Volume I Part 12 (1/2)

66 ”As there is not any sort of pleasure that is not itself a good, nor any sort of pain the exemption from which is not a good, and as nothing but the expectation of the eventual enjoyment of pleasure in some shape, or of exemption from pain in some shape, can operate in the character of a motive, a necessary consequence is that if by motive be meant _sort_ of motive, there is not any such thing as a bad motive.”-Bentham's _Springs of Action_, ii. -- 4. The first clauses of the following pa.s.sage I have already quoted: ”Pleasure is itself a good, nay, setting aside immunity from pain, the only good.

Pain is in itself an evil, and indeed, without exception, the only evil, or else the words good and evil have no meaning. And this is alike true of every sort of pain, and of every sort of pleasure. It follows therefore immediately and incontestably that there is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one.”-_Principles of Morals and Legislation_, ch. ix. ”The search after motive is one of the prominent causes of men's bewilderment in the investigation of questions of morals.... But this is a pursuit in which every moment employed is a moment wasted. All motives are abstractedly good. No man has ever had, can, or could have a motive different from the pursuit of pleasure or of shunning pain.”-_Deontology_, vol. i. p. 126. Mr. Mill's doctrine appears somewhat different from this, but the difference is I think only apparent. He says: ”The motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent,” and he afterwards explains this last statement by saying that the ”motive makes a great difference in our moral estimation of the agent, especially if it indicates a good or a bad habitual disposition, a bent of character from which useful or from which hurtful actions are likely to arise.”-_Utilitarianism_, 2nd ed. pp. 26-27.

67 This truth has been admirably ill.u.s.trated by Mr. Herbert Spencer (_Social Statics_, pp. 1-8).

68 ”On evalue la grandeur de la vertu en comparant les biens obtenus aux maux au prix desquels on les achete: l'excedant en bien mesure la valeur de la vertu, comme l'excedant en mal mesure le degre de haine que doit inspirer le vice.”-Ch. Comte, _Traite de Legislation_, liv. ii. ch. xii.

69 M. Dumont, the translator of Bentham, has elaborated in a rather famous pa.s.sage the utilitarian notions about vengeance. ”Toute espece de satisfaction entrainant une peine pour le delinquant produit naturellement un plaisir de vengeance pour la partie lesee.

Ce plaisir est un gain. Il rappelle la parabole de Samson. C'est le doux qui sort du terrible. C'est le miel recueilli dans la gueule du lion. Produit sans frais, resultat net d'une operation necessaire a d'autres t.i.tres, c'est une jouissance a cultiver comme toute autre; car le plaisir de la vengeance consideree abstraitement n'est comme tout autre plaisir qu'un bien en lui-meme.”-_Principes du Code penal_, 2me partie, ch. xvi. According to a very acute living writer of this school, ”The criminal law stands to the pa.s.sion of revenge in much the same relation as marriage to the s.e.xual appet.i.te” (J. F.

Stephen, _On the Criminal Law of England_, p. 99). Mr. Mill observes that, ”In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility” (_Utilitarianism_, p. 24). It is but fair to give a specimen of the opposite order of extravagance.

”So well convinced was Father Claver of the eternal happiness of almost all whom he a.s.sisted,” says this saintly missionary's biographer, ”that speaking once of some persons who had delivered a criminal into the hands of justice, he said, G.o.d _forgive_ them; but they have secured the salvation of this man at _the probable risk of their own_.”-Newman's _Anglican Difficulties_, p. 205.

_ 70 De Ordine_, ii. 4. The experiment has more than once been tried at Venice, Pisa, &c., and always with the results St. Augustine predicted.

71 The reader will here observe the very transparent sophistry of an a.s.sertion which is repeated ad nauseam by utilitarians. They tell us that a regard to the remote consequences of our actions would lead us to the conclusion that we should never perform an act which would not be conducive to human happiness if it were universally performed, or, as Mr. Austin expresses it, that ”the question is if acts of this cla.s.s were generally done or generally forborne or omitted, what would be the probable effect on the general happiness or good?” (_Lectures on Jurisprudence_, vol. i. p. 32.) The question is nothing of the kind. If I am convinced that utility alone const.i.tutes virtue, and if I am meditating any particular act, the sole question of morality must be whether that act is on the whole useful, produces a net result of happiness. To determine this question I must consider both the immediate and the remote consequences of the act; but the latter are not ascertained by asking what would be the result if every one did as I do, but by asking how far, as a matter of fact, my act is likely to produce imitators, or affect the conduct and future acts of others. It may no doubt be convenient and useful to form cla.s.sifications based on the general tendency of different courses to promote or diminish happiness, but such cla.s.sifications cannot alter the morality of particular acts. It is quite clear that no act which produces on the whole more pleasure than pain can on utilitarian principles be vicious. It is, I think, equally clear that no one could act consistently on such a principle without being led to consequences which in the common judgment of mankind are grossly and scandalously immoral.

72 There are some very good remarks on the possibility of living a life of imagination wholly distinct from the life of action in Mr. Bain's _Emotions and Will_, p. 246.

73 Bentham especially recurs to this subject frequently. See Sir J.

Bowring's edition of his works (Edinburgh, 1843), vol. i. pp. 142, 143, 562; vol. x. pp. 549-550.

74 ”Granted that any practice causes more pain to animals than it gives pleasure to man; is that practice moral or immoral? And if exactly in proportion as human beings raise their heads out of the slough of selfishness they do not with one voice answer 'immoral,' let the morality of the principle of utility be for ever condemned.”-Mill's _Dissert_. vol. ii. p. 485. ”We deprive them [animals] of life, and this is justifiable-their pains do not equal our enjoyments. There is a balance of good.”-Bentham's _Deontology_, vol. i. p. 14. Mr.

Mill accordingly defines the principle of utility, without any special reference to man. ”The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility or the great happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”-_Utilitarianism_, pp. 9-10.

75 The exception of course being domestic animals, which may be injured by ill treatment, but even this exception is a very partial one. No selfish reason could prevent any amount of cruelty to animals that were about to be killed, and even in the case of previous ill-usage the calculations of selfishness will depend greatly upon the price of the animal. I have been told that on some parts of the continent diligence horses are systematically under-fed, and worked to a speedy death, their cheapness rendering such a course the most economical.

76 Bentham, as we have seen, is of opinion that the gastronomic pleasure would produce the requisite excess of enjoyment. Hartley, who has some amiable and beautiful remarks on the duty of kindness to animals, without absolutely condemning, speaks with much aversion of the custom of eating ”our brothers and sisters,” the animals.

(_On Man_, vol. ii. pp. 222-223.) Paley, observing that it is quite possible for men to live without flesh-diet, concludes that the only sufficient justification for eating meat is an express divine revelation in the Book of Genesis. (_Moral Philos._ book ii. ch.

11.) Some reasoners evade the main issue by contending that they kill animals because they would otherwise overrun the earth; but this, as Windham said, ”is an indifferent reason for killing fish.”

77 In commenting upon the French licentiousness of the eighteenth century, Hume says, in a pa.s.sage which has excited a great deal of animadversion:-”Our neighbours, it seems, have resolved to sacrifice some of the domestic to the social pleasures; and to prefer ease, freedom, and an open commerce, to strict fidelity and constancy.

These ends are both good, and are somewhat difficult to reconcile; nor must we be surprised if the customs of nations incline too much sometimes to the one side, and sometimes to the other.”-_Dialogue._

78 There are few things more pitiable than the blunders into which writers have fallen when trying to base the plain virtue of chast.i.ty on utilitarian calculations. Thus since the writings of Malthus it has been generally recognised that one of the very first conditions of all material prosperity is to check early marriages, to restrain the tendency of population to multiply more rapidly than the means of subsistence. Knowing this, what can be more deplorable than to find moralists making such arguments as these the very foundation of morals?-”The first and great mischief, and by consequence the guilt, of promiscuous concubinage consists in its tendency to diminish marriages.” (Paley's _Moral Philosophy_, book iii. part iii. ch.

ii.) ”That is always the most happy condition of a nation, and that nation is most accurately obeying the laws of our const.i.tution, in which the number of the human race is most rapidly increasing. Now it is certain that under the law of chast.i.ty, that is, when individuals are exclusively united to each other, the increase of population will be more rapid than under any other circ.u.mstances.”

(Wayland's _Elements of Moral Science_, p. 298, 11th ed., Boston, 1839.) I am sorry to bring such subjects before the reader, but it is impossible to write a history of morals without doing so.

79 See Luther's _Table Talk_.

80 Tillemont, _Mem. pour servir a l'Hist. ecclesiastique_, tome x. p.

57.

81 ?? te ????e?e?? ?a? t? e?e??ete??. (aelian, _Var. Hist._ xii. 59.) Longinus in like manner divides virtue into e?e??es?a ?a? ????e?a.

(_De Sublim._ -- 1.) The opposite view in England is continually expressed in the saying, ”You should never pull down an opinion until you have something to put in its place,” which can only mean, if you are convinced that some religious or other hypothesis is false, you are morally bound to repress or conceal your conviction until you have discovered positive affirmations or explanations as unqualified and consolatory as those you have destroyed.

82 See this powerfully stated by Shaftesbury. (_Inquiry concerning Virtue_, book i. part iii.) The same objection applies to Dr.

Mansel's modification of the theological doctrine-viz. that the origin of morals is not the will but the nature of G.o.d.

83 ”The one great and binding ground of the belief of G.o.d and a hereafter is the law of conscience.”-Coleridge, _Notes Theological and Political_, p. 367. That our moral faculty is our one reason for maintaining the supreme benevolence of the Deity was a favourite position of Kant.