Part 16 (1/2)
[Footnote 16: It was at first intended to adopt the arrangement of staff and method of recording preferences used at the election of 1897. These arrangements were after a test abandoned in favour of the much more convenient method used at the Proportional Representation Society's model election held December 1908.--_Report on the Tasmanian General Election_, 1909, par. 8.]
[Footnote 17: For full details of these elections, see Report presented to both Houses of the Transvaal Parliament.--T.G. 5--'10.]
[Footnote 18: _Report of Royal Commission on Electoral Systems_, par.
76.]
[Footnote 19: A simple example will explain. Let it be a.s.sumed that P and Q are members of party A, and poll 18,000 votes, that R and S and T are members of party B, polling in all 19,000 votes, and that the following table records the votes given and the details of the transfers made in arriving at the final result:--
Quota = (37,000/4) + 1 = 9251
Transfer Transfer 1st of R's of T's Candidates. Count. Surplus. Result. Votes. Result.
P 9,050 9,050 9,050 (Elected).
Party A. Q 8,950 8,950 8,950 (Elected).
R 10,000 -749 9,251 9,251 (Elected).
Party B. S 6,000 +500 6,500 +2,400 8,900 T 3,000 +249 3,249 -3,249
Exhausted +849 849 ------ ------ ------ 37,000 37,000 37,000
The members of the two parties recorded their votes as follows:--
Party A. Party B.
P. 9,050 R. 10,000 Q. 8,950 S. 6,000 T. 3,000
The total number of votes polled is 37,000, and the quota, therefore, is 9251. Candidate R, having received more than a quota would be declared elected, and his surplus of 749 votes carried forward. It may be a.s.sumed that candidates S and T, who are of the same party, received 500 and 249 as their shares of this surplus. The result of this transfer is shown in the table. T, the lowest candidate on the poll, would then be eliminated. Now, if the contingent of voters Supporting T are not fully loyal to their party, and as many as 849 have recorded no preference save for T, then 2400 would be available for transfer to S, whose total would be only 8900. S would be eliminated, and the three candidates elected would be P and Q of party A, and R of party B, although R and S between them represented 18,151 voters. This case can be met by providing that whenever votes are exhausted the quota should be counted afresh. The votes in play, ignoring those exhausted, would be in all 36,151, the new quota would be 9038, while an additional number of votes, viz. 213, would be available for transfer from R to S, with the result that the position of these candidates would be as follows:--
R 9,038 S 9,113 P 9,050 Q 8,950
Party B would obtain two seats, the party A only one seat.]
[Footnote 20: Address delivered on 6 September 1909.]
[Footnote 22: See Appendix VII.]
CHAPTER VIII
LIST SYSTEMS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
”'One man, one vote; one party, one candidate'--thus runs the cry.”--COUNT GOBLET D'ALVIELLA
List systems of proportional representation are based upon the block vote or _scrutin de liste_--the method of election generally used on the Continent of Europe and in the United States of America when several members are to be elected for the same const.i.tuency. With the _scrutin de liste_, lists of candidates are nominated by the various political organizations or groups of electors; each elector has as many votes as there are members to be elected, but he may not give more than one vote to any one candidate. The party which can obtain the support of a majority of the electors can carry its list to the exclusion of all others; minorities are crushed even more completely than with the system of single-member const.i.tuencies. But as const.i.tuencies returning several members are an essential requirement of any scheme of proportional representation, the _scrutin de liste_ facilitates the introduction of a proportional system, for the only great change involved is the allotment of seats to the respective lists in proportion to the totals of votes obtained by each. But this change brings in its train a change in the nature of the vote. It remains no longer a vote only for candidates as individuals; it obtains a twofold significance, and becomes what is termed the double simultaneous vote (_le double vote simultanee_). In the first place it is a vote for the party list as such, and is used for determining the proportion of seats to be allotted to the lists; and, in the second place, it is a vote for a particular candidate or order of candidates for the purpose of ascertaining which of the candidates included in a list shall be declared successful. This double function of the vote is characteristic of all list systems of proportional representation. Other changes of a subsidiary character, which experience has shown to be advisable, have been adopted in different countries so that the various systems differ in detail in the methods both by which seats are apportioned among the competing lists and by which the successful candidates are chosen.
_The Belgian electoral system_.]
List systems are in operation for parliamentary purposes in Switzerland, Belgium, Wurtemberg, Sweden, and Finland. The simplest of these is that adopted by Belgium, and the description of a Belgian election may serve as an introduction to the study of other systems. Through the courtesy of M. Steyeart, the President of the Tribunal of First Instance and Chief Electoral Officer for the const.i.tuency of Ghent-Eecloo, the author was enabled to watch the elections in May 1908 in that const.i.tuency.
Proportional representation is, however, only one of the points in which the Belgian and English electoral systems differ, and in order to obtain a true estimate of the working of the Belgian law it is necessary to distinguish between results which are due to the franchise qualifications and those which are due to the system of proportional representation. The effects arising from these two separate features of the electoral system have sometimes been confused, and it is therefore desirable to give a brief outline of the conditions which govern a Belgian election.