Part 13 (1/2)

Herr von Schoen recognized the justice of these considerations and vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When I asked him if we should give to the Austrian note the character of a simple _mise en demeure_, which permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he answered that personally he had no views.[53]

[Footnote 53: French _Yellow Book_, No. 28.]

On the following day the German Amba.s.sador again called at the French Foreign Office and protested against an article, which had appeared in a Paris newspaper and which had characterized his communication of the preceding day as the ”German menace.” The German Amba.s.sador again gave an unequivocal a.s.surance

that there was no agreement between Austria and Germany over the Austrian note, _of which the German Government was ignorant_, although the German Government had subsequently approved it on receiving communication of it _at the same time as the other Powers_.[54]

[Footnote 54: _Ibid._, No. 36.]

The hardihood of this statement, in view of the fact that on the preceding day, simultaneously with the service of the ultimatum, the threatening demand had been delivered by Germany to the leading European chancelleries that the quarrel between Austria and Servia must be localized, is apparent. Baron von Schoen, the German Amba.s.sador, then denied that his suggestion of ”incalculable consequences,” if the dispute were not localized, was a ”menace.” This statement, repeated by German diplomats in other capitals, approaches the ludicrous. The first military power of Europe formally advises other nations that unless they waive their legitimate claims and interests, ”incalculable consequences” will follow, and it is gravely suggested that this is not a ”menace.”

On the following day Baron von Schoen made two visits at the French Foreign Office and a.s.sured the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that

Germany _was on the side of France in the ardent desire for the maintenance of peace_, and she earnestly hoped that France would use her influence in a soothing manner in St.

Petersburg.

I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that she had committed no act throwing doubt upon her moderation, and that we were in agreement with her in seeking for a peaceful solution of the struggle. It therefore appeared to me that in counterpart Germany should act in Vienna, _where the efficacy of her action was sure_, with a view to avoiding military operations tending to the occupation of Servia.

The Amba.s.sador having pointed out to me that that was irreconcilable with the position adopted by Germany, ”that the question only concerned Austria and Servia,” I said to him that mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg might be made by the four Powers who were less directly interested in the matter.

Baron von Schoen then sheltered himself behind his lack of instructions on this point, and I told him that in these circ.u.mstances I did not feel able to act in St. Petersburg alone.

Our conversation concluded with the renewed a.s.surance by the Amba.s.sador as to the peaceful intentions of Germany, who, he declared, was with France on this point.[55]

[Footnote 55: French _Yellow Book_, No. 56.]

The incident now followed, which suggested to the French Foreign office a subtle attempt of Germany to compromise the relations of France with Russia by imputing disloyalty to the former. On his second visit a few hours later, Baron von Schoen desired the French Foreign Office to give to the public a statement with reference to the preceding interview, and suggested the following, which he dictated to the French official:

”The German Amba.s.sador and the Minister of Foreign Affairs had a further interview in the course of the afternoon, during which they examined, _in_ _the most friendly spirit and with a feeling of pacific solidarity, the means which might be employed for the maintenance of general peace_.”

The Acting Political Director at once replied: ”Then, in your mind, everything is settled, and you give us the a.s.surance that Austria accepts the Servian note, or will be willing to converse with the Powers with regard to it?”

The Amba.s.sador appeared to be taken aback, and made a vigorous denial. It was therefore pointed out to him that if nothing had changed in the negative att.i.tude of Germany, the terms of the suggested ”note to the Press” were excessive, and likely to give French opinion a false feeling of security by creating illusions as to the actual situation, the dangers of which were but too evident.[56]

[Footnote 56: French _Yellow Book_, No. 57.]

It is not surprising that the French Foreign Office looked askance at these German suggestions of ”pacific solidarity” with France, which contrasted so strangely with Germany's refusal to work for peace and its sinister menaces to other countries. France's suspicion that Baron von Schoen was thus attempting to compromise its loyalty in the eyes of Russia cannot be said to be without some foundation, although it is as reasonable to a.s.sume that these professions of the German Amba.s.sador were only an incident to the general plan of lulling France and its allies into a false sense of security. Here again the full truth can only be ascertained when Germany is willing to submit to the scrutiny of the world the records of its Foreign Office.

On July 26th, M. Jules Cambon had an interview with the German Secretary of State and earnestly supported Sir Edward Grey's suggestion that a conference be called in which England, France, Germany, and Italy should partic.i.p.ate for the preservation of peace.

This interview is at once so dramatic, and almost prophetic, that it justifies quotation _in extenso_:

To Cambon's proposition, von Jagow replied, as he did to the British Amba.s.sador, that he could not accept a proposal to charge the Italian, French, and German Amba.s.sadors with the task of seeking, with Sir Edward Grey, a means of solving the present difficulties, for that would be to establish a regular conference to deal with the affairs of Austria and Russia. I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his response, but that the great object, which Sir Edward Grey had in view, _was above a question of form_, and what was important was the a.s.sociation of England and France with Germany and Italy in laboring for peace; that this a.s.sociation could show itself in common action in St.

Petersburg and Vienna; that he had frequently expressed to me his regret at seeing the two groups of alliances always opposed to each other in Europe, and that here he had an opportunity of proving that there was a European spirit, by showing four Powers belonging to the two groups acting in common agreement to prevent a struggle. Herr von Jagow evaded the matter by saying that Germany had her engagements with Austria. _I pointed out that the relations of Germany with Vienna were no more close than those of France with Russia, and that it was he himself who raised the question of the two opposed groups of alliances._

The Secretary of State then said that he did not refuse to act with a view to avoiding an Austro-Russian conflict, but that he could not intervene in the Austro-Servian conflict.

”One is the consequence of the other,” I said, ”and it would be well to prevent the creation of any new state of affairs calculated to bring about the intervention of Russia.”

As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was obliged to observe his engagements with regard to Austria, _I asked him if he had pledged himself to follow Austria everywhere blindfold_, and if he had made himself acquainted with the Servian reply to Austria, which had been handed to him that morning by the Servian Charge d'Affaires. ”_I have not yet had time_,” he said. ”I regret it,” I replied. ”You will see that except on points of detail Servia has yielded completely. It would seem, however, that since Austria has obtained the satisfaction, which your support procured her, you might to-day advise her to be content, or to examine with Servia the terms of the Servian reply.”