Part 29 (1/2)

[Footnote 652: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVII, p. 810.]

[Footnote 653: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, June 21, 1862.]

CONTENTS OF VOLUME TWO

CHAPTER PAGE X. KING COTTON . . . . . . . . . . 1 XI. RUSSELL'S MEDIATION PLAN . . . . . . 33 XII. THE EMANc.i.p.aTION PROCLAMATION . . . . 75 XIII. THE LAIRD RAMS . . . . . . . . . 116 XIV. ROEBUCK'S MOTION . . . . . . . . 152 XV. THE SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE a.s.sOCIATION . 186 XVI. BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE SOUTH . . . 219 XVII. THE END OF THE WAR . . . . . . . . 247 XVIII. THE KEY-NOTE OF BRITISH ATt.i.tUDE . . . 274 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . 307

LIST OF ILl.u.s.tRATIONS

PART TWO

PROFESSOR GOLDWIN SMITH . . . . . . . . _Frontispiece_ _From a photograph by Elliott & Fry, Ltd_.

JOHN SLIDELL . . . . . . . . . . . _facing p. 24_ _From Nicolay and Hay's ”Life of Abraham Lincoln,” by permission of the Century Co., New York._

”ABE LINCOLN'S LAST CARD” . . . . . . . ” 102 _Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of ”Punch_”

WILLIAM EDWARD FORSTER (1851) . . . . . . ” 134 _From Reid's ”Life of Forster” (Chapman & Hall, Ltd._)

”THE AMERICAN GLADIATORS--HABET!” . . . . ” 248 _Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of ”Punch_”

”BRITANNIA SYMPATHIZES WITH COLUMBIA” . . . ” 262 _Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of ”Punch_”

JOHN BRIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . ” 294 _From Trevelyan's ”Life of John Bright”

(Constable & Co., Ltd_.)

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

CHAPTER X

KING COTTON

For two weeks there was no lightening of Southern depression in England.

But on June 28 McClellan had been turned back from his advance on Richmond by Lee, the new commander of the Army of Virginia, and the much heralded Peninsular campaign was recognized to have been a disastrous failure. Earlier Northern victories were forgotten and the campaigns in the West, still progressing favourably for the North, were ignored or their significance not understood. Again, to English eyes, the war in America approached a stalemate. The time had come with the near adjournment of Parliament when, if ever, a strong Southern effort must be made, and the time seemed propitious. Moreover by July, 1862, it was hoped that soon, in the cotton districts, the depression steadily increasing since the beginning of the war, would bring an ally to the Southern cause. Before continuing the story of Parliamentary and private efforts by the friends of the South it is here necessary to review the cotton situation--now rapidly becoming a matter of anxious concern to both friend and foe of the North and in less degree to the Ministry itself.

”King Cotton” had long been a boast with the South. ”Perhaps no great revolution,” says Bancroft, ”was ever begun with such convenient and soothing theories as those that were expounded and believed at the time of the organization of the Confederacy.... In any case, hostilities could not last long, for France and Great Britain must have what the Confederacy alone could supply, and therefore they could be forced to aid the South, as a condition precedent to relief from the terrible distress that was sure to follow a blockade[654].” This confidence was no new development. For ten years past whenever Southern threats of secession had been indulged in, the writers and politicians of that section had expanded upon cotton as the one great wealth-producing industry of America and as the one product which would compel European acquiescence in American policy, whether of the Union, before 1860, or of the South if she should secede. In the financial depression that swept the Northern States in 1857 _De Bow's Review_, the leading financial journal of the South, declared: ”The wealth of the South is permanent and real, that of the North fugitive and fict.i.tious. Events now transpiring expose the fiction, as humbug after humbug explodes[655].” On March 4, 1858, Senator Hammond of South Carolina, asked in a speech, ”What would happen if no cotton was furnished for three years? I will not stop to depict what everyone can imagine, but this is certain: England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her save the South. No, you dare not make war on cotton. No power on earth dares make war upon it. Cotton _is_ King[656].” Two years later, writing before the elections of 1860 in which the main question was that of the territorial expansion of slavery, this same Southern statesman expressed himself as believing that ”the slave-holding South is now the controlling power of the world.... Cotton, rice, tobacco and naval stores command the world; and we have sense enough to know it, and are sufficiently Teutonic to carry it out successfully[657].”

These quotations indicative of Southern faith in cotton might be amplified and repeated from a hundred sources.

Moreover this faith in the possession of ultimate power went hand in hand with the conviction that the South, more than any other quarter of the world, produced to the benefit of mankind. ”In the three million bags of cotton,” said a writer in _De Bow's Review_, ”the slave-labour annually throws upon the world for the poor and naked, we are doing more to advance civilization ... than all the canting philanthropists of New England and Old England will do in centuries. Slavery is the backbone of the Northern commercial as it is of the British manufacturing system[658]....” Nor was this idea unfamiliar to Englishmen. Before the Civil War was under way Charles Greville wrote to Clarendon:

”Any war will be almost sure to interfere with the cotton crops, and this is really what affects us and what we care about. With all our virulent abuse of slavery and slave-owners, and our continual self-laudation on that subject, we are just as anxious for, and as much interested in, the prosperity of the slavery interest in the Southern States as the Carolinan and Georgian planters themselves, and all Lancas.h.i.+re would deplore a successful insurrection of the slaves, if such a thing were possible[659].”

On December 20, 1860, South Carolina led the march in secession.

Fifteen days earlier the British consul at Charleston, Bunch, reported a conversation with Rhett, long a leader of the Southern cause and now a consistent advocate of secession, in which Rhett developed a plan of close commercial alliance with England as the most favoured nation, postulating the dependence of Great Britain on the South for cotton--”upon which supposed axiom, I would remark,” wrote Bunch, ”all their calculations are based[660].” Such was, indeed, Southern calculation. In January, 1861, _De Bow's Review_ contained an article declaring that ”the first demonstration of blockade of the Southern ports would be swept away by the English fleets of observation hovering on the Southern coasts, to protect English commerce, and especially the free flow of cotton to English and French factories.... A stoppage of the raw material ... would produce the most disastrous political results--if not a revolution in England. This is the language of English statesmen, manufacturers, and merchants, in Parliament and at cotton a.s.sociations' debates, and it discloses the truth[661].”

The historical student will find but few such British utterances at the moment, and these few not by men of great weight either in politics or in commerce. The South was labouring under an obsession and prophesied results accordingly. So strong was this obsession that governmental foreign policy neglected all other considerations and the first Commission to Europe had no initial instructions save to demand recognition[662]. The failure of that Commission, the prompt British acquiescence in the blockade, were harsh blows to Southern confidence but did not for a long time destroy the faith in the power of cotton. In June, 1861, Bunch wrote that there was still a firm belief that ”Great Britain will make any sacrifice, even of principle or of honour, to prevent the stoppage of the supply of cotton,” and he enclosed a copy of an article in the _Charleston Mercury_ of June 4, proclaiming: ”The cards are in our hands, and we intend to play them out to _the bankruptcy of every cotton factory in Great Britain and France, or the acknowledgment of our independence_[663].” As late as March, 1862, Bunch was still writing of this Southern faith in cotton and described the newly-made appointment of Benjamin as Secretary of State as partly due to the fact that he was the leader of the ”King Cotton” theory of diplomacy[664]. It was not until the war was well nigh over that British persistence in neutrality, in spite of undoubted hards.h.i.+ps caused by the lack of cotton, opened Southern eyes. Pollard, editor of a leading Richmond newspaper, and soon unfriendly to the administration of Jefferson Davis, summed up in _The Lost Cause_ his earlier criticisms of Confederate foreign policy: