Part 17 (1/2)

Seeming to ooze resentment, Myers also rejected Schlesinger's finding that the general and his staff had been slow to react to events in Iraq. ”We've been very good at adjusting,” he insisted. ”Could we have been faster, sharper, quicker? Sure, we could have been, in probably many areas it goes without saying, particularly if we have the benefit of looking backwards and not looking forward. And that's the way I would address that.” Myers essentially refused to conduct the cold, hard review of the errors of the U.S. effort, from a.s.sumptions to strategy to tactics, that was so desperately needed, especially as the reasons for going to war fell apart.

To a surprising degree, those punished for the crimes committed at Abu Ghraib would be the lowest of the low-England, Graner, and the like, which is to say, a low-ranking female reservist enlisted soldier and her ex-lover. The Army repeatedly insisted that its top commanders were not at fault, and seemed to refuse to consider the possibility that that stance was wrong. Even former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird-such a longtime friend of the defense secretary that he had helped in Rumsfeld's first campaign for Congress-found that outcome unacceptable. ”To stop abuses and mistakes by the rank and file, whether in the prisons or the streets, heads must roll at much higher levels than they have thus far,” he wrote over a year later. ”The best way to keep foot soldiers honest is to make sure their commanders know that they themselves will be held responsible for any breach of honor.” But that was not the message the Pentagon or the Army chose to send.

Over the next year, additional information about abuses would continue to surface. There were many more Pentagon reviews but no independent ones, and because most of the internal reviews seemed to blame the privates while excusing the generals, a lingering air of unfairness hangs over the entire affair. Also, because the top bra.s.s seemed unwilling to confront what really happened and continued to insist that each instance was an isolated case, each additional disclosure of abuse would be cited by journalists and others to challenge the theory that a few low-ranking bad apples were entirely to blame. To anyone who knew the military, that just didn't sound right. ”As former soldiers, we knew that you don't have this kind of pervasive att.i.tude out there unless you've condoned it,” said retired Army Col. Larry Wilkerson, who had been Colin Powell's chief of staff at the State Department. ”And whether you did it explicitly or not is irrelevant.”

An unfortunate side effect of that continued suspicion was that it shadowed the courage shown by thousands of other U.S. soldiers. ”We now spend ninety percent of our time talking about the Abu Ghraib stuff, and one percent talking about the valor of the troops,” said Bing West, the chronicler of the Marines in Iraq.

The op-ed pages try reverse gear In the wake of the unraveling of the Bush administration's rationales for invasion, and the tarring of the U.S. military presence, expert opinion in the United States began to catch up with the facts on the ground. The op-ed pages of the New York Times, New York Times, the the Was.h.i.+ngton Post, Was.h.i.+ngton Post, and the and the Los Angeles Times Los Angeles Times in May 2004 looked almost like the reverse of the 2002 and 2003 stampedes that culminated in the gus.h.i.+ng reviews of Powell's presentation to the UN. in May 2004 looked almost like the reverse of the 2002 and 2003 stampedes that culminated in the gus.h.i.+ng reviews of Powell's presentation to the UN.

The New York Times' New York Times' Thomas Friedman, probably the most influential writer on foreign affairs in the United States, and one of the more prominent journalistic supporters of going to war in Iraq, sounded the alarm in early May. ”This administration needs to undertake a total overhaul of its Iraq policy,” he wrote. ”Otherwise, it is courting a total disaster for us all.” Thomas Friedman, probably the most influential writer on foreign affairs in the United States, and one of the more prominent journalistic supporters of going to war in Iraq, sounded the alarm in early May. ”This administration needs to undertake a total overhaul of its Iraq policy,” he wrote. ”Otherwise, it is courting a total disaster for us all.”

A week later, his Times Times colleague David Brooks, who had been even more hawkish back in 2002, when he argued that ”Bush has such an incredibly strong case to go in there,” sounded even more chagrined. ”This has been a crus.h.i.+ngly depressing period, especially for people who support the war in Iraq,” Brooks wrote. ”The predictions people on my side made about the postwar world have not yet come true. The warnings others made about the fractious state of post-Saddam society have.” In retrospect, he added, the plan to simply remove Saddam, establish democracy, and depart the country ”seems like a childish fantasy.” colleague David Brooks, who had been even more hawkish back in 2002, when he argued that ”Bush has such an incredibly strong case to go in there,” sounded even more chagrined. ”This has been a crus.h.i.+ngly depressing period, especially for people who support the war in Iraq,” Brooks wrote. ”The predictions people on my side made about the postwar world have not yet come true. The warnings others made about the fractious state of post-Saddam society have.” In retrospect, he added, the plan to simply remove Saddam, establish democracy, and depart the country ”seems like a childish fantasy.”

Fouad Ajami, a Johns Hopkins University expert on the Mideast who had been a strong supporter of invading, was almost confessional in his new tone. ”A year or so ago, it was our war, and we claimed it proudly,” he wrote later in May. ”But gone is the hubris. Let's face it: Iraq is not going to be America's showcase in the Arab-Muslim world.”

Newsweek columnist Fareed Zakaria, another thoughtful writer who had been an Iraq hawk, wrote in the magazine's May 17,2004, issue that George W. Bush's ”strange combination of arrogance and incompetence” had proven ”poisonous” for American foreign policy. ”On almost every issue involving postwar Iraq- troop strength, international support, the credibility of exiles, de-Baathification, handling Ayatollah Ali Sistani-Was.h.i.+ngton's a.s.sumptions and policies have been wrong,” he charged. columnist Fareed Zakaria, another thoughtful writer who had been an Iraq hawk, wrote in the magazine's May 17,2004, issue that George W. Bush's ”strange combination of arrogance and incompetence” had proven ”poisonous” for American foreign policy. ”On almost every issue involving postwar Iraq- troop strength, international support, the credibility of exiles, de-Baathification, handling Ayatollah Ali Sistani-Was.h.i.+ngton's a.s.sumptions and policies have been wrong,” he charged.

The crowd of proinvasion columnists perched on the Was.h.i.+ngton Post's Was.h.i.+ngton Post's op-ed page also were having emotional second thoughts. ”All but the most blindly devoted Bush supporters can see that Bush Administration officials have no clue about what to do in Iraq tomorrow, much less a month from now,” wrote Robert Kagan, a prominent neoconservative intellectual. ”It's not even clear that he [Bush] understands how bad the situation in Iraq is or how close he is to losing public support for the war.” op-ed page also were having emotional second thoughts. ”All but the most blindly devoted Bush supporters can see that Bush Administration officials have no clue about what to do in Iraq tomorrow, much less a month from now,” wrote Robert Kagan, a prominent neoconservative intellectual. ”It's not even clear that he [Bush] understands how bad the situation in Iraq is or how close he is to losing public support for the war.”

The Abu Ghraib scandal drove the Was.h.i.+ngton Post Was.h.i.+ngton Post editorial page into vocal opposition-not to the war itself, but to the Bush administration's handling of postinvasion Iraq. The Post's editorialists long had been bothered by the administration's approach, and especially by Rumsfeld's. ”We believe that there has been more progress in Iraq than critics acknowledge, but also that the administration has made serious mistakes,” the editorial page into vocal opposition-not to the war itself, but to the Bush administration's handling of postinvasion Iraq. The Post's editorialists long had been bothered by the administration's approach, and especially by Rumsfeld's. ”We believe that there has been more progress in Iraq than critics acknowledge, but also that the administration has made serious mistakes,” the Post Post had said in an October 2003 editorial. During the month of May 2004, the had said in an October 2003 editorial. During the month of May 2004, the Post Post carried thirteen editorials on the subject, most of them lengthy. The first struck a theme to which the newspaper would return repeatedly: ”The rule of law matters.” The second one struck the counterpoint, hanging the blame around the neck of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld: ”The foundation for the crimes at Abu Ghraib was laid more than two years ago, when Mr. Rumsfeld inst.i.tuted a system of holding detainees from Afghanistan not only incommunicado, without charge, and without legal process, but without any meaningful oversight mechanism at all.” carried thirteen editorials on the subject, most of them lengthy. The first struck a theme to which the newspaper would return repeatedly: ”The rule of law matters.” The second one struck the counterpoint, hanging the blame around the neck of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld: ”The foundation for the crimes at Abu Ghraib was laid more than two years ago, when Mr. Rumsfeld inst.i.tuted a system of holding detainees from Afghanistan not only incommunicado, without charge, and without legal process, but without any meaningful oversight mechanism at all.”

The Pentagon's response to the Post Post editorial page's campaign was to accuse it of being as bad as the torturers. Pentagon spokesman Lawrence Di Rita wrote in a letter to the editor, ”The editorial page's campaign was to accuse it of being as bad as the torturers. Pentagon spokesman Lawrence Di Rita wrote in a letter to the editor, ”The Post's Post's continued editorializing on narrow definitions of international laws and whether our soldiers understand them puts the continued editorializing on narrow definitions of international laws and whether our soldiers understand them puts the Post Post in the same company as those involved in this despicable behavior in terms of apparent disregard for basic human dignity.” It was a remarkable way for the Pentagon to treat an editorial page that had been a political ally in the Iraq war. in the same company as those involved in this despicable behavior in terms of apparent disregard for basic human dignity.” It was a remarkable way for the Pentagon to treat an editorial page that had been a political ally in the Iraq war.

Yet it would prove to be an oddity of the Iraq war that, despite the loss of such supporters, President Bush would win reelection six months later, as his opponent, John Kerry, seemed unable to articulate a clear stance on the war.

The New York Times New York Times asks some questions asks some questions The newspaper that would be most affected by postinvasion reconsiderations was the New York Times, New York Times, which for a year had resisted looking under the rock of Judith Miller's coverage. It is an old saying in the public relations business that bad news is like dead fish: It doesn't improve with age, it only begins to stink more. That axiom proved doubly true for the which for a year had resisted looking under the rock of Judith Miller's coverage. It is an old saying in the public relations business that bad news is like dead fish: It doesn't improve with age, it only begins to stink more. That axiom proved doubly true for the Times, Times, whose resistance to review was becoming embarra.s.sing by the spring of 2004. whose resistance to review was becoming embarra.s.sing by the spring of 2004.

On the heels of her reckless prewar coverage of Iraqi WMD, Miller had traveled to Iraq and cut a wide swath. Embedding with an Army unit searching for weapons of ma.s.s destruction, she filed a series of articles in the spring of 2003 that suggested that large amounts of stockpiles were about to be uncovered. Like the Bush administration, Miller seemed to believe what she was saying about WMD. It was almost as if she were operating in a parallel universe. On April 21, she reported that members of a search team had been told by an Iraqi scientist that ”Iraq [had] destroyed chemical weapons and biological warfare equipment only days before the war began.” Two days later, the lead on her story was that American forces ”have occupied a vast warehouse complex in Baghdad filled with chemicals where Iraqi scientists are suspected of having tested unconventional agents on dogs within the past year.” On May 4, she reported that experts had ”found sources of radioactive material.” Later that week they concluded that they had found ”a mobile biological weapons laboratory.” Then, she reported, they found another radiation source.

When Mission Exploitation Team Alpha, the unit to which she was attached, was rea.s.signed, she even sent a note to the Army protesting the move. ”I intend to write about this decision in the NY Times to send a successful team back home just as progress on WMD is being made,” she wrote in an e-mail.

More than a half-dozen military officers said that Miller had played an extremely unusual role as an embedded reporter, effectively operating as a middleman between Chalabi's organization and the Army unit, MET Alpha. Through the Chalabi connection, she also got MET Alpha involved in interrogating deposed Iraqi officials, a U.S. military officer said. Zaab Sethna, an INC adviser, would later dispute that account, but U.S. military officers said that Miller had played an unusually obtrusive role for a journalist. ”This woman came in with a plan,” one officer said. ”She ended up almost hijacking the mission.”

A staff officer on the 75th Exploitation Task Force, of which MET Alpha was a part, said, ”It's impossible to exaggerate the impact she had on the mission of this unit, and not for the better.”

The New York Times' New York Times' official reaction to stories about Miller's antics was a Nixonian stonewall. ”She didn't bring MET Alpha anywhere.... It's a baseless accusation,” the newspaper's a.s.sistant managing editor for news, Andrew Rosenthal, said. ”Singling out one reporter for this kind of examination is a little bizarre.” official reaction to stories about Miller's antics was a Nixonian stonewall. ”She didn't bring MET Alpha anywhere.... It's a baseless accusation,” the newspaper's a.s.sistant managing editor for news, Andrew Rosenthal, said. ”Singling out one reporter for this kind of examination is a little bizarre.”

Even more embarra.s.sing for the Times, Times, Miller also a.s.serted in an angry e-mail intended only for internal consumption that her main source for stories on Iraqi weapons of ma.s.s destruction was Ahmed Chalabi. ”I've been covering Chalabi for about 10 years, and have done most of the stories about him for our paper, including the long takeout we recently did on him,” she wrote to John Burns, the Miller also a.s.serted in an angry e-mail intended only for internal consumption that her main source for stories on Iraqi weapons of ma.s.s destruction was Ahmed Chalabi. ”I've been covering Chalabi for about 10 years, and have done most of the stories about him for our paper, including the long takeout we recently did on him,” she wrote to John Burns, the Times's Times's Baghdad bureau chief. ”He has provided most of the front-page exclusives on WMD to our paper.” (Miller later backed down from that a.s.sertion, telling the Post's Sally Quinn that she had been using a kind of journalistic shorthand in that note: ”In my reporting experience, it is not accurate to say that he provided most of the WMD material to the Baghdad bureau chief. ”He has provided most of the front-page exclusives on WMD to our paper.” (Miller later backed down from that a.s.sertion, telling the Post's Sally Quinn that she had been using a kind of journalistic shorthand in that note: ”In my reporting experience, it is not accurate to say that he provided most of the WMD material to the Times Times or to the U.S. government.” But both she and Chalabi had made statements that undercut that revised account.) or to the U.S. government.” But both she and Chalabi had made statements that undercut that revised account.) Miller's troubles were only beginning. When she returned to the United States that summer she would have several talks with I. Lewis ”Scooter” Libby, the former Wolfowitz aide who had become Cheney's chief of staff at the White House. Those meetings ultimately would carry major legal consequences.

Jack Shafer, the media critic for Slate, Slate, the on-line magazine, became a powerful critic of Miller's stories, observing that she seemed to have agreed to a series of unusual coverage rules, that her sourcing was awkward at best, and-worst of all-that her stories weren't standing up. Where, he asked, were the editors, and when was the the on-line magazine, became a powerful critic of Miller's stories, observing that she seemed to have agreed to a series of unusual coverage rules, that her sourcing was awkward at best, and-worst of all-that her stories weren't standing up. Where, he asked, were the editors, and when was the Times Times going to address the issue? ”Miller was one of the more eager consumers of defector baloney,” he wrote in April 2004, ”but the newspaper of record has yet to untangle the lies from the Iraqi defectors and exiles that Miller dutifully published.” going to address the issue? ”Miller was one of the more eager consumers of defector baloney,” he wrote in April 2004, ”but the newspaper of record has yet to untangle the lies from the Iraqi defectors and exiles that Miller dutifully published.”

First, in May 2004, more than a year after the invasion of Iraq, the Times Times responded with an official once over lightly. It declined to name the people it was writing about, though they were reporters whose names were readily available at the top of each article examined. Though the review didn't say so, five of the six articles it called into question had been written or cowritten by Miller. Seemingly more solicitous of the sensibilities of the responded with an official once over lightly. It declined to name the people it was writing about, though they were reporters whose names were readily available at the top of each article examined. Though the review didn't say so, five of the six articles it called into question had been written or cowritten by Miller. Seemingly more solicitous of the sensibilities of the Times's Times's staffers than of its readers, the article backed into the point, beginning by saying that in checking its work, ”we found an enormous amount of journalism that we are proud of.” This was rather like an airline beginning a press release about a crash by listing all the flights that had landed successfully. But, it continued, ”we have found a number of instances of coverage that was not as rigorous as it should have been.” This review ran on page ten of the newspaper, though it was clearly going to be the most noticed staffers than of its readers, the article backed into the point, beginning by saying that in checking its work, ”we found an enormous amount of journalism that we are proud of.” This was rather like an airline beginning a press release about a crash by listing all the flights that had landed successfully. But, it continued, ”we have found a number of instances of coverage that was not as rigorous as it should have been.” This review ran on page ten of the newspaper, though it was clearly going to be the most noticed Times Times story of the day. story of the day.

A few days later, Daniel Okrent, the Times's Times's new public editor, or ombudsman, lowered the boom. He named Judith Miller and Patrick Tyler as authors of the bad stories and faulted editors for a variety of errors, such as never telling the newspaper's readers that Ahmed Chalabi's niece had been employed by the new public editor, or ombudsman, lowered the boom. He named Judith Miller and Patrick Tyler as authors of the bad stories and faulted editors for a variety of errors, such as never telling the newspaper's readers that Ahmed Chalabi's niece had been employed by the Times's Times's Kuwait bureau in 2003. The ombudsman's own reporting led him to conclude that the paper had a ”dysfunctional system” of managing certain reporters. The next installment in the saga came in September, when the Kuwait bureau in 2003. The ombudsman's own reporting led him to conclude that the paper had a ”dysfunctional system” of managing certain reporters. The next installment in the saga came in September, when the Times Times exorcised one of its demons with a huge review of the Bush administration's handling of intelligence about Iraq's supposed nuclear program. The story, which ran nearly ten thousand words, was among other things effectively a correction of the exorcised one of its demons with a huge review of the Bush administration's handling of intelligence about Iraq's supposed nuclear program. The story, which ran nearly ten thousand words, was among other things effectively a correction of the Times Times story on the same subject that had run in September 2002. story on the same subject that had run in September 2002.

In the New York Review of Books, New York Review of Books, Michael Ma.s.sing's verdict was that many major newspapers had erred, but that the Michael Ma.s.sing's verdict was that many major newspapers had erred, but that the New York Times New York Times stood out in particular. ”Compared to other major papers, the stood out in particular. ”Compared to other major papers, the Times Times placed more credence in defectors, expressed less confidence in inspectors, and paid less attention to dissenters.” Shortly after leaving his post at the placed more credence in defectors, expressed less confidence in inspectors, and paid less attention to dissenters.” Shortly after leaving his post at the Times, Times, Okrent would summarize its coverage of the WMD issue as ”really very bad journalism.” Okrent would summarize its coverage of the WMD issue as ”really very bad journalism.”

But Miller wasn't giving up. Speaking at the University of California at Berkeley in 2005, Miller would defend her coverage, saying that she ”wrote the best a.s.sessment that I could based on the information that I had.”

”Do you have any misgivings?” she was asked.

No, Miller said. ”I think I did the best possible job I could do,” she said. ”So no, I really don't.”

Iraq ultimately would prove lethal to Miller's career at the New York Times. New York Times. The last act began with others' articles in her own newspaper and in the The last act began with others' articles in her own newspaper and in the Was.h.i.+ngton Post: Was.h.i.+ngton Post: On July 6, 2003, the On July 6, 2003, the Times's Times's op-ed page carried an article by former amba.s.sador Joseph C. Wilson IV alleging that President Bush, in his State of the Union address seven months earlier, had exaggerated intelligence about Iraqi efforts to buy uranium in Niger for its nuclear weapons program. He related how he had traveled to Africa for the CIA to look into those intelligence reports, and had found that Niger's uranium mines were a small industry with ”too much oversight” to permit such leakage. Eight days later, conservative pundit Robert Novak wrote a column in the op-ed page carried an article by former amba.s.sador Joseph C. Wilson IV alleging that President Bush, in his State of the Union address seven months earlier, had exaggerated intelligence about Iraqi efforts to buy uranium in Niger for its nuclear weapons program. He related how he had traveled to Africa for the CIA to look into those intelligence reports, and had found that Niger's uranium mines were a small industry with ”too much oversight” to permit such leakage. Eight days later, conservative pundit Robert Novak wrote a column in the Was.h.i.+ngton Post Was.h.i.+ngton Post that, in the course of responding to Wilson, disclosed that ”two senior Bush administration officials” had told him that Wilson's wife was a CIA operative named Valerie Plame, who specialized in WMD issues, and that she had helped arrange his trip to Niger. that, in the course of responding to Wilson, disclosed that ”two senior Bush administration officials” had told him that Wilson's wife was a CIA operative named Valerie Plame, who specialized in WMD issues, and that she had helped arrange his trip to Niger.

For a federal official to leak the name of a covert intelligence operative may have been a crime. The subsequent investigation led Justice Department lawyers to want to talk to reporters who had had contact with Bush administration officials. One of them was Miller. She declined to cooperate, so in 2004, a federal court held her in contempt. Ultimately, she was jailed for refusing to testify. After eighty-five days behind bars in the federal facility in Alexandria, Virginia, Miller changed her mind, announcing that Libby had told her she could name him, and appeared before the grand jury. On September 30, 2005, she testified that her source had been Libby, Cheney's aide. She wouldn't share her notes with Times Times reporters writing about the situation. Jill Abramson, the newspaper's tough managing editor, all but called Miller a liar in print, following a dispute over what the two had said to each other. Within a few weeks Miller's career at the reporters writing about the situation. Jill Abramson, the newspaper's tough managing editor, all but called Miller a liar in print, following a dispute over what the two had said to each other. Within a few weeks Miller's career at the Times Times ended. ended.

Congress stirs In the spring of 2004, Congress briefly embraced a more significant role in overseeing the management of the Iraq war. Congress was awakened by the Abu Ghraib prison torture scandal, and by the realization, forced by mounting casualties and persistent widespread violence, that the administration line wasn't playing out. At an unusually contentious hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sen. Hillary Clinton issued a virtual indictment of Wolfowitz: Given your track record, the New York Democrat asked, why should we believe your a.s.surances now? ”You come before this committee... having seriously undermined your credibility over a number of years now. When it comes to making estimates or predictions about what will occur in Iraq, and what will be the costs in lives and money,... you have made numerous predictions, time and time again, that have turned out to be untrue and were based on faulty a.s.sumptions.” As Wolfowitz sat before her at the witness table, she quoted his previous testimony from the run-up to the war in which he had a.s.serted that the Iraqi people would see the United States as their liberator, that Iraq could finance its own reconstruction, and that Gen. s.h.i.+nseki's estimate that it would take several hundred thousand troops to occupy Iraq was ”outlandish.” Wolfowitz ignored most of Clinton's comments in his response, but told her that in disputing s.h.i.+nseki's estimate he had been siding with Gen. Franks, who was closer to the action in Iraq.

Wolfowitz took on a somewhat haunted look during this period. In private meetings he sometimes seemed profoundly fatigued. He could be disjointed when defending his views, in striking contrast to his challenging stance of the previous summer and fall. One friend said that Wolfowitz had begun to worry that he would be scapegoated for Iraq.

Wolfowitz took another pounding when he appeared before the House Armed Services Committee in June 2004. Rep. Skelton looked at Wolfowitz and said he had no doubt that the administration intended to stay the course. But, he added, ”There's a difference between resolve, on the one hand, and competence, on the other.” That comment, unusually pointed from the soft-spoken Skelton, set the tone of the hearing. ”I see two Iraqs,” he continued. ”One is the optimistic Iraq that you describe, and we thank you for your testimony. And the other Iraq is the one that I see every morning, with the violence, the deaths of soldiers and Marines.” Watching CNN with his breakfast each day and hearing announced the small towns that had been the homes of soldiers killed in Iraq, Skelton was beginning to suspect that rural America was suffering disproportionately in this war. The previous day, five soldiers had died-from Glade Spring, Virginia; Cleburne, Arkansas; Hardin, Kentucky; Whitfield, Georgia; and Harris, Texas. ”I must tell you, it breaks my heart a little more every day.”

”You said I presented an optimistic picture,” Wolfowitz responded. ”Maybe it's optimistic compared to the total gloom and doom that one otherwise hears, but I in no way mean to minimize the security problem.” It is important to remember, Wolfowitz added, that Saddam hadn't acted alone in his evil acts. As he did so frequently when his back was to the wall on Iraq, Wolfowitz played the n.a.z.i card. ”He had some thousands of people in his so-called Mukhabarat, the so-called intelligence service, which is probably best described as the modern-day equivalent of the n.a.z.i Gestapo. He had other even more horrendous killers in something called the Fedayeen Saddam, which I guess is like the Hitler Youth, or like the SS perhaps.” Later in the hearing he even went so far as to say some Iraqis might have been worse than the n.a.z.is: ”We are dealing with several thousand people who are as bad or worse than the n.a.z.i Gestapo.”

What the hearing would be most remembered for was Wolfowitz's own attack- on the American press corps in Baghdad. There was lots of good news to report, he insisted, but the reporters somehow were too cowardly to get out there and cover it. ”Frankly, part of our problem is [that] a lot of the press are afraid to travel very much, so they sit in Baghdad and they publish rumors,” he said. ”And rumors are plentiful.” It wasn't a particularly logical statement, and Wolfowitz would back down from it two days later, issuing a letter of apology.

Gen. Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, insisted that ”great progress” was being made on all fronts in Iraq. ”I think we're on the brink of success,” he told the House Armed Services Committee.

Ultimately, that was enough for Congress, which again backed away from the subject of Iraq. There was little follow-up investigation or oversight. There were, for example, no hearings with returning division commanders. In retrospect, the hearings of May and June 2004 were a spasm before the election season. They made it appear that Congress was paying attention, but they did little to affect the course of events on the ground or to produce more information for the American people. ”I know a bunch of folks on the Armed Services committees,” said a former Bush administration official who was deeply involved in defense issues, and especially in the handling of Iraq. ”If any of those folks had called me and asked me to speak to them candidly about Iraq, I would have. But no one ever did.”

At Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Capt. Ian Fishback, who had served with the 82nd Airborne Division near Fallujah, watched Pentagon officials give congressional testimony with growing disbelief. Rumsfeld ”testified that we followed ... the letter of the Geneva Conventions in Iraq, and as soon as he said that I knew something was wrong,” Fishback said later. In Iraq and in Afghanistan, where he had also served, he remembered bewilderment about how prisoners should be treated. ”I am certain that this confusion contributed to a wide range of abuses including death threats, beatings, broken bones, murder, exposure to elements, extreme forced physical exertion, hostage-taking, stripping, sleep deprivation, and degrading treatment,” he later wrote. ”I and troops under my command witnessed some of these abuses in both Afghanistan and Iraq.”

Fishback, who had been cla.s.s president, football MVP, and ”most likely to succeed” in high school in Newberry, Michigan, talked to West Point cla.s.smates about it over the following weekend, and to a chaplain he respected, and then decided to approach his chain of command. His company commander wasn't welcoming: ”Don't expect me to go to bat for you on this issue if you take this up,” he recalled being told. (It was an unfortunate phrase to use, given that one of the allegations was that a soldier in Fishback's unit had amused himself by beating a prisoner with a baseball bat.) Next Fishback talked to his battalion commander, who sent him to a military lawyer who rea.s.sured him that, while there were some gray areas, the law had been followed. Unsatisfied, and feeling that Army soldiers deserved better, Fishback continued to ask questions. Ultimately, after seventeen months of pus.h.i.+ng the issue internally, he would contact Sen. John McCain, who had questioned Rumsfeld's handling of detention issues. ”We owe our soldiers better than this,” Fishback wrote.

Chalabi bolts At the same time, the U.S. relations.h.i.+p with Ahmed Chalabi soured. The politician had been a longtime ally of the Pentagon, and a major source of its intelligence information; as late as January 2004, he had remained in the good graces of at least part of the Bush administration, and had been given a place of honor behind Mrs. Bush at that year's State of the Union address. But just five months later, early on the morning of May 20, 2004, Chalabi's home in Baghdad was raided. Officially the operation was conducted by Iraqi police, and was a matter for Iraqi police and the Iraqi judge who had issued a warrant. Chalabi called the raid ”an act of political intimidation” and said that he believed that Bremer had been behind it. In fact, while the raid officially was an operation of Iraqi forces, it was actually conducted by the CIA and SEAL Team 6, said a senior U.S. intelligence official with direct access to that information. ”We hit his place hard because he had the records of Sunni generals that were directing the insurgency” but wouldn't turn them over, this official said.

Other U.S. officials hinted darkly that there was more to the matter, and it only took a few phone calls by reporters to be told by another U.S. intelligence official that Chalabi's organization had conveyed information to the Iranian government that was considered very damaging to U.S. intelligence gathering. An American intelligence official in Baghdad had gotten drunk and told Chalabi that the Americans were routinely listening in on all his conversations and reading his e-mails, the first senior intelligence official said. He said that the American eavesdroppers then caught Chalabi telling an Iranian intelligence contact, ”You have to understand, the Americans are reading your traffic.”

Chalabi denied that allegation. ”The whole thing is ridiculous,” he told the Middle East Quarterly Middle East Quarterly in an interview later that year. ”I did not give any such information to the Iranians, and no U.S. official told me cla.s.sified information.” But he conceded that he had met with Iranian intelligence officials, adding that he had met with such officials from every country bordering Iraq. in an interview later that year. ”I did not give any such information to the Iranians, and no U.S. official told me cla.s.sified information.” But he conceded that he had met with Iranian intelligence officials, adding that he had met with such officials from every country bordering Iraq.

Chalabi also seemed nonchalant about the possibility that his organization had helped mislead the U.S. government into war. Told by another interviewer that some people who had once supported the war now felt they had been suck-ered, he said, ”Okay.” Asked if he felt any discomfort with the fact that many of the arguments for justifying the invasion had crumbled, Chalabi indicated that the ends justified the means. ”No,” he said. ”We are in Baghdad now.”

In his new incarnation, Chalabi began to sound like one of the Bush administration's harsher critics. ”What did fourteen months of occupation achieve?” he asked rhetorically in the interview with the Middle East Quarterly. Middle East Quarterly. ”The electricity still doesn't work, thousands are dead, the United States has lost the moral high ground in the Middle East, and the UN, which opposed the liberation of Iraq, has been allowed to impose Baathists back on the Iraqi people.” ”The electricity still doesn't work, thousands are dead, the United States has lost the moral high ground in the Middle East, and the UN, which opposed the liberation of Iraq, has been allowed to impose Baathists back on the Iraqi people.”