Part 10 (2/2)

At the request of the government Noske a.s.sumed the post of Governor of Kiel. Order was restored. The relations between the mutineers and their former officers were strikingly good. The spirit of the Majority Socialists prevailed. Not until the Berlin revolution had put the seal upon their work did the mutineers of Kiel realize that it was they who had started the revolution.

CHAPTER X.

The Revolution Reaches Berlin.

The first news of the Kiel revolt reached Berlin on November 5th, when the morning papers published a half-column article giving a fairly accurate story of the happenings of Sunday, November 3d. The report ended:

”By eight o'clock the street” (Karlstra.s.se, where the firing occurred) ”was clear. Only a few pools of blood and numerous shattered windows in the nearby buildings gave evidence that there had been sad happenings here. The late evening and the night were quiet. Excited groups stood about the street corners until midnight, but they remained pa.s.sive. Reinforced patrols pa.s.sed through the city, which otherwise appeared as usual. All public places are open and the performances in the theaters were not interrupted.”

The papers of the following day announced that ”official reports concerning the further course of events in Kiel and other cities in North Germany had not been made public here up to noon. We are thus for the moment unable to give a report concerning them.”

This was but half the truth. The capital was already filled with reports, and the government was by this time fully informed of what was going on. Rumors and travelers' tales pa.s.sed from mouth to mouth, but even yet the movement was not considered directly revolutionary, nor, indeed, was it revolutionary, although it became so within the next twenty-four hours. The executive committee of the German Federation of Labor published a declaration regarding ”the recent spreading of anonymous handbills summoning laborers to strikes and disorders for political ends.” It was also reported by the press that Kurt Eisner, who had been released from prison by the October amnesty, had made a violent revolutionary speech at a meeting of the Independent Socialists in Munich. A further significant newspaper item complained of the distribution in Germany of vast quant.i.ties of revolutionary literature printed in Sweden and Denmark and smuggled across the Danish border.

Joffe, convicted of abusing his privileges as a diplomat and of lying, had been escorted to a special train, together with his staff, and headed for Russia. With him went the Berlin representatives of the Rosta Telegraph Agency. But it was too late. Not only had the mischief already been done, but the loyalist Germans had also been disgusted with the government's timorous failure to grasp this nettle earlier and the Independent Socialists and their Spartacan soul-brothers were still further enraged, if possible, by the expulsion and the manner in which it was carried out.

It is doubtful whether the government even yet realized that it had an embryo revolution to deal with. A more h.o.m.ogeneous government, composed of men with executive as well as legislative experience, would have realized it, but h.o.m.ogeneity and executive experience were sadly lacking in this cabinet. It is significant that the experienced men at the head of the political police had already begun preparations to crush any uprising and had burned certain archives which they did not desire to have fall into the hands of revolutionary elements. The government was also embarra.s.sed by the uncertain att.i.tude of the Majority Socialists.

Ostensibly these did not desire the overthrow of the monarchy, but merely of the Kaiser; Scheidemann had declared in so many words that his party, despite the fact that it had always striven for an eventual republic, was willing to wait for such a development and was for the present not opposed to the maintaining of a const.i.tutional monarchy. As late as November 8th Scheidemann told von Payer that the Socialists did not insist on the abolition of the monarchy.

There were even Socialists who did not desire the Kaiser's abdication.

Herr Marum, a Socialist member of the Baden Diet, in a speech at the end of October, had warned his hearers that any attempt to depose the Kaiser would bring chaos and imperil the state. He declared that the overwhelming majority of Germans were still monarchists, and although the Socialists were advocates of a republic, that question was now subordinate. The Kaiser, said Marum, had, in common with all Germans, learned much, and it would be a great risk to try to force a republic upon an unwilling majority. Dr. Dietz, a Socialist city councillor, seconded Marum, and expressed indignation at any efforts to make a scapegoat of the Kaiser.

The Wednesday evening papers published a note from Lansing, wherein it was stated that the allied nations accepted Wilson's fourteen points of January 8, 1918, and the supplementary points enunciated in the Mount Vernon speech, except that relating to the freedom of the seas. The German delegation ”for the conclusion of an armistice and to begin peace negotiations” left Berlin for the west. It was composed of General von Gundell, General von Winterfeldt, Admiral Meurer and Admiral von Hintze.

Thursday, November 7th, brought more rea.s.suring news from Kiel. The official Wolff Bureau reported:

”The military protection of the Baltic by the marine is completely reestablished. All departing wars.h.i.+ps carry the war-flag. The movement among the sailors and workmen has taken a quieter course. The soldiers of the garrison are endeavoring to take measures against violations of order. A gradual general surrender of weapons is proceeding. Private houses and business places, as well as lazarets and hospitals, are unmolested.

Nearly all banks are doing business. The provisioning in the barracks and on the s.h.i.+ps is being carried out in the usual manner. The furnis.h.i.+ng of provisions to the civilian population has not been interfered with. The strike at the factories continues. The people are quiet.”

Reports from other coast cities were less favorable. Wolff reported:

”In Hamburg there is a strike in the factories. Breaches of discipline and violent excesses have occurred. The same is reported from Lubeck. Except for excesses in certain works, private property has not been damaged nor touched. The population is in no danger.”

Chancellor Prince Max issued a proclamation, declaring that Germany's enemies had accepted Wilson's program, except as to the freedom of the seas. ”This,” he said, ”forms the necessary preliminary condition for peace negotiations and at the same time for armistice negotiations.” He declared that a delegation had already been sent to the west front, but ”the successful conduct of negotiations is gravely jeopardized by disturbances and undisciplined conduct.” The Chancellor recalled the privations endured by the people for more than four years and appealed to them to hold out a little longer and maintain order.

The situation was, however, already lost. If Scheidemann, Ebert and their fellow members in the central committee of the Majority Socialist organization had had their followers in hand the revolution could probably still have been prevented, or at least transformed into an orderly dethroning of the Kaiser and inst.i.tution of parliamentary reforms. But they did not have them in hand, and the result was that _Vorwarts_, the party's central organ, published in its morning issue a further demand for the Kaiser's abdication. _Vorwarts_ declared that his sufferings could not be compared to those of most German fathers and that the sacrifice he was called upon to make was comparatively small.

The appearance of this article was followed a few hours later by an ultimatum to the government, demanding that the Kaiser abdicate within twenty-four hours and declaring that if he failed to do so, the Socialists would withdraw from the government. It is probable that Scheidemann, Ebert and some of the other leaders of the party presented the ultimatum with reluctance, realizing what it would involve, but they were helpless in the face of the sentiment of the ma.s.s of their party and of the att.i.tude of the Independent Socialists.

The att.i.tude of the Kaiser toward abdication was already known to them.

Following Scheidemann's demand a week earlier, Dr. Drews, the Minister of the Interior, had submitted the demand to the Kaiser. Scheidemann had declared that, if the Kaiser did not abdicate, the Independent Socialists would demand the introduction of a republic, in which case the Majority Socialists would be compelled to make common cause with them. The Kaiser, doubtless still convinced of the loyalty of the troops, was not moved by Drews's report. He declared that his abdication would mean complete anarchy and the delivering of Germany into the hands of the Bolsheviki. He could not accept the responsibility for such a step. That Scheidemann and Ebert, although they were cognizant of the Kaiser's att.i.tude, consented to Thursday's ultimatum gives color to a report that informal negotiations had in the meantime been carried on between them and certain Independent leaders.[28]

[28] These negotiations had nothing to do with a revolution as such, nor with the formation of soviets. It must be emphasized that the Majority Socialists still had no part in these plans and were themselves surprised by the events of Friday evening and Sat.u.r.day.

Revolution was now fairly on the march. The Independent Socialists and Liebknecht's Spartacans were already endeavoring to form a Workmen's and Soldiers' Council for Greater Berlin. General von Linsingen, commander in the Marches, made a last desperate attempt to forbid the revolution by issuing the following decree:

”In certain quarters there exists the purpose to form Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils after the Russian pattern, in disregard of the provisions of the laws.

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