effective preference to a representative of the Independent Labour Party, in the person of Mr. Henderson, was very noteworthy. In the Belgian system no such fluidity is possible; the Liberal electors would be shut off from any relation with the supporters of Mr. Henderson, who could figure only upon the Labour Party's list.
_The different methods of selecting successful candidates_.
It will be seen that the problem of allotting seats to lists has been solved in several different ways. Similarly, different methods have been tried for the purpose of selecting the successful candidates from the respective lists. The instructions to voters vary accordingly. The earlier schemes (and the practice obtains in several Swiss cantons to-day) provided that each elector should have as many votes as there were members to be elected, and that he might distribute (without the privilege of c.u.mulating) his votes over the whole of the candidates nominated, selecting, if he desired, some names from one list, some from another, and some from another. After the number of seats secured by each list had been ascertained those candidates were declared elected who, in the respective lists, had obtained the highest number of individual votes.
_Panachage_.
The practice of voting for candidates belonging to different lists--_panachage_, as it is called--has evoked considerable discussion, and still gives rise to differences of opinion among the advocates of proportional representation on the Continent. At first sight there would appear to be nothing to discuss, and that there was no possible reason why the elector should not be allowed to exercise his choice in the freest manner. It has, however, been found that this privilege can be used in an unfair way. When each elector has as many votes as there are candidates, and is not permitted to c.u.mulate his votes on any one, it usually happens that the votes obtained by individual candidates in any given list vary but little in number. When in some elections it was realized that the party could only obtain a certain number of seats, but that it had a few hundred votes to spare, some extreme partisans used these votes for the purpose of voting for the least competent men of their opponents' list, and their action sometimes resulted in the election of those men in preference to the more competent men of the party. The danger from this cause would appear to be exaggerated, but although success has seldom attended the abuse of _panachage_, the fear of a successful attempt has a disturbing influence. The later Swiss laws allow electors to c.u.mulate three votes, but not more, upon any one candidate, so that the success of popular candidates is a.s.sured.
_The single vote and the case de tete_.
The Belgian parliamentary system suppresses _panachage_, and that in a most effective way. In this system each elector has but one vote, and therefore can only vote for one candidate. In addition, the Belgian system confers upon the organization presenting a list the right to arrange the order in which the candidates shall appear upon the list, and, further, it provides that the voter may approve of this arrangement by voting at the head of the list in the s.p.a.ce provided for that purpose and which is known as the _case de tete_. Party organizations naturally advise their supporters to vote in this way. Public opinion is divided on this feature of the Belgian system, but M. Van den Heuvel, formerly Minister of Justice, who took a responsible part in the pa.s.sing of the law, and with whom the author discussed this provision, defended it most vigorously, on the ground that the party as a whole had a right to determine which of its members should be elected. In the absence of the provision referred to it might happen that some candidate would be elected in preference to one who was more generally approved of by the party. This may be made clear by an example given by M. Van den Heuvel himself. A, B, C and D are candidates. Suppose that the party is strong enough to return three candidates, but no more, and that five-sixths of the party are in favour of candidates A, B and C, whilst the minority, one-sixth, are ardently in favour of candidate D. It will be necessary that the majority of the party (the five-sixths) should cleverly divide their votes equally between the candidates A, B and C in order to prevent the possibility of candidate D being elected by a small minority of the party. A little reflection will show that in the absence of any such provision the popular candidate of the majority, say A, might attract too large a proportion of the votes, thereby allowing D to pa.s.s B or C. Each provision of the Belgian system has been most carefully thought out, and, if it strengthens the hands of party organizations, it does so in order to secure the representation of the party by the candidates most generally approved. It may, however, be pointed out that had the single transferable vote been used, the candidates A, B and C, who, in M. Van den Heuvel's example, were supported by five-sixths of the party, would have been sure of election; there would have been no need to have conferred a special privilege upon the party organizations.
_The limited and c.u.mulative vote_.
The French Proportional Representation League, which, impressed with the simplicity of the Belgian system, desired to introduce it into France, refrained from advocating the adoption of the _case de tete_, and suggested that the order in which candidates should be declared elected on each list should be determined by the votes of the electors. The French League in its first proposal recommended that each elector should, as in Belgium, have but one vote. It was soon realized that the popular candidate of the party might attract a large majority of the votes, and that, in consequence, candidates might be elected who were the nominees of only a small section of the party. The League in its second proposal recommended the use of the limited vote, each elector having two votes when six deputies were to be elected, and three in larger const.i.tuencies. The League, however, followed the Belgian practice in confining the choice of the elector to candidates on one list. This proposition was examined in 1905 by the _Commission du Suffrage Universel_, which, in the Report, declared that it was impossible to approve of such a limitation of the elector's freedom.
”Nous ne pouvons,” runs the Report, ”laisser si etroitment enchainer, garrotter, ligotter l'electeur proclame souverain et qui doit en tout cas etre libre.” The Committee recommended the use of the limited vote without the restriction recommended by the League. In a further Report, issued in 1907, this Committee again emphasized the necessity of leaving the elector quite free in the choice of candidates, and a new Bill, drafted by the Committee, provided that each elector should have as many votes as there were deputies to be elected, and that he should be allowed to c.u.mulate the whole, or several of his votes, upon any one candidate. Where, however, the c.u.mulative vote has been introduced into recent Swiss laws, as in that of the Canton of Bale City, the elector is not permitted to c.u.mulate more than three votes upon any one candidate.
It will thus be seen that the single vote, the multiple vote without the privilege of c.u.mulating, the limited vote, and the c.u.mulative vote, have all been proposed or adopted as methods of determining which candidates shall be declared elected.
_Special characteristics of Swedish and Finnish systems_.
This summary of the different methods used in solving the double problem of a list system--the allotment of seats to parties and the selection of successful candidates--is not fully complete.[10] Special features have been incorporated in the Swedish and Finnish systems for the purpose of securing as much freedom of action as possible to electors, and these systems are described in Appendices Nos. III. and IV. The differences between the various list systems are, however, not so great as those between a list system and the single transferable vote, but the consideration of these must be reserved for the next chapter.
[Footnote 1: The text of the Belgian law (Art. 263 of the Electoral Code) runs as follows: ”Le bureau princ.i.p.al divise successivement par 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, &c. le chiftre electoral de chacune des listes et range les quotients dans l'ordre de leur importance jusqu'a concurrence d'un nombre total de quotients egal a celui des membres a elire. Le dernier quotient sert de diviseur electoral.