Part 30 (1/2)

”Mr. Stanly: 'I charge the official reporters not to let his (Mr.

Giddings') felonious hand touch one word of what I say, for we know how he on a former occasion misrepresented my colleague from the Orange district, and his own colleague from the Chillicothe district, having altered his own speech after he got to his room with his coloured friends. (Laughter.) He talks about my a.s.sociates: but has anybody ever seen him in private decent company? Free negroes may call to see him. He does not let his right hand know what his left doeth. He alludes to my absence; but I have not set myself up as a standard. I don't say I'm always in the house as I ought to be. He says we were here drinking our grog during Christmas times. Where was he? In Philadelphia, drinking beer and eating oysters with free negroes. (Laughter.) Which was the best off? Judge ye. (Laughter.) He thinks he was better off than we were. [Mr. Stanly paused, and, looking towards Mr. Preston King, who was standing near Sir. Giddings, remarked, raising his voice to a higher pitch, ”Help him out; he needs a little more poison.” (Voices, ”Ha, ha!

Good! Ha, ha!”)] I quit this subject in disgust. I find that I have been in a dissecting-room, cutting up a dead dog. I will treat him as an insane man, who was never taught the decencies of life, proprieties of conduct--whose a.s.sociations show that he never mingled with gentlemen.

Let him rave on till doomsday.'

”The conversation then ceased.”

Any one who has seen much of American gentlemen, must know that such language as the above contains would be reprobated by them fully as strongly as by any gentleman in this country. To doubt that would be to do them a gross injustice. Does not, therefore, the recurrence of such scenes go far to prove, that the advance of ultra-democratic principles has the effect of lowering the tone of the Representative Chamber, and that men of liberal education and gentlemanly bearing do not const.i.tute the majority in that House? In the days of Was.h.i.+ngton, would any member have dared to use, or would any other member have for a moment tolerated, such language? It is but justice to say, that the tone of the Senate Chamber is far more dignified; and many who have been members of that body have established a world-wide reputation both as orators and statesmen.

Let us now turn for a few minutes to that important subject, the Judiciary of the States, one peculiar feature of which is, its being a co-ordinate branch of the Legislature. The Supreme Court of the United States is the highest tribunal in the country; it consists of a Chief Justice and eight a.s.sociate Justices, the Attorney-General, a reporter, and a clerk. All questions affecting foreign amba.s.sadors, consuls, &c., are tried before this court; and it is a final court of appeal in cases involving const.i.tutional questions, and various others, too long to enumerate here. It has even the power of annulling the acts of the Federal Congress at Was.h.i.+ngton, if such acts are contrary to the Const.i.tution.

The following article in the Const.i.tution regulates the terms upon which alone any change may be made, and which is of so peculiar and conservative a character that I insert it in full:--

”ARTICLE V.--_Power of Amendment_.

”The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Const.i.tution, or, on the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Const.i.tution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress; provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article, and that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.”

The foregoing article is a remarkable instance of prudence and forethought, and acts as the strongest safeguard against hasty measures, which in times of great excitement may sometimes obtain a majority that would afterwards be regretted by all parties. If the principle involved in any question is really felt to be of vital importance, the majority can dissolve the Union if they consider the object in view worth the sacrifice.

The salary of the Chief Justice is about 1050l. a-year. This court is, I believe, invariably composed of men of the highest talent and integrity; their appointment is from the President, and endorsed by the Senate, and their tenure of office is ”during good behaviour.”[CD] There has, fortunately, been no change in the manner or term of these appointments; but, in the different States, the democratic mania has removed the old landmarks of prudence bequeathed to them by their fathers. Mr. Tremenheere tells, that in 1833 only 5 States out of the 24 had adopted the principle of electing Judges, and appointing them for a term of years; in 1844, 12 States out of the 29 had adopted the principle; and in 1853, 22 out of the 31 States had come to the same resolution. We surely have in these facts a most important warning of the danger of introducing too much of the democratic element into the const.i.tution of any country. Reflect, if but for a moment, on the danger to the community, where the selection of the Judges of the land may be guided by political rancour or public clamour; the bare knowledge that such may be the case, even if the purity of the ma.s.ses be so great as not to admit of such sinister influence, the bare possibility, I say, is calculated to lower the respect in which it is most desirable the judiciary should ever be held,[CE] and to deter the most pure and high-minded citizens from offering their services. The salaries of the Judges range from 250l. to 400l. a-year.

The next point to which I would call attention, is to be found in Art.

I., sect. 6, of the Const.i.tution of the United States, the last clause of which runs thus:--”No person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office.” This was probably one of the most extraordinary blunders such an able body of men as the framers of the Const.i.tution ever made; and if their object was to guard against corruption, and the undue influence of the leading men of the country, it has most signally failed, as the Act before referred to, of February, 1853, fully testifies. Only conceive the effect of excluding all the Cabinet and high functionaries from seats in the Lords and Commons; conceive the great statesmen of this country being obliged to hand over the introduction of most important measures, and the defence and explanation of them, to other hands. On this point, Mr. Justice Story remarks: ”Thus, that open and public responsibility for measures, which properly belongs to the executive in all governments, especially in a republican government, as its greatest security and strength, is completely done away. The executive is compelled to resort to secret and unseen influence,--to private interviews and private arrangements,--to accomplish its own appropriate purposes, instead of proposing and sustaining its own duties and measures by a bold and manly appeal to the nation in the face of its representatives. One consequence of this state of things is, that there never can be traced home to the executive any responsibility for the measures which are planned and carried at its suggestion. Another consequence will be--if it has not yet been--that measures will be adopted or defeated by private intrigues, political combinations, irresponsible recommendations, by all the blandishments of office, and all the deadening weight of silent patronage; ... ministers may conceal or evade any expression of their opinions.”

In charity it should be presumed that in all nations which possess anything worthy of the name of free inst.i.tutions, the ablest men of the political majority const.i.tute the Cabinet; and, by the enactment we are considering, all this talent is excluded from the councils of the nation, whereas all the talent of the Opposition may be there arrayed against their measures. I confess it is beyond my penetration, to see how this can be reconciled to justice or common sense; in no one principle of their Government did they more completely ignore the wisdom and experience of the mother country, and in the object they had in view they appear to have most completely failed. It is but fair to the democrats to say it is no act of theirs; they inherited the misfortune, and are likely to keep it, as it is one of the fundamental principles of their Const.i.tution, and they have a salutary dread--much to their praise--of tinkering up any flaw they find in that doc.u.ment, lest in mending one hole they make two. They have, as a nation, so greatly prospered under its combined enactments, and possess such an unlimited independence in their individual States, that although the exclusion of the Cabinet is now very generally admitted to be an error, I saw no inclination to moot the question; probably, lest other questions affecting the slave and non-slave-holding States might be brought on the boards, and again disturb the bonds of union.

Another very remarkable--and in a Republic anomalous--feature in the government, is the power of the President, who, by the Const.i.tution, is enabled during his four years' tenure of office to rule in total opposition to the majority, obstructing all the measures they may bring forward, unless the majority amounts to two-thirds in both Houses of Congress.

Article I., section 7, clause 2, runs thus:--”Every bill which shall have pa.s.sed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approves, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to re-consider it. If after such re-consideration two-thirds of that House shall agree to pa.s.s the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be re-considered, and if approved by two-thirds of that House, it shall become a law,” &c.

This power of the President has been used by Was.h.i.+ngton, Jackson, Tyler, and Polk; particularly by Tyler, who opposed the wishes of the majority even when those wishes were backed by his own ministry. During the discussions on the Const.i.tution, many of the wisest heads at that eventful period desired to establish the Presidency for life, but eventually the term of four years was agreed upon; and if such powers of obstructing the wishes of a majority were to accompany the office, it certainly was a prudent conclusion they arrived at. In a densely populated community like Great Britain, such powers, whether in the hands of the sovereign or the ministers, would produce a revolution in much less time than four years. It may, however, be questioned, whether these powers are not productive of evil, by rendering necessary such frequent elections for the Presidency. On this point, Mr. Justice Story states: ”The inconvenience of such frequently recurring elections of the chief magistrate, by generating factions, combining intrigues, and agitating the public mind, seems not hitherto to have attracted as much attention, as it deserves.” And Chancellor Kent remarks, that ”the election of a supreme executive magistrate for a whole nation affects so many interests, addresses itself so strongly to popular pa.s.sions, and holds out such powerful temptations to ambition, that it necessarily becomes a strong trial to public virtue, and even hazardous to public tranquillity.”

There is another evil which attends these frequent elections of the chief magistrate--namely, the enormous patronage at his disposal, and the ma.s.s of jobbery and corruption to which the exercise of it almost invariably leads. Besides the appointment of nearly ever military, naval, civil, judicial, and revenue-collecting official--some of these subject, it is true to the approval of the Senate--Mr. Justice Story remarks, that with regard to inferior offices ”his patronage probably includes ninety-nine out of every hundred of the lucrative offices of the government.” His great rival in patronage is the Postmaster-General, who has power to appoint and remove all deputy-postmasters, which, as the number of post-offices is 22,688, amounts to something considerable.

This power was doubtless intended for the public good, and in order that incompetent or inefficient persons should be removed. To the honour of Was.h.i.+ngton, it is recorded that during his eight years' Presidency only nine removals took place. To President Jackson they are indebted, as I have before remarked, for the introduction of the present corrupt system. According to Justice Story, on his entering office he removed 233 _employes_; since then, the s...o...b..ll has been steadily increasing till the present moment; it has now reached an amount which it would require Mr. Babbage's machine to calculate. Who can doubt that such vast patronage, has far more influence in the selection of a President, than any personal qualification for the high and important post? Nothing could prove more clearly that such influences are paramount to all others than the last election. There were eight candidates on the democratic side, of whom General Pierce was not one; all the eight had their special friends, and each party was loth to lose the chance of patronage which their friend's election might reasonably lead them to hope for. Thus they fought so vigorously that there was no chance of any one having the requisite number of votes, i.e., a majority of the whole number polled.

The Convention being deputed by the different States to select from the candidates already in the field, how do they get out of the difficulty at the eleventh hour? They take upon themselves to nominate a candidate for the Presidential chair, who was not fettered by any particular followers, and from whom all parties hoped they would receive some share of the loaves and fishes as a reward for their support. The electors endorsed the new selection of the Convention, and General Pierce, lately commanding a brigade in the Mexican war, was elected by a most astounding majority. Scarcely any President was ever elected with such all-but unanimity, and the Press was equally undivided in its praises.

Every paper I read, in every place I pa.s.sed through, was full of the most unbounded eulogy. But mark the change a few months made. Before the end of the year, one-half of that Press, which had bespattered him with such fulsome adulation during the honeymoon of which his inauguration was the centre, were filling their columns with long and loud complaints, if not abuse. And what was the chief burden of their invective? It was the manner in which he distributed his patronage. In short, they were discontented with the share they received of the loaves and fishes, and thus the target of their adulation during the summer of hope, became the b.u.t.t for their abuse in the winter of disappointment.

There is another subject connected with these elections, which speaks with warning voice against the presumable advantage of democracy. I would not be misunderstood as casting the slightest reflection upon the amiable qualities, intellectual powers, or administrative talents of any American citizen who has been raised to the Presidency during later years. Let any candid reader, however, whether English or American, look at the following lists of Presidents since the Const.i.tution, and he cannot fail to observe that while the franchise was restricted in nearly every State, those called to that high post were the marked men of the highest talent in the country--men whose reputation and abilities were patent to the whole community; while, with the increase of democracy, those selected during later years are men who, whatever their virtues and capabilities, were comparatively unknown. In the case of General Franklin Pierce, he was never even named by the community; but, as we have shown, was selected by the Convention at the eleventh hour, as a compromise of political partisans.h.i.+p. Let us not forget, that while some of the later Presidents were elected, Calhoun, Clay, and Webster--whose names are the just pride of the Republic, and household words in every family--were pa.s.sed over.[CF] Surely these simple facts may afford us subject for profitable reflection.

We will now pa.s.s on from the Governor of the Republic to the Governors of individual States. Their salaries vary in different States, and range from 300l. to 2000l. a-year. Their election is in some States by the people, in others by the legislature: their term of office varies; in some States the election is annual, and in all for a very limited period; and under them each separate State has its own House of Representatives and its Senate. The chief power, which resides in the Governor alone, is that of pardon; and here we may observe, that it is only reasonable to suppose that so enlightened a community as the United States would not for any considerable number of years have tolerated the most flagrant abuse of such a power as that of pardon; and consequently that if it be found that such abuse do now exist, it must have grown with the ever-growing democratic element.

Mr. Tremenheere quotes largely from a work by Dr. Lieber, Professor of Political Philosophy in the State College of South Carolina. Among others of a similar character, the following pa.s.sage occurs:--”I consider the indiscriminate pardoning so frequent in many parts of the United States, one of the most hostile things, now at work in our country, to a perfect government of law.” He elsewhere states ”that the New York Committee had ascertained that there are men who make a regular trade of procuring pardons for convicts by which they support themselves.” Further on he says, ”To this statement we have now to add the still more appalling fact, which we would pa.s.s over in silence if our duty permitted it, that but a short time ago the Governor of a large State--a State among the foremost in prison discipline--was openly and widely accused of taking money for his pardons. We have it not in our power to state whether this be true or not, but it is obvious that a state of things which allows suspicions and charges so degrading and so ruinous to a healthy condition, ought not to be borne with.” He then subjoins this note:--”While these sheets are going through the press, the papers report that the Governor of a large State has pardoned thirty criminals, among whom were some of the worst characters, at one stroke, on leaving the gubernatorial chair.”--Among the conclusions Dr. Lieber draws on this point, is the following astounding one--”That the executive in our country is so situated that, in the ordinary course of things, it cannot be expected of him that he will resist the abuse; at least, that he will not resist it in many cases.”

The foregoing extracts are certainly ent.i.tled to no small weight when it is remembered they come from the pen of a republican professor, writing upon ”Civil Liberty and Self-government.” I do not pretend to say that such gross cases as those referred to by him came within my cognizance during my travels, but I most certainly did hear charges made against governors, in more than one instance, of granting pardons through corrupt influence.

I have now given a cursory review of the leading features in the executive of the United States; and I have endeavoured, while doing so, to point out the effects which the gradual inroads of the democratic element have produced. The subject is one of the deepest interest to us as Englishmen, inasmuch as it is the duty of every government to enlarge, as far as is consistent with the welfare of the nation, the liberty of the subject. The foregoing remarks on the const.i.tution of the United States appear to me conclusive as to one fact--viz., that the democratic element may be introduced so largely as that, despite a high standard of national education and worldly prosperity, its influence will produce the most pernicious effect upon the government of the country.