Part 6 (1/2)

CHAPTER VIII

THE FIRST ADVANCE ON VICKSBURG

1862

The purpose of the Navy Departut, had been to send his squadron up the river immediately after the capture of New Orleans The words were: ”If the Mississippi expedition from Cairo shall not have descended the river, you will take advantage of the panic to push a strong force up the river to take all their defenses in the rear” When New Orleans fell, the Cairo expedition, more co descended the river to the neighborhood of New Orleans, was still detained before Fort Pillow, one of the outlying defenses of Meht hundred from New Orleans It was not until the end of May that the evacuation of Corinth by the Confederatesto the abandonment of the forts on the 4th of June and the surrender of the city on the following day It beca over the coo up the river as soon as he possibly could

Although the flag-officer see, it was probably with the expectation that the advance, up river and against the current, required of his heavy-draught and slow- shi+ps would not be very far; that the Cairo expedition, which at the date of the orders quoted, January 20th, had not begun toit, e of the current, have progressed very far by the time he had taken New Orleans Moreover, at that date the upper river flotilla was still a branch of the army, and its prospective reatcontrol both of the streaut's was a purely naval operation, to which the army contributed only a force sufficient to hold the points which were first reduced by the fleet

Under the actual conditions, the proposed ascent of the river bore a very different aspect to the co naval officer on the spot froinations of the officials in Washi+ngton The question noas not one of fighting batteries, for there was no reason as yet to expect anything heavier than the fleet had already overcome with ease; it was the far more difficult matter of communications, in the broadest scope of the word, to be , narrow, tortuous, and very difficult road, passing in uns of the eneut to the departers and difficulties of the river have proved to us, since we first entered it, ress, and more destructive to our vessels, than the enee up the river are great” To take the defenses in the rear, and in their then state to drive the ene; but to hold the abandoned positions against the return of the defenders, after the fleet had passed on, required an adequate force which Butler's army, calculated by McClellan for a much narrower sphere, could not afford Coal and supply shi+ps, therefore, antlet for the four hundredfrom New Orleans, or be accompanied always by armed vessels The former alternative was incompatible with the necessary security, and for the latter the numbers of the fleet were utterly inadequate In fact, to maintain the proposed operations, there would be needed so uard the communications that there would be none left for the operations to which they led

It must also be observed that not only was this line of co as that which led froe, but that the natural character of the enemy's positions upon it was essentially different They were as yet undeveloped by art; but by nature they were high and co secure land communications with an extensive enemy's country in their rear over which our troops exercised no control whatever--where they had not even been seen To speak of ”taking the the question--to assume that their front was then, as in June, 1863, toward an eneion below, including its defenses and the co and intersected with numerous water-courses; over such a navy naturally exercises a preponderating control Above New Orleans the low delta of the Mississippi extends, indeed, on the west bank as far as the Red River, if itand beyond; but on the east bank it ceases one hundred and fifty , a distance of two hundred and fiftyon a firm country of moderate elevation Such positions are not to be reduced from the water alone On the contrary, if the water be a narrow strip swept by their guns, they command it; while, from the extent of country in their rear, they are not susceptible of isolation by fleets above and below, as were Forts Jackson and St Philip

This series of bluffs became, therefore, the line upon which the Confederates based their control of the Mississippi and maintained their vital coion It could be reduced only by aadvantage of the panic following the fall of New Orleans, was truly to rely upon moral effect without adequate physical force to support it It is due to the Navy Department to say that they expected the army from the North to advance n the blame, the utterly useless penetration of the United States fleet four hundred miles into the heart of the ene withdrahen contrasted with the brilliant success resulting frout's dash by the forts, afford a very useful lesson in the adaptation of means to ends and the selection of a definite objective, upon co happens The object of the United States Govern to control the lower Mississippi, that was effected byits defenses, which then fell When the further object was sought of controlling the course of the stream above, the , because it ai in particular, and could have no effect upon the decisive points

Of all these considerations Farragut was fully sensible; and, while he obeyed his orders, he showed in his dispatches to the Departainst his judgment were operations conceived on such erroneous military principles and undertaken with such inadequate force The Department was forward to press him on, and as early as the 17th of May sent a dispatch intiotten his orders on the subject; and he was urged and required to open up the Mississippi to Flag-officer Davis's command (the Mississippi flotilla), then still above Memphis This and other letters of the sa; for they were received early in June, when he had been up the river as far as Vicksburg and satisfied hi could be accomplished ”The Department,” he replies, ”see escaped all injury, and that when they arrived off New Orleans they were in condition to be pushed up the river This was not the case; but, the unboats were all sent up under the command of Co, take that place, and cut the railroad From all I could hear it was not considered proper, even with pilots, to risk the shi+ps beyond Natchez By the ti (May 18th) he was satisfied that the force of the enereat for him to venture to take the town, or even to pass it The land in the rear of Vicksburg is about two hundred feet high, on which are placed soht and ten inch columbiads, which are perfectly secure froet the heavy shi+ps up there if possible, which I did a day or two after General Williams arrived in the mean time with fifteen hundred men, when I proposed to him, if he could carry the battery on the hill, I would attack the town He made a careful reconnaissance, and returned to me in the afternoon, when I had all the (naval) commanders assembled He reported that it would be i anything with the place so long as the ene at their coe majority of the co to his home about this council, in which, contrary to his independent decision when below Fort Jackson, he yielded to the advice of his captains, he said: ”I did not pass Vicksburg; not because it was too strongly fortified; not because we could not have passed it easily enough, _but ould have been cut off from our supplies of coal and provisions_ We would have been placed between two ene and Memphis), and so the captains advised me not to do it I was very sick at the tiood_; but I doubt if I would have taken it had I been well” Here is seen, transpiring vividly enough, the uncertainty and indecision arising from the conflict between the orders of the Departh they ht cruelly embarrass, the responsibility of the officer in co,” he adds, ”to the evils of the river--getting on shore, running foul of one another, losing anchors, etc” ”The army,” he resumes in his dispatch to the Department, ”had been sent up early with a few days' rations, and I was co our own supplies, which were barely sufficient to bring the shi+ps back to New Orleans, inning to fall, and I apprehended great difficulty in getting down should I delay er In the mean time coal vessels had been towed up the river just above Natchez (a hundreddown and keep in co captured by the guerrilla bands which appear to infest almost the entire banks of the river wherever there are rapids and bluffs”

Such were so experienced when the assistant-Secretary of the Navy riting: ”The _only_ anxiety _we_ feel is to know if you have followed up your instructions and pushed a strong force up the river to meet the Western flotilla” ”I had no conception,” replied Farragut, ”that the Department ever contemplated that the shi+ps of this squadron were to atteo to Memphis, above which the Western flotilla then was; nor did I believe it was practicable for them to do so, unless under the most favorable circumstances, in ti the river The gunboats are nearly all so daed that they are certainly not in condition to contend with ironclad ra down upon thee entirely in favor of the vessel that has the current added to her velocity” In conclusion he adds: ”I arrived in New Orleans with five or six days'

provisions and one anchor, and a to procure others As soon as provisions and anchors are obtained ill take our departure for up the river, and endeavor to carry out, as far as practicable, the orders conveyed in your different dispatches” Writing home, he expressed himself more freely and unmistakably: ”They will keep us in this river until the vessels break down and all the little reputation we have made has evaporated The Govern

They expect ate the Mississippi nine hundred miles in the face of batteries, ironclad rams, etc, and yet with all the ironclad vessels they have North they could not get to Norfolk or Richmond

Well, I will do my duty to the best of my ability, and let the rest take care of itself They can not deprive me and my officers of the historical fact that we took New Orleans Now they expect ih has been quoted to show that Farragut was in no way responsible for, nor approved of, the ill-tiinal plan, when the conditions had turned out entirely different from those at first expected The Secretary of the Navy at a later date endeavored to throw the blame of failure entirely upon the War Depart or unable to support the naval movement with adequate troops It is not necessary, in a life of the adree of remissness, if any, shown by the military service, nor upon whose shoulders it falls It is sufficient to point out that the Navy Departo up to meet the Western flotilla when it was near nine hundred miles from the mouth of the Mississippi, for no better reason, apparently, than that it had determined upon the junction at a time when it supposed it would be effectedon the spot ”I think,” said Farragut quietly, ”that more should have been left to my discretion; but I hope for the best, and pray God to protect our poor sailors from harm” His own opinion was that Mobile should be the next point attacked The difficulties there were not so great as those encountered at the Mississippi forts; and his success at the latter ht not improbably have considerable moral effect upon the other works, whose position had so features of resemblance to those already subdued, and which were not yet in the strong state of defense which they afterward reached The blockade of the coast was part of his charge; and in no way did he think it could be so thoroughlythe harbors themselves, or their entrances

In obedience to his pereain started up the river, with the apprehension that if he once got above Vicksburg he would not be able to return before the next spring rise; for the season of loater in the Mississippi was now at hand The Hartford did run ashore on the way up, and remained hard and fast for the better part of twenty-four hours ”It is a sad thing to think of having your shi+p on a mud bank, five hundred miles fro-officer; ”but I knew that I had done all I could to prevent her being up the river so high, and was coo” She had to take out her coal and shot, and had even reuns before she floated

On the 18th of June the squadron was asse in company also seventeen schooners of the mortar flotilla, still under Porter's command These were placed as rapidly as possible in suitable positions on the two sides of the river, opened fire on the 26th, and continued it through the 27th Upon the evening of the latter day Porter notified the flag-officer that he was ready to cover, by a steady boe of the fleet before the batteries

[Illustration: PassAGE OF VICKSBURG BATTERIES, JUNE 28, 1862

ORDER OF ATTACK]

Vicksburg is situated on the first high landMemphis, from which it is four hundred th and iation of the river Not only was it exceptionally lofty, and on one flank of that series of bluffs which has before beenthe line upon which the Confederate grip of the streaave particular facilities for an enfilading fire on vessels both before and after they caer and erous cannonade than is the case where the streaht past the front of a battery The channel has now changed; but in 1862 the river, which froh an alluvial country,a sharp turn to the northeast, as though determined to reach the bluffs but fourround with a sharp turn to the southwest, parallel to its recent direction, flowing for the most part close to the foot of the hills Between the two reaches, and formed by theue of land, or pro and less than one wide The squadron, being below, had to steaainst the current, h the upper reach In the bend it was followed by a fire frohest part of the bluffs, to which it could iven, and at three the squadron was under way--eleven vessels, of which three were the heavy shi+ps Hartford, Richmond, and Brooklyn; two, the corvettes Iroquois and Oneida; and six gunboats At four, the shi+ps in their slow progress, ste the current, had passed the mortar schooners; and the latter then opened fire, as did the steamers connected with the to a , the three vessels which forunboats, did not get by The others, at 6 A M, anchored above Vicksburg Though exposedfire, to which they were not able to reply, the vessels suffered less than would have been expected, owing to the ene toothus accout reported coldly to the Department that, in obedience to the orders ”and the co with the Brooklyn, Richmond, and Hartford, with the determination to carry out my instructions to the best of my ability

The Department will perceive from this report that the forts can be _passed_, and _we have done it_, and can _do it again as often as may be required_ of us It will not, however, be an easy matter for us to doas the ene and holding the place” ”I aain, ”it is not possible to take Vicksburg without an army of twelve or fifteen thousand men General Van Dorn's division (Confederate) is here, and lies safely behind the hills

The water is too low for ” The last sentence reveals clearly enough theto take three of the best shi+ps of the navy to the upper river in falling water Fortunately the insufficient depth noas above--not below--them, and they were not utterly cut off from the sea

Commander Porter, however, who started down river a week later, in coton, and than who officer, wrote back to the flag-officer that if the big shi+ps did not soon return he feared they would have to reut passed the batteries of Vicksburg, on the 1st of July, the Mississippi flotilla, under the co-officer Charles H Davis, joined hi left Mee by the current, by coht suited to the difficulties of river navigation

The united squadrons continued together until the 15th of July, lying at anchor near the neck of the pro; with the exception of the Brooklyn and the two gunboats which had not passed up on the 28th of June These remained below the works, and on the opposite side of the pro-officers was about four miles below the mouth of the Yazoo River, a tributary of the Mississippi, which enters theIt was known to them that there was somewhere in the Yazoo an ironclad ram called the Arkansas; which, more fortunate than the Mississippi at New Orleans, had been hurried away from Memphis just before that city fell into the hands of the United States forces She was a vessel of between eight hundred and a thousand tons burden, carrying ten guns, which were protected by three inches of railroad iron, backed by bales of coerous weapon, however, was her raines, this was not as forht have been to the enemy's shi+ps

So little injury had thus far been done to the United States vessels by the ra-officers were probably lulled into a state of over-security, and they allowed their squadrons to lie with too low fires To this doubtless contributed the more powerful motive of the difficulty to the coal supply incurred by the excessively long line of exposed communications, imposed upon both squadrons by the stubborn persistence of the Navy Depart the fleets far in advance of any support by the aruns they could not control the river banks; and, unless they could be present everywhere along the eight hundred miles which separated Memphis from New Orleans, even the narrow strip on either side swept by their cannon was safe at any point only while they were abreast it The moral effect of their pro was accurately weighed by the enemy; and, however itto insure the safety of the unarmed vessels upon which supplies depended This essentially vicious ree of insecurity which could have but one issue--a retreat by both squadrons toward their respective bases, which soon after followed