Part 4 (1/2)
Hayward in _The Nineteenth Century_, February 1884, p. 295.]
[Footnote 8: _Proportional Representation_, by Professor Commons, p. 52 _et seq_. For further examples in the United States the reader should consult Chapter III. of Professor Commons' book.]
[Footnote 9: _Preferential Voting_, by the Right Hon. J. Parker Smith.
p. 8.]
[Footnote 10: _Proportional Representation_, p. 50.]
[Footnote 11: _The Machinery of Politics_, W. R. Warn, 1872.]
[Footnote 12: Such instructions are contained in Clause 40 of the South African Act, signed by the South African National Convention at Bloemfontein, 11 May 1909.]
[Footnote 13: See Report of Delimitation Commission.]
[Footnote 14: This electoral method is known by various names. In Australia it is called the block vote, in the United States the general ticket, on the Continent the _scrutin de liste_.]
[Footnote 15: The action was defended on the ground that the Munic.i.p.al Reform party had obtained a majority of 39,653 votes at the polls.]
[Footnote 16: _Report on Munic.i.p.al Representation Bill (H.L.)_, 1907 (132), p. vi.]
CHAPTER III
THE INDIRECT RESULTS OF MAJORITY SYSTEMS
”Nous attachons un interet vital, presque aussi grand, a la forme dans laquello on consulte la nation qu'au principe lui-meme du suffrage universel.”--GAMBETTA
_False impressions of public opinion._
The first and immediate consequence arising from present electoral methods is the growth of false impressions of the true tendencies of public opinion, impressions that are still further distorted by the exaggerations of the press. The winning of a seat is always a ”brilliant victory,” and a ”crus.h.i.+ng defeat” for the other side. The German General Election of 1907 affords an excellent ill.u.s.tration of these false impressions. The Social Democrats lost nearly 50 per cent. of their previous representation, and an outburst of delight arose in certain journals over their ”crus.h.i.+ng defeat.” But the Socialists' poll showed an increase of a quarter of a million, and although their total poll had not increased in quite the same proportion as that of other parties, the figures showed that the Social Democrats were still by far the largest party in Germany. The number of seats won were no true index to the movements in political forces. Not only the press, however, but some of the most careful writers on modern tendencies in politics are also misled by these false impressions. The General Election of 1895, in which there was a majority of 117,473 for the Unionists in a total of 4,841,769 votes, is a case in point. This election has often been chosen as marking the commencement of a period of strong reaction in political thought. Writers have been misled by the overwhelming majority in seats obtained by the Unionists at that election. They have entirely ignored the figures of the polls, and these, the only safe guide to the opinions of the electors, show that the reaction was far less strong than is usually supposed.
_False impressions become the basis of legislative action._
False impressions of public opinion, however, lead to an indirect effect of much greater importance. The false impression becomes the basis of action, and an apparent triumph for reaction makes a ”reactionary”
policy much more easy of achievement. Similarly an apparent triumph for a ”progressive” policy facilitates its adoption. For the House of Commons is still the most powerful factor in determining our political destinies, and hence these false results have a very material effect in the shaping of history. If the opinion of the people had been truly represented in the Parliaments elected in 1895 and 1900, is it not almost a certainty that the legislation of those two Parliaments would have been considerably modified? Or, to go further back to the election of 1886, the result of which was universally interpreted as a crus.h.i.+ng defeat of Mr. Gladstone's proposals in favour of Home Rule, would not a true result on that occasion have influenced subsequent developments?
Over-representation, which results in the temporary triumph of a party and of partisan measures, involves the nation in a serious loss, for the time and energy of a Parliament may be largely consumed in revising and correcting, if not in reversing the partisan legislation of its predecessor. Thus, a considerable portion of the time of the Parliament of 1906-1909 was spent in attempting to reverse the policies embodied in the Education and Licensing Acts of the preceding Parliament.
_Loss of prestige by the House of Commons._
Apart, however, from speculation as to the effect of false electoral methods on the development of public affairs, the serious divergences between representation and polling strength, to which attention has been directed in the previous chapter, must tend to the weakening of the authority and prestige of the House of Commons. Should a Government, misled by the composition of the ”representative” House, make use of its majority in that House for the pa.s.sage of measures not really desired by the country, and should the House of Lords, reformed or not, guess rightly that the decisions of the Commons were contrary to the popular will, then inevitably the position of the House of Lords would be strengthened as compared with that of the Commons. ”A House of Commons which does not represent,” said a leading Liberal journal, ”may stand for less in the country than the House of Lords, or the Crown, and its influence will infallibly decline in proportion. One has only to take up an old volume of Bagehot to confirm one's suspicions that the imperfections of electoral machinery, combined with the changes in the character of the electorate, are already threatening to undermine the real sources of the nation's power.”[1] Sir Frederick Pollock has declared that our defective electoral system may ”yield a House of Commons so unrepresentative in character as to cease to command the respect and obedience of citizens.”[2]
_Unstable representation._
False impressions of public opinion, unstable legislation based upon such false impressions, the weakening of the foundations on which the authority of the House of Commons rests, these are results which in themselves const.i.tute a sufficiently serious condemnation of present methods. But those upheavals in representation, those violent swings of the pendulum which have often been so p.r.o.nounced a feature of elections, give an instability to the composition of our supreme legislative chamber that must still further undermine its authority. Many, indeed, imagining that this dangerous instability is the reflection of an equally unstable electorate, begin to question whether a popular franchise is in any circ.u.mstances a satisfactory basis for government.
The violence of the change in representation is attributed to the character of the electors instead of to the evil effects of a defective electoral method. On the other hand, the large majorities which accompany such changes are regarded by other politicians as blessings in disguise--as being essential to the formation of a strong Government.
But a Government based on a false majority will, in the long-run, find that this exaggeration of its support in the country is a source of weakness rather than of strength. Like the image in Nebuchadnezzar's dream, the feet of such a Government are part of clay. For the extreme swing of the pendulum which brought the Government into power is usually followed by an equally violent swing in the opposite direction. When the high-water mark of success is attained at a General Election it becomes practically impossible for the party in power to gain additional seats at bye-elections, whilst an unbroken series of losses makes it difficult to prevent a feeling arising that the ministry has lost the confidence of the electors, although the actual change in public opinion may have been of the slightest. The prestige of the Government is gone, and prestige is as necessary to a Government as a majority. In brief, a large majority strengthens a Government only in so far as that majority corresponds to public opinion.
_Weakened personnel_.
Moreover, the extreme changes which take place at a General Election often result in a considerable weakening of the personnel of the House of Commons. In such a debacle as that which took place in 1906, there was no process of selection by which the Unionists might have retained the services in Parliament of their ablest members. Although there were 33,907 Unionists in Manchester and Salford, Mr. Balfour, the leader of the party, experienced the mortification of being rejected by one of the divisions. This failure was paralleled by the defeat of Sir William Harcourt at Derby in 1895, whilst Mr. Gladstone, in contesting Greenwich in 1874, only succeeded in obtaining the second place, the first seat being won by a Conservative. A way is usually found by which party leaders return without delay to the House of Commons, but there are members of the highest distinction and capacity who, especially if these qualities are a.s.sociated with a spirit of independence, find, it increasingly difficult to re-enter political life. Victory at the polls depends not so much upon the services which a statesman, however eminent, may have rendered to his country, as upon the ability of the party to maintain its majority in the particular const.i.tuency for which he stands. Indeed, in this matter a leader of opinion is placed at a disadvantage as compared with an ordinary member of the party; his very pre-eminence, his very activities bring him into conflict with certain sections of the electorate which, insignificant in themselves, may yet be sufficiently numerous to influence the result of an election.
Statesmen, moreover, have often lost their seats merely because they have endeavoured to give electors of their very best. When Mr. John Morley (now Lord Morley of Blackburn), during the election of 1906, received a deputation of Socialists, he, with characteristic courage, explained very frankly the ground on which he could not support their principles.[3] A similar candour on his part in 1895 cost him his seat at Newcastle. Can we wonder then that there arise complaints that our statesmen are deficient both in courage and in ideas? Single-member const.i.tuencies are, as Gambetta pointed out more than twenty years ago, inimical to political thinking, and recent General Elections have afforded numerous examples in support of this statement. The courageous and forcible presentment of ideas has time after time been rewarded by exclusion from the House of Commons.