Part 22 (2/2)
”All orders and decrees of the President, including those affecting the country's armed forces, require for their validity to be countersigned by the Chancellor or the competent minister. The official who countersigns accepts thereby the responsibility for the order or decree in question.”
A similar provision in the American const.i.tution would be of no importance, for the members of the cabinet are not responsible to either the people or the Congress for their acts. Once appointed, there is no way of getting rid of them against the will of the President, no matter how inefficient or even harmful they may be to the best interests of the country. The German const.i.tution confers much more effective power upon the people and the people's representatives. Its article 54 provides:
”The Chancellor and the ministers of the Reich require the confidence of the Reichstag for the conduct of their offices.
Any one of them must resign if the Reichstag, by express decision, withdraws its confidence from him.”
It is readily apparent that the President's powers are greatly limited by these two articles. As against a hostile Reichstag he is all but powerless. The Chancellor or other member of the government required to countersign orders or decrees knows in advance that such countersigning means his own official suicide if the matter be one in which a majority of the Reichstag is at odds with the President. It is apparent from a study of the proceedings of the National a.s.sembly and its const.i.tutional committee that it was intended to give the President independent powers in respect of two important matters--the dissolution of the Reichstag and the suspensive veto by appeal to the people--but article 50 says unqualifiedly that ”all” orders and decrees must be countersigned.
The legislative functions of the Reich are vested in the Reichstag and the Reichsrat, or Council of the Reich, which succeeds the Federal Council of the monarchy. The members of the Reichstag are elected by direct vote of the people for a term of four years, after the proportional election system. The Reichstag must convene for the first time not later than thirty days after the election, which must be held on a Sunday or a public holiday, and the election for the succeeding Reichstag must be held within sixty days from the date of the expiration or dissolution of the preceding one. It convenes regularly on the first Wednesday of every November. The President of the Reichstag must call an extraordinary session at the demand of the President of the Reich or when a third of the members of the Reichstag itself demand it.
All the const.i.tution's provisions regarding the Reichstag indicate the determination of the framers of the instrument to make it a thoroughly representative, independent body of great dignity. The deputies are clothed with more far-reaching immunities than is the case in most countries, and in addition to that there is a specific provision extending to them the right to refuse to reveal, even in court proceedings, any matters communicated to them in their capacity as members of the Reichstag.
There is a provision for a standing committee on foreign affairs, which may hold sessions at any time and holds office after the expiration of the members' terms or after dissolution of the Reichstag until the succeeding Reichstag convenes. It is expressly provided that the sessions of this committee shall not be public unless two-thirds of the members vote at any particular time to hold a public session. This provision, adopted by a body, the majority of whose members were outspoken opponents of secret diplomacy, is not without interest. It would seem to be a tacit admission that preliminary negotiations between nations cannot always be carried on advantageously in public.
The Federal Council was, under the monarchy, the chief bulwark of the princes, whose representatives, not the people's, its members were.[72]
In the new Reichsrat, the successor of the Federal Council, the various lands are represented ”by members of their governments.”[73] These are the cabinet ministers of the respective states. The Weimar const.i.tution provides that such ministers shall be directly responsible to the diets of their respective lands, in like manner as the members of the federal government are responsible to the Reichstag. Hence, although chosen indirectly, being named, as under the imperial const.i.tution, by their respective state governments, they are nevertheless subject to constant, effective control by the people's representatives, who can remove them at any time by a simple vote of lack of confidence.
[72] _Vide_ p. 22.
[73] Weimar const.i.tution, art. 63.
Each state is ent.i.tled to send at least one representative to the Reichsrat. The larger states are ent.i.tled to one representative for each 700,000 inhabitants, and a remainder of at least 350,000 ent.i.tles them to one additional member. It is provided, however, that Prussia may not have more than two-fifths of the entire number of representatives.[74]
The Reichsrat consists of sixty-six members, apportioned as follows:
Prussia, 26; Bavaria, 10; Saxony, 7; Wurtemberg, 4; Baden, 3; Thuringia, 2; Hesse, 2; Hamburg, 2; Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 1; Oldenburg, 1; Brunswick, 1; Anhalt, 1; Bremen, 1; Lippe, 1; Lubeck, 1; Mecklenburg-Strelitz, 1; Waldeck, 1; Schaumburg-Lippe, 1.
[74] Original drafts of the const.i.tution, as well as the provisional const.i.tution adopted in February, provided that no state should have more than one-third of the total number.
Prussia, with four-sevenths of the total population of Germany, successfully opposed this attempt to reduce her representation so disproportionately. She was, however, compelled to accept a provision that half her representatives should be appointed by the state government and the other half by the provincial governments. In the other lands the state government appoints all the representatives.
The fifth section of the const.i.tution containing articles 68 to 77 inclusive, is devoted to the legislative functions of the Reich. Article 68 reads:
”Bills are proposed by the government of the Reich[75] or by the members of the Reichstag.
[75] ”The government of the Reich” or ”the Reich government”
means the Chancellor and all the ministers of his cabinet.
”The laws of the Reich are enacted by the Reichstag.”
While the Reichsrat cannot directly propose legislative measures, however, it can compel the government to submit to the Reichstag measures drafted by it. If the government be in disagreement with the Reichsrat, it must accompany its submission with a statement of its att.i.tude toward the measure in question. The Reichsrat, while it cannot take any positive part in enacting legislation, has the right to vote disapproval of any measure enacted by the Reichstag, and such disapproval acts as a suspensive veto. In such case, the measure goes back to the Reichstag. If the Reichstag reenacts it by a two-thirds majority, the President of the Reich must duly proclaim the law within three months or else order a popular referendum. If a smaller majority than two-thirds again votes in favor of the measure, the President may order a referendum within three months thereafter. If he fail to do this, the measure is lost.[76]
[76] This seems to be the sole instance in which the President possesses any real, independent power. In such a case it would be possible for him to ally himself with the Reichsrat against both Reichstag and government, for he cannot be compelled to order a referendum.
The express approval by the Reichsrat of proposed legislation is not required for its enactment. It must express its disapproval within two weeks after an act has been pa.s.sed finally by the Reichstag; if it fail to do so, the act becomes law.
One is again impressed by the importance a.s.signed to the Reichstag, the direct creation of the people. The national government is responsible to it, as is also the President through the provision that all his decrees must be countersigned by a member of the government. A two-thirds majority of the Reichstag can overrule the Reichsrat, and the same number can impeach the President or any member of the government, or even submit directly to the people the question as to whether the President shall be recalled. Its decision to hold such a referendum automatically inhibits the President from exercising any of the functions of his office.
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