Part 15 (1/2)

There is a sense, however, in which the idea as a purpose can be taken as the partial fulfilment of another purpose; in the sense that any purpose is the outgrowth of activity involving previous purposes This becomes evident e inquire into the ”indefinite restlessness” and dissatisfaction out of which the idea as purpose springs

Dissatisfaction presupposes so on in attempted fulfilment of so, or with not singing, it is because one has already purposed to participate in the perfor a certain melody, or one has rashly contracted to entertain a strenuous infant who is vociferously deiven dissatisfaction and the purpose to which it gives rise grow out of activity involving previous purposing But this does not do aith the distinction between the idea as a purpose and the i experience

If the discussion appears at this point to be growing somewhat captious, let us pass to a consideration of the relation between internal and external s, where the problem of truth and error appears, and where the vital import of these distinctions becomes more obvious

II PURPOSE AND THE JUDGMENT

Mr Royce begins with the traditional definition of truth, which he then proceeds to reinterpret:

Truth is very frequently defined in tere_ In the second place, truth has been defined as the _correspondence between our ideas and their objects_[179] When we undertake to express the objective validity of any truth, we use judgarded, that is, if viewed , whose objects are external to themselves, involve in all their more complex forms, combinations of ideas, devices whereby eave already present ideas intoour internal ment has always its other, its objective aspect

The ideas e judge are also to possess external

It is true, as Mr Bradley has well said, that the intended subject of every judge about external s are to have value for us as truth only in so far as they not only possess internal , but also imitate, by their structure, what is at once other than the above themselves That, at least, is the natural view of our consciousness, just in so far as, in judging, we conceive our thought as essentially other than its external object, and as destined merely to correspond thereto Noe have by this time come to feel how hard it is to define the Reality to which our ideas are thus to confor as we thus sunder external and internal ment_--The probleround of this relation between the internal and external , between the idea and its object This relation is established in the act of judg has at best only a negative relation to the external

To say that all A is B is in fact merely to assert that the real world contains no objects that are A, but that fail to be of the class B To say that no A is B is to assert that the real world contains no objects that are at once A and B[181]

The universal judgments then ”tell us indirectly what is in the real us what is not”[182]

However, these universal judgments have after all a positive value in the realht

This negative character of the universal judgments holds true of them, as we have just said, just in so far as you sunder the external and internal , and just in so far as you view the real as the beyond, and as the merely beyond If you turn your attention once , you see, indeed, that they are constantly beco enriched in their inner life by all this process To know by inner demonstration that 2+2=4 and that this is necessarily so, is not yet to know that the external world, taken merely as the Beyond, contains any true or finally valid variety of objects at all, any two or four objects that can be counted On the other hand, so far as your internal oes, to have experienced within that which ment necessary, is indeed to have observed a character about your own ideas which rightly seee deserves especial attention In the light of Kant, and in view of Mr Royce's general definition of the judgs, one is puzzled to find that for the ment ”two and two are four”

is confined to the real To be sure, Mr Royce says that this li occurs only when the external and internalare sundered But the point is: Does the ard the judgment ”two and two are four” as of positive value only as internal ? Indeed, in another connection Mr Royce himself shows most clearly that mathematical results are as objective and as empirical as the astronomer's star[184]

Nor would it appear competent for anyone to say here: ”Of course, they are not internal h the kind offices of the epistes are valid of the external world” We are insisting that they are never taken by the mathe whose externalis then to be established Surely the ical e fro is there all the while in the fores hich the ain seems to be that the distinction above discussed between the idea in the logical sense, as purpose, and the iht of The relation between two and four is not first discovered as aIt is discovered in the process of fulfilling so out of this relation So the sule is not discovered as ais then to be found It is found _in working with_ the triangle It is discovered _in_ the triangle And, once le here is a ical idea, it is as truly external and objective as pine sticks or chalk es that flow spontaneously under the sti experiences as the manipulation of sticks or chalk lines

The difficulty in keeping the universal judg :

As to these two types of judgments, the universal and the particular, they both, as we have seen, ments arise in the realm where experience and idea have already fused into one whole; and this is precisely the reals Here one constructs and observes the consequences of one's construction But the construction is at once an experience _of fact and an idea_ Upon the basis of such ideal constructions one e, mysterious, undertake to be valid of that other world--the world of external [185]

One is somewhat puzzled to know just what is meant by the fusion ”of experience and idea” We must infer that it means the fusion of soainst idea, and this has always , and this interpretation see which describes the fusion as one ”of _fact_ and idea” The situation then see, a fact and an idea, ”fuse into one whole” and thus constitute that which is yet ”precisely the reals,” which ais And this waives the question of how experience fused into one whole can be an internal , since as such it ; or conversely, how experience can be at once fact _and_ idea and still be ”fused into one whole”

Nor does the difficulty disappear e turn to the aspects of universality and necessity What is the significance and basis of universality and necessity as confined ?

So far as your internal oes, _to have experienced within that which ment necessary_ is, indeed, to have observed a character about your own ideas which rightly seems to you very positive[186]

But what is it that we ”experience within” which ment necessary? In the discussion of the relation of the universal judgh which the forative force, there is an interesting statement:

One who inquires into a matter upon which he believes hi_, in mathematics, has present to his mind, at the outset, questions such as admit of alternative answers ”A,” he declares, ”in case it exists at all, is either B or C” Further research shows universally, perhaps, that No A is B

The last sentence is the statement referred to What is meant by ”further research shows universally, perhaps, that No A is B”? What kind of ”research,” internal or external, can show this? In short, there appears to be as much difficulty with universality and necessity in the real as in the reference of internal to externalthis point, Mr Royce pursues the proble, and finds that regarded as sundered there is no basis so far for even the negative universality and necessity in the reference of the internalto the external