Part 3 (2/2)

The Government had the support of that part of the country which had received the largestdevelopment, and could, therefore, most quickly prepare the material for war, in which both sides were lamentably deficient; and, as yet more important, it possessed in the new navy built since 1855 an efficient weapon to which the South had nothing to oppose The hope was extravagant and doomed to disappointment; for to overrun and hold so extensive a territory as the immediate basin of the Mississippi required a developree of exhaustion on the other which could not be reached so early in the war The relative strengths, though unequal, were not yet sufficiently disproportioned to enable the gigantic work to be accomplished; and the principal result of an effort undertaken without due consideration was to paralyze a large fraction of a navy too sallantly, but uselessly, above New Orleans Nor was this the worst; the ti up the hill in order at once toMobile before its defenses were strengthened Had the navy been large enough, both tasks ht have been attempted; but it will appear in the sequel that its scanty numbers were the reason which postponed the attack on Mobile froer Farragut ever had to encounter

Despite the extensive sea-coast of the United States and the largeof the war, the navy had never, except for short and passing intervals, been regarded with the interest its importance deserved To this had doubtless contributed the fixed policy of the Government to concentrate its attention upon the internal development of the country, and to concern itself little with external interests, except so far as they proive extension to slaveholding territory

The avoidance of entangling alliances had become perverted to indifference to the means by which alone, in the last resort, the nation can assert and secure control in regions outside its borders, but vitally affecting its prosperity and safety The power of navies was therefore, then as now, but little understood Consequently, when the importance of the Mississippi Valley was realized, as it immediately was, there was but one idea as to theit, and that was by a land invasion froreat Western and Northwestern States

To this a navy was indeed to be adjoined, but in a manner so distinctly subsidiary that it was, contrary to all custom, placed under the orders of the commander-in-chief of the Western army, and became simply a division of the land forces From this subordinate position it was soon raised by its own intrinsic value and the logic of facts; but the transient experience is noteworthy, because illustrating the general ignorance of the country as to the powers of the priceless weapon which lay ready, though unnoticed, to its hand

Happily, in the Navy Departeneral indifference permitted it at least one compensation--to follow its oays The Secretary hih he had had official connection with the service in the past; but most fortunately there was called to his assistance one who had been for eighteen years in the navy, had passed while in it to the command of ned and entered civil life This gentleman, Mr Gustavus V Fox, thus combined with business experience and an extensive acquaintance with naval officers the capacities of a seaman He knehat shi+ps could do and what they could not; but to this coained by the daily habit of sea life, he had added the results of study and reflection upon events passing elsewhere than under his own observation The experiences of the allied navies in the Crimean War had convinced him that, if the wooden sides of shi+ps could not be pitted in prolonged stand-up fight against the stone walls of fortresses, they were capable of enduring such battering as they h an unobstructed channel This conviction received support by the results of the attacks upon Hatteras Inlet and Port Royal He one ment as a seaman by the express opinion of an eminent soldier

Nearly a hundred years before, Washi+ngton, at the siege of Yorktown, had urged the French Admiral De Grasse to send vessels past Cornwallis's works to control the upper York River, saying: ”I am so well satisfied by experience of the little effect of land batteries on vessels passing the breeze that, unless the two channels near Yorktown should be found ireatest confidence in the success of this iton's Letters_, October 1, 1781]

In this conviction of Mr Fox's lay the inception of the expedition against New Orleans It was, in his view, to be a purely naval attack

Once over the bar at the mouth of the river, the channel as far as the city had no natural obstruction, was clearly defined, and easily followed, by day or night, without a pilot The heavy current of the early spring e of the shi+ps and so keep theer under fire, would make it difficult for the enemy to maintain in position any artificial barrier placed by him The works to be passed--the seaward defenses of New Orleans, Forts Jackson and St

Philip--were powerful fortifications; but they were ultimately dependent upon the city, ninety miles above them, for a support which could come only by the river A fleet anchored above the forts lay across their only line of communication, and when thus isolated, their fall became only a question of time The work proposed to the United States Navy was, therefore, to turn the forts by passing their fire, seize their line of communications--the upper river--and their base, New Orleans, and then to give over the latter to the ared to furnish a force sufficient to hold the conquest

Having first taken the necessary, but strictly preli as a depot shi+p Island, in Mississippi Sound, about a hundred miles from the mouth of the river, Mr Fox's proposition, which had been adopted by the Secretary of the Navy, was submitted to the President

Mr Lincoln, hirossed with the idea of invasion from the north, was disposed to be incredulous of success; but with his usual open-mindedness consented to a full discussion before hi was therefore held with General McClellan at his headquarters There were present, besides the President, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr Fox, and Commander David D Porter, who had recently returned from service off the mouth of the Mississippi The antecedents of General McClellan were those of an officer of the engineers, who are generally disposed to exaggerate the powers of forts as compared with shi+ps, and to conteular approaches; just as an officer of the line of the ar to the capture of a place like New Orleans, will usually and most properly seek first a base of operations, fron whose issue shall be the fall of the city To this cause was probably due the preference observed by the Navy Department to exist in ar close to the sea, which was completely under the control of the navy, the necessary land operations would begin under far more favorable conditions, and could be more easily maintained than in the alluvial soil of the Mississippi delta McClellan, as an accomplished master of his profession in all its branches, received at first the iainst New Orleans by way of the river were being proposed to hi that the only des in case of success, he readily consented to detail ten or fifteen thousand troops for the purpose Though more hazardous, the proposition of the Navy Departically sound

The key of the position was to be struck for at once, and the outlying defenses were expected then to fall by the severance of their coht have his own opinion as to the power of the navy to carry out the proposed passage of the forts, and as to whether its coal, when once above, would outlast the endurance of the hostile garrisons; but those were points upon which the Navy Departht be presument than himself

The conference, which was held about the middle of November, 1861, resulted in the adoption of Mr Fox's plan in its main outlines; but with an important addition, which threatened at one tigested that the naval vessels should be accompanied by a mortar flotilla, to subdue the fire of the forts by bombardment, and so to allow the fleet to pass without risk, or with risk ineer instincts of McClellan, and was adopted The general then designated Major Barnard, of the Engineer Corps, to represent hi the details of the expedition Barnard also took strong ground in favor of the mortars, and to this added the opinion--in which Porter concurred--that the forts should be not e He su perfectly clear words: ”To pass those works (merely) with a fleet and appear before New Orleans is merely a raid--no capture New Orleans and the river can not be held until communications are perfectly established” The assertion of the last sentence can not be denied; it admits of no difference of opinion The point in dispute between the two arguments was not this, but whether the fall of the city, which had no local defenses, would entail that of the forts, and so open the coh he stuck to his opinion, he had a deservedly high estimate of Porter's professional ability--so much so that, had the latter's rank justified, he would have urged him for the coureat ie of the whole undertaking Had he also taken the view of Barnard and Porter in favor of the erous course, it could scarcely have failed that Fox would have been overruled

The noer deferred Secrecy and rapidity of action were large elements in the hoped-for achieveth of ti the officers whose length of service and professional reputation indicated theuide the departency show the audacity and self-reliance deh it falls within the limits of the itimate place in the so-called science of as, nevertheless, as the opinions of Barnard and Porter show, contrary to the uards commonly insisted upon, overleaped the successive steps by which military achieve only to the exceptional conditions, resorted fearlessly to exceptional methods For such a duty the departor

Farragut's na those considered; but the final choice appears to have been deterh hi Norfolk at the tireat superiority of character, clear perception of duty, and firm resolution in the perfornized, could not be until revealed by war; but it was evident that he stood well above the common run of simply accomplished officers

Still, further tests were required; in a matter of so much iut was faithful could not be doubted; but was his heart so far in the contest that he could be depended upon to exert his abilities to the full? Coo to New York on duty connected with the mortar flotilla, and while there to ut There had been, as is known, a close relation between the two faut was likely to sho hearty he was in the cause Porter's account was e whether he was in sympathy with the military plan of the proposed expedition

For this object Farragut was ordered to report at the department, and Fox undertook to meet him at the train and talk over the ton on the 21st of Deceed, and taken to the house of the Postomery Blair The latter was brother-in-law to Fox, and the three breakfasted together ”After breakfast, Fox laid before Farragut the plan of attack, the force to be employed, and the object to be attained, and asked his opinion Farragut answered unhesitatingly that it would succeed Fox then handed hi fitted out, and asked if they were enough Farragut replied he would engage to run by the forts and capture New Orleans with two thirds the number Fox told him more vessels would be added, and that he would coht and enthusiasreat that when he left us Fox asked if I did not think he was too enthusiastic I replied I was most favorably impressed with him, and sure he would succeed”[D] There could be no question, at any rate, that his whole heart was in the war and in the expedition; whether he would rise equal to his task still remained to be seen He said, however, frankly, that had he been previously consulted, he would have advised against the employment of the mortar flotilla He had no faith in the efficacy of that mode of attack since his observations of the results at San Juan de Ulloa, twenty-three years before He was convinced that the fleet could run by the forts, and anticipated nothing but delay froeive the bombs a trial ”He was never profuse in promises,” writes Mr Welles, the Secretary of the Navy, ”but he felt complimented that he was selected, and I saw that in ency and to the expectation of the Government”[E] To his home he wrote: ”Keep your lips closed and burn my letters, for perfect silence is to be observed--the first injunction of the Secretary I a in the Gulf, and the rest depends upon myself Keep calm and silent I shall sail in three weeks”

[Footnote D: Montgomery Blair, in _The United Service_, January, 1881]

[Footnote E: Gideon Welles, in the _Galaxy_, Noveut received preparatory orders, and on the 9th of the following January was for Squadron; the limits of which, on the coast of the Confederacy, were defined as from St Andrew's Bay to the mouth of the Rio Grande The coasts of Mexico and Yucatan were also embraced in the-shi+p

On the 20th of January final orders were issued to him These were somewhat discreetly worded, and, literally understood, must be conceded to take fro to, and assuinal plan--a credit Mr Welles seems desirous to claim ”When you are completely ready,” they read, ”you will collect such vessels as can be spared from the blockade, and proceed up the Mississippi River _and reduce the defenses_ which guard the approaches to New Orleans, _when_ you will appear off that city and take possession of it under the guns of your squadron” Understood according to the plainof the words, these orders prescribed the reduction of the works as a condition precedent to appearing off the city, and so recur to the fears expressed by both Barnard and Porter as to the consequences of leaving the forts unreduced There is not in them even ”the latitude and discretion in the employment of the means placed under his cout, after leaving the forts unreduced, as he did, met with serious disaster, it can scarcely be doubted that the phrase quoted would have been used to acquit the Government

[Footnote F: Gideon Welles, in the _Galaxy_, Deceut now hoisted his flag, and in which he continued throughout the as a nearly new vessel, having sailed on her first cruise to China in the sued to the early period of the transition from sails to steaarded as auxiliary only, and giving her a speed of but eight knots per hour, while the spars and sail area were those of a full-rigged shi+p The deficiency of horse-poas a serious drawback in such an operation as passing forts, especially when, as in the Mississippi, the current was strong and always adverse to vessels ascending the river The Hartford had, on the other hand, a powerful battery of the best existent type She carried twenty-two Dahlgren nine-inch shell guns, eleven on each side; and, owing to the lowness of the river banks, these guns would be on a level with or even above those in the lower tier of the batteries opposed to her The Pensacola, Brooklyn, and Richmond were vessels of the same type as the Hartford, and built at the same time

[Illustration: PassAGE OF FORTS JACKSON AND ST PHILIP, APRIL 24, 1862

ORDER OF ATTACK