Part 2 (1/2)
Director of Military Operations--Imperial General Staff, 1915-16.
Sir Frederick Maurice said:--This problem of the reduction of armaments is one of the most urgent of the international and national problems of the day. It is urgent in its economic aspect, urgent also as regards its relation to the future peace of the world. The urgency of its economic aspect was proclaimed two years ago at the Brussels conference of financiers a.s.sembled by the League of Nations. These experts said quite plainly and definitely that, so far as they could see, the salvation of Europe from bankruptcy depended upon the immediate diminution of the crus.h.i.+ng burden of expenditure upon arms. That was two years ago. Linked up with this question is the whole question of the economic reconstruction of Europe. Linked up with it also is that deep and grave problem of reparations. It is no longer the case to-day, if it has ever been the case since the war, which I doubt, that sober opinion in France considers it necessary for France to have large military forces in order to protect her from German aggression in the near future. For the past two years, however, it has been the custom of those who live upon alarms to produce the German menace. There is a great body of opinion in France at this moment which feels that unless France is able to put the pistol to Germany's head, it will never be able to get a penny out of Germany.
You have the further connection of the att.i.tude of America to the problem. America said, officially through Mr. Hoover and unofficially through a number of her leading financiers, that she was not ready to come forward and take her share in the economic restoration of Europe so long as Europe is squandering its resources upon arms. The connection is quite definitely and explicitly recognised in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 8 begins: ”The principles of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.” These words were promulgated in 1919. Personally, I find myself in complete agreement with what Lord Robert Cecil said this morning, and what Lord Grey said a few days ago at Newcastle, that one of the prime causes of the war was Prussian militarism. By that I mean the influence of that tremendous military machine, which had been built up through years of labour in Germany, in moulding the public opinion of that country.
A GROUP OF NEW ARMIES
Well, how do we stand in regard to that to-day? We stand to-day in the position that the armaments of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, have all been compulsorily drastically reduced, but in their place you have a whole group of new armies. You have armies to-day which did not exist before the war, in Finland, Esthonia, Poland, Lithuania, and Czecho-Slovakia, and the sum total is that at this moment there are more armed men in time of peace in Europe than in 1913. Is there no danger that this machine will mould the minds of some other peoples, just as the German machine moulded the minds of the Germans? This is the position as regards the peace establishments of Europe to-day in their relation to the future peace of the world. What about the economic position? I have mentioned that certain Powers have had their forces drastically reduced, and that has brought with it a drastic reduction of expenditure, but I have before me the naval, military, and air force estimates of the eight princ.i.p.al Powers in Europe, leaving out Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria, whose forces have been compulsorily reduced.
At the economic conference of financiers in Brussels in 1920 it was mentioned with horror that 20 per cent. of the income of Europe was then being devoted to arms. I find that to-day 25 per cent. of the total income of these eight Powers is devoted to arms. I find, further, that of these eight Powers who have budgeted for a smaller service, only one--Yugo-Slavia--has managed to balance her budget, and the others have large deficits which are many times covered by their expenditure on arms. And this is going on at a time when all these eight nations are taxed almost up to their limit, when the whole of their industries are suffering in consequence, and when the danger of bankruptcy, which horrified the financiers in 1920, is even more imminent.
That being the case, what has been done in the last few years to remedy this matter, and why is more not being done? As you all know, this question is in the forefront of the programme of the League of Nations.
And the League began to deal with it at once. Lord Robert Cecil will agree with me that the framers of the Covenant, of which he is one of the chief, could not foresee everything, and they did not foresee at the time the Covenant was framed, that machinery would be required to deal with this extraordinarily complex question of armaments. They created an organisation then called a Permanent Military Command, still in existence, to advise the Council of the League on all military matters.
But when these gentlemen got to work upon such questions as reduction of armaments, they at once found themselves dealing with matters entirely beyond their competence, because into this problem enter problems of high politics and finance, and a thousand other questions of which soldiers, sailors, and airmen know nothing whatever.
THE LEAGUE'S COMMISSION
The first step was to remedy an oversight in the machinery, and that was done at the first meeting of the a.s.sembly. The first meeting of the a.s.sembly created a temporary mixed commission on armaments, which was composed of persons of recognised competence in political, social, and economic matters. It consisted of six members of the old Permanent Commission, and in addition a number of statesmen, employers, and representatives of labour. This body started to tackle this grave question. Before it began the first a.s.sembly of the League had suggested one line of approach--that there should be an agreement to limit expenditure; that an attempt should be made to limit armaments by limiting budgets; and nations were asked to agree that they would not exceed in the two years following the acceptance of the resolution the budgeted expenditure on armaments of the current year.
That proposal did not meet with great success. It was turned down by seven Powers, notably by France and Spain. On the whole, I think France and Spain and the other Powers had some reason on their side, because it is not possible to approach this problem solely from the financial standpoint. You cannot get a financial common denominator and apply it to armaments. The varying costs of a soldier in Europe and in j.a.pan have no relation to each other. The cost of a voluntary soldier in Great Britain has no relation to the cost of a conscript on the Continent.
Therefore, that line of approach, when applied too broadly, is not fruitful. I think myself it is quite possible that you may be able to apply financial limitations to the question of material, the construction of guns and other weapons of war, because the cost of these things in foreign countries tends much more to a common level. I think this is a possible line of approach, but to try to make a reduction of armaments by reducing budgets on a wholesale scale I do not think will lead us anywhere at all. I may safely say that for the present that line of approach has been abandoned.
The Temporary Mixed Commission got to work, and in its first year, frankly, I cannot say it did very much. It concerned itself very largely with the acc.u.mulation of information and the collection of statistics, bearing rather the same relation to world problems as a Royal Commission does to our domestic problems. By the time the second a.s.sembly met practically nothing had been done by the Commission. But other people had been at work, and our own League of Nations Union had put forward a proposal--a line of approach, rather, I would say, to this problem--which I for one think is extremely useful. It began by inquiring as to what armaments were for, which after all is a useful way of beginning, and the inquiry came to the conclusion that nations required them for three purposes--to maintain internal order; as a last resort for the enforcement of law and order; and to protect overseas possessions. After these purposes were served there was a large residuum left. That residuum could only be required for one purpose--to protect the country in question from foreign aggression. When you had gone thus far in your reasoning, you had obviously got into the zone where bargaining becomes possible, because it is obvious that by agreement you can get the force by which a nation is liable to become reduced. That line of approach received the general blessing at the second a.s.sembly of the League of Nations. Things began to move, primarily because the Dominion of South Africa took a keen interest in this problem of the reduction of armaments, and South Africa appointed Lord Robert Cecil as its representative, and instructed him to press the matter on, and he did. The a.s.sembly definitely instructed this temporary mixed Commission that by the time the third a.s.sembly met plans should be prepared and concrete proposals put on paper.
WAs.h.i.+NGTON
Soon after that came the Was.h.i.+ngton Conference--a great landmark in the history of this problem. For reasons I need not go into in detail, the naval problem is very much easier than the military or air problem. You have as the nucleus of naval forces something quite definite and precise--the battles.h.i.+p--and it also happens that that particular unit is extremely costly, and takes a long time to build, and no man has yet ever succeeded in concealing the existence of a battles.h.i.+p. There you had three important points--a large and important unit in the possession of everybody concerned, very costly, so that by reducing it you make great reductions in expenditure. There was no possibility of avoiding an agreement about the construction of battles.h.i.+ps, and it is to these facts mainly that the happy results of the Was.h.i.+ngton Conference were due.
But for the furtherance of the problem the point is this. The Was.h.i.+ngton Conference definitely established the principle of reduction of armaments on a great ratio. The ratio for battles.h.i.+ps between Great Britain, the United States, j.a.pan, France, and Italy, was settled as to 5, 5, 3, and 1.75. They all agreed on a definite ratio. All agreed to sc.r.a.p a certain number of s.h.i.+ps, to bring their tonnage down to a certain figure, and by doing that relatively they were left in the same position as before, with this advantage--that they at once obtained an enormous reduction in expenditure on armaments.
That opened up a new line of approach for the attack on this problem from the military and air standpoint. And the next development took place in February this year at the meeting of the Temporary Mixed Commission on armaments, when the Esher proposals were presented. There has been a great deal of talk about the Esher proposals, and I am glad of it, because the one thing wanted in this question is public interest.
The Esher proposals were an endeavour to apply to land armaments this principle of reduction on a great ratio. And the line taken was this. It was necessary to find some unit in land armaments which corresponded with the battles.h.i.+ps, and the unit selected by Lord Esher was the 300,000 regular soldiers of the peace armies in France, England, and Spain. It was selected because it happened to be the number to which the Austrian army was reduced by treaty, and with that unit he proposed a ratio for the armies of Europe, which would leave everybody relatively in much the same position as before, but would obtain an immediate reduction in numbers of standing armies and a great reduction of expenditure.
This proposal was subjected to a great deal of criticism, and I am sorry to say nine-tenths of the criticism appears to emanate from persons who have never read the proposal at all. It is a proposal which lends itself to a great deal of criticism, and the most effective criticism which could have been applied at the time it was presented was that it put the cart before the horse, and approached the problem from the wrong direction, for, as Lord Robert Cecil has said here this morning, what nations require is security. Some of them have clear ideas as to the way of obtaining it, but they all want it, and before you can expect people to reduce their armaments, which are, after all, maintained mainly for the purpose of providing security, you must give them something that will take the place of armaments.
A GENERAL DEFENSIVE PACT
In June an important development took place in this Temporary Commission. It was increased by the addition of a number of statesmen, and, amongst others, of men who ought to have been on it long ago. Lord Robert Cecil was added, and he at once proceeded to remedy what was a real difficulty in Lord Esher's proposals. He put forward a plan for providing security in the form, as the a.s.sembly of the League had asked, of a definite written proposal--really a brief treaty. The purport of that treaty is included in the form of resolutions, which are roughly as follows:--No scheme for the reduction of armaments can be effective unless it is general; that in the present state of the world no Government can accept the responsibility for a serious reduction of armaments unless it is given some other equally satisfactory guarantee of the safety of its country; such guarantee can only be found in a general defensive agreement of all the countries concerned, binding them all to come to the a.s.sistance of any one of them if attacked.
A general defensive pact, with a proviso! It is obviously unreasonable to expect the States of the American continent to be ready to come over at any moment to help in Europe. It is obviously unreasonable to expect the States of Europe to bind themselves to come and fight in Asia.
Therefore, there was this proviso added that an obligation to come to the a.s.sistance of the attacked country should be limited to those countries which belonged to the same quarter of the globe. Thus, you see, you are getting the obligation of the League into regional application. Personally my own conviction is that this is the line upon which many of the functions of the League will develop.
The main point of the situation as it is to-day is that you have got a committee working out in detail a general pact, which when it is formulated will be far more complete and satisfactory than the very general and vague Clause 10 of the Covenant. We have reached the position when practical proposals are beginning to emerge. What more is wanted? How can we help on this work? You will have gathered from what I said that it is my own conviction that with this problem of reduction of armaments is so closely linked up the problem of economic reconstruction and reparations that the whole ought to be taken together. I believe one of the reasons why so little progress has been made is that the economic problems have been entrusted, with the blessing of our and other Governments, to perambulating conferences, while the disarmament problem has been left solely to the League of Nations. I believe if you could get the whole of these problems considered by one authority--and there is one obvious authority--progress would be far more rapid.