Volume XI Part 7 (1/2)

_To the Second Question._

”Supposing the day appointed by the judgment for execution should lapse before such execution done, (which, however, the law will not presume,) we are all of opinion that a new time may be appointed for the execution, either by the High Court of Parliament, before which such peer shall have been attainted, or by the Court of King's Bench, the Parliament not then sitting: the record of the attainder being properly removed into that court.”

The reasons upon which the Judges founded their answer to the question relating to the further proceedings of the House after the High Steward's commission dissolved, which is usually done upon p.r.o.nouncing judgment, may possibly require some further discussion. I will, therefore, before I conclude, mention those which weighed with me, and, I believe, with many others of the Judges.

_Reasons, &c._

Every proceeding in the House of Peers, acting in its judicial capacity, whether upon writ of error, impeachment, or indictment, removed thither by _Certiorari_, is in judgment of law a proceeding before the King in Parliament; and therefore the House, in all those cases, may not improperly be styled the Court of our Lord the King in Parliament. This court is founded upon immemorial usage, upon the law and custom of Parliament, and is part of the original system of our Const.i.tution. It is open for all the purposes of judicature, during the continuance of the Parliament: it openeth at the beginning and shutteth at the end of every session: just as the Court of King's Bench, which, is likewise in judgment of law held before the King himself, openeth and shutteth with the term. The authority of this court, or, if I may use the expression, its constant activity for the ends of public justice, independent of any special powers derived from the Crown, is not doubted in the case of writs of error from those courts of law whence error lieth in Parliament, and of impeachments for misdemeanors.

It was formerly doubted, whether, in the case of an impeachment for treason, and in the case of an indictment against a peer for any capital crime, removed into Parliament by _Certiorari_, whether in these cases the court can proceed to trial and judgment without an High Steward appointed by special commission from the Crown. This doubt seemeth to have arisen from the not distinguis.h.i.+ng between a proceeding in the Court of the High Steward and that before the King in Parliament. The name, style, and t.i.tle of office is the same in both cases: but the office, the powers and preeminences annexed to it, differ very widely; and so doth the const.i.tution of the courts where the offices are executed. The ident.i.ty of the name may have confounded our ideas, as equivocal words often do, if the nature of things is not attended to; but the nature of the offices, properly stated, will, I hope, remove every doubt on these points.

In the Court of the High Steward, he alone is judge in all points of law and practice; the peers triers are merely judges of fact, and are summoned by virtue of a precept from the High Steward to appear before him on the day appointed by him for the trial, _ut rei veritas melius sciri poterit_. The High Steward's commission, after reciting that an indictment hath been found against the peer by the grand jury of the proper county, impowereth him to send for the indictment, to convene the prisoner before him at such day and place as he shall appoint, then and there to hear and determine the matter of such indictment; to cause the peers triers, _tot et tales, per quos rei veritas melius sciri poterit_, at the same day and place to appear before him; _veritateque inde comperta_, to proceed to judgment according to the law and custom of England, and thereupon to award execution.[82] By this it is plain that the sole right of judicature is in cases of this kind vested in the High Steward; that it resideth solely in his person; and consequently, without this commission, which is but in nature of a commission of Oyer and Terminer, no one step can be taken in order to a trial; and that when his commission is dissolved, which he declareth by breaking his staff, the court no longer existeth.

But in a trial of a peer in full Parliament, or, to speak with legal precision, before the King in Parliament, for a capital offence, whether upon impeachment or indictment, the case is quite otherwise. Every peer present at the trial (and every temporal peer hath a right to be present in every part of the proceeding) voteth upon every question of law and fact, and the question is carried by the major vote: the High Steward himself voting merely as a peer and member of that court, in common with the rest of the peers, and in no other right.

It hath, indeed, been usual, and very expedient it is, in point of order and regularity, and for the solemnity of the proceeding, to appoint an officer for presiding during the time of the trial, and until judgment, and to give him the style and t.i.tle of Steward of England: but this maketh no sort of alteration in the const.i.tution of the court; it is the same court, founded in immemorial usage, in the law and custom of Parliament, whether such appointment be made or not. It acteth in its judicial capacity in every order made touching the time and place of the trial, the postponing the trial from time to time upon pet.i.tion, according to the nature and circ.u.mstances of the case, the allowance or non-allowance of council to the prisoner, and other matters relative to the trial;[83] and all this before an High Steward hath been appointed.

And so little was it apprehended, in some cases which I shall mention presently, that the existence of the court depended on the appointment of an High Steward, that the court itself directed in what manner and by what form of words he should be appointed. It hath likewise received and recorded the prisoner's confession, which amounteth to a conviction, before the appointment of an High Steward; and hath allowed to prisoners the benefit of acts of general pardon, where they appeared ent.i.tled to it, as well without the appointment of an High Steward as after his commission dissolved. And when, in the case of impeachments, the Commons have sometimes, at conferences between the Houses, attempted to interpose in matters preparatory to the trial, the general answer hath been, ”This is a point of judicature upon which the Lords will not confer; they impose silence upon themselves,”--or to that effect. I need not here cite instances; every man who hath consulted the Journals of either House hath met with many of them.

I will now cite a few cases, applicable, in my opinion, to the present question. And I shall confine myself to such as have happened since the Restoration; because, in questions of this kind, modern cases, settled with deliberation, and upon a view of former precedents, give more light and satisfaction than the deepest search into antiquity can afford; and also because the prerogatives of the Crown, the privileges of Parliament, and the rights of the subject in general appear to me to have been more studied and better understood at and for some years before that period than in former ages.

In the case of the Earl of Danby and the Popish lords then under impeachments, the Lords,[84] on the 6th of May, 1679, appointed time and place for hearing the Earl of Danby, by his council, upon the validity of his plea of pardon, and for the trials of the other lords, and voted an address to his Majesty, praying that he would be pleased to appoint an High Steward for those purposes. These votes were, on the next day, communicated to the Commons by message in the usual manner. On the 8th, at a conference between the Houses upon the subject-matter of that message, the Commons expressed themselves to the following effect:--”They cannot apprehend what should induce your Lords.h.i.+ps to address his Majesty for an High Steward, for determining the validity of the pardon which hath been pleaded by the Earl of Danby, as also for the trial of the other five lords, because they conceive the const.i.tuting an High Steward is not necessary, but that judgment may be given in Parliament upon impeachment without an High Steward”; and concluded with a proposition, that, for avoiding any interruption or delay, a committee of both Houses might be nominated, to consider of the most proper ways and methods of proceeding. This proposition the House of Peers, after a long debate, rejected: _Dissentientibus_, Finch,[85] Chancellor, and many other lords. However, on the 11th, the Commons' proposition of the 8th was upon a second debate agreed to; and the Lord Chancellor, Lord President, and ten other lords, were named of the committee, to meet and confer with a committee of the Commons. The next day the Lord President reported, that the committees of both Houses met that morning, and made an entrance into the business referred to them: that the Commons desired to see the commissions that are prepared for an High Steward at these trials, and also the commissions in the Lord Pembroke's and the Lord Morley's cases: that to this the Lords' committees said,--”_The High Steward is but Speaker pro tempore, and giveth his vote as well as the other lords; this changeth not the nature of the court_; and the Lords declared, they have power enough to proceed to trial, though the King should not name an High Steward:[86] that this seemed to be a satisfaction to the Commons, provided it was entered in the Lords'

Journals, which are records.” Accordingly, on the same day, ”_It is declared and ordered by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament a.s.sembled, that the office of an High Steward, upon trials of peers upon impeachments, is not necessary to the House of Peers; but that the Lords may proceed in such trials, if an High Steward be not appointed according to their humble desire._”[87] On the 13th the Lord President reported, that the committees of both Houses had met that morning, and discoursed, in the first place, on the matter of a Lord High Steward, and had perused former commissions for the office of High Steward; and then, putting the House in mind of the order and resolution of the preceding day, proposed from the committees that a new commission might issue, so as the words in the commission may be thus changed: viz., Instead of, _Ac pro eo quod officium Seneschalli Angliae, (cujus praesentia in hac parte requiritur,) ut accepimus, jam vacat_, may be inserted, _Ac pro eo quod proceres et magnates in Parliamento nostro a.s.semblati n.o.bis humiliter supplicaverunt ut Seneschallum Angliae pro hac vice const.i.tuere dignaremur_: to which the House agreed.[88]

It must be admitted that precedents drawn from times of ferment and jealousy, as these were, lose much of their weight, since pa.s.sion and party prejudice generally mingle in the contest; yet let it be remembered, that these are resolutions in which both Houses concurred, and in which the rights of both were thought to be very nearly concerned,--the Commons' right of impeaching with effect, and the whole judicature of the Lords in capital cases. For, if the appointment of an High Steward was admitted to be of absolute necessity, (however necessary it may be for the regularity and solemnity of the proceeding during the trial and until judgment, which I do not dispute,) every impeachment may, for a reason too obvious to be mentioned, be rendered ineffectual, and the judicature of the Lords in all capital cases nugatory.

It was from a jealousy of this kind, not at that juncture altogether groundless, and to guard against everything from whence the necessity of an High Steward in the case of an impeachment might be inferred, that the Commons proposed and the Lords readily agreed to the amendment in the Steward's commission which I have already stated. And it hath, I confess, great weight with me, that this amendment, which was at the same time directed in the cases of the five Popish lords, when commissions should pa.s.s for their trials, hath taken place in every commission upon impeachments for treason since that time.[89] And I cannot help remarking, that in the case of Lord Lovat, when neither the heat of the times nor the jealousy of parties had any share in the proceeding, the House ordered, ”That the commission for appointing a Lord High Steward shall be in the like form as that for the trial of the Lord Viscount Stafford, as entered in the Journal of this House on the 30th of November, 1680: except that the same shall be in the English language.”[90]

I will make a short observation on this matter. The order, on the 13th of May, 1679, for varying the form of the commission, was, as appeareth by the Journal, plainly made in consequence of the resolution of the 12th, and was founded on it; and consequently the constant, unvarying practice with regard to the new form goeth, in my opinion, a great way towards showing, that, in the sense of all succeeding times, that resolution was not the result of faction or a blamable jealousy, but was founded in sound reason and true policy. It may be objected, that the resolution of the 12th of May, 1679, goeth no further than to a proceeding upon impeachment. The letter of the resolution, it is admitted, goeth no further. But this is easily accounted for: a proceeding by impeachment was the subject-matter of the conference, and the Commons had no pretence to interpose in any other. But what say the Lords? _The High Steward is but as a Speaker or Chairman pro tempore, for the more orderly proceeding at the trials; the appointment of him doth not alter the nature of the court, which still remaineth the Court of the Peers in Parliament._ From these premises they draw the conclusion I have mentioned. Are not these premises equally true in the case of a proceeding upon indictment? They undoubtedly are.

It must likewise be admitted, that in the proceeding upon indictment the High Steward's commission hath never varied from the ancient form in such cases. The words objected to by the Commons, _Ac pro eo quod officium Seneschalli Angliae, (cujus praesentia in hac parte requiritur,) ut accepimus, jam vacat_, are still retained; but this proveth no more than that the Great Seal, having no authority to vary in point of form, hath from time to time very prudently followed ancient precedents.

I have already stated the substance of the commission in a proceeding in the Court of the High Steward. I will now state the substance of that in a proceeding in the Court of the Peers in Parliament; and shall make use of that in the case of the Earl of Kilmarnock and others, as being the latest, and in point of form agreeing with the former precedents. The commission, after reciting that William, Earl of Kilmarnock, &c., stand indicted before commissioners of gaol-delivery in the County of Surrey, for high treason, in levying war against the King, and that the King intendeth that the said William, Earl of Kilmarnock, &c., shall be heard, examined, sentenced, and adjudged before himself, in this present Parliament, touching the said treason, and for that the office of Steward of Great Britain (whose presence is required upon this occasion) is now vacant, as we are informed, appointeth the then Lord Chancellor Steward of Great Britain, to bear, execute, and exercise (for this time) the said office, with all things due and belonging to the same office, in that behalf.

What, therefore, are the things due and belonging to the office in a case of this kind? Not, as in the Court of the High Steward, a right of judicature; for the commission itself supposeth that right to reside in a court then subsisting before the King in Parliament. The parties are to be there heard, sentenced, and adjudged. What share in the proceeding doth the High Steward, then, take? By the practice and usage of the Court of the Peers in Parliament, he giveth his vote as a member thereof, with the rest of the peers; but, for the sake of regularity and order, he presideth during the trial and until judgment, as Chairman or Speaker _pro tempore_. In that respect, therefore, it may be properly enough said, that his presence is required during the trial and until judgment, and in no other. Herein I see no difference between the case of an impeachment and of an indictment. I say, during the time of the trial and until judgment; because the court hath, as I observed before, from time to time done various acts, plainly judicial, before the appointment of an High Steward, and where no High Steward hath ever been appointed, and even after the commission dissolved. I will to this purpose cite a few cases.

I begin with the latest, because they are the latest, and were ruled with great deliberation, and for the most part upon a view of former precedents. In the case of the Earl of Kilmarnock and others, the Lords, on the 24th of June, 1746, ordered that a writ or writs of _Certiorari_ be issued for removing the indictments before the House; and on the 26th, the writ, which is made returnable before the King in Parliament, with the return and indictments, was received and read. On the next day, upon the report of the Lords' committees, that they had been attended by the two Chief-Justices and Chief-Baron, and had heard them touching the construction of the act of the 7th and 8th of King William, ”for regulating trials in cases of high treason and misprision of treason,”

the House, upon reading the report, came to several resolutions, founded for the most part on the construction of that act. What that construction was appeareth from the Lord High Steward's address to the prisoners just before their arraignment. Having mentioned that act as one happy consequence of the Revolution, he addeth,--”However injuriously that revolution hath been traduced, whatever attempts have been made to subvert this happy establishment founded on it, your Lords.h.i.+ps will now have the benefit of that law in its full extent.”

I need not, after this, mention any other judicial acts done by the House in this case, before the appointment of the High Steward: many there are. For the putting a construction upon an act relative to the conduct of the court and the right of the subject at the trial, and in the proceedings preparatory to it, and this in a case entirely new, and upon a point, to say no more in this place, not extremely clear, was undoubtedly an exercise of authority proper only for a court having full cognizance of the cause.

I will not minutely enumerate the several orders made preparatory to the trial of Lord Lovat, and in the several cases I shall have occasion to mention, touching the time and place of the trial, the allowance or non-allowance of council, and other matters of the like kind, all plainly judicial; because the like orders occur in all the cases where a journal of the preparatory steps hath been published by order of the Peers. With regard to Lord Lovat's case, I think the order directing the form of the High Steward's commission, which I have already taken notice of, is not very consistent with the idea of a court whose powers can be supposed to depend, at any point of time, upon the existence or dissolution of that commission.

In the case of the Earl of Derwent.w.a.ter and the other lords impeached at the same time, the House received and recorded the confessions of those of them who pleaded guilty, long before the _teste_ of the High Steward's commission, which issued merely for the solemnity of giving judgment against them upon their conviction. This appeareth by the commission itself. It reciteth, that the Earl of Derwent.w.a.ter and others, _coram n.o.bis in praesenti Parliamento_, had been impeached by the Commons for high treason, and had, _coram n.o.bis in praesenti Parliamento_, pleaded guilty to that impeachment; and that the King, intending that the said Earl of Derwent.w.a.ter and others, _de et pro proditione unde ipsi ut praefertur impet.i.t', accusat', et convict'