Part 9 (1/2)

The principal entrance fro, narrow, sandy beach which projects from the east side of the bay--and Dauphin Island, one of a chain which runs parallel to the coast of Mississippi and encloses Mississippi Sound At the end of Mobile Point stands Fort Morgan, the principal defense of the bay, for the uns At the eastern end of Dauphin Island stood a much san the distance is nearly threeout from the island prevents vessels of any considerable size approaching it nearer than two miles Between Dauphin Island and the mainland there are soht draft can pass from Mississippi Sound into the bay These were not practicable for the fighting vessels of Farragut's fleet; but a small earthwork known as Fort Powell had been thrown up to command the deepest of them, called Grant's Pass

The sand bank off Dauphin Island extends south as well as east, reaching between four and five miles from the entrance A similar shoal stretches out to the southward from Mobile Point Between the two lies thein width from seven hundred and fifty yards, three miles outside, to two thousand, or about a sea an Nearly twenty-one feet can be carried over the bar; and after passing Fort Morgan the channel spreads, forular contour, about four miles deep by tide, in which the depth is from twenty to twenty-four feet Beyond this hole, on either side the bay and toward the city, the water shoals gradually but considerably, and the heavier of Farragut's shi+ps could not act outside of its limits The Confederate ironclad Tennessee, on the contrary, drawing but fourteen feet, had a more extensive field of operations open to her, and, fros, was able to take her position at a distance where the most formidable of her opponents could neither follow her nor penetrate her sides with their shot

Between the city and the lower bay there were extensive flats, over which not even the fourteen feet of the Tennessee could be taken; and these in one part, called Dog River Bar, shoaled to as little as nine feet To bring the Tennessee into action for the defense of the entrance and of the lower bay, it was necessary to carry her across these flats--an undertaking requiring both time and mechanical appliances, neither of which would be available if an enemy were inside to molest the operations As the Tennessee was distinctly the ut had to encounter, and as the character of the soundings gave her a field of action peculiarly suited to utilize her especial powers, which consisted in the strength of her sides and the long range of her heavy rifled guns, it was particularly desirable to anticipate her crossing the upper bar by the fleet itself crossing the lower That done, the Tennessee was reduced to impotence It was not done, for two reasons First, the Navy Departut de wasted its strength in a divergent operation, was unable to supply the force necessary to reduce Fort Morgan That the delay was not productive of more serious consequences was due to the impatience or recklessness of the Confederate adut seized the opportunity afforded by his mistake

Six months passed before the h devoid ofmonths of idleness or enjoye a coies of the adenial to hi River Bar, which she did on the 18th of May, Farragut felt that he must be on the spot, in case she atte out to break up the blockade; but up to that ti actively from point to point of his command, between New Orleans on the one side, and Pensacola, now become his principal base, on the other From time to ti the battle of the Bay he lay off the port in all the drearyto the large force and numerous interests entrusted to hiht him, of course, numerous communications fro,” he writes to a member of his family, ”but at the same time received so many from the Department that my eyes were used up before I came to yours, so that e part of this correspondence consisted of letters froh the State Depart for the Confederacy or to break the blockade ”Nearly all my clerical force is broken down,” he writes on another occasion ”The fact is, I never saw so ; and yet Drayton, who does as much as any of theo on I do not h I write all e now that it keeps us all at work the whole tihtly of his own share in these labors, the confineer details, even while he intrusted the minor to others, and the unavoidable anxieties of a man who had so many important irons in the fire, and at the sa his sixty-fourth year, told upon him To this he bore witness when, after the capture of the Mobile forts, the Department desired him to take command of the North Atlantic fleet, with a view to the reduction of Wilton, North Carolina ”They must think I a letter, telling hi to a new station to coanizations; that I must have rest for my mind and exercise for my body; that I had been down here within two months of five years, out of six, and recently six months on constant blockade off this port, _and my mind on the stretch all the tiain on the Atlantic coast! Why, even the routine of duty for a fleet of eighty sail of vessels works us all to death; and but that I have the most industrious fleet-captain and secretary, it would never be half done It is difficult to keep things straight” ”I know,” he writes on another occasion, ”that few h what I have in the last three years, and no one ever will know except yourself perhaps What the fight was to my poor brains, neither you nor any one else will ever be able to coht for an enemy; to know him to be as brave, as skilful, and as detered to his Government and the South to drive me away and raise the blockade, and free the Mississippi froed to my Government that I would capture or destroy the rebel”

Besides his labors and the official anxieties due to his individual coain, as in 1862, felt deeply the n of 1864 opened, and especially in the Southwest

There was continually present to thethe war the apprehension that the constancy of the people ht lead to a depression that would cause the abandonment of the contest, in which success was nevertheless assured to perseverance and vigor Grant's ard he had, in planning his greater military operations, to this important factor in the war, the vacillation under uncertainty of that popular support upon which success depended The teut reflected readily the ups and downs of the struggle, and was saddened by the weaknesses and inconsistencies of his own side, which he keenly appreciated ”I am _depressed_,” he writes, ”by the bad news fro their whole soul and body to the war and whipping us in every direction What a disgrace that, with their slender means, they should, after three years, contend with us froht sick_, every now and then, at the bad news” ”The victory of the Kearsarge over the Alabama,” on a more auspicious occasion, ”raised ht than any ever fought on the ocean”; and his exultation was the greater that the first lieutenant of the Kearsarge had been with him in the same capacity when the Hartford passed the Mississippi forts

But, while thus sensitive to the vicissitudes of his country's fortunes, he did not readily entertain the thought of being hi prepared for defeat,” he wrote before New Orleans, ”I certainly am not Any man who is prepared for defeat would be half defeated before he commenced I hope for success; shall do all in my power to secure it, and trust to God for the rest” And again: ”The officers say I don't believe anything I certainly believe very little that comes in the shape of reports They keep everybody stirred up I mean to be whipped or to whip my enemy, and not to be scared to death” ”I hope for the best results,” he wrote a week before forcing the passage into Mobile Bay, ”as I am always hopeful; put ment, and trust to God for the rest”; or, inhas a weak spot, and the first thing I try to do is to find out where it is, and pitch into it with the biggest shell or shot that I have, and repeat the dose until it operates” ”The Confederates at Fort Morgan are reat preparations to receive us That concerns ht-heartedness, but because it was a condition he had from the first accepted, and over which he hoped to triumph; for he continues, ”I know they will do all in their power to destroy us, and ill reciprocate the coet inside I expect nothing from them but that they will try to blow me up if they can”

Amid such cares and in such a spirit were spent the six reat victory that crowned his active career The only relief to its weariness was a boht-draft steamers of the squadron from Mississippi Sound in February, to create a diversion in favor of Sher upon Meridian, which was then in progress

The boats could not get nearer to the work than four thousand yards, and even then were aground; so that no very serious effect was produced A greater and more painful excitement was aroused by the un on unsound ainst French intrigues the claim of the United States to Texas, that ill-oh involved the Mississippi squadron in an overwhel disaster The Red River was unusually low for the season, and falling instead of rising There was not, when the arun-boats which had ascended the river to repass the rapids at Alexandria The army could delay but for a limited time, at the end of which, if the boats had not passed, they ut, as in New Orleans when the news arrived, wrote bitterly about the blunders made, and was sorely distressed for the issue to the navy ”I have no spirit to write,” he says ”I have had such long letters fros so bad with them that I don't kno to help they, will lose some of his finest vessels I have just sent him some boats to help hiy of Colonel Joseph Bailey, the chief-of-engineers in Franklin's corps of Banks's army; by as thrown across the river a dam, which raised the water on the shoals sufficiently for the boats to cross

A more pleasant incident occurred to vary the sameness of the blockade days, in the presentation to the adue Club of New York, of a very handsoold and silver, the hilt set in brilliants The gift was accoivers' appreciation of the brilliant services rendered to the nation, and was a grateful rerapple with the enemy in his front, that his fellow-countryers he had incurred, nor of those he was still facing on their behalf

The ti, which the aded for thedesired The co-operation of a division from Canby's army was assured toward the end of July; and at the saan to arrive As the want of these and the presence of the eneut's opinion, had made necessary the postponement of the purely naval part of the combined operation, a short description of the vessels which formed so potent an element in his calculations will not be out of place

The idea of the monitor type of ironclads, which was then the prevalent one in the United States Navy, was brought by John Ericsson froested to hi the waters hich he was familiar In its conception, the monitor was si upon a raft nearly flush with the water, and provided with the motive power of steaht be one or uns, standing side by side and pointing in exactly the saether the projectiles would follow parallel courses Within the turret the guns could be turned neither to the right nor to the left; if such a change of aim ished, the turret itself was revolved by stea, the port through which the gun was fired was turned away from the enemy; so that if a shot happened to strike at that tiun-turret there was a second of much smaller diameter, which did not revolve It was also heavily plated and designed to shelter the co of the shi+p So much inconvenience was, however, experienced fro turrets were struck, and their dimensions were so contracted, that many captains preferred to re transht-holes pierced in the arut in his attack upon Mobile Bay Two, the Tecumseh and Manhattan, ca monitors They had each but one turret, in which they carried two fifteen-inch guns, the heaviest then in use afloat The other tere river monitors, built at St Louis for service in the Mississippi

They were consequently of light draught, so much so that to obtain the necessary motive power they each had four screw propellers of suns in two turrets Their nao and the Chickasaw The arle-turreted monitors was ten inches thick, and that of the river ht and a half inches

The Tennessee, to which these were to be opposed, was a vessel of different type, and one to which the few ironclads built by the Confederates for the most part conforuns, like those of shi+ps-of-war generally, were disposed chiefly along the sides Her hull was built at Selma, on the Alaba desirable to take her down the river while as light as possible She o hundred and nine feet long and forty-eight feet wide, drawing, as has been said, fourteen feet when loaded Upon her deck, midway between the bow and the stern, was a house seventy-nine feet long, whose sides and ends sloped at an angle of thirty-four degrees and were covered with iron plating, six inches thick on the forward end and five inches thick on the other end and the sides With the inclination given, a cannon ball striking would be likely to be turned upward by the iron surface, instead of penetrating The sloping sides of the house were carried down beyond the point where they met those of the vessel, until two feet below the water There they turned and struck in at the saain met six or seven feet under water

Thus was for filled-in solid and covered with iron, was a very perfect protection against any but the most powerful ram The Tennessee herself was fitted with a beak and intended to ra to the slender resources of the Confederacy, her engines were too weak to be effective for that purpose

She could only steam six knots Her battery, however, ell selected and powerful She carried on each side two six-inch rifles, and at each end one seven-inch rifle--six guns in all There were, besides the Tennessee, three wooden gunboats, and Farragut was inforards the lower bay at least, was a mistake

It will be seen froiven of Mobile Bay, that the advantages of the Tennessee were her great protective strength, a draught which enabled her to choose her own position relatively to the heaviest of the enee and penetrative power of her guns, being rifles; for while there were cannon of this type in the United States fleet, the great majority of them were smooth bores The ironclads opposed to her had only s her side, and therefore only able to reduce her by a continued pounding, which ht shake her frame to pieces The chief defects of the Tennessee as a harbor-defense shi+p, for which she was mainly intended, were her very inferior speed, and the fact that, by an oversight, her steering chains were left exposed to the ene and weak points constituted her tactical qualities, which should have deter battle

Although the ironclads were, as Farragut estee factors in the defense and attack, the Tennessee was by no means the only very formidable obstacle in the way of his success Except the ironclads, the fleet he carried into Mobile Bay was not substantially stronger than that hich he fought his way up the Mississippi; but since that tithen the works which he now had to encounter The nu upon the channel was thirty-eight In Fort Jackson, excluding the obsolete caliber of twenty-four pounders, there were twenty-seven, and in St Philip twenty-one--total, forty-eight; but in caliber and efficiency those of Morgan were distinctly superior to those of the river forts, and it e that the poas here concentrated in a single work under a single hand The gunners of Fort Morgan,harass over the six days prior to the final deies They ca its continuance from no distraction except that caused by the fire of the fleet itself While, therefore, Fort Gaines could not be considered to support Morgan by any deterrent or injurious influence upon the United States fleet, the latter as by itself superior in offensive power to the two Mississippi forts

To the general defense the Confederates had here brought two other factors, one of a most i eastward frounboats, a line of piles was driven in the direction of Fort Morgan nearly to the edge of the channel Where the piles stopped a triple line of torpedoes began, following the sa only at a hundred yards fro was left for the passage of friendly vessels--blockade runners and others Had the electrical appliances of the Confederacy been at that tiap would doubtless also have been filled with mines, whose explosion depended upon operators ashore

As it was, the torpedo system employed at Mobile, with some few possible exceptions, was solely mechanical; the explosion depended upon contact by the passing vessel with the mine To insure this, the line was triple; those in the second and third rows not being in the alignment of the first, but so placed as to fill the interstices and make aling to the saeh inforees or deserters They--the power of the works, the disposition of the torpedoes, the Tennessee and her companions--constituted the eleet his fleet safely past the obstacles into the bay Although not disposed to lay as much stress as others upon the torpedoes, which were then but an imperfectly developed weapon, prudence dictated to hi between them and the fort; and this was fortunately in accordance with the sound policy which dictates that wooden vessels engaging permanent works, less liable than theet as close as possible to the enemy, whose fire they may then beat down by the rapidity of their own There were certain black buoys floating across the channel, between the piles and Fort Morgan, and it was understood that these -lieutenant, Lieutenant (now Captain) John C Watson, had exahtly reconnaissances; but, although he had not been able to discover any of the arded His examination doubtless had some effect upon the adency that arose during the action, to pass over the spot where the hidden dangers were said to lie; but in the dispositions for battle the order was given for the fleet to pass eastward of the easternmost buoy, where no torpedoes would be found

The closeness of this approach, however, and the fact that the line of the channel led in at right angles to the entrance, had the disadvantage of obstructing the fire of the broadside wooden vessels, in which the offensive strength of the fleet, outside thedisposed along the sides, were for the most part able to bear only upon an enele of train toward ahead or astern It was not, therefore, until nearly up with the fort that these numerous cannon would co effect which had driven off the gunners at Forts St Philip and Jackson This inconvenience results from the construction of such shi+ps, and can only be overcoe from her course; a resort which led a witty Frenchman to say that a shi+p-of-war so situated is like a shark, that can only bite by turning on its back The remedy, however applicable under certain circule shi+p, causes delay, and therefore is worse than the evil for a fleet advancing to the attack of forts, where the object must be to close as rapidly as possible There are, however, on board such vessels a few guns, uns, which, fro of the bows, bear sooner than the others upon the ene

To support these and concentrate from the earliest ut brought his ironclads inside of the wooden vessels, and abreast the four leaders of that coluuns of the ht ahead to right astern; and the disposition had the additional great advantage that, in the critical passage inside the torpedo buoys, these all-important vessels would be on the safer side, the wooden shi+ps interposing between theers, which threatened an injury far more instantaneous and vital than any to be feared from the enemy's shot and shell

The position of the ironclads being deterement of the wooden shi+ps for the attack conforreatest security was to be found in concentrating upon the eneuns As at Port Hudson, a large proportion of the fourteen vessels he purposed to take in with hiunboat class, or a little above it Resort was accordingly again had to the double column adopted there; the seven shi+ps that had the e Fort Morgan The lighter ones were distributed in the other column, and lashed each to one of the heavier shi+ps, in an order probably designed, though it is not expressly so stated, to make the combined steam power of the several pairs as nearly equal as possible Aines, the machinery of which is necessarily more above water, and so h their batteries were powerful for their tonnage, e the the furious few uns of the fort

The sum of these various considerations thus resulted in the fleet advancing into action in a coluhting column To this the admiral was probably induced by the reflection that the first broadsides are half the battle, and the freshest attack of the eneorous resistance on his own part; but it is open to doubt whether one of these powerful vessels would not have been better placed in the rear Upon a resolute enemy, the effect of each shi+p is simply to drive him to cover while she passes, to resume his activity when relieved from the pressure of her fire The case is not strictly similar to the advance of a column of troops upon a fortified position, where the head does the , and the rear mainly contributes inertia to the u froe of perht of battery somewhat more equally distributed, with, however, a decided preponderance in the van The last of the shi+ps in this column received a shot in the boiler, which entirely disabled her--an accident that may have been purely fortuitous, and to which any one of her predecessors was in a degree liable, but also possibly due to the greater activity of the eneed by the more powerful batteries which preceded She was saved from the more serious results of this disaster, and the squadron spared the necessity of rallying to her support, by the other adht