Part 15 (1/2)
[Map: The Presidential Election of 1824]
The cry of corruption is a recurrent note in the history of democracies. The American democracy is no exception. With most of the charges of corruption, the historian has little concern; but the bargain and corruption cry of 1825 has a historical significance. The falsity of the charge against Clay has been proved as nearly as a negative can be.
Adams may not have been above the uncongenial task of soliciting votes, but he kept safely within the moral domain which his conscience marked out. The motive which governed his appointment of Clay as Secretary of State is stated frankly in a letter to Monroe, two days after the election by the House. He considered the appointment ”due to his talents and services to the western section of the Union, whence he comes, and to the confidence in me manifested by their delegations.” Upon one individual these considerations made no impression: Andrew Jackson left the capital with wrath in his soul. He felt that he had been defrauded by a corrupt bargain. From this time on his hand was against Clay,--that ”Judas of the West,” as he afterward called him,--who had conspired to ”impair the pure principles of our republican inst.i.tutions” and to ”prostrate that fundamental maxim which maintains the supremacy of the people's will.”
Years after the events of 1824-25, the belief of Jackson that the will of the people had been defeated found cla.s.sic expression in Thomas H.
Benton's _Thirty Years' View of Congress_. What Benton termed ”the Demos Krateo principle” was thoroughly in accord with the spirit of the new democracy, but it rested upon an entire misunderstanding of the Const.i.tution. A direct popular election of the President was never contemplated by the framers of the Const.i.tution. It is impossible to find in either the letter or the spirit of the Const.i.tution any justification for the view that the House of Representatives is bound to elect the candidate having the highest popular vote.
What the will of the people really was in the presidential election of 1824 is by no means clear. Even in those States where presidential electors were chosen by popular vote, Jackson received less than half of the popular vote; and in many of these States the actual vote fell far below the potential. In Ma.s.sachusetts, where 66,000 votes had been cast for governor the year before, only 37,000 voters took the trouble to vote for President. In Pennsylvania, which boasted of a population of over a million, less than 48,000 voted in 1824. Moreover, the six States which chose the presidential electors through their legislatures, contained one fourth of the population of the country. One fact, however, stands out with unmistakable clearness,--and it did not escape politicians like Van Buren, of New York, who had their fingers on the pulse of the people,--this martial hero from out of the West had an unprecedented vote-getting capacity. It were well to observe the Western horizon more intently.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
The best description of the political characteristics of American society in this period is given by Alexis de Tocqueville, _Democracy in America_ (2 vols., trans., 1862). F. J. Turner has pointed out the importance of the West in the development of the nation in several studies, notably: ”The Significance of the Frontier in American History” (American Historical a.s.sociation, _Report_, 1893); ”The Problem of the West” (_Atlantic Monthly_, vol. 78); ”Contributions of the West to American Democracy”
(_Atlantic Monthly_, vol. 91). The political development of the South is set forth with great thoroughness by U. B. Phillips, _Georgia and State Rights_ (American Historical a.s.sociation, _Report_, 1901); W. A. Schaper, _Sectionalism and Representation in South Carolina_ (_ibid._, 1900); and C. H. Ambler, _Sectionalism in Virginia from 1776 to 1861_ (1910). Important aspects of the tariff are discussed in Edward Stanwood's _American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century_ (2 vols., 1903), and in C. W. Wright's _Wool-Growing and the Tariff_ (1910).
CHAPTER XVIII
POLITICS AND STATE RIGHTS
The circ.u.mstances of his election made the position of President Adams one of very great difficulty. He alluded to his embarra.s.sment in his first message to Congress. ”Less possessed of your confidence in advance than any of my predecessors,” said he, ”I am deeply conscious of the prospect that I shall stand more and oftener in need of your indulgence.” It is doubtful, however, if even he appreciated the momentum of the forces which were already combining to discredit his administration. In October, the legislature of Tennessee had again nominated Jackson for the Presidency, and he had accepted the nomination as a summons to wage war upon the forces of evil in high places. The campaign of 1828, indeed, had already begun: and it was to be a campaign of personal vindication as well as of popular rights.
Under similar circ.u.mstances most men would have made sure of the loyalty of their const.i.tutional advisers, at least, but Adams flattered himself that he could carry on a non-partisan administration. The results were disastrous, for at least two of the Cabinet were not above using the patronage of office to further the cause of Jackson. In his laudable desire not to allow the Government to become ”a perpetual and unintermitting scramble for office,” Adams refused to make removals in the civil service on partisan grounds, yet he retained in office underlings who labored incessantly in the cause of the opposition.
Equally impolitic was the att.i.tude of the President toward questions of public policy in his first message to Congress. Just when the opposition was in a fluid state and the winds of conflicting doctrines were ruffling the surface of national politics, Adams gave utterance to opinions on the functions of government which were bound to alienate many of his followers. Entertaining no doubts as to const.i.tutional limitations upon the powers of the National Government, he advocated not only the construction of roads and ca.n.a.ls, but the establishment of observatories and a national university. His program included governmental aid to the arts, mechanical and literary, and to the sciences, ”ornamental and profound.” He was prepared to give encouragement not only to manufacturing but to agriculture and to commerce. Many of these were objects which President Jefferson had recommended to the consideration of Congress in 1806; but whereas he had urged the adoption of amendments to the Const.i.tution which would authorize Congress to provide for roads and ca.n.a.ls and education, Adams seemed oblivious to the limitations of the Const.i.tution. In much alarm Jefferson suggested to Madison the desirability of having Virginia adopt a new set of resolutions, bottomed on those of 1798, and directed against the acts for internal improvements. In March, 1826, the general a.s.sembly declared that all the principles of the earlier resolutions applied ”with full force against the powers a.s.sumed by Congress” in pa.s.sing acts to protect manufactures and to further internal improvements. That the Administration would meet with opposition in Congress, whatever its program might be, was a foregone conclusion. The only question was whether the diverse and mutually hostile factions which had followed the fortunes of Crawford, Calhoun, and Jackson could coalesce into a consistent opposition. The first test occurred when the Administration proposed the Panama mission.
The overthrow of the authority of Spain in South America had left the way clear for the long-projected union of the republics. Early in the year 1825, the ministers of Mexico, Guatemala, and Colombia waited on Clay to learn whether the United States would accept an invitation to a great council or congress which had been called by the revolutionist Bolivar, now President of Colombia. The project appealed strongly to Clay. A league of young republics in the New World to offset the Holy Alliance in Europe was, as his biographer remarks, ”one of those large, generous conceptions well calculated to fascinate his ardent mind.” The imagination of the President was not so easily touched: he instructed Clay to inquire more particularly into the purposes of the congress.
The condition of affairs in the countries bordering on the Caribbean Sea--the American Mediterranean--was such, indeed, as to justify extreme caution in dealing with the Latin-American republics. It was matter of common knowledge that Colombia and Mexico had designs upon Cuba, the last of the Spanish outposts in the New World. So long as Spain continued at war with her old colonies, the United States was bound to be uneasy about the fate of Cuba and Porto Rico. Even if the islands were liberated by the republican armies of Central and South America, they were likely to fall a prey to some European power. The appearance of a French fleet off the coast of Cuba during the summer of 1825 gave point to these not unwarranted apprehensions. It was rumored that Cuba was to be made the basis for an expedition against Mexico in behalf of Spain. This episode prompted Clay to make strong representations to France that the United States could not consent to the occupation of Cuba by any other European power.
When, then, a formal invitation came to partic.i.p.ate in the Panama Congress, the Administration determined to seize the occasion to exercise a wholesome restraint by friendly advice upon the a.s.sembled delegates of the republics, and at the same time to ascertain their purposes. In asking the Senate to confirm the nomination of two delegates, however, the President voiced his own expectation of what the Congress would be and do, rather than the purposes of Bolivar and his a.s.sociates. The occasion would be favorable, the President intimated, for the discussion of commercial reciprocity, of neutral rights, and of principles of religious liberty. An alliance with the Latin-American republics was not contemplated. On the contrary, the delegates from the United States would urge ”an agreement between all of the parties represented at the meeting, that each will guard by its own means against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders.” At this stage in its evolution the Monroe Doctrine was not understood to include any obligation on the part of the United States to police the territories of the lesser republics of the New World.
The instructions given to the envoys leave no doubt as to the intentions of the Administration. Every possible endeavor was to be made to dissuade Colombia and Mexico from their designs upon Cuba and Porto Rico. The recognition of Hayti as an independent state was to be deprecated. In short, the _status quo_ in the Caribbean Sea was to be maintained; and throughout, the congress was to be regarded as a diplomatic conference and in no wise as a convention to const.i.tute a permanent league of republics.
Nevertheless, the opposition in Congress persisted in misrepresenting the President's purposes. It was pointed out that the republics to the south very generally believed that the United States was pledged by Monroe's message to make common cause with them when their independence was threatened. ”Are we prepared,” asked Hayne, of South Carolina, ”to send ministers to the Congress of Panama for the purpose of making effectual this pledge of President Monroe as construed by the present administration and understood by the Spanish-American states?” With greater sincerity Southern Representatives protested against partic.i.p.ating in a congress which proposed to discuss the suppression of the slave trade and the future of Hayti. ”Slavery in all its bearings,” said Hayne, ”is a question of extreme delicacy, concerning which there is but one safe rule either for the States in which it exists or for the Union. It must ever be treated as a domestic question.
To foreign governments the language of the United States must be that the question of slavery concerns the peace and safety of our political family, and that we cannot allow it to be discussed.” Least of all, he continued, could the United States touch the question of the independence of Hayti in connection with revolutionary governments which had marched to victory under the banner of universal emanc.i.p.ation and which had permitted men of color to command their armies and enter their legislative halls.
In the end the Administration had its way and the nominations were confirmed; but the delay was most unfortunate. On their way to the Isthmus, one of the delegates died, and the other arrived too late to take part in the congress. From the viewpoint of domestic politics, the controversy over the mission was only an incident in the evolution of a party within the bosom of the Democratic party. The animus of the opposition is revealed in the often-quoted remark of Martin Van Buren, who was trying to drill the varied elements in the Senate into a coherent organization: ”Yes, they have beaten us by a few votes, after a hard battle; but if they had only taken the other side and refused the mission, we should have had them.”
Of far more serious import than this factional opposition in Congress was the resistance which the authorities of Georgia offered to the National Administration in the matter of Indian lands. On March 5, 1825, the Senate ratified the Treaty of Indian Springs with the Creek Indians, which provided for the cession of practically all the lands of the tribe between the Flint and Chattahoochee Rivers. For years the planters of Georgia had coveted these fertile tracts, awaiting with impatience the negotiations of the Federal Government with the reluctant Indians.
Although the t.i.tle to the lands was not to pa.s.s to Georgia until September 1, 1826, Governor Troup ordered them to be surveyed with a view to their immediate occupation. Meantime, well-founded charges were current that the treaty had been made by a faction among the Creeks, without the consent of the responsible chiefs. President Adams at once ordered the state authorities to desist from their survey; but the governor replied that Georgia was convinced of the validity of the treaty and fully determined to enter into possession of her own. The tone of the governor's letter was ominous. Nevertheless, the President inst.i.tuted negotiations for a new treaty. The diplomatic s.h.i.+fts resorted to by the Indian agents in this instance were not above suspicion, but the President seemed to entertain no misgivings, for he a.s.sured the Senate that the new Treaty of Was.h.i.+ngton (January 24, 1826) was the will and deed of ”the chiefs of the whole Creek Nation.” The grant left the Indians still in possession of some lands west of the Chattahoochee.
The feelings of all loyal Georgians were outraged by the course of the Administration. The legislature protested against the Treaty of Was.h.i.+ngton as ”illegal and unconst.i.tutional,” and denounced the President's action as ”an instance of dictation and federal supremacy unwarranted by any grant of powers to the General Government.” ”Georgia owns exclusively the soil and jurisdiction of all the territory within her present chartered and conventional limits,” read the resolutions of December 22, 1826. ”She has never relinquished said right, either territorial or jurisdictional, to the General Government.”
The ebullient governor hardly needed the indors.e.m.e.nt of the legislature.
He pushed on the surveys to the limits set by the original treaty. But the surveyors soon met with resistance from the Indians; and the Indians appealed to the President. The Secretary of War then notified Troup that the President felt himself compelled to employ all the means under his control to maintain the faith of the nation and to carry the treaty into effect. Governor Troup replied defiantly that the ”military character of the menace” was well understood. ”You will distinctly understand, therefore, that I feel it my duty to resist to the utmost any military attack.... From the first decisive act of hostility, you will be considered and treated as a public enemy, and with less repugnance because you, to whom we might const.i.tutionally have appealed for our defense against invasion, are yourselves the invaders, and, what is more, the unblus.h.i.+ng allies of the savages whose course you have adopted.” He at once issued orders to the state military officers to hold the militia in readiness to repel any invasion of the soil of Georgia.