Part 7 (2/2)

Captain von Bruninghaus of the Admiralty reported that the U-boats were sinking much more tonnage than was being built, and that the losses of submarines were much smaller than those reported by the enemy.

The tone of the aged Chancellor's speech was such that his words carried no conviction. The war-weary, discouraged people could not but see in them an admission that all was lost.

And then came a blow that was felt by everybody. Bulgaria surrendered.

The first breach had been made in the alliance of the Central Powers; the collapse had begun and its significance was plain to the humblest German. Bulgaria's defection came as no surprise to the government, which had known for nearly a week that such an event was at least probable. On September 23d, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria had summoned a grand council to consider the situation. The result was that a formal demand was made on Berlin and Vienna for immediate a.s.sistance. Germany and Austria recognized the urgency of the situation, but they were unable to meet Bulgaria's demands. Both governments promised help in the near future and besought King Ferdinand to keep up the struggle for a short time.

The King realized the emptiness of these promises. There was, moreover, a powerful personal dynastic interest at stake. Revolution of the reddest type already threatened his crown. Workmen and soldiers were organizing soviets in Sofia on the familiar Bolshevik plan, and riotous demonstrations had been held in front of the royal palace. Help from Berlin and Vienna was obviously out of the question. Ferdinand turned to the Entente.

The negotiations were brief. Bulgaria surrendered unconditionally. Her railways and all other means of transportation were handed over to the Allies to be used for military or any other purposes. All strategic points in the kingdom were likewise given into the control of Germany's enemies, and Bulgaria undertook to withdraw immediately all her troops from Greece and Serbia and disarm them.

As an ally Bulgaria had long ceased to play a decisive part in Germany's military operations, but her surrender, apart from its moral effect, was nevertheless disastrous for Germany. General Mackensen's army suddenly found itself in a hostile land, with its route of retreat threatened.

Thousands of German locomotives and cars, badly needed at home, stood on tracks now handed over to the control of Germany's enemies.

Worst of all, completed enemy occupation of Bulgaria meant the isolation of Germany from another ally, for the only route to Constantinople ran through Bulgaria. The days of the Balkan Express, whose initial trip had been acclaimed as the inauguration of what would some day become the Berlin-to-Bagdad line, were numbered. Turkey, isolated, would no longer be able to carry on the war, and reports were already current that Turkey would follow Bulgaria's example. British troops were but a few miles from Damascus, and Bonar Law, reporting in a speech at Guildhall the surrender of Bulgaria, added:

”There is also something in connection with Turkey which I cannot say, but which we can all think.”

Uneasy rumors that Austria was also about to follow the lead of Bulgaria spread through Germany.

The Kaiser, wiser than his reactionary advisers, issued on the last day of September a proclamation, in which he declared it to be his will that ”the German people shall henceforth more effectively cooperate in deciding the destinies of the Fatherland.”

But the destinies of the Fatherland had already been decided by other than political forces. The iron wall in the West that had for more than four years withstood the shocks of the armies of a great part of the civilized world was disintegrating or bending back. In the North the Belgians, fighting on open ground, were encircling Roulers, lying on the railway connecting Lille with the German submarine bases in Zeebrugge and Ostende, and another junction on this important route, Menin, was menaced by the British. Unless the enemy could be stopped here, all the railways in the important triangle of Lille, Ghent, and Bruges must soon be lost, and their loss meant the end of the U-boats as an important factor in the war.

To the north and west of Cambrai the British, only a mile from the center of the city, were forcing their way forward relentlessly, and the French were closing in from the south on the doomed city, which was in flames. British and American troops were advancing steadily on St.

Quentin and the French were approaching from the south. The American forces between the Argonnes and the Meuse were moving ahead, but slowly, for the Germans had weakened their lines elsewhere in order to concentrate heavy forces against the men from across the sea.

Count Hertling confessed political s.h.i.+pwreck by resigning the chancellors.h.i.+p. With him went Vice Chancellor von Payer and Foreign Minister von Hintze. The Kaiser asked Prince Max (Maximilian), heir to the throne of the Grand Duchy of Baden, to accept the post. He complied.

The choice of Prince Max was plainly a concession to and an acknowledgement of the fact that Germany had become overwhelmingly democratic, and it was at the same time a virtual confession that the military situation was desperate and that peace must soon be sought.

Baden had always been one of the most democratic of the German federal states, and the Prince was, despite his rank, a decidedly democratic man. In the first years of the war he had distinguished himself as a humane enemy, and had well earned the tribute paid to him by Amba.s.sador James W. Gerard in the Amba.s.sador's book, _My Four Years in Germany_.

This tribute was paid in connection with a proposal to place Prince Max at the head of a central organization for prisoners of war in Germany.

The appointment, said Gerard, would have redounded to the benefit of Germany and the prisoners.

Prince Max had for some years been recognized as the leader of the Delbruck group of moderates, and his name had been considered for the chancellors.h.i.+p when Dr. Michaelis resigned. That he was not then appointed was due chiefly to his own reluctance, based upon dynastic reasons. He had never been in sympathy with _Schrecklichkeit_ in any of its manifestations, and was known to be out of sympathy with the ruling caste in Prussia. Early in 1918 he had made public a semi-official interview outlining his ideas as to what Germany's peace terms should be. These were in general in accordance with the resolution of the majority _bloc_ of the Reichstag of July 19, 1917, and condemned all annexations of foreign territory and all punitive indemnities. He declared also that the interests of Europe and America would be best served by a peace which should not disrupt the Anglo-Saxon-Teutonic peoples, since Germany must be maintained as a bulwark against the spread of Bolshevism to the nations westward. The conclusion seems justified that the government believed that Prince Max, uncompromised and with known democratic leanings, could secure a more favorable peace for Germany than any other man who could be named.

And the government knew that peace must be had. It had heard so on October 2, the day before Prince Max's appointment, from the lips of a man who brought a message from Hindenburg and Ludendorff. What had long been feared had become a reality--an armistice must be requested. The bearer of these calamitous tidings was Major von Busche. Word had been sent that he was coming, and the leaders of the various Reichstag parties a.s.sembled to hear his message. Nominally the message came from Hindenburg, as commander-in-chief, but really it was Ludendorff speaking through Hindenburg and his emissary.

The message was brief; Hindenburg, said Major von Busche, had become convinced that a request for an armistice must be made. The General Field Marshal had declared, however, that if the request should be refused, or if dishonoring conditions should be imposed, the fight must and could go on. He had no intention of throwing his rifle into the ditch. If necessary, Germany could continue fighting in enemy territory for months. Von Busche did not admit in so many words that all hope of an eventual victory had been lost, but that was the effect of his message.

The men who heard from the highest military authorities in this blunt manner that the situation was even worse than they had feared were dumfounded. If Hindenburg and Ludendorff had given up, there was nothing to be said. It was decided to ask for an armistice.

Prince Max was inclined to refuse to become Imperial Chancellor if it meant that his first act must be a confession of the impossibility of carrying on the war longer--for that, he perceived clearly, would be the natural and logical deduction from a request for an armistice. He particularly disapproved of making the request as the first act of his chancellors.h.i.+p. This, he pointed out, would give a needless appearance of desperate haste and increase the depressing effect of the action, which would in any event be serious enough.

Prince Max's att.i.tude at this crisis was explained by him in an article in the _Preussische Jahrbucher_ following the armistice. He wrote then:

”My peace policy was gravely hampered by the request for an armistice, which was presented to me completely formulated when I reached Berlin. I opposed it on practical political grounds.

It seemed to me to be a great mistake to permit the new government's first step toward peace to be followed by such a surprising confession of German weakness. Neither our own people nor the enemy countries estimated our military situation to be such that a desperate step of this kind was necessary. I made a counter-proposal. The government should as its first act draw up a detailed program of its war-aims, and this program should demonstrate to the whole world our agreement with Wilson's principles and our honest willingness to make heavy national sacrifices for these principles.

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