Part 6 (1/2)
CHAP. II.
As we have thus traced the situation of man from unbounded liberty to subordination, it will be proper to carry our inquiries farther, and to consider, who first obtained the pre-eminence in these _primoeval societies_, and by what particular methods it was obtained.
There were only two ways, by which such an event could have been produced, by _compulsion_ or _consent_. When mankind first saw the necessity of government, it is probable that many had conceived the desire of ruling. To be placed in a new situation, to be taken from the common herd, to be the first, distinguished among men, were thoughts, that must have had their charms. Let us suppose then, that these thoughts had worked so unusually on the pa.s.sions of any particular individual, as to have driven him to the extravagant design of obtaining the preeminence by force. How could his design have been accomplished?
How could he forcibly have usurped the jurisdiction at a time, when, all being equally free, there was not a single person, whose a.s.sistance he could command? Add to this, that, in a state of universal liberty, force had been repaid by force, and the attempt had been fatal to the usurper.
As _empire_ then could never have been gained at first by _compulsion_, so it could only have been obtained by _consent_; and as men were then going to make an important sacrifice, for the sake of their _mutual_ happiness, so he alone could have obtained it, (not whose _ambition_ had greatly distinguished him from the rest) but in whose _wisdom, justice, prudence_, and _virtue_, the whole community could confide.
To confirm this reasoning, we shall appeal, as before, to facts; and shall consult therefore the history of those nations, which having just left their former state of _independent society_, were the very people that established _subordination_ and _government_.
The commentaries of Caesar afford us the following accounts of the ancient Gauls. When any of their kings, either by death, or deposition, made a vacancy in the regal office, the whole nation was immediately convened for the appointment of a successor. In these national conventions were the regal offices conferred. Every individual had a voice on the occasion, and every individual was free. The person upon whom the general approbation appeared to fall, was immediately advanced to pre-eminence in the state. He was uniformly one, whose actions had made him eminent; whose conduct had gained him previous applause; whose valour the very a.s.sembly, that elected him, had themselves witnessed in the field; whose prudence, wisdom and justice, having rendered him signally serviceable, had endeared him to his tribe. For this reason, their kingdoms were not hereditary; the son did not always inherit the virtues of the sire; and they were determined that he alone should possess authority, in whose virtues they could confide. Nor was this all. So sensible were they of the important sacrifice they had made; so extremely jealous even of the name of superiority and power, that they limited, by a variety of laws, the authority of the very person, whom they had just elected, from a confidence of his integrity; Ambiorix himself confessing, ”that his people had as much power over him, as he could possibly have over his people.”
The same custom, as appears from Tacitus, prevailed also among the Germans. They had their national councils, like the Gauls; in which the regal and ducal offices were confirmed according to the majority of voices. They elected also, on these occasions, those only, whom their virtue, by repeated trial, had unequivocally distinguished from the rest; and they limited their authority so far, as neither to leave them the power of inflicting imprisonment or stripes, nor of exercising any penal jurisdiction. But as punishment was necessary in a state of civil society, ”it was permitted to the priests alone, that it might appear to have been inflicted, by the order of the G.o.ds, and not by any superiour authority in man.”
The accounts which we have thus given of the ancient Germans and Gauls, will be found also to be equally true of those people, which had arrived at the same state of subordinate society. We might appeal, for a testimony of this, to the history of the Goths; to the history of the Franks and Saxons; to, the history, in short, of all those nations, from which the different governments, now conspicuous in Europe, have undeniably sprung. And we might appeal, as a farther proof, to the Americans, who are represented by many of the moderns, from their own ocular testimony, as observing the same customs at the present day.
It remains only to observe, that as these customs prevailed among the different nations described, in their early state of subordinate society, and as they were moreover the customs of their respective ancestors, it appears that they must have been handed down, both by tradition and use, from the first introduction of _government_.
CHAP. III.
We may now deduce those general maxims concerning _subordination_, and _liberty_, which we mentioned to have been essentially connected with the subject, and which some, from speculation only, and without any allusion to facts, have been bold enough to deny.
It appears first, that _liberty_ is a _natural_, and _government_ an _advent.i.tious_ right, because all men were originally free.
It appears secondly, that government is a [042]_contract_ because, in these primeval subordinate societies, we have seen it voluntarily conferred on the one hand, and accepted on the other. We have seen it subject to various restrictions. We have seen its articles, which could then only be written by tradition and use, as perfect and binding as those, which are now committed to letters. We have seen it, in short, partaking of the _federal_ nature, as much as it could in a state, which wanted the means of recording its transactions.
It appear thirdly, that the grand object of the _contrast_, is the _happiness_ of the people; because they gave the supremacy to him alone, who had been conspicuous for the splendour of his abilities, or the integrity of his life: that the power of the mult.i.tude being directed by the _wisdom_ and _justice_ of the prince, they might experience the most effectual protection from injury, the highest advantages of society, the greatest possible _happiness_.
FOOTNOTES
[Footnote 042: The author has lately read a work, int.i.tled Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, which, in this one respect, favours those which have been hinted at, as it denies that government was a contract.
”No social compact was ever made in fact,”--”it is to suppose it possible to call savages out of caves and deserts, to deliberate upon topicks, which the experience and studies, and the refinements of civil life alone suggest. Therefore no government in the universe begun from this original.” But there are no grounds for so absurd a supposition; for government, and of course the social compact, does not appear to have been introduced at the time, when families coming out of their caves and deserts, or, in other words, quitting their former _dissociated_ state, joined themselves together. They had lived a considerable time in _society_, like the Lybians and Gaetulians before-mentioned, and had felt many of the disadvantages of a want of discipline and laws, before government was introduced at all. The author of this Essay, before he took into consideration the origin of government, was determined, in a matter of such importance, to be bia.s.sed by no opinion whatever, and much less to indulge himself in speculation. He was determined solely to adhere to fact, and, by looking into the accounts left us of those governments which were in their infancy, and, of course in the least complicated state, to attempt to discover their foundation: he cannot say therefore, that upon a very minute perusal of the excellent work before quoted, he has been so far convinced, as to retract in the least from his sentiments on this head, and to give up maxims, which are drawn from historical facts, for those, which are the result of speculation. He may observe here, that whether government was a _contract_ or not, it will not affect the reasoning of the present Essay; since where ever the contract is afterwards mentioned, it is inferred only that its object was ”the _happiness of the people_,” which is confessedly the end of government. Notwithstanding this, he is under the necessity of inserting this little note, though he almost feels himself ungrateful in contradicting a work, which has afforded him so much entertainment.]
CHAP. IV.
Having now collected the materials that are necessary for the prosecution of our design, we shall immediately enter upon the discussion.