Part 17 (1/2)

”Well, of course, I don't know.”

”Precisely. Neither do I. Therefore I can't say whether that way was a mysterious one or not.”

”It is not even certain that he did leave it,” I remarked, rather recklessly.

”Exactly,” said Mr. Jellicoe. ”And if he did not, he is there still. And if he is there still, he has not disappeared--in the sense understood.

And if he has not disappeared, there is no mystery.”

I laughed heartily, but Mr. Jellicoe preserved a wooden solemnity and continued to examine me through his spectacles (which I, in my turn, inspected and estimated at about minus five dioptres). There was something highly diverting about this grim lawyer, with his dry contentiousness and almost farcical caution. His ostentatious reserve encouraged me to ply him with fresh questions, the more indiscreet the better.

”I suppose,” said I, ”that, under these circ.u.mstances, you would hardly favour Mr. Hurst's proposal to apply for permission to presume death?”

”Under what circ.u.mstances?” he inquired.

”I was referring to the doubt you have expressed as to whether John Bellingham is, after all, really dead.”

”My dear sir,” said he, ”I fail to see your point. If it were certain that the man was alive, it would be impossible to presume that he was dead; and if it were certain that he was dead, presumption of death would still be impossible. You do not presume a certainty. The uncertainty is of the essence of the transaction.”

”But,” I persisted, ”if you really believe that he may be alive, I should hardly have thought that you would take the responsibility of presuming his death and dispersing his property.”

”I don't,” said Mr. Jellicoe. ”I take no responsibility. I act in accordance with the decision of the Court and have no choice in the matter.”

”But the Court may decide that he is dead and he may nevertheless be alive.”

”Not at all. If the Court decides that he is presumably dead, then he is presumably dead. As a mere irrelevant, physical circ.u.mstance he may, it is true, be alive. But legally speaking, and for testamentary purposes, he is dead. You fail to perceive the distinction, no doubt?”

”I am afraid I do,” I admitted.

”Yes; members of your profession usually do. That is what makes them such bad witnesses in a court of law. The scientific outlook is radically different from the legal. The man of science relies on his own knowledge and observation and judgment, and disregards testimony. A man comes to you and tells you he is blind in one eye. Do you accept his statement? Not in the least. You proceed to test his eyesight with some infernal apparatus of coloured gla.s.ses, and you find that he can see perfectly well with both eyes. Then you decide that he is not blind in one eye; that is to say, you reject his testimony in favour of facts of your own ascertaining.”

”But surely that is the rational method of coming to a conclusion?”

”In science, no doubt. Not in law. A court of law must decide according to the evidence which is before it; and that evidence is of the nature of sworn testimony. If a witness is prepared to swear that black is white, and no evidence to the contrary is offered, the evidence before the Court is that black is white, and the Court must decide accordingly.

The judge and the jury may think otherwise--they may even have private knowledge to the contrary--but they have to decide according to the evidence.”

”Do you mean to say that a judge would be justified in giving a decision which he knew privately to be contrary to the facts? Or that he might sentence a man whom he knew to be innocent?”

”Certainly. It has been done. There is a case of a judge who sentenced a man to death and allowed the execution to take place, notwithstanding that he--the judge--had actually seen the murder committed by another man. But that was carrying correctness of procedure to the verge of pedantry.”

”It was, with a vengeance,” I agreed. ”But to return to the case of John Bellingham. Supposing that after the Court has decided that he is dead he should turn up alive? What then?”

”Ah! It would then be his turn to make an application, and the Court, having fresh evidence laid before it, would probably decide that he was alive.”

”And meantime his property would have been dispersed?”

”Probably. But you will observe that the presumption of death would have arisen out of his own proceedings. If a man acts in such a way as to create a belief that he is dead, he must put up with the consequences.”

”Yes, that is reasonable enough,” said I. And then, after a pause, I asked: ”Is there any immediate likelihood of proceedings of the kind being commenced?”