Part 262 (1/2)

To import, is rightful. After-taxation, against my consent, cannot make it wrong. Neither am I obliged to smuggle, in order to avoid it.

I include in these remarks, all taxes, whether on property, or imports, or railroads.

A chemist, hundreds of years ago, finds out how to temper steel. The art is useful for making knives, lancets, and machinery. But he knows that the bad will abuse it by making swords and daggers. Is he responsible? Certainly not.

Similar to this is trading in America,--knowing government will thus have an opportunity to increase its revenue.

But suppose the chemist to see two men fighting, one has the other down,--to the first our chemist presents a finely tempered dagger.

Such is voting under the United States Const.i.tution--appointing an officer to help the oppressor.

The difference between voting and tax-paying is simply this: I may do an act right in itself, though I know some evil will result. Paul was bound to preach the gospel to the Jews, though he knew some of them would thereby be led to add to their sins by cursing and mobbing him.

So I may locate property in Philadelphia, trade there, and ride on its railroads, though I know government will, without my consent, thereby enrich itself. Other things being equal, of course I shall not allow it the opportunity. But the advantages and good results of my doing so, _may be_ such as would make it my duty there to live and trade, even subject to such an evil.

But on the other hand, I may not do an act wrong in itself to secure any amount of fancied good.

Now, appointing a man by my vote to a pro-slavery office, (and such is every one under the United States Const.i.tution,) is wrong in itself, and no other good deeds which such officer may do, will justify an abolitionist in so appointing him.

Let it not be said, that this reasoning will apply to voting--that voting is the right of every human being, (which I grant only for the sake of argument,) and innocent in itself.

Voting _under our_ Const.i.tution is appointing a man to swear to protect, and actually to protect slavery. Now, appointing agents generally is the right of every man, and innocent in itself, but appointing an agent to commit a murder is sin.

I trade, and government taxes me; do I authorize it? No.

I vote, and the marshal whom my agent appoints, returns a slave to South Carolina. Do I authorize it? _Yes_. I knew it would be his _sworn duty_, when I voted; and I a.s.sented to it, by voting under the Const.i.tution which makes it his duty. If I trade, it is said, I may foresee that government will be helped by the taxes I pay, therefore I ought not to trade. But I do not trade _for the purpose_ of paying taxes! And if I am to be charged with all the foreseen results of my actions, then Garrison is responsible for the Boston mob!

The reason why I am responsible for the pro-slavery act of a United States officer, for whom I have voted, is this: I must be supposed to have _intended_ that which my agent is _bound_ by his contract with me (that is, his oath of office) to do.

Allow me to request our opposers to keep distinctly in view the precise point in debate. This is not whether Ma.s.sachusetts can rightfully trade and make treaties with South Carolina, although she knows that such a course will result in strengthening a wrongdoer.

Such are most of the cases which they consider parallel to ours, and for permitting which they charge us with inconsistency. But the question really is, whether Ma.s.sachusetts can join hands and strength with South Carolina, for the express and avowed purpose of sustaining Slavery. This she does in the Const.i.tution. For he who swears to support an instrument of twelve clauses, swears to support one as well as another,--and though one only be immoral,--still he swears to do an immoral act. Now, my conviction is, ”which fire will not burn out of me,” that to return fugitive slaves is sin--to promise so to do, and not do it, is, if possible, baser still; and that any conjunction of circ.u.mstances which makes either necessary, is of the Devil, and not of G.o.d.

OBJECTION XIV.

Duty requires of a non-voter to quit the country, and go where his taxes will not help to build up slavery.

ANSWER. G.o.d gave me my birth here. Because bad men about me ”play such tricks before high Heaven, as make the angels weep,” does it oblige me to quit? I have as good right here as they. If they choose to leave, let them--I Shall remain. 'Twould be a pretty thing, indeed, if, as often as I found myself next door to a bad man, who would bring up his children to steal my apples and break my windows, I were obliged to take the temptation away by cutting down all my apple trees and moving my house further west, into the wilderness.

This would be, in good John Wesley's phrase, ”giving up all the good times to the devil,” with a witness.

OBJECTION XV.

”Society has the right to prescribe the terms, upon the expressed or implied agreement to comply with which a person may reside within its limits.”

ANSWER. This principle I utterly deny. All that Society has a right to demand is peaceful submission to its exactions:--_consent_ they have neither the power nor the right to exact or to imply. Twenty men live on a lone island. Nineteen set up a government and say, every man who lives there shall wors.h.i.+p idols. The twentieth submits to all their laws, but refuses to commit idolatry. Have they the _right_ to say, ”Do so, or quit;” or, to say, ”If you stay, we will consider you as impliedly wors.h.i.+pping idols?” Doubtless they have the _power_, but the majority have no _rights_, except those which justice sanctions. Will the objector show me the justice of his principle? I was born here. I ask no man's permission to remain.

All that any man or body of men have a right to infer from my staying here, is that, in doing this _innocent act_, I think, that on the whole, I am effecting more good than harm. Lawyers say, I cannot find this right laid down in the books. That will not trouble me.

Some old play has a character in it who never ties his neckcloth without a warrant from Mr. Justice Overdo. I claim no relations.h.i.+p to that very scrupulous individual.