Part 42 (1/2)
[Footnote 958: Published Oxford and London, 1863.]
[Footnote 959: Rhodes, IV, p. 355.]
[Footnote 960: Lutz, _Notes_. Schleiden's despatch, No. 1, 1863. German opinion on the Civil War was divided; Liberal Germany sympathized strongly with the North; while the aristocratic and the landowning cla.s.s stood for the South. The historian Karl Friedrich Neumann wrote a three-volume history of the United States wholly lacking in historical impartiality and strongly condemnatory of the South. (Geschichte der Vereinigten Staaten, Berlin, 1863-66.) This work had much influence on German public opinion. (Lutz, _Notes_.)]
[Footnote 961: _Liberator_, Feb. 20, 1863. Letter of J.P. Jewett to W.L.
Garrison, Jan. 30, 1863. ”The few oligarchs in England who may still sympathize with slavery and the Southern rebels, will be rendered absolutely powerless by these grand and powerful uprisings of THE PEOPLE.”]
[Footnote 962: Duffus, _English Opinion_, p. 51.]
[Footnote 963: Argyll, _Autobiography_, II, pp. 196-7.]
[Footnote 964: Trevelyan, _John Bright_. Facsimile, opp. p. 303. Copy sent by Sunmer to Bright, April, 1863.]
[Footnote 965: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, March 10, 1863. Lyons was slow to favour the emanc.i.p.ation proclamation. The first favourable mention I have found was on July 26, 1864. (Russell Papers. To Russell.) In this view his diplomatic colleagues coincided. Stoeckl, in December, 1863, wrote that slavery was dead in the Central and Border States, and that even in the South its form must be altered if it survived. (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 22-Dec. 4, 1863, No. 3358.) But immediately after the second proclamation of January, 1863, Stoeckl could see no possible good in such measures. If they had been made of universal application it would have been a ”great triumph for the principle of individual liberty,” but as issued they could only mean ”the hope of stirring a servile war in the South.” _(Ibid._, Dec. 24, 1863-Jan. 5, 1864, No. 70.)]
CHAPTER XIII
THE LAIRD RAMS
The building in British ports of Confederate war vessels like the _Alabama_ and the subsequent controversy and arbitration in relation thereto have been exhaustively studied and discussed from every aspect of legal responsibility, diplomatic relations, and principles of international law. There is no need and no purpose here to review in detail these matters. The purpose is, rather, to consider the development and effect at the time of their occurrence of the princ.i.p.al incidents related to Southern s.h.i.+p-building in British yards. The _intention_ of the British Government is of greater importance in this study than the correctness of its action.
Yet it must first be understood that the whole question of a belligerent's right to procure s.h.i.+ps of war or to build them in the ports of neutral nations was, in 1860, still lacking definite application in international law. There were general principles already established that the neutral must not do, nor permit its subjects to do, anything directly in aid of belligerents. The British Foreign Enlistment Act, notification of which had been given in May, 1861, forbade subjects to ”be concerned in the equipping, furnis.h.i.+ng, fitting out, or arming, of any s.h.i.+p or vessel, with intent or in order that such s.h.i.+p or vessel shall be employed in the service ...” of a belligerent, and provided for punishment of individuals and forfeiture of vessels if this prohibition were disobeyed. But the Act also declared that such punishment, or seizure, would follow on due proof of the offence. Here was the weak point of the Act, for in effect if secrecy were maintained by offenders the proof was available only after the offence had been committed and one of the belligerents injured by the violation of the law. Over twenty years earlier the American Government, seeking to prevent its subjects from committing unneutral acts in connection with the Canadian rebellion of 1837, had realized the weakness of its neutrality laws as they then stood, and by a new law of March 10, 1838, hastily pa.s.sed and therefore limited to two years' duration, in the expectation of a more perfect law, but intended as a clearer exposition of neutral duty, had given federal officials power to act and seize _on suspicion_, leaving the proof of guilt or innocence to be determined later. But the British interpretation of her own neutrality laws was that proof was required in advance of seizure--an interpretation wholly in line with the basic principle that a man was innocent until proved guilty, but fatal to that preservation of strict neutrality which Great Britain had so promptly a.s.serted at the beginning of the Civil War[966].
The South wholly lacking a navy or the means to create one, early conceived the idea of using neutral ports for the construction of war vessels. Advice secured from able British lawyers was to the effect that if care were taken to observe the strict letter of the Foreign Enlistment Act, by avoiding warlike equipment, a s.h.i.+p, even though her construction were such as to indicate that she was destined to become a s.h.i.+p of war, might be built by private parties in British yards. The three main points requiring careful observance by the South were concealment of government owners.h.i.+p and destination, no war equipment and no enlistment of crew in British waters.
The princ.i.p.al agent selected by the South to operate on these lines was Captain J.D. Bullock, who a.s.serts in his book descriptive of his work that he never violated British neutrality law and that prevailing legal opinion in England supported him in this view[967]. In March, 1862, the steamer _Oreto_ cleared from Liverpool with a declared destination of ”Palermo, the Mediterranean, and Jamaica.” She was not heard of until three months later when she was reported to be at Na.s.sau completing her equipment as a Southern war vessel. In June, Adams notified Russell ”that a new and still more powerful war-steamer was nearly ready for departure from the port of Liverpool on the same errand[968].” He protested that such s.h.i.+ps violated the neutrality of Great Britain and demanded their stoppage and seizure. From June 23 to July 28, when this second s.h.i.+p, ”No. 290” (later christened the _Alabama_) left Liverpool, Adams and the United States consul at Liverpool, Dudley, were busy in securing evidence and in renewing protests to the Government. To each protest Russell replied in but a few lines that the matter had been referred to the proper departments, and it was not until July 26, when there was received from Adams an opinion by an eminent Queen's Counsel, Collier, that the affidavits submitted were conclusive against the ”290,” that Russell appears to have been seriously concerned. On July 28, the law officers of the Crown were asked for an immediate opinion, and on the thirty-first telegrams were sent to Liverpool and to other ports to stop and further examine the vessel. But the ”290” was well away and outside of British waters[969].
The _Alabama_, having received guns and munitions by a s.h.i.+p, the _Bahama_, sent out from England to that end, and having enlisted in the Confederate Navy most of the British crews of the two vessels, now entered upon a career of destruction of Northern commerce. She was not a privateer, as she was commonly called at the time, but a Government vessel of war specially intended to capture and destroy merchant s.h.i.+ps.
In short her true character, in terms of modern naval usage, was that of a ”commerce destroyer.” Under an able commander, Captain Semmes, she traversed all oceans, captured merchant s.h.i.+ps and after taking coal and stores from them, sank or burnt the captures; for two years she evaded battle with Northern war vessels and spread so wide a fear that an almost wholesale transfer of the flag from American to British or other foreign register took place, in the mercantile marine. The career of the _Alabama_ was followed with increasing anger and chagrin by the North; this, said the public, was a British s.h.i.+p, manned by a British crew, using British guns and ammunition, whose escape from Liverpool had been winked at by the British Government. What further evidence was necessary of bad faith in a professed strict neutrality?
Nor were American officials far behind the public in suspicion and anger. At the last moment it had appeared as if the Government were inclined to stop the ”290.” Was the hurried departure of the vessel due to a warning received from official sources? On November 21, Adams reported that Russell complained in an interview of remarks made privately by Bright, to the effect that warning had come from Russell himself, and ”seemed to me a little as if he suspected that Mr. Bright had heard this from me[970].” Adams disavowed, and sincerely, any such imputation, but at the same time expressed to Russell his conviction that there must have been from some source a ”leak” of the Government's intention[971]. The question of advance warning to Bullock, or to the Lairds who built the _Alabama_, was not one which was likely to be officially put forward in any case; the real issue was whether an offence to British neutrality law had been committed, whether it would be acknowledged as such, and still more important, whether repet.i.tions of the offence would be permitted. The _Alabama_, even though she might, as the American a.s.sistant-secretary of the Navy wrote, be ”giving us a sick turn[972],” could not by herself greatly affect the issue of the war; but many _Alabamas_ would be a serious matter. The belated governmental order to stop the vessel was no a.s.surance for the future since in reply to Adams' protests after her escape, and to a prospective claim for damages, Russell replied that in fact the orders to stop had been given merely for the purpose of further investigation, and that in strict law there had been no neglect of governmental duty[973]. If this were so similar precautions and secrecy would prohibit official interference in the issue from British ports of a whole fleet of Southern war-vessels. Russell might himself feel that a real offence to the North had taken place. He might write, ”I confess the proceedings of that vessel [the _Alabama_] are enough to _rile_ a more temperate nation, and I owe a grudge to the Liverpool people on that account[974],” but this was of no value to the North if the governmental decision was against interference without complete and absolute proof.
It was therefore the concern of the North to find some means of bringing home to the British Ministry the enormity of the offence in American eyes and the serious danger to good relations if such offences were to be continued. An immediate downright threat of war would have been impolitic and would have stirred British pride to the point of resentment. Yet American pride was aroused also and it was required of Seward that he gain the Northern object and yet make no such threat as would involve the two nations in war--a result that would have marked the success of Southern secession. That Seward was able to find the way in which to do this is evidence of that fertility of imagination and gift in expedient which marked his whole career in the diplomacy of the Civil War[975].
In that same month when Adams was beginning his protests on the ”290,”
June, 1862, there had already been drawn the plans, and the contracts made with the Laird Brothers at Liverpool, for the building of two vessels far more dangerous than the _Alabama_ to the Northern cause.
These were the so-called Laird Rams. They were to be two hundred and thirty feet long, have a beam of forty feet, be armoured with four and one-half inch iron plate and be provided with a ”piercer” at the prow, about seven feet long and of great strength. This ”piercer” caused the s.h.i.+ps to be spoken of as rams, and when the vessels were fully equipped it was expected the ”piercer” would be three feet under the surface of the water. This was the distinguis.h.i.+ng feature of the two s.h.i.+ps; it was unusual construction, nearly impossible of use in an ordinary battle at sea, but highly dangerous to wooden s.h.i.+ps maintaining a close blockade at some Southern port. While there was much newspaper comment in England that the vessels were ”new _Alabamas_,” and in America that they were ”floating fortresses,” suitable for attack upon defenceless Northern cities, their primary purpose was to break up the blockading squadrons[976].
Shortly before the escape of the _Alabama_ and at a time when there was but little hope the British Government would seize her and shortly after the news was received in Was.h.i.+ngton that still other vessels were planned for building in the Lairds' yards, a Bill was introduced in Congress authorizing the President to issue letters of marque and privateering. This was in July, 1862, and on the twelfth, Seward wrote to Adams of the proposed measure specifying that the purpose was to permit privateers to seek for and capture or destroy the _Alabama_ or other vessels of a like type. He characterized this as a plan ”to organize the militia of the seas by issuing letters of marque and reprisal[977].” Neither here nor at any time did Seward or Adams allege in diplomatic correspondence any other purpose than the pursuit of _Alabamas_, nor is it presumable that in July, 1862, the construction plans of the Rams were sufficiently well known to the North to warrant a conclusion that the later purpose of the proposed privateering fleet was _at first_ quite other than the alleged purpose. Probably the Bill introduced in July, 1862, was but a hasty reaction to the sailing of the _Oreto_ (or _Florida_) and to the failure of early protests in the case of the _Alabama_. Moreover there had been an earlier newspaper agitation for an increase of naval power by the creation of a ”militia of the seas,” though with no clear conception of definite objects to be attained. This agitation was now renewed and reinforced and many public speeches made by a General Hiram Wallbridge, who had long advocated an organization of the mercantile marine as an a.s.set in times of war[978].
But though introduced in the summer of 1862, the ”privateering bill” was not seriously taken up until February, 1863.
In the Senate discussion of the Bill at the time of introduction, Senator Grimes, its sponsor, declared that the object was to encourage privateers to pursue British s.h.i.+ps when, as was expected, they should ”turn Confederate.” Sumner objected that the true business of privateers was to destroy enemy commerce and that the South had no such _bona fide_ commerce. Grimes agreed that this was his opinion also, but explained that the administration wanted the measure pa.s.sed so that it might have in its hands a power to be used if the need arose. The general opinion of the Senate was opposed and the matter was permitted to lapse, but without definite action, so that it could at any time be called up again[979]. Six months later the progress of construction and the purpose of the rams at Liverpool were common knowledge. On January 7, 1863, the privateering bill again came before the Senate, was referred to the committee on naval affairs, reported out, and on February 17 was pa.s.sed and sent to the House of Representatives, where on March 2 it was given a third reading and pa.s.sed without debate[980]. In the Senate, Grimes now clearly stated that the Bill was needed because the Confederates ”are now building in England a fleet of vessels designed to break our blockade of their coast,” and that the privateers were to ”a.s.sist in maintaining blockades.” There was no thorough debate but a few perfunctory objections were raised to placing so great a power in the hands of the President, while Sumner alone appears as a consistent opponent arguing that the issue of privateers would be dangerous to the North since it might lead to an unwarranted interference with neutral commerce. No speaker outlined the exact method by which privateers were to be used in ”maintaining blockades”; the bill was pa.s.sed as an ”administration measure.”
Coincidently, but as yet unknown in Was.h.i.+ngton, the chagrin of Russell at the escape of the _Alabama_ had somewhat lost its edge. At first he had been impressed with the necessity of amending the Foreign Enlistment Act so as to prevent similar offences and had gained the approval of the law officers of the Crown. Russell had even offered to take up with America an agreement by which both countries were to amend their neutrality laws at the same moment. This was in December, 1862, but now on February 14, 1863, he wrote to Lyons that the project of amendment had been abandoned as the Cabinet saw no way of improving the law[981].
While this letter to Lyons was on its way to America, a letter from Seward was _en route_, explaining to Adams the meaning of the privateering bill.